Introduction
1. The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Select Committee's (HCDC) report on the UK operations in Afghanistan.
2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) joins the Committee
in recognising the scale of the challenge in Afghanistan. The
country has come a long way since the overthrow of the Taliban
regime but the size of the challenge was, and remains, vast. As
the Committee highlights in its report, Afghanistan is one of
the poorest countries in the world; with weak government authority
outside the capital, limited infrastructure, and where educating
women used to be a criminal offence. The Secretary of State and
other government officials have always made clear that addressing
these problems will take a number of years.
3. Yet despite the scale of the challenge, real progress
is being made, bringing tangible changes to the lives of ordinary
Afghans. Seven million children are now in school and there are
ten universities operating around the country, against one (barely
functioning) under the Taliban. 83% of the population now
has access to medical facilities, compared to 9% in 2004. In addition,
4.8m Afghan refugees have returned to their homeland, safe from
the oppression they suffered under the Taliban. Significant progress
is also being made at a Provincial level. In Helmand alone, the
Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team has implemented over 150
projects, often with engineering support from the military. Examples
include the building, extending or refurbishing of 12 schools,
the construction of three new parks including a women's park,
6 projects improving local healthcare facilities including the
construction of a twenty-room midwifery hostel, and 5 projects
improving the rivers and irrigation canals that enable local farmers
to earn a living. While there is much still to do, the International
Community is making good progress in helping Afghanistan recover
from decades of civil war and Taliban rule.
4. We are grateful to the Committee for recognising
the efforts made by the MoD to increase the number of UK Forces,
the firepower they have at their disposal, and the selection of
vehicles available to Commanders in theatre. Protecting our troops
is paramount and although it is impossible to protect them from
every eventuality, we do as much possible to provide the best
protection we can. We also welcome the Committee's recognition
of the increase in the number of helicopters that the MoD has
provided since the initial deployment in 2006. We keep our force
package in Afghanistan under continual review to ensure that commanders
have all that they need to achieve the ISAF mission.
5. We note the Committee's concern about the difficulties
NATO is experiencing in providing resources to meet the shortfalls
in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). It is
the MoD's belief that NATO Allies should do more to meet the shortfalls
in requirements. The UK continues to emphasise to Allies the importance
of providing more in terms of military and non-military resources
but we have also accepted that if more is required in the demanding
environment of the South and East, there are only a small number
of nations that have the military capability to do more in those
areas. Equally the UK does not underestimate the importance of
Allies' continuing contributions in the North, West and Capital
regions where the relatively good security situation needs to
be maintained and exploited.
6. The MoD would like to address a number of the
conclusions and recommendations made by the Committee. In particular,
we do not believe that the International Community's counter-narcotics
policy lacks 'clarity and coherence'. Detailed responses to a
number of the Committee's conclusions are set out below.
7. Finally, the MoD would like to join the Committee
in paying tribute to those Service people who have lost their
lives or suffered injury in Afghanistan. Our sympathies are extended
to all of their families and friends.
Afghanistan has experienced 30 years of strife.
In the short term, ISAF's primary purpose is to secure stability
and deny the Taliban and Al Qaeda the environment in which to
operate. In the longer term, it will require a sustained military
and financial commitment by the international community, working
with the Government of Afghanistan, to create the environment
in which enduring democratic institutions can be established.
If that commitment is to succeed, its size and strength must be
very great, and in our view considerably greater than the international
community is at present willing to acknowledge, let alone to make.
(Paragraph 24)
8. We share the Committee's view of the long-term
nature of the commitment. The British Ambassador to Afghanistan
has said that the UK and international effort in Afghanistan will
last for decades. We are determined that Afghanistan should not
be allowed to become a failed state again. Additional military
and financial support from the International Community would always
be welcome; we can never have too much. Yet as alluded to above,
real progress is being made with the current resources and as
the work of the International Community continues to bear fruit,
the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) increases
and the Afghan Government begins to take greater responsibility
for its own affairs, the shape of the support provided by the
International Community will change to reflect the differing circumstances.
