Examination for Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PETER WALL
CBE AND MR
JON DAY
CBE
23 OCTOBER 2007
Q40 John Smith: As I recall it, Chairman,
when we were in Basra in July, there was an issue about members
of the army being Basrawi Shias, holding a loyalty to the local
community rather than the army. Is that still an issue or has
it been addressed?
Lieutenant General Wall: It has
been addressed principally by moving people to operate away from
the areas in which they live so that they are less susceptible
to threats to their families and that sort of thing, and that
has been one of the key elements of the progress in the evolution
of 14th Division in Basra, the majority of whom are not Basrawis.
Q41 Willie Rennie: If we are making
so much progress with the army, why are we having so many difficulties
with the police? What is the difference? What is causing so many
difficulties?
Des Browne: Because there is an
endemic level of corruption in the police. Corruption is an issue
in the police, there is no question about that. I have my own
views about this and about why we should see that difference.
Part of the reason is that the police operate at the point of
corruption and stopping the police from operating at the point
of corruption depends on a number of things, but it depends on
them operating within a functioning legal system where there are
consequences, whereas, as far as the army is concerned, if one
develops an army to the international model that is now used,
it brings with it its own justice system, and discipline and justice
are contained within the army and I think that is important. It
is also the case that the army is seen traditionally as being
a national institution and people sign up to it and sign up to
serving their country, whereas I do not think there was that history
in some parts of the police force in Iraq. The important thing
about the south-east is that we now have a general in charge of
the police who is beginning to deal with this issue and is building,
and there is very strong evidence of this, an independent and
loyal police force which is increasingly capable of serving the
people at Basra and patrolling the streets. It has been a very
difficult thing for him to do. We know that attacks have been
made on his life because he has been prepared enough to be brave
enough to do this, and on more than one occasion, he and his family
have been put under significant pressure, but he has maintained
his brave approach to this and his professionalism throughout
that and he is increasingly taking them on. He is dismissing police
officers for corruption and investigating them in large numbers.
In the most recent operation, he has investigated over 2,000 cases
of misconduct and dismissed 1,000 police officers from the police
force, so he is beginning to drive the message down into the police
force that corruption will no longer be permitted and it is having
an effect to the extent that he has become a target for those
who see the effect of what he is doing and he has been attacked
on more than one occasion himself.
Q42 Willie Rennie: Have we now accepted
that the more benign, in the loosest sense, militias play an important
security role in the communities in Basra in the south-east?
Des Browne: We have not accepted
that at all. We believe that security for the people of Basra
and the south-east of Iraq should be delivered by their own security
forces who should be answerable to the constitution of the country,
to its Government and to the processes of law. The transition
to get there may involve, as we have seen in other parts of Iraq,
engagement with people who have carried arms for others and their
incorporation through the appropriate processes into the Iraqi
Security Forces, but we have not accepted that at all.
Q43 Mr Crausby: I have some questions
on political reconciliation. First of all, Secretary of State,
do you accept that the Government of Iraq has not made progress
towards reconciliation as laid out in the Bush Administration
Congressional plans and what are the prospects for further reconciliation
at the national level?
Des Browne: I think from speaking
to the Americans, particularly given the progress that has been
made and has been reported upon, at least some of them regret
that they set these performance indicators for themselves which
they were not going to meet. On the issue of reconciliation, there
is a long way to go, there is no question about that. It is key
to the stability, in my view, of Iraq and I do not think anybody
would dispute that. We have not seen as much progress in that
regard at the national political level as we would have liked
to have seen. We continue to encourage the political leadership
of Iraq to move in that direction. We understand that it is very
difficult, and I think you probably know the difficulties that
the Government presently faces with those who refuse to be engaged
in it. I think we can only continue to work with them to encourage
them to go down this road and to continue to explain to them how
important it is for sustained peace in their country that they
do it.
Q44 Mr Crausby: Much has been said
about local-level reconciliation. Are there risks involved in
relying on local-level reconciliation at the expense of national
efforts?
Des Browne: I am sorry, I was
slightly distracted. Could you just repeat that question please.
Q45 Mr Crausby: There has been much
talk, in the absence of national reconciliation, at concentrating
on the local level and seeing if we can achieve things in that
way, but there are some who would argue that there are risks in
that in the sense that local-level reconciliation and efforts
in persuading some groups, for instance, in joining with coalition
partners against al-Qaeda will just effectively in the long run
act against national efforts in the prospect maybe of a future
war?
