Examination for Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PETER WALL
CBE AND MR
JON DAY
CBE
23 OCTOBER 2007
Q20 Mr Hamilton: You could take it
the other way of course and that is that the Americans are very
envious of the British who have been able to deal with things
in the south slightly differently and indeed are able to be in
a position of being able to withdraw, so it could be that they
are now envious of our position. Could I ask you, Secretary of
State, can we provide effective overwatch cover outside of Iraq,
if we get to that point?
Des Browne: We are not proposing
to provide overwatch cover from outside of Iraq, but we are proposing
to provide overwatch cover from the COB because that is what we
have agreed with the Iraqi Government and with our allies that
we will do. We will of course position about 500 troops and some
equipment outside of Iraq to support that process inside. We are
not planning to do this from outside of Iraq. Can I just say in
relation to the point that we have just moved from, what is important
is to look at what General Petraeus said when he was asked these
very questions when he came over here recently. I know his responses
were a significant disappointment to many people, but he made
it perfectly clear that he was four-square behind exactly what
we were doing and had been part of the planning process with us
and then he went back to Iraq and spent time with the Chief of
Joint Operations in Iraq, describing and delivering these plans
which determine the figure of 2,500.
Q21 Mr Hamilton: If the security
situation deteriorates and we have to move back in at any stage
in the future, will we be in a position to be able to send troops
back in again and where will they come from?
Lieutenant General Wall: Clearly
we are trying to make predictions on a sort of conditions-based
trajectory and there is always a danger that the situation could
reverse, although we will try and gauge it so that we do not get
caught in that trap. If it is a question of delivering reserves
into the MNF south-east area in response to requests from the
Iraqi agencies and presumably at that stage through the Iraqi
MoD with the Iraqi Prime Minister's endorsement, then there are
a number of levels at which those reserves could be delivered,
starting with the Iraqi Security Forces themselves, we could redeploy
into the area either from elsewhere in the south or from nationwide,
the MNF core-level reserves which are factored in principle into
the thinking that was discussed between General Petraeus and General
Houghton, or indeed, if required and in extremis, additional UK
forces from our own reserves.
Q22 Mr Hamilton: You feel confident
that we will have enough troops to be able to replenish?
Lieutenant General Wall: Yes,
indeed.
Q23 Mr Hamilton: Irrespective of
what happens in Afghanistan?
Lieutenant General Wall: Yes,
indeed.
Q24 Chairman: Do you think it would
be politically acceptable to send more troops back to Iraq having
withdrawn some?
Lieutenant General Wall: I do
not know whether that is for me to judge, Mr Arbuthnot. In terms
of military capability, it is feasible.
Q25 Chairman: Fair enough. Secretary
of State, politically is it feasible?
Des Browne: I think we need to
remind ourselves of how we have come to this position. This process
of making this assessment and being proved by events broadly to
be correct about the assessment about sustaining security, we
have met before. We have met this challenge before successfully
in three provinces. On each occasion, I remember commentators
and others, including those who hold themselves out as experts,
suggesting that immediately there would be meltdown and we would
not be able to go back and deal with what we had created by, as
it were, pulling out of these provinces.
Q26 Chairman: But this is a different
issue.
Des Browne: Well, the point I
make is that we are in the process of making the assessment of
sustainability of the conditions in Basra and we will make an
assessment of that before we remove the troops in the first place,
or reduce the troops, I should say, because this idea that people
are coming back home has caused some concern in the past.
Q27 Chairman: The implication of
that answer is that, politically speaking in terms of public opinion
in this country, it would be inconceivable to send British troops
back to Iraq having withdrawn them. Do you agree with that?
Des Browne: I am content that
if the situation were to deteriorate at some time in the future,
we are in a position where our own force and the coalition as
a whole and the Iraqi army will be in a position to respond, but
clearly the order—
Q28 Chairman: That is not an entire
answer to the question.