We are under no illusion about the amount of time it will take
to address all of these problems, but we are confident that success
can be achieved.
Coordinating the international effort in Afghanistan
is a huge task. The Government should encourage the United Nations
to work towards the appointment of a high-profile and authoritative
individual with responsibility for coordinating the international
effort in support of the Government of Afghanistan. (Paragraph
30)
9. We entirely agree that ensuring a co-ordinated
international effort in Afghanistan is both vital and a significant
challenge. The United Nations has a key role to play in bringing
true coherence to the international community's efforts in Afghanistan.
Both the Secretary of State and colleagues in the FCO regularly
raise this with interlocutors including the UN Secretary General.
While we note the assertion made by the MoD that
the Taliban does not present a "strategic threat" to
security in Afghanistan, we are concerned at reports that violence
is increasing and spreading to the relatively peaceful Kabul and
the Northern Provinces. We are also concerned about the increased
use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 35)
10. We share the Committee's concerns over reports
of increased levels of violence in certain provinces of Afghanistan,
and the trend towards more asymmetric methods of warfare. The
increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide
bombings is of concern, both to NATO and to the Afghan Government,
but it will only serve to turn the local population against the
Taliban, since it is they who invariably suffer as a result of
such tactics. Indeed, a reliance on asymmetric tactics was to
some extent an inevitable reaction to the inability to face NATO
and Afghan forces in combat and to a steady stream of losses at
all levels of the Taliban command structure. ISAF continues to
adapt to the threats posed by the insurgents, utilising the expertise
of its counter-IED cell and training ANSF in how to recognise
and react to suicide bombers. It remains our assessment that the
Taliban does not present a strategic threat to security in Afghanistan.
We regret the number of civilians killed as a
result of military activity in Afghanistan. Our Forces try their
utmost to minimise civilian casualties on operations and it is
to be hoped that the introduction of precision weapons such as
the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System should help minimise
civilian casualties further. Every life lost is a tragedy, causing
misery to families and destruction to communities. Moreover, civilian
casualties undermine support for ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan
and fuel the insurgency, further endangering our troops and the
objectives of their mission. (Paragraph 38)
11. We are grateful to the Committee for highlighting
the extensive effort made by our Forces to minimise civilian casualties.
The loss of innocent lives is a tragedy and ISAF and coalition
forces seek at all times to avoid civilian casualties. Our targeting
process, weapons selection, doctrine, training and rules of engagement
are all designed with this as a priority. Civilian casualties
are, however, made more likely by the tactics of the Taliban.
The deliberate use of suicide bombs, mounting attacks from amongst
civilians and the use of public buildings such as schools, hospitals
and mosques as bases actively seeks to place civilians in danger.
While we note the progress that has been made
in reducing national caveats, we remain concerned that national
caveats risk impairing the effectiveness of the ISAF mission.
The Government should continue to press ISAF partners to reduce
further the restrictions placed on the use of their Forces. (Paragraph
45)
12. We will continue to work with our ISAF partners
to ensure that national caveats are kept to a minimum and do not
impinge upon ISAF's operational effectiveness. The nations
deployed alongside us in the South well understand the challenging
operational environment there, and the need for few caveats and
appropriate rules of engagement.
Despite the Secretary of State's assurances, we
remain deeply concerned that the reluctance of some NATO members
to provide troops for the ISAF mission is undermining NATO's credibility
and also ISAF operations. In response to our report, the Government
should explain its strategy for engaging other NATO Governments
in addressing the deficit in the CJSOR. (Paragraph 49)
13. The MoD concurs with the Committee's assessment
that NATO Allies should do more to meet the shortfalls in the
CJSOR. NATO Allies have made a collective commitment to Afghanistan;
they must live up to it. Over the past twelve months we have seen
substantial additional contributions from the US, Poland and Australia
in addition to important further contributions from a number of
other countries such as France, Germany and Canada. We continue
to urge other nations in bilateral meetings and international
fora to keep Afghanistan at the forefront of discussions.
