Select Committee on Crossrail Bill Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 18960 - 18979)

  18960. Mr Thompson: I think, sir, we say that it is more important that you should think about this very carefully and we should pose the question because the scheme which you are being asked to endorse, we say, has not been worked up, has not been properly justified and may be the wrong one. If we can now move to modelling. Can we say something first about PEDROUTE? Is PEDROUTE a reliable modelling tool?

   (Mr Spencer) PEDROUTE is a means by which designers are able to test their designs during the evolution of a project. So it will tell you the pedestrian level of service, and it is very much a design tool that helps the architects and the engineers to perfect the design of the project. As the Select Committee knows only too well, there is another tool which is the use of software called Legion Dynamics, which provides a far more sophisticated appraisal of complex situations. It has to be the case that the scheme being brought forward for planning has to be subjected in detail to Legion analysis. The PEDROUTE analysis you have got at this point in time is a helpful design tool; to actually get to the bottom of the issues that need to be addressed there should be Legion modelling of these stations. It is an extremely complicated station, no less complicated than the Liverpool Street situation, where obviously Cross London Rail Links were happy to do the Legion analysis. We have not got the Legion analysis here.

  18961. Given that it is PEDROUTE that we have got, can you tell us what it does show about the congestion relief?

   (Mr Spencer) In 2016 I think it is completely inconclusive as to whether or not Crossrail makes the situation better or worse. As such, I do not think the analysis is particularly helpful for a variety of reasons. One is that there is not the quality of the design to appraise. As I said, you would expect it to reach Stage B. If you run a PEDROUTE on a RIBA Stage B design then you have got very little confidence that you would actually be able to build it. The PEDROUTE modelling that has been done, for some reason, excludes some of the problem areas with Bond Street Station. Bond Street has a sub-surface ticket hall. For a large number of people you actually get to that sub-surface ticket hall through a retail development. That retail development is a congestion problem but is actually not part of the PEDROUTE modelling. So you are left with a whole series of unanswered questions, likewise the access to Liverpool Street and subway underneath Oxford Street. Neither of those appear in modelling. So it is really only telling you about half the story at present, and I do not think you can reach conclusions on the basis of that. I would like to take a few points which do not necessarily flow from PEDROUTE but they are basically dealing with numbers. Numbers are important, and I know I cannot use too many of them, and I will only use three or four. Fundamentally, without Crossrail, about 20,000 passengers seek to leave LUL station in the am peak hour to go to street. With Crossrail this number reduces significantly from 20,300 to 17,200. That is, maybe, a 15 per cent reduction. It seems illogical to suggest that you need a new ticket hall in Oxford Street occupying a prime retail pitch when you are actually faced with the proposition that demand to go to street is significantly less with Crossrail than without Crossrail. There cannot be a case for provision of that ticket hall. Now, other aspects of the scheme, as indicated by what is for LUL and what is for Crossrail that appeared in the Minister's briefing note, undoubtedly some of those aspects are related to Crossrail, which are the issues on interchange and potentially providing new escalators, and Crossrail can be potentially picking that up, but for Crossrail to be building a new ticket hall when there is a reduction in the number of people that go to street because those people have transferred to Crossrail using the Dover Street ticket hall, clearly raises a number of questions about the proposal that has come forward. Significantly fewer passengers would be using the escalator system that I just talked to you about within the West One Centre. That is where the congestion is: those people that have moved to Crossrail. So it is completely missing the point to add capacity when problems have been solved by Crossrail in the first instance. Also, to be absolutely clear for the record, the demand forecasts show that absolutely no Crossrail passengers would attempt to reach street level by way of the LUL station complex. In other words, it is always assumed that they are given a fantastic route to street by Crossrail and they will all use it and that nobody would use the labyrinth of tunnels within the LUL station to leave Crossrail and go to street. I think it is an important point. So, really, there is no justification for an additional ticket hall facility at all on the back of the Crossrail project. Some of the numbers that have been produced I have looked at in some detail, and as an example the flows from Jubilee Line using the escalators where you gain an extra escalator, in the base situation the movement from the Jubilee up those escalators is identical with or without Crossrail—no change whatsoever. So quite clearly there cannot be a justification for providing additional escalators driven by Crossrail if the demand forecasts are saying they are the same. That is the case on the evidence that has been put forward. As I said, the fact that the West One retail centre has not been assessed as part of this analysis, in many respects we had actually looked at doing something in that centre as a means of solving the existing problems because the escalator vertical circulation is inadequate. That is not even a proposal in what is coming forward here; it is all about a new ticket hall for Crossrail, and that is a significant problem for us.