Des Browne: Clearly the order
of response would need to be the Iraqis themselves first, then
supported, or otherwise. We would need to judge that in the circumstances
that we then face and, with respect, Chairman, there are so many
different possible sets of circumstances that could arise that
I am not from here going to judge what the political mood will
be then, particularly against the background that we will make
very careful decisions about whether that is likely to happen
or not.
Q29 John Smith: On the question of
the tasks set for the remaining troops next spring, whatever number
they are, as I understand it, Secretary of State, a key role played
by Basra Air Base was maintaining the supply lines, not just to
British troops, but to other coalition forces. Will that continue
to remain a key task next year?
Des Browne: Clearly, maintaining
supply lines into the Basra Palace, for example, or anywhere else
in Basra is no longer now necessary. Sustaining the forces that
we had in Basra from the COB was a significant part of what we
needed to do. We will be moving to mainly, as has been explained,
training and mentoring and, as far as the details of other tasks
that we will be doing are concerned, I would much rather share
them with the Committee on a confidential basis, if you do not
mind, Mr Smith.
Q30 Mr Jones: Can I first of all
pick up something that Bernard Jenkin said. Having reread my notes
last night from our visit in July, I also recall what General
Petraeus said to us when we asked him the same question about
drawdown in the south, and it was quite clear that, as long as
it was conditions-based, he was quite happy with it, which I think
chimes with what the Secretary of State is saying. General, you
used the term "perfectly workable" as to the numbers
that you have got now, but what is the viable minimum number of
troops that we could actually have at the COB in the future?
Lieutenant General Wall: I think
it comes back to a number of factors: first of all, the extent
to which the Iraqi security force capacity, capability and effectiveness
continues to grow; the evolving political situation in the south,
particularly in the context of potential provincial elections
and the inevitable interest in Shia arrangements there; the extent
of any external influences; and, in summary, therefore, the nature
of the task we need to continue doing. I would not see the scope
for wholesale reductions from the numbers that we have described,
although perhaps more of that capability could be hosted outside
southern Iraq. if that were logistically advantageous.
Q31 Mr Hancock: Secretary of State,
in the, I did not think, helpful reply you gave to the Chairman's
legitimate question of, "Would it be possible to put troops
back into Iraq if we had withdrawn all of them?", your evasion
of that leads me to believe that the plan is that we do not withdraw
troops certainly in the near or medium-term future because of
the danger of hostility to putting troops back in when we have
withdrawn them. In an earlier answer, you suggested that the template
for withdrawal was task-based, but surely that template must also
indicate to you that, when those tasks are exhausted, there is
a point in time when there is no point in having British troops
there, so surely you can answer that question. If you have a template
based on tasks and those tasks must, by their very nature, be
time-limited, you must be able to give an indication of when you
would expect British troops not to be required to be based in
Iraq.
Des Browne: Can I just say to
you, first of all, Mr Hancock, from my perspective, you are not
entitled to draw the conclusion that you seek to draw from what
you have described as an evasive answer to the Chairman. It was
not evasive. What I was saying was that—
Q32 Mr Hancock: I am entitled to
draw the opinion I like. If it does not agree with you—
Des Browne: I am just saying it
from my perspective and maybe there are two perspectives on this.
I just do not want anybody to think, from this evidence session,
that I am acceding to the conclusion that you have drawn because,
from my point of view, the answer I gave does not support it.
What I said to the Chairman, and I stick by this, is that we make
these decisions prospectively and very carefully and I was asked,
did I believe that, having moved this far down the transition,
it would be politically sustainable for us to reverse any part
of that, and my answer is that I will make that decision at the
time, if I need to, but up until now our judgments have allowed
us to continue in a trajectory that we have set and I have no
reason to believe that we will not be able to continue to do that
because we do it with such care, and that seems to me to be a
reasonable and straightforward answer. As far as the second part
of your question is concerned which is a different question altogether,
that is that you see the tasks that we have set for the force
that we will continue to have in Iraq from the spring onwards
when we share those tasks with you. Of necessity, they will be
completed at some stage or another, but they are not, in my view,
capable of having fixed times attached to them. Our ability to
be able to train and mentor Iraqi forces to a particular point
that will allow us to reduce our troops further is a function
also of the ability of the Iraqi forces to be able to be trained
and mentored to that point. From this point, I could not tell
you the progress that we have made, the General can, but I am
not prepared to set a prospective time-limit on that going forward,
that is all. However, that having been said, we have consistently
shown our plans in advance for months about what we are doing
in Iraq and we have, I think I can say without fear of contradiction,
broadly stuck to those plans. There may have been a week or a
month here or there or a couple of hundred troops here or there,
but broadly we have stuck to them and we have shown that progression.