14. The UK continues to engage other nations on the
political and military fronts, to emphasise the importance of
providing additional contributions to the ISAF mission. Every
Ally has to judge its ability to contribute against the capabilities
it has available, the domestic political background and its existing
engagement in Afghanistan. It is impossible to say to what extent
further contributions, such as those announced at the NATO summit
in Seville, are a result of the lobbying efforts of the UK and
other ISAF Allies. But it is important to remember that our military
involvement in Afghanistan is only part of a much broader effort.
We must take advantage of the security and stability our forces
bring to rebuild Afghanistan. Many countries made very generous
pledges at the London Conference and more recently at the Rule
of Law Conference in Rome, and we are working to help ensure those
pledges are converted to real improvements to the lives of the
Afghan people.
The MoD, in consultation with NATO colleagues,
should consider the feasibility of extending the operational tours
of key personnel. This would allow sufficient time to build and
maintain relationships with Afghans and other key figures in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 51)
15. The MoD recognises the value of extended tour
lengths for key personnel and has implemented such a policy where
appropriate. For instance, General David Richards the former COMISAF
did nine months in post, precisely for reasons of continuity and
relationship building. Major General Page is currently serving
nine months as Commander Regional Command South for the same reasons.
However, we must be cognisant of the effects that extended tour
lengths have on the welfare of individuals and their families.
We note the widespread concerns about the Afghan
National Police reform programme. Police failure and corruption
alienate support for the Government of Afghanistan and add to
grievances which fuel the insurgency. The formation of a well-trained
and disciplined ANP is vital to the long-term security of the
country. The Government should work to create a greater coherence
to the international effort to establish an effective ANP. (Paragraph
61)
16. Reform and development of the Police in a post-conflict
environment is always difficult and invariably more challenging
than developing Armed forces. There are a number of reasons for
this but simply put an Army serves the state; the police serve
the law. Generating that ethos in societies for whom the police
force has been little more than a body for keeping local order
requires a host of different strands of development. Policing
is complex in concept and complex in implementation. By
comparison, whilst security is also often complex in implementation,
it is much simpler in principle.
17. In recognition of this, HMG has committed to
providing 10% of the EUPOL policing mission, including key positions
such as the Deputy Head of Mission and the Head of Mentors. The
EUPOL mission draws together many donor nations into a single
structure with the aim of delivering additional quality and better
co-ordination in relation to the training and development of the
Afghan National Police (ANP). The Government is also working very
closely with the US, including through a policing experts visit
to CENTCOM and Washington in July. We will continue to work closely
with them in-country through engagement on the International Police
Co-ordination Board, which brings together the EUPOL and Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) missions. We
also have regular bilateral contact with the CSTC-A Police Development
Programme, and intend to provide additional civilian expert personnel
to further reinforce international co-operation in improving the
effectiveness of the ANP.
18. In Helmand the UK is currently providing two
Police Mentor Teams and will provide a further six with the deployment
of 24 Royal Military Police personnel. These will be supplemented
by a further three specialist civilian police mentors.
The MoD should, in its response to this report,
clarify the purpose of the Auxiliary Police in Southern Afghanistan
and provide detail about how its members are recruited. (Paragraph
62)
19. The purpose of the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police is to provide additional static policing functions such
as guarding for checkpoint operations to enable the Afghan National
Police to focus on other elements of law enforcement. The Afghan
National Auxiliary Police is a temporary force and its members
are on one-year rolling contracts. Recruitment processes are the
same as for the Afghan National Police and applicants are subject
to screening through the Combined Strategic Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A) programme in the same manner as the Afghan National Police.
The Government should press the international
community to give greater emphasis to the judicial reform programme.