Des Browne: I do not believe that
it necessarily would. I understand that people, for example, look
at Al Anbar province and say, "What will be the long-term
consequences of using local leadership and local people, equipping
and supporting them to drive out al-Qaeda? Are you creating a
militia there which you will come to regret having created at
some time in the future if it turns its attention to insurgency?"
The fact of the matter is that the next stage in that process
was to ensure that the leadership of that community encouraged
its young people to enrol and enlist in the national security
forces and they have done that. I have not got the figures, but
they are quite stunning for enlistment in the army and in the
police service in Al Anbar. That was at the encouragement of the
local sheikhs and the local leadership, so the next stage of the
process took place and followed on immediately after the success
of using those forces in order to drive out al-Qaeda. If we see
these processes through, for example, the engagement of JAM militia
and its leadership in Basra, Iraqi solutions, leads to those people
coming the whole way across to serve their country either in the
army or in the police and subjecting themselves to the proper
rules and disciplines of that, then that will be the sort of sustainable
progress that we need, but we cannot get to where we need to be
unless we are prepared to take the risk of that transition and
we have to leave the Iraqis, I think, the opportunity and the
space to do it. My response to you is that that will reinforce,
I think, the national process, but there needs to be more political
leadership at the centre for this reconciliation process and I
do not think there is any doubt about that. I have just been reminded
by a note that the figure that I shared with the Committee of
2,000 investigations and 1,000 dismissals was a national figure
and not a Basra figure, but I do not have in my brief here a figure
for Basra. [2]
Q46 Mr Crausby: Could I turn then to
the question of provincial councils. The Prime Minister told us
on 8 October that it was important that local elections go ahead
in early 2008, making provincial councils more representative,
so in what ways at present are the provincial councils insufficiently
representative?
Des Browne: Well, as far as we
are concerned at Basra of course, significant political players
in the south-east boycotted the provincial elections when they
took place before, so there are important political factions that
are not represented on the provincial councils at all and that
is one of the reasons why we support early provincial elections,
although they were planned to take place in the timescale that
we were talking about because we believe that there would be more
involvement, greater involvement of political parties representative
of the political interest and, consequently, the councils that
emerged would be more representative.
Q47 Mr Crausby: So will there be
local elections held in Basra next spring and do you expect the
Governor of Basra to be re-elected?
Des Browne: The timing of the
provincial elections is subject to legislation being drafted by
the Government of Iraq and we continue to work with them to see
if we can progress that legislation with a view to the objective
that we share with them, that there should be early provincial
elections. I cannot predict from here exactly who will be elected,
but what I can tell the Committee is that if all the political
parties engage in the process, then the electoral system will
ensure that the provincial council is representative of the balance
of political power in the area, which it presently is not because
people boycotted the elections in the past.
Q48 Chairman: I would like to move
on to Afghanistan now and I will give a bit of preamble by saying
that both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, when the Select Committee
has visited our troops on operations there, we have been highly
impressed by the work that they are doing, by the commitment that
they are showing and the courage that they are showing day in,
day out. It is all very well for us to flit in for three or four
days at a time and to think we understand what it is that they
are going through, but the achievements and the work that they
are doing are utterly astonishing, and I think we ought to pay
tribute to them. Secretary of State, in Afghanistan, in Helmand,
what have our Armed Forces achieved over the summer, would you
say?
Des Browne: Well, first of all,
thank you very much, Chairman, for your generous remarks and I
will ensure that they are reported to the troops, not only those
who have recently come home from Afghanistan in particular, but
those who have gone out to replace them, and I will make sure
that that information is conveyed to them. Actually, I know from
my own dealings with the Committee that that is the view of the
Committee across the board, that everybody on the Committee has
that view.
Q49 Chairman: And it always has been.
Des Browne: Frankly, everybody
who sees what our troops are doing on the ground both in Afghanistan
and Iraq comes away with that view, I think. I think I last gave
evidence on Afghanistan in May and I spent some time, I think,
describing Operation Silicon which was the operation that sought
to expand the Afghan Government's authority out from the town
of Sangin and up the Sangin valley, which I am on the record,
I think, as describing at that time as one of the most dangerous
places in the world. The aim was not only to keep the Taliban
on the back foot, but to let some normality return to Sangin itself
because the people of Sangin had been denied that for some time,
so rather than me trying to describe it, I have brought this picture
which I will circulate for the Committee which is designed to
show the difference between around the time when I last gave evidence
and the month of August when we came to the end of that operation.