I cannot be any more open than that because I do not think it
is helpful to our troops, and we have explained this time and
time again, to set a point at some time in the future when we
will withdraw them because we will be in danger of recreating
the set of circumstances that we suffered from in the Basra Palace
where people will want to take the credit for having shot or bombed
us out of Iraq, and that will put our troops in danger.
Mr Jenkin: Of course we would not expect
General Petraeus or anyone else to complain publicly about the
British drawdown.
Mr Jones: He did and you were there.
Q33 Mr Jenkin: I would not say that
that was tantamount to public. I wonder if General Wall would
just give us the assurance that I think he has given already,
that we are in a position militarily to reinforce our position
in Iraq should the military requirement be to do so.
Lieutenant General Wall: I will
reiterate my comments on that. I have never had one of these sessions
before, Mr Arbuthnot, so please stop me if you think I am behaving
inappropriately, but the tone of this evidence session does not
seem to me to reflect what has been going on in southern Iraq
in the context of the achievements of our forces in the last six
to nine months. This is an incredibly complex situation and you
have all seen it for yourselves. A considerable amount of progress
has been made on a number of fronts. The very nature of the transition
strategy is one that involves a balance of risk and some very
careful judgments and, thus far, our progress in the last six
to nine months has been very considerable and—
Chairman: We are about to come on to
this because we particularly want to come on to the training and
that will be our next question.
Mr Hamilton: I do not accept the point
he is making as to the tone of this, the tone of certain members
of this Committee making political gestures, so qualify what you
are saying. I take exception to the comment because the inference
is that this Committee would be unhelpful to the General or the
troops and I really do take exception to that.
Q34 Chairman: I want to move on,
having asked one final question of fact about the overwatch issue
and that is a question about the meaning of the word "from",
that UK forces will be cut to 2,500 "from the spring".
That has been taken to mean in the spring. Would you confirm,
Secretary of State, that it does not mean in the spring, but it
means from the spring, and could you explain what "from the
spring" means in those circumstances?
Des Browne: If I had known that
the words that I used were going to be subject to this very careful
forensic analysis—
Q35 Chairman: These are the words
of the Prime Minister, so you have got to be very careful indeed
about them.
Des Browne: We plan, and if I
use a different active verb in relation to this, it is invariably
over-interpreted as well, but we plan to reduce the numbers from
the spring. If we are able to do it in a month, which some people
would describe as "in the spring", then we will do it,
but we plan to do it from about that time of the year. We use
seasons in relation to this because, otherwise, we will put constraints
on the people who are on the ground to operate to a timetable
which may turn out to be unrealistic, so we give them a general
direction. If it happens in a month that somebody would argue
is summer as opposed to spring, then I will accept that criticism
at some time in the future, but I think broadly that the people
in the country know what part of the year we are aiming to do
this and continue from there, and that is what we were seeking
to communicate.
Q36 Chairman: So the purpose of the
phrase "from the spring" was to give an impression of
being as likely as possible to be in the spring whilst leaving
yourselves some leeway?
Des Browne: I think the alternative
is that we may be constrained not to put this information about
planning into the public domain at all if we cannot give ourselves
what we have needed in the past—
Q37 Chairman: I am not complaining
about it.
Des Browne: I am content to share
this. In the past, we have, against our ambition, maybe missed
it by a week or a couple of weeks or discussions in some part
of what we have been seeking to do have been delayed. Our experience
suggests to us that in this process of transition we need a degree
of flexibility, so we use general phrases and it is nothing more
sophisticated than that.