This should include measures to address alleged corruption in
all areas of society. (Paragraph 65)
20. The Government works closely with the Afghan
government to promote judicial reform. The establishment of the
counter-narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) is an example
of the work that has been carried out to date. Following on from
the Rome Rule of Law Conference on 2-3 July 2007, we are assisting
the Afghan government and other donors in the drafting of a justice
sector strategy and the setting up of a national priority programme
for justice. Anti-corruption measures are factored into all of
our programmes. HMG also intends to deploy anti-corruption specialists
as part of our support to law enforcement in Afghanistan. We continue
to make representations at the highest levels on the importance
of visible action against corruption.
Improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan
is of vital importance to both countries and the wider region.
We note the recent move towards increased cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and call on the UK Government to continue
to encourage dialogue between the two countries. (Paragraph 70)
21. We agree with the Committee on the vital importance
of good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We will continue
to encourage such relations, both bilaterally and through international
fora. As the Committee's Report notes, relations between both
countries have improved in recent weeks, and we welcome the outcome
of the Joint Peace Jirga held in Kabul on 9-12 August, whilst
recognising that it is only one step in the process. In this context,
we are pleased that the Jirga agreed on regular meetings, which
will form part of an enhanced and more formalised bilateral dialogue.
The Government will support this process, and complementary steps
taken by the G8 and by Turkey with both countries, in any way
it can.
We note the role Iran has taken in undertaking
development work in Western Afghanistan and welcome Iran's pledge
to check the flow of narcotics across its border with Afghanistan.
We also note with concern reports that explosives originating
from Iran have been used by insurgents in Afghanistan. This underlines
the urgent necessity for the West, particularly the US and UK,
to foster constructive dialogue, and to build confidence in relationships,
with as many parts of the Iranian Government and its offshoots
as possible. (Paragraph 75)
22. Iran has publicly expressed its support for stability
in Afghanistan and it is in Iran's interest to work with the Government
of Afghanistan and the rest of the international community in
supporting efforts against the Taliban. Nevertheless, we have
concerns that elements of the Iranian regime are pursuing a policy
of supporting a range of parties and interests in Afghanistan
including the provision of support to the Taliban. We have made
it clear that any Iranian links to illegal armed groups such as
the Taliban, either through supply of munitions, training or funding,
would be completely unacceptable.
The UK's mission to bring stability to Helmand
will require a long-term military and humanitarian commitment
if it is to be successful. We recommend that the Government clarify
its planning assumptions for the UK deployment to Afghanistan
and state the likely length of the deployment beyond the summer
of 2009. (Paragraph 89)
23. We share the Committee's assessment of the long-term
nature of the mission. The UK is completely committed to a better
and more stable future for Afghanistan which will entail the provision
of diplomatic, military, development/reconstruction and financial
support beyond 2009. The scale and duration of that commitment
will evolve as we continue to make progress and as the Afghan
Government takes even greater responsibility for its own affairs.
Therefore we will not speculate on the shape that our future commitment
will take.
The Platoon Houses in Northern Helmand were established
at the request of the then Governor of Helmand Province—in
other words at the request of the civilian power. The long-term
military consequence of this strategy is unclear. (Paragraph101)
24. The NATO led ISAF has deployed to Afghanistan
at the request of a legitimate civilian authority, the Government
of Afghanistan. We should remember that before UK troops came
to Helmand, areas such as Sangin were beyond the control of the
Afghan government. The establishment of platoon houses in Northern
Helmand helped establish the authority of the Helmand governor
and began to create the security conditions in which development
is occurring, in line with the Afghan Development Zones concept.
While we welcome the additional commitment of
helicopters since the initial deployment in 2006, we recommend
that the MoD make even greater efforts to increase the provision
of appropriate helicopters to UK Forces and sufficient trained
air and ground crew. UK helicopter operations in Afghanistan are
not sustainable at the present intensity. (Paragraph 116)
25. The MoD acknowledges that our helicopters fleet
is working hard and we continue to keep our helicopter requirements
under review to ensure that we have sufficient helicopter support
to meet current and anticipated tasks. We have allocated additional
flying hours and are working hard to generate more. More helicopters
were deployed in September and October 2006, with further Sea
Kings deploying this October. UK troops in the South also have
access to a significant number of other helicopters provided by
our Allies in the ISAF mission.