  18962. Mr Spencer, would it be helpful; we know the Promoters have handed us some PEDROUTE exhibits, just to have your take on those, about the position in 2016, so it is entirely clear?
  (Mr Spencer) Absolutely. I have severe reservations about any in-depth analysis of this work because it is so preliminary, but if we can have a couple of the examples. On page 2, there are four plots.[18] Can you zoom in?


  18963. Sir, I do not think you have seen this yet. The Promoters did provide us with some PEDROUTE examples and it may just be helpful to have Mr Spencer's take on it. What they do is they include some coloured PEDROUTE diagrams which tell us the position with and without Crossrail in 2016 plus 35 per cent. I just wanted to make sure that Mr Spencer indicated quite what his position was on this.
  (Mr Spencer) If we can move to the second page, I will only take an example. Can you zoom in either of the bottom ones? As ever, the overhead is of significantly less quality than the screens in front of you. This is the 2016 am peak PEDROUTE modelling and you will see there are locations within the station, particularly the escalators up from the Jubilee Line, where there is the yellow coding, which is a congested situation for periods of time within 15-minute periods. When you are looking at the escalators it is important to look at the fact that there is no crowding back off the escalators. Basically, the escalators are very busy but there are no queues to get on the escalators—or no significant queues—which means that it is pretty much a normal escalator in London Underground stations. You can see the bulk of the station platforms, both the Jubilee Line platforms and the Central Line platforms, are relatively uncongested. There are small amounts of green dotted around. I give very little weight to either interpreting these things in too much detail or relying on them, because of the lack of supporting information. If we move to the next page, if you can blow up the bottom one, I do not think it is at all helpful for me to speak too much about it, but this is a situation with the introduction of Crossrail without the congestion relief scheme.[19] On balance, you would say it is neutral. You could argue it is better or you could argue it is worse but I think you would be doing that within such a narrow confine it would be a pointless discussion. To all intents and purposes it is the same, as far as I can see. Clearly, as far as my proposition is concerned, to the limited extent I use this information, there is no compelling case that Crossrail is creating a far worsening of the situation that would lead you to conclude that Crossrail should be mitigating that problem.


  18964. Mr Spencer, you have given us a feel for your view on that and the position in 2016. Can you tell us what your position is on this plus 35 per cent scenario?[20]

  (Mr Spencer) Plus 35 is future-proofing and we have been through this in the Select Committee. It is a requirement of LUL, unless there are circumstances that dictate otherwise. You would do an analysis of plus 35 per cent on the demand forecasts, which essentially is saying this is what the view is of how the station will operate in 16 years' time—16-year future-proofing. You should never interpret it on the basis that, particularly in a situation like Bond Street which is a very stable location, it is suggesting that demand forecasts are wrong and that you should add 35 per cent to the demand forecast. It is not that proposition. It is entirely to do with future-proofing.

