Examination of Witnesses (Questions 14760
- 14779)
14760. In your EWS 12 you produce a copy of
the Railtrack transfer scheme. If we go to page 32, schedule seven,
that is your contractual entitlement, is it not, to call down
the strategic freight sites?[31]
(Mr Smith) Yes. The rail freight
operators were privatised in expectation that strategic sites
would be available to us when we had a customer of rail freight
potential. Therefore we have the expectation that this land will
be available to us and continue to be available to us until called
down for rail freight purposes.
14761. What is the specific undertaking you
seek?
(Mr Smith) We want an undertaking
from the Promoter that EWS's leasehold interest in New Yard will
be replaced by an equivalent proprietary interest in West Yard.
That is the first requirement. Also, that the Promoter will also
provide to Network Rail for Network Rail to hold strategic freight
sites on behalf of EWS and the rest of the rail freight industry
a strategic freight site as a replacement site for Paddington
West Yard.
14762. EWS 9/9 is Bow Midland Yard West.[32]
(Mr Smith) This site we have
now moved from the Great Western Main Line to the Great Eastern
Main Line. It is very close to London. It is a busy aggregates
and concrete batching site. It is the only existing and continuing
rail freight yard that could be used for bringing building materials
for the Olympic facilities that are being built adjacent to it
for the 2012 Olympics. We understand that the Promoter's intent
is to use part of the site during construction for the storage
of tunnel segments and spoil from the excavation of the tunnel.
14763. Mr George: Can you see any reason
why the land should be in Schedule 6, that is for permanent taking?
(Mr Smith) There is no reason
whatsoever that the land should be in Schedule 6.
14764. Mr George: What is it that you
seek in respect of this land?
(Mr Smith) That the Bill
should be amended or the Promoter should be required to give the
Committee or the EWS an undertaking that the Promoter's powers
of compulsory acquisition are restricted, and this is a little
like Acton, the powers need to rearrange tenants on the site and
to revest the superior interest in EWS, and that the Promoter
has powers of temporary occupation only in relation to that parts
of the site required by the Promoter for construction purposes.
Again, to limit the limits in the Bill to just what the Promoter
needs rather than having a footprint over the entire site.
14765. Mr George: To the simplest of
them all, site 10, Bow Midland Yard East, is this site required
any longer by Crossrail? [33]
(Mr Smith) We understand that
it is not required by Crossrail, instead it will be used as a
warm-up track for the 2012 Olympics, and after the Olympics it
will be restored for rail freight use.
14766. Mr George: What undertaking do
you seek?
(Mr Smith) We consider the
Bill should be amended by the Committee to remove the land from
the Bill powers, or that the Promoter should give the Committee
or EWS an undertaking to the same effect.
14767. Mr George: The last site, Plumstead,
which is 9 of 11, EWS 9/11.[34]
Can you explain the position there?
(Mr Smith) Plumstead is a strategic
freight site, part of which is being called down for a customer
for the storage and distribution of aggregates. It is a site which
is being taken to Crossrail for the tunnel portal. The same argument
is applied to Paddington, which is if a site that the rail freight
industry might have been led to expect it could use at some point
for rail freight purposes is taken for a non-rail freight use,
then the Promoters should ensure that Network Rail has an alternative
site which the rail freight industry can draw down to use in the
future for rail freight business.
14768. Mr George: After that lengthy
traverse through your sites, I think you have got a concluding
comment?
(Mr Smith) I mentioned earlier
in several instances that our requirement is for alternative sites.
I have explained why our sites are vital to our business and our
operations and how our sites are not typical. They have particular
characteristics, in particular being adjacent to rail land. Just
being paid off does not work for us, we need land to continue
in business. If we do not have land, we do not have terminals,
and if we do not have terminals we do not have rail freight. If
we do not have existing rail freight then we do not have the potential
for rail freight growth. We believe that the Promoters and our
colleagues in the industry, Network Rail, do have sites adjacent
to the railway network. We have talked about North Pole, there
are other sites as well, and we are asking the Department for
Transport to engage with us about ensuring that once Crossrail
is constructed and settled that we have got land that we can use
for rail freight rather than just having compensation in the bank.
14769. Mr George: Now we turn to an entirely
different topic altogether, leaving aside conventional land issues,
to the question of capacity for freight. What is your concern?
(Mr Smith) There is not
sufficient capacity for freight on the routes that are being affected
by Crossrail. The Crossrail services will undermine freight activity
and will displace it from rail to road. The issue here is not
about existing rail services, it is also about freight growth.