26. As the Committee acknowledged, in March this
year, we agreed to buy new Merlin helicopters, which will be available
within a year, and to convert existing Chinook Mark 3 helicopters
currently estimated to be available to operations in two years.
The complete package will cost around £230 million.
The MoD acknowledges that reconstruction and development,
rather than military power alone, is the key to winning Afghan
hearts and minds in Helmand. After a slow start, it seems that
coordination between the military and government departments has
improved and development work has begun. The people of Helmand
will need to see tangible improvements soon or else ISAF and the
UK will lose support for the mission. (Paragraph 127)
27. The Committee is correct to recognise the increased
coordination between government departments in the PRT (now referred
to as the Helmand Executive Group (HEG)) in Helmand. This has
translated into an acceleration in the pace of development projects
in the province with over 150 projects either in progress or having
been completed. Examples include the building, extending or refurbishing
of 12 schools, the construction of three new parks including a
women's park, 6 projects improving local healthcare facilities
including the construction of a twenty-room midwifery hostel,
and 5 projects improving the rivers and irrigation canals that
enable local farmers to earn a living. The HEG will continue to
engage with locals in a bid to identify and implement projects
that will make the most difference to the lives of the Helmand
community
The consent of the people living in Helmand province
will not be gained through the deployment of superior military
force alone. Once security has been established, it is vital that
development projects follow swiftly. The military has provided
much needed immediate reconstruction in Helmand. A balance has
to be struck between quick impact reconstruction provided by the
military and longer-term development best delivered by Government
and NGOs in close cooperation with Afghans. Projects such as the
ambitious Kajaki dam project will, in time, create jobs and demonstrate
to Afghans the commitment of the international community; however,
the Government should also ensure that smaller-scale projects
are undertaken which involve Afghans closely in their design and
construction. (Paragraph 132)
28. Once again, we agree with the Committee's conclusion
that the consent of the people living in Helmand province will
not be gained through military force alone. It is for this reason
that Development and Influence Teams deployed immediately after
major operations to engage with local leaders and establish local
priorities for development projects. Development work, focused
on improvements over the long term, and stabilisation activities
which deliver immediate benefits for the people of Helmand, are
both essential to progress in the region. There is indeed a need
to strike a balance between Quick Impact Projects and longer-term
development. In addition to the QIPs projects described above,
DfID is working with the Government of Afghanistan to initiate
longer- term development in Helmand, by implementing the
Government's National Programmes in Helmand, committing £30
million from 2006-09 to support this. This includes
funding for the construction of roads and wells, the creation
of Community Development Councils to identify and implement priority
development projects at a community level, and funding for the
provision of small loans to support licit enterprise. All of these
activities help to create local jobs, and demonstrate the commitment
of the Government of Afghanistan to stabilising and improving
conditions in Helmand, supported by the international community.
29. As the Committee has noted, it is important that
we cooperate closely with the Afghan government and civil
society in implementing development and stabilisation activities.
DFID has ensured that all of its interventions
have been in close consultation with the Afghan government and
civil society at the provincial level and increasingly with an
Afghan lead, including in the design and construction stages.
This approach has demonstrated to local communities
that their Government can deliver improved basic services
and demonstrated the longer-term commitment of the international
community.
The Government should continue to support the
Government of Afghanistan in its attempts to bring drug traffickers
to justice. To have maximum impact, the particular focus should
be on punishing those people involved in the funding and large-scale
trafficking of narcotics. (Paragraph 139)
30. We agree that this is a key part of the counter
narcotics (CN) effort. Targeting the trafficker is one of the
four priorities in the Afghan's National Drug Control Strategy.
