Examination of Witnesses (Questions 14520
- 14539)
14520. Chairman: But if you present figures
it gives any member of the Committee an opportunity to say, "Why
is that there?".
14521. Mr Kingston: We are very happy
to turn Mr Garratt over, if I can put it this way, on any of the
figures because they represent from the Petitioner's point of
view robust estimates, that is, these can be relied upon as not
overblowing the case in terms of what is required in rail freight
terms.
14522. Kelvin Hopkins: I am sorry I missed
the very beginning of your evidence, Mr Garratt, but the table
here talks about tonnages but it does not mention mileages. Tonne/miles
is a normal measure of volume of freight.
(Mr Garratt) I completely
agree. We can certainly provide for you columns of figures without
any difficulty. I was simply trying not to make this a lecture
on rail freight.
14523. Mr Kingston: Mr Garratt, we have
got your figure 1. Going on to figure 2, that is looking at London;
is that right?[30]
(Mr Garratt) Yes, that is right.
That is 2005.
14524. Let us have a look at the figures. Headlines
please from these figures.
(Mr Garratt) Yes. Of those
118 million tonnes we saw in the previous line 20 million tonnes
are to, from or through London, of which half are construction,
10 out of 20, and you can see if we look specifically at the traffic
to and from Greater London as opposed to through Greater London
7.6 out of 10.3, about three-quarters, are construction.
14525. In that context therefore how significant
in the broadest sense of customer is aggregates traffic for rail
freight capacity in London?
(Mr Garratt) Most important.
14526. In the same context the consequences
therefore of inadequacy of capacity with regard to knock-on effects
in terms of road transport?
(Mr Garratt) They would
be serious and, as we discussed before, would have environmental
impact.
14527. We ought then to move from those figures
with regard to the tonnages to what that might mean in train movements
and you have, I think, figures 4, 5 and 6 to help us with that.
This form of diagram may appear at least a little
familiar as something we saw earlier this afternoon, and now you
know the source of it.
(Mr Garratt) That is right.
14528. Mr Garratt, frankly it looks bewildering
presented in this form. Can you please give us the message from
this figure
(Mr Garratt) I apologise
for that. It is quite difficult to get across. The small numbers
you see on each of the different legs, the first number shows
the actual number of freight trains on average running along that
section of the track and the second number shows the maximum number
because there is clearly a variation during the week between average
and maximum. That, if you like, is the demand which the network
is trying to deal with. The colour coding is self-evident, it
conveys those routes that are busier than others. If we look to
the red line pointing off towards about 11 o'clock, that is the
West Coast Main Line, and as far as the Crossrail route is concerned
it is the green line to the left, if you like, coming in from
Berkshire through Central London. We see the red section in the
middle of London which is the North London Line and moving eastwards
towards, as it were, two o'clock the green line towards Ipswich.
14529. This figure, figure 4, is current rail
freight train movements in 2005, is that right?[31]
(Mr Garratt) Correct.
14530. The overall message, please, translating
the colours and the like?
(Mr Garratt) The overall
message is that this is a busy part of the railway network.
14531. Currently in 2005.
(Mr Garratt) Yes.
14532. Let us have figure 5.[32]
This is forecast to 2014, what has happened, please? What is the
difference?
(Mr Garratt) What you see here
is much more red. The colours begin to change as demand grows
particularly from the east and in the centre on the North London
Line.
14533. And number 6, please, the same question:
what has happened now we have moved to 2030?[33]
(Mr Garratt) It has got busier
and busier in all directions, particularly influenced by the increase
in maritime containers, and what we see is a London railway network
with very heavy rail freight demands.
14534. You have already told us what the consequences
of restricted capacity would be likely to be: restricted choice,
restricted competition and the potential, therefore, for less
rail use.
(Mr Garratt) Yes.
14535. Let us have figure 7 then, please.[34]
(Mr Garratt) What we saw before
was demand and this is current supply. These are the freight paths
currently available. We have only to see that some of the legs
which are red in the later years are no longer red so we can see
that demand is likely to exceed supply.
14536. Then figure 8, please.[35]
This is forecast path utilisation in 2030. What should we be looking
at here, Mr Garratt, in terms of what you want the Committee to
understand from your evidence?
(Mr Garratt) If we take, for
example, table one, the top line where we see an actual volume
of 49 trains, this is via Shenfield to reach the North London
Line at Stratford on the Great Eastern. We see 40 today growing
through 75 and 90 with only 53 paths available, so we see a high
level of utilisation, ie demand is 170% of supply and so on and
so forth.
14537. The same applies in the third table here
looking at the west of West Drayton, is that right?
(Mr Garratt) Table three
deals with Great Western and we see, using the same approach,
that utilisation would reach 98%.
14538. And the message from that, please?
(Mr Garratt) 98% is unrealistic.
It presumes every train runs on time, is there and available and
so forth, and the rail freight industry cannot work to that level
simply because demand, particularly on the aggregates side which
is largely Great Western, does vary day by day and week by week.
14539. Figure 9.[36]
This is forecast shortfall on paths along the network, busiest
day.
(Mr Garratt) This is assuming
that every path is used, which is a wildly optimistic view, and
even then comparing supply and demand for paths we see a shortfall
of paths in 2030. The colour coding is the same and the numbers
reflect the shortfalls.
30 Committee Ref: A166, Figure 2: London Freight Rail
Traffic-million tonnes 2005 (LINEWD-33005-003). Back
31
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 4: Current rail freight train movements
(2005) London (LINEWD-33005-005). Back
32
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 5: Rail freight train forecasts (2014)
London (LINEWD-33005-006). Back
33
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 6: Rail freight train forecasts (2030)
London (LINEWD-33005-007). Back
34
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 7: Existing freight paths (20058)
London (LINEWD-33005-008). Back
35
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 8: Forecast path utilisation 2030
(LINEWD-33005-009). Back
36
Committee Ref: A166, Figure 9: Forecast shortfall in paths along
Crossrail corridor (busiest day) (LINEWD-33005-010). Back
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