It is about the amount of freight that we could anticipate operating
by 2015. We are aware that senior representatives from Crossrail
have expressed confidence that the Great Western Main Line will
be able to accommodate existing freight services, but that cannot
surely be what the debate must be about, it must be about the
potential for growth and it must be about being sure that there
is in place a timetable and infrastructure enhancement works which
are sufficient to provide for that freight growth in the future.
14770. Mr George: We have already looked
at EWS4 which showed freight growing.[35]
Is there anything further comment you want to make on that matter?
(Mr Smith) There we were talking
about tunnel kilometres, essentially the weight lifted by the
distance moved. I talked about the growth from 13 to 22 today,
up to 26 and beyond in 2015. In terms of capacity, these have
to be converted into trains and into piles. Our view is that by
2015 we will see at least a 30% increase in the need for piles
on the Great Western Main Line and 100% on the Great Eastern Main
Line, the latter because of the port developments in the increasing
use of the East Coast port to bring goods into this country. My
colleague from Freightliner will develop that point in detail.
14771. Mr George: Can we put up EWS13,
please.[36]
Can you briefly explain what we are seeing here?
(Mr Smith) This demonstrates
that the freight timetable is not like a passenger timetable that
you get from the station or from the railway bookshop. We run
our freight trains to meet our customers' particular requirements.
They may not run every day and they may not run one week to the
next because unlike the passenger railway, which will run its
train irrespective of whether there are passengers, passenger
services operate in anticipation of demand, freight services operate
in response to demand. This shows the different types of trains.
In this case, travelling eastbound from Reading into London, the
key is at the bottom, different colours for different commodities,
it shows the reporting identity of the train. On the left-hand-side
one equals Monday to Tuesday, and so forth, to show what days
the trains run. It is a very complex exercise fitting the freight
trains into the passenger service and vice versa, but what you
have there is a picture of how rail freight operates in one direction
on the Great Western Main Line.
14772. Mr George: We previously looked
at EWS2 and I do not think we need to put it up again, that shows
the quarries and the freight terminals at either end of the Great
Western, does it not?
(Mr Smith) Yes, and to reinforce
the point that the terminals and the locations which would be
affected by Crossrail are not just the receiving points within
London but also the source points in the West Country; Leicestershire
and Northamptonshire, these are terminals which will suffer if
our services are disrupted and we are unable to move stone and
other manufactured goods from outside of London into London and
vice versa.
14773. Mr George: What is the way forward
as you see it?
(Mr Smith) First of all,
the effect of this disruption has an environmental impact. This
environmental impact has not been assessed in the Environment
Statement. The Promoters believe that there is no impact on freight.
We are firmly of the view as the Bill currently stands that there
is an impact on freight and therefore there is an environmental
consequence. In order to make sure that Crossrail, freight and
of course all the other passenger services can co-exit there are
two solutions. One is to adjust the timetable so that there is
an interaction between freight, Crossrail and other passengers
services works and works effectively and, also, that there needs
to be works to enhance the infrastructure to create capacity so
that all users of the network can be accommodated.
14774. Mr George: Insofar as that first
suggestion which is to reduce the service, that is a matter which
was referred to in the report of the Timetable Working Party?
(Mr Smith) Yes, on page 29, item 7.[37]
Crossrail stated it would consider running fewer services in the
East, either terminating at Stratford, Maryland or running more
services to Abbeywood. We are not aware of whether that issue
is being considered or being considered seriously.
14775. Mr George: Is it something which
you think should be considered seriously?
(Mr Smith) It should because,
as we will come onto, the work of the Industry Timetable Working
Group is far from finished, many things remain unproven. It has
not yet demonstrated, and our colleagues from Network Rail indicated
this morning, that all the users of the network can be fitted
on either now or in 2015. Looking at service changes and service
patterns, it is one of the solutions which must be examined.
14776. Mr George: Can we come to the
Industry Timetable Working Group, the Chairman of which gave evidence
to the Committee last Tuesday on day 48.
(Mr Smith) The Working Group
was set up in response to concerns expressed by all parts of the
rail industry, freight passenger and Network Rail. The timetabling
which had until that time been done solely within the Crossrail
team was neither transparent nor accurate. The working Group was
set up. I suppose you might have thought given that this is an
extremely important part of proving works, it could have been
done earlier, but it was set up. There have been numerous meetings,
many of which had nothing to do with timetabling at all, it was
rather about the terms of reference. It has continued to meet
and the last meeting was on 22 May under what we understand were
extreme pressures to produce a report for consideration by this
Committee. Although they had hoped to continue to meet because
there are a number of issues unresolved there have been no further
meetings since 22 May. There is more work to be done, matters
of fundamental importance. The report that the Committee saw last
week can only be regarded as an interim report. It is only a statement
of where the Working Group has got to so far, highlighting issues
of concern and issues which need to be dealt with. Any suggestion
that this is a final report with all the solutions is unacceptable.