The majority of the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit's funding
for CN is aimed at targeting the top end of the trade. The UK
has supported the development of the Counter Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan and the Afghan Special Narcotics Force—the
Afghan law enforcement agencies charged with targeting drug traffickers
and disrupting the trade. We are also helping to build the capacity
of the Afghan government to convict drug traffickers. They have
had some successes. Over 457 traffickers have been convicted in
the last two years including five medium value targets as of 23
August. We are providing an additional £22.5 million this
year for the Afghan interdiction forces, to disrupt the operations
of influential traffickers and weaken their links to the insurgency.
We are very concerned at the indications of closer
links between the Taliban and the narcotics trade. (Paragraph
140)
31. So are the Government, the Afghans and the International
Community. In the South of Afghanistan, both the drug traffickers
and the Taliban have a common interest in resisting Afghan government
authority and international forces. There are indications of extensive
financial and logistical links between Taliban and traffickers
at all levels. The Taliban have encouraged farmers to grow opium
poppy and resist Afghan government eradication efforts. This is
why we need to make CN a fundamental part of a "comprehensive
approach" in the South. We are working with ISAF to maximise
military support for counter narcotics operations within the CN
Annex of the NATO Operational Plan.
The MoD's position is that it will not take part
in the eradication of poppy until alternative livelihood schemes
are available. We call on the Government to ensure that this message
is communicated clearly to farmers in Helmand. We are deeply concerned
that uncertainty has arisen among Afghans about ISAF's policy
towards, and role in, poppy eradication and that UK Forces, under
ISAF command, may consequently have been put at risk. This uncertainty
undermines the effectiveness of the entire ISAF mission. (Paragraph
146)
32. It is correct that ISAF and the UK Task Force
do not carry out poppy eradication. Eradication policy and implementation
is the responsibility of the Afghan Government. Their policy as
set out in the National Drug Control Strategy (NCDS) is that eradication
should be targeted where there is access to legal rural livelihoods.
Under the terms of the OPLAN NATO forces can and do provide support
to CN operations, such as training of Afghan counter narcotics
forces and in extremis support (e.g. medical) to their operations
within means and capabilities. They can also help the Afghan government
explain its policies to the population. Of course, synchronising
military and CN operations in theatre can be challenging. But
together with the MoD, narcotics teams are working together to
find ways to make things better.
33. As in previous years, there have been reports
that eradication has adversely affected security. But resistance
has, in fact, been limited, particularly given this year's lengthened
eradication season and the greater numbers of Afghan government
personnel involved. The eradication campaign is also accompanied
by a carefully worded information operation, which makes clear
that eradication is an Afghan policy and explains who the eradication
forces are and what they are there to do and not to do.
Success in combating the narcotics trade will
be crucial to the future stability of Afghanistan. We remain concerned
that the coalition's counter-narcotics policy lacks clarity and
coherence. We recommend that, in its response to this report,
the Government set out in detail the international counter-narcotics
strategy for Afghanistan, including its assessment of progress
to date and targets for the years ahead. (Paragraph 151)
34. We agree that success in CN is crucial to Afghanistan's
stability. The Afghan government's NDCS is based on the experience
of countries like Thailand and Pakistan, which successfully eliminated
opium production over a 15-20 year period. The strategy covers
all key elements including law enforcement, developing legal livelihoods
and targeted eradication, and has led to progress and reductions
in cultivation in the North and centre of Afghanistan. But it
is not working in Helmand and the South, where a significant drop
in cultivation will only be achieved through the long-term extension
of security, governance and development.
35. The UK sees the NDCS as the strategy for
CN. The NDCS is a five-year plan of which we are currently in
year two. CN is also included as a crosscutting theme in the Afghanistan
Compact and the Afghan Government's interim Afghan National Development
Strategy (IANDS). Both the NDCS and the Compact were launched
at the London Conference on Afghanistan in 2005 with the full
support of the International Community. We fully support the NDCS,
the Compact and IANDS, and as Afghanistan's G8 partner nation
on counter narcotics, we lobby for continued and increased international
assistance and support for counter narcotics.