  18965. Chairman: Before you move on, Mr Thompson, the Committee is going to adjourn for five minutes.

  After a short break

  18966. Mr Thompson: If I can move on, Mr Spencer, I indicated in opening that you took the view that the design detail in this case was slightly impoverished—there was not a lot of it. Can we move on to that? We have confirmed, I think, the design provides not just for underground escalators but the full ticket hall on the site. Can you tell us a bit more about that? How detailed is the design?
  (Mr Spencer) The report is what it says; it is a Stage B report. The electronic copy that I received on Thursday was missing all of the plans. The only design drawing I have at my disposal at present is the axonometric—absolutely nothing else.[21] As you have seen outside, that axonometric has been translated into a physical model. There was a schedule in this report which purported to include a series of plans, which would have shown me the layout of the ticket hall and the intermediate concourse and platform levels, and so forth, but it was not supplied to me. So I do not know if it is an administrative error or that when this report was published those plans did not exist, certainly not in my electronic version of the report. What I am able to glean from this report is that the scheme is costed at £110 million at this stage of the project development, which is very early days, but I am also aware of the fact that in the AP documentation the financial consequence of incorporating this congestion relief scheme, I think, was £158 million, in terms of the net increase to the Crossrail budget, if these measures were incorporated through the Hybrid Bill. I take you back to some of the earlier scheme developments which were clearly schemes of £10 to £20 million, which were being looked at quite seriously a few years ago to address the critical congestion problems within Bond Street Station. I see this as being a project that is in a very early stage of development. The costs I have got are shown in the Stage B report, which was issued to us on 24 January of this year. The level of design information is clearly insufficient to properly consider the proposals in any level of detail with any confidence. Indeed, the report itself self-critically admits that this is a quick assessment with a minimal level of design that has not been fully detailed. That is as documented in the risk assessment of the Stage B report. So I can conclude from that that you can look at a very impressive model but you can have no confidence in the detail and deliverability and, really, what the final outcomes will be for the project because it has not been subjected to the full investigation, and has not had the amount of time put into it that would allow one to have confidence that it was truly deliverable.


  18967. Mr Spencer, can you remind the Committee what the estimated project costs are for this proposal, this congestion scheme?

   (Mr Spencer) In here it is £110 million but in the AP3—I cannot remember what the document is called -

  18968. It is the departmental memorandum on the promotion.

   (Mr Spencer) That quotes a figure of £158 million. What I have no idea about is what the year is for the costing. You are quite likely to find that 158 is an inflated version of 110 to take account of when the expenditure would occur, but—

  18969. Relatively speaking, this is not a minor add-on; this is a substantial piece of work in financial terms, not just in physical terms.

   (Mr Spencer) Absolutely. It is an enormous investment.

  18970. With the complexities that that infers.

   (Mr Spencer) Absolutely the case, and it needs to be subjected to not just capacity appraisals, it has to be subjected to an entire economic appraisal, and there is no evidence of that appraisal being undertaken for a scheme of this cost. That inflation does not appear anywhere.

  18971. Sir, if it helps, we will not be much longer; we are coming towards the close of this. I think you want to say something about the demand forecasting, and whether it is intuitive.

   (Mr Spencer) Yes. I have looked at the demand forecasts and some of the forecasts do concern me and do appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive, such that more people use the Jubilee Line to get to the local area because you have built Crossrail, which does not seem to make sense. They are not using Crossrail, so why should there be more simply because you have built a new railway? Those kinds of things are actually feeding through at this stage, because the driver for the congestion relief in the case of Crossrail is because they are saying there are more people in there, but in reality I am not at all certain that the demand forecasts do stack up. A lot more work would need to be done to ensure that the demand forecasts make sense and then you would use those as a basis for the detailed capacity assessment, which would be by way of Legion analysis.

  18972. Just before we leave the question of design detail, I said something in opening about this being a rather special site. Did you want to endorse that?

   (Mr Spencer) The ticket hall location?

  18973. In Oxford Street.

   (Mr Spencer) Absolutely. Oxford Street is an international shopping centre of world renown. The quality of the retail end, the commerciality of the retail, in terms of rental—I am no expert on this but I am pretty certain—is about the most expensive in the world.

