Further memorandum from the Export Control
Organisation, Department of Trade and Industry
EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY
1. How does the Government propose to measure
the effectiveness of the extra-territoriality controls since 2004?
In accordance with the agreed Terms of Reference
for the Government's forthcoming review, the Government will measure
the effectiveness of the extra-territorial controls by looking
at three key factors; (i) the extent to which the controls achieved
their desired effect; (ii) their impact upon businesses operating
them; and (iii) the extent to which difficulties were encountered
in administering or enforcing them. Evidence for the first factor
will include the number of licence applications, number and nature
of any refusals, and any other evidence about behavioural change
caused by these new controls (eg business being refused by UK
entities because it could breach these extra-territorial controls).
Evidence for the second factor will include, where available,
the costs to business both in terms of money and staff time, of
instituting new procedures and then ongoing administration, training
and record-keeping costs. Evidence for the third factor will be
sought from the UK licensing and enforcement authorities.
2. How many UK nationals resident abroad
have applied for, and how many have been granted, trade control
licences?
Three UK nationals working overseas have applied
for trade control licences. In one case ECO determined that no
licence was necessary. Licences were issued to the two other applicants.
In total, 1 OITCL and 3 SITCLs have been issued.
3. On 3 April 2003, the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry, then Patricia Hewitt, stated that, "[The
Americans] do have extraterritorial controls on trafficking and
brokering in everything, in all military equipment. We have had
a look at it and our judgment is that it simply does not work.
As far as I know there has not been a single successful prosecution
under