This picture shows effectively the market street of the town of
Sangin itself and if the media contain themselves, I will make
sure that they get a copy of it themselves before they leave,
but I did not bring enough colour photocopies for them. It seems
to me that it shows a town which is substantially deserted, where
the people have been driven out, stopped from doing their normal,
everyday tasks and work by the brutality of the Taliban to a bustling
market street where the normal, everyday business of the town
dominates the picture.
Q50 Chairman: That is a very stark
picture. It is very important to have that evidence and I think
we would, if it is possible, include that in our report. [3]
Des Browne: It will be of course.
Q51 Chairman: We will, within the
limits of publication of these things, do our best to do so. What
proportion of Helmand is under ISAF control?
Des Browne: I will seek to answer
that question in this way: that there are large parts of Helmand
where no one lives, large parts of it are desert, and no one has
any intention of bringing it under control in the sense, I think,
that you mean, Chairman, neither the Taliban nor ISAF. By and
large, the population is concentrated in the valley of the River
Helmand and an area either side of it which variously measures
a few kilometres or is quite narrow in places, and the area has
come to be known as the `green zone' for the very obvious reason
that when the growing season is on, it becomes very green and
very dense. A substantial part of it, I have not actually measured
how much of it, is under control, but substantially the areas
where people live are. I do not think necessarily it would be
helpful to put a figure on it, but the General might be able to
give you some sort of perspective on that better than I can in
terms of proportions.
Lieutenant General Wall: It is
a question of degree of control, I think, and of course our efforts
in the design of the Afghanistan Development Zone strategy that
originated last year and has been carried forward by General McNeill
focuses inevitably on centres of population, so in population
terms the progress is quite good, but I cannot give you a specific
percentage. Lashkar Gah is an area where considerable progress
has been made to the point where we would regard it as stable.
It is the focus of our principal `quick impact' projects and it
is the place where small numbers of NGOs can function. Gereshk
and the upper Gereshk valley are places where progress has been
made to a lower level of control, but nevertheless a lot better
than six months ago. Sangin, we have heard about, but there are
still areas that have not yet had the opportunity to have this
security situation created and the development to flow in behind
it, the stabilisation work to flow in behind it, and those would
include the upper Sangin valley, up to Khajaki where of course
there is a separate project going on which is creating a local
effect with considerable investment there from the United States,
and then down south in Gharmsir, so in population terms it is
reasonable progress and perhaps we could in writing offer you
some proportions.
Chairman: That would be helpful, yes.
[4]
Q52 Willie Rennie: You talked about the
police in Iraq a moment ago. Have any of the lessons from Iraq
been transferred to Afghanistan in terms of the training of the
police and trying to end the corruption?
Des Browne: Yes, there is no question
that it is of advantage to our training both of the Afghan army
and of the police service that we have learnt lessons from Iraq,
yes, there is no question about that.
Q53 Mr Hancock: Is our main purpose
still, as far as Helmand province is concerned, to counter the
insurgency there, to tackle the activities of the Taliban and
ultimately to defeat the Taliban?
Des Browne: Well, our main purpose
there is to counter the insurgency and generate a degree of security
which will allow the development of governance and economic development
for the Afghan people which, in my view, will be what will in
the long term defeat the Taliban, yes.
Q54 Mr Hancock: Does that not then
lead to a contradiction when you have President Karzai and his
invitation for the Taliban to join the Government and where does
that place our troops in tackling the Taliban in Helmand province
when the President of the country is inviting the very people
we are fighting and who are killing our soldiers into the Government
and what is your reaction to that, Secretary of State?
Des Browne: Let me just say at
the beginning of this that what we refer to from here as `the
Taliban' are not a generic, homogeneous organisation. We do not
look upon them as all being the same and indeed we do, for the
purposes of our tactics, differentiate those whom we consider
to be irreconcilable and whom we put in the top tier from those
whom we consider to be prepared to fight with them in certain
circumstances whom we put in a lower tier from those whom we consider
support them from the communities out of fear or out of their
desire for some degree of stability which the Taliban have in
the past produced whom we put in a lower tier, so I think we have
to be careful about how we use this descriptive noun of `the Taliban'.