Q38 Willie Rennie: This is about
the training for the police and the Iraqi army, and the first
section is about the Iraqi army. Could you give us an update about
how the training for the army is progressing, what challenges
remain and how the Iraqi army has been performing in the provinces
in which you have handed over control to the Iraqis?
Des Browne: I may refer to the
General for some of the detail of this appropriately, but perhaps
I can give an overall picture. We consider that we are making
good progress across Iraq in building the capability and capacity
of the security forces, and that is both now the army and we are
making progress in relation to the police, but we will no doubt
come to that in a moment. Overall, the numbers stand at 360,000
across Iraq, so that is the total figure. In southern Iraq, we
now have 20,000 Iraqi army personnel and over 31,000 in the Iraqi
police service, including 15,000 in the police service in Basra.
Overall, in the south of Iraq the Iraqi Security Forces have shown
themselves as capable of dealing with isolated incidents of violence
in the three provinces that have been handed over to Iraqi control
and that is what they have had to face. In Basra city, they have
assumed the primary role for security and they have proved able
to deal efficiently and effectively with incidents of violence,
such as, for example, the recent mosque bombing. The responses
of the Iraqi Security Forces to that incident and to the other
incident of the same nature were much better than we have seen
in the past and their ability to be able to contain that violence
and not allow it to generate a process of increased violence,
as it was clearly intended to do, is to their credit. As General
Wall has already said, General Mohan, who commands those forces,
has brought strong Iraqi leadership to the security situation
in Basra and that is extremely welcome from our perspective. He
takes a very robust approach to the development of the Iraqi Security
Forces as a whole and he works closely with General Jalil and
the re-established governor in seeking to do that. General Jalil,
for his part, remains focused and effective, continuing his drive
to counter corruption in the Iraqi police service, but we will
come to that no doubt. The 10th Division continues to show its
growing capability. It is taking the lead in many operations in
the south with minimum support from the coalition. Since February,
in addition about a third of its personnel have been deployed
into Baghdad in Operation Fardh al-Qanun, so it has been making
a contribution there, and a new 14th Division, which is taking
over responsibility for Basra, is building up as it forms up to
be engaged and already they are under the authority of General
Mohan and, when fully formed, it will have between 10,000 and
15,000 personnel, and the GOC for 14th Brigade has been appointed,
so that is an overview. General, do you want to deal with the
specifics?
Lieutenant General Wall: I have
a couple of comments, if I may, Secretary of State. What the Secretary
of State said really bears out the considerable progress that
has been made through our mentoring to date which has been quite
a protracted effort, through considerable materiel investment
of course by the United States and some by ourselves. It is witness
to the fact that actually there was a shift in emphasis from us
training the Iraqi army to us now mentoring the Iraqi army in
how to train itself and, therefore, our role is becoming increasingly
specialised and niche and there are a number of areas of more
subtle activity where we shall continue to have a minor training
role, but, in the round, this is a very good story. I would see
the way it goes forward as being gradual further growth in the
size of the organisation as another brigade is provided for 14th
Division in Basra, so that is not yet at the average unit strength,
and then, as they get more experience in the evolving situation
and of course there will be new challenges because the situation
is changing all the time, as we have seen, they will become more
adept at dealing with these things and progressively we would
see our role being very much as `touching the tiller' sort of
mentoring rather than the detailed training at the working level.
Q39 Willie Rennie: So for how long
do you expect training teams to be there and, if the force levels
reduce to quite a low level, what will be required to protect
those training teams?
Lieutenant General Wall: It is
very difficult to envisage how fast they will progress and I would
say that we could keep them making a contribution for quite a
protracted period, although there will be a diminishing requirement
and probably in a sense diminishing returns. The amount of protection
will be a function of the security situation, but there is a number
of ways in which this training support can be given which does
not necessarily involve our people always being in the most exposed
areas. That said, the exposed areas are progressively becoming
less exposed, as we have discussed hitherto.
|