  18974. I do not think this is in dispute but the reason I ask you to turn to this is the fact that in the London Plan it is a conservation area. In your experience as an engineer, not as a planner or whatever, does this suggest to you that you would expect quite a lot of design work here?

   (Mr Spencer) It would be an extremely complicated project to take through the full design process. There are so many possibilities. The risk assessment is quite clear; they are saying: "We just have not got enough information to properly understand how we are going to build this thing because we have done it too quickly and the information is not sufficient." It does not surprise me in the slightest.

  18975. If we then move on to look at what sort of design work could be undertaken and what alternatives you might expect to emerge. Can you tell us something about that?

   (Mr Spencer) There are certainly opportunities to improve matters within the existing West One complex substantially, which I personally would take to be a major problem within the interchange at present.

  18976. That is on the south side of Oxford Street, as opposed to our site which is the north side.

   (Mr Spencer) Absolutely. I absolutely 100 per cent support the principle of the stations being made to be DDA compliant. Basically that responsibility would very firmly rest on LUL. It is not as though they can avoid that because the works to the LUL station by Crossrail in effect would trigger the requirement for the station to become DDA compliant. This is a very serious matter for London Underground. It is going through that process where there is a physical intervention that they would then say triggers automatically the need to make the station DDA compliant or MIP access compliant and no doubt there are dozens of ways that that can be done without using my client's site.

  18977. Thank you. If we can then just conclude, can I have my exhibit 5 again, which is the headline summary of Mr Spencer's preliminary findings.[22] I just want you to have a look at this, Mr Spencer, and make sure that we have not misrepresented your position. I read it to the Committee earlier. Are you happy with that?

  (Mr Spencer) The first point is recognised by the designers themselves. There is no documentation of optioneering, so it is impossible for me to conclude anything on what has been assessed because I have no knowledge of it. In a planning situation you would have to very clearly set out the options that have been considered before a planning inspector would give you consent for a complex scheme. I certainly do not think the modelling is at all conclusive and it is not pointing towards there being a problem induced by Crossrail. I totally agree with the proposition that there is no evidence that Crossrail makes it materially worse.

  18978. Can we sum up? In your opinion, does the Select Committee have sufficient information available to it to determine the propriety of taking our client's property and spending in excess of 100 million on this proposed scheme?

   (Mr Spencer) It is absolutely clear to me that the Committee does not have sufficient information in front of it to be able to reach that decision with any certainty.

  18979. Is there anything you would like to add, Mr Spencer?

   (Mr Spencer) Responding to the Chairman, London Underground are doing an enormous amount of work in upgrading the Tube system in London, partly in preparation of 2012 but partly because the much-maligned PPP is actually beginning to deliver projects on the ground now. There is an enormous amount of work to be done and LUL is in a position to deliver this, and that is their role. They have got very precise objectives in terms of safety and accessibility and in terms of consultation procedures and design qualification, making sure they get it right. I think this Select Committee can rest assured there will be a congestion relief scheme brought forward for Bond Street, I think you can be certain of that. What you cannot be certain of is if they became the drivers of this project whether it would be the same project that you are being asked to give, in effect, planning consent to.


18   Crossrail Ref: P137, PEDROUTE Existing Station No Crossrail-2016 Base AM (WESTCC-AP3-49-04-003). Back

19   Crossrail Ref: P137, PEDROUTE Existing Station with Crossrail-2016 Base AM (WESTCC-AP3-49-04-004). Back

20   Crossrail Ref: P137, PEDROUTE Existing Station with Crossrail-2016 Base AM+35% Demand (WESTCC-AP3-49-04-013). Back

21   Crossrail Ref: P137, Crossrail Amendment of Provisions Environmental Statement (AP3), Bond Street Station, Amendment of Provisions-Axonometric (LINEWD-AP3-49-04-001). Back

22   Committee Ref: A216, Headline Summary of Tim Spencer's Preliminary Findings (WESTCC-AP3-49-05-005). Back


 
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