36. The Afghan Compact outlines 42 benchmarks, of
which five relate to CN, broken down into seventy targets. The
Afghan government is also continuing to develop the IANDS, whose
benchmarks are those of the compact as well and are designed to
reinforce each other. Attached at Annexes A and B are a copy of
the NDCS[1] and a progress
sheet on Afghan CN.
We are concerned that the Government is not communicating
key messages to the British public about the purpose of its operations
in Afghanistan effectively enough. (Paragraph 154)
37. We recognise the importance of a greater understanding
on the part of the British public about why it is crucial to get
Afghanistan right. We need to explain what we are trying to achieve
with our presence in Afghanistan, how we are working with the
Afghan government and the rest of the international community
on the ground. We have established a cross-Whitehall working group
to make sure that we give a consistent and coherent government
message. We are working with the UK and foreign media to explain
the context and situation. We are in regular contact with NGOs,
parliament and other opinion formers to do the same.
ISAF is bringing tangible improvements to the
lives of Afghans, but there is evidence that news of such improvements
is not being communicated effectively to Afghans. Indeed, there
is a strong suggestion that the Taliban is ahead in the "information
campaign". We recommend that the Government work together
with its allies to coordinate more effectively the presentation
of ISAF's objectives and the way in which developments in Afghanistan
are reported. (Paragraph 158)
38. Communication is a key aspect of ISAF's overall
effort and the UK is working closely with international partners,
NATO HQ and ISAF on the ground to work on improving ISAF communications.
The relocation of the National Communications Centre into the
President's Office should provide greater coherence to the Afghan
national communications strategy, which should help explain developments
in Afghanistan to the population on the ground. This should, in
turn, enhance ISAF's own information campaign. In Helmand, UK
forces, alongside Governor Wafa, have held Shuras with local leaders
to prepare the ground for operations and explain the objectives
of the Afghan Government and ISAF. Nevertheless, there are fundamental
difficulties in conducting an information campaign in the kind
of environment where word of mouth predominates and large portions
of the population are illiterate and/or do not have access to
reliable media. The situation is made even more complex when one
considers that the Taliban are not constrained by the same burden
of proof as the rest of the international community. Which is
why it is important that we help the Afghan Government enhance
the credibility and reach of its own messaging.
CN Summary of Progress—August
2007
- Criminal Justice Task Force
capacity (36 investigators, 34 prosecutors & 14 judges)—457
convictions since May 2005, including 5 MVTs. Over $2.2m spent
by UK on CJTF in 2006-07, and we recently allocated a further
$18m over 4 years.
- CN Police of Afghanistan—1,400 officers
(planned expansion to 2,958 by 2008), forensic lab and intelligence
unit operational, 9 Mobile Detection Teams operating, CN Training
Unit established.
- Increase in seizures of opiate equivalents (88.9mt
since March 2006).
- CN Trust Fund—$87.1m committed by 13 countries,
the EU & UNDP.
- Over 22,000 community projects financed.
- $307m (£153m) grants dispersed for local
development needs through over 17,000 Community Development Councils.
- Over 9,000 km roads reconstructed.
- Micro-finance—$267m (£133m) through
739,352 small loans to over 364,786 Afghans.
- Drug treatment centres in Kabul, Paktia, Kandahar,
Herat, Badakhshan, Faizabad, Gardez & Helmand. Over 3,800
addicts treated.
- Effective eradication figure of 19,047 hectares.
- 13 poppy free provinces.
- 13.1 million employment days have been created.
- Over 28,000 projects financed by the National
Solidarity Programme (part funded by DFID)—water supply
& sanitation, transport, irrigation, power, livelihoods, agriculture,
education, rural development, public building, health and emergency
response.
1 Not printed. Available at www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/NDCS%20-%20Final%20PDF%20version.pdf Back