What was particular curious was that the independent Chairman
of the Committee, Robert Watson, for whom we have very high regard,
seems to be under the impression that his job is done, that he
is not required to lead the Industry Working Group and is not
required to follow-up on all these unresolved issues. I can only
presume that Robert is under a misapprehension because there is
still a significant amount of work to be done. Until we have got
this work done on both the Great Western and the Great Eastern,
it is impossible to say, particularly in 2015, that freight, Crossrail
and other passenger services can co-exist. It is difficult to
see how Mr Berryman can have reached the position as he told the
Committee last week that he has a level of confidence which he
would like to state as his complete confidence that we can achieve
the service we are talking about without disrupting the existing
services on the Great Western on either freight or passenger.
This is not yet proven for reasons we will come onto and it is
certainly not proven in respect of the position at the start of
the Crossrail services in 2015.
14777. Mr George: You have listed your
concerns in an exhibit EWS14, are those largely matters which
need further modelling and timetabling work to be done on?[38]
(Mr Smith) They are. They draw
together each of the concerns that we have relating to whether
the Working Group is looking at the maximum number of services,
whether it is looking at the final service pattern, whether the
timetable includes or excludes a freight ban during peak hours,
to what extent the process of taking one single hour on the Great
Western saying, "That is okay folks, that one works so therefore
all the others must do", is acceptable. As I demonstrated
earlier on with a colour graph, no one hour is the same, there
are different services to different originating and terminating
points.
14778. Mr Smith, for the convenience of the
Committee, I think items 1-10 are the same items on which I on
your company's behalf cross-examined Mr Watson last Tuesday, Day
18? Those were the 10 matters, 1-10?
(Mr Smith): That is correct.
Under issues relating to the relationship with an increased level
of passenger services specified by Transport for London; the modelling
of perturbation when the railway is not working 100%; can you
still run an effective and deliverable timetable; the issue relating
to capacity enhancements that we will come back to; and whether
planned improvements on alterative routes are sufficient to relieve
congestion on the Crossrail railway lines; whether the effect,
and I hesitate to mention this, but if the current plans were
changed, what impact that would have on the timetable; the whole
issue of engineering access, where this route, which should be
very intensively used, will need a lot of maintenance and renewal
and trains will need to be able to use the network at that time,
but will be squeezed from four lines into two or, perhaps in the
event of a total blockade, into alternative routes. All of these
things need to be dealt with by the Timetable Working Group. There
is a lot of detail; it is quite complicated; but it is doable.
14779. Can I bring you back to the position
of the West Coast Main Line. What happens there about timetabling?
(Mr Smith): I recall that
the West Coast Main Line was the subject of a lot of scrutiny
five or six years ago, with extensive plans by the passenger rail
industry to develop services, both high speed services and more
frequent services. The West Coast Main Line is also a route critical
to freight—as important as the Great Western and Great Eastern.
We appeared to have an impasse; we could not solve it. What happened?
The industry got together. All of the representatives of all of
the operators got together to work out a timetable in detail.
This was through cooperation, not compulsion. There were not Bill
powers; there were no instructions; there were no issues of interference
by anybody. We were just asked to get together and produce a timetable
that worked, and allowed passenger and freight interests to coexist,
and we did it. It took two years. It could have been quicker,
but it was done by the industry working together, not by instructions,
not by compulsion.
31 Committee Ref: A168, Railtrack Transfer Scheme,
Schedule Seven-Strategic Freight Sites (LINEWD-19605-042). Back
32
Committee Ref: A168, EWS Site 9-Bow Midland Yard West (LINEWD-19605-024). Back
33
Committee Ref: A168, EWS Site 10-Bow Midland Yard East (LINEWD-19605-025). Back
34
Committee Ref: A168, EWS Site 11-Plumstead (LINEWD-19605-026). Back
35
Committee Ref: A168, UK Rail Freight Volume Growth (LINEWD-19605-004). Back
36
Committee Ref: A168, Trains per day: Reading-London (LINEWD-19605-051). Back
37
Crossrail Ref: P106, Crossrail Timetable Working Group, Timetable
Alterations (LINEWD-GEN13-030). Back
38
Committee Ref: A168, List of unresolved issues with the timetable
for the only likely scenario: 2015including freight growth (LINEWD-19605-052
and -053). Back
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