There clearly are people who are capable of being persuaded and
encouraged to make the transition from a general allegiance to
that political philosophy to engagement in the democratic processes
and the better governance of Afghanistan and we should encourage
people to make that transition. That has always been the case
in Afghanistan. Indeed, the previous Governor of Oruzgan province
who just gave up office, I think, in September was a former Taliban.
I have somewhere in these papers, but I cannot put my hands on
it right now, but somebody may give it to me, a list of other
politicians who have been in the Government, and I have at least
four of them here: the former Governor of Oruzgan; a senior Alizai
tribal leader in northern Helmand is an ex-Taliban senior commander
in the south and he is actively engaged—
Q55 Mr Hancock: At that time when
they were members of the Taliban, the Taliban were in power in
Afghanistan.
Des Browne: No, no, these people
are present.
Q56 Mr Hancock: Yes, but when they
were actively involved with the Taliban, as government ministers,
the Taliban were running the majority of the country. Here we
have a situation where we are fighting the Taliban or a version
of the Taliban, to use your words—
Des Browne: No, I think I may
be misleading you or you may be misunderstanding me, Mr Hancock.
I am saying that these people were Taliban and are now in government,
so there are people who have made that transition successfully,
some of them into ministerial portfolios, so the fact that President
Karzai continues to encourage others to make that journey is not
a surprise to me. The attention that the fact that he does that
has received recently is to some degree surprising to me because
it has always been his position and he has appointed ex-Taliban
people into government. I think we need to accept that one of
the measures of success in Afghanistan is going to be the political
process's ability to get people to sign up to it and some of them
will be people who at some stage signed up to one or other of
the tiers of the Taliban movement.
Q57 Mr Hancock: But, Secretary of
State, his invitation was not to those people who had deserted
the Taliban, it was an invitation to the current leadership of
the Taliban who are the ones who are orchestrating the war against
our forces in provinces like Helmand. He was not looking for dissenters
from the Taliban, he was looking for active co-operation with
the leadership of the current Taliban regime that operates in
Pakistan and in Afghanistan. How does that place us?
Des Browne: Well, it puts us into
the position where I think we have to recognise that that is part
of the process that is often described by the military and others
as there being no exclusively military solution to Afghanistan.
Part of what we are seeking to do is to create an environment
where people can make that very transition. Of course, there are
some of them who will be completely and utterly irreconcilable
and would only make that transition if they did it on those terms.
That is unacceptable. President Karzai made it clear to them when
they responded in those terms, some of them, that that would be
unacceptable, but for those who are prepared to make the transition
which those to whom I have already referred have made, there must
be a place for them in a future Afghanistan. It is not an unconditional
process, but unless somebody is brave enough to engage in it,
then it cannot happen at all. It is what we call `reconciliation'.
Q58 Mr Jenkin: Can I say that I entirely
agree with you, Secretary of State, on this question, but does
that not beg the question: have our commanders on the ground got
enough freedom to make the peace with these factions where they
can in the same way as General Richards made the peace with the
tribal leaders in Musa Qala? Do we not need lots more Musa Qalas,
given the limitations we actually have on our military resources?
Des Browne: Well, the point is
that it is the people who are engaged in the violence who have
to make the peace. We have to create the environment which encourages
them to do that, but the engagement, just as in Musa Qala, has
to be between Afghans and that is the sustainable peace. We will
facilitate it, we will help people to engage in it, we will protect
people as they move around if they want to engage in these sorts
of discussions, but it is the Afghans that have to make the peace.
I make that point quite specifically about Musa Qala because the
settlement that was arrived at in Musa Qala, which was not sustained
but is just the sort of settlement that we have to make sustainable
so that we can move forward, was an Afghan settlement and it was
led by President Karzai.
Q59 Mr Jenkin: So long as we divide
the so-called Taliban from their support for al Qaeda we are actually
achieving our objectives and fulfilling our national interest.
Des Browne: Of course we are doing
that, but we recognise how difficult it is. Of course, as Mr Hancock
suggests, there are people who are so ideologically bound to the
objectives of the Taliban and indeed often describe and articulate
them that it is almost impossible to consider that these people
would make that transition, but there is plenty of room for other
people underneath to make the transition providing they are prepared
to sign up to a democratic future for the country and to identify
with the principles and ideals that underpin the Afghan constitution.
2 See Ev 21 Back
3
See Ev 21 Back
4
See Ev 21 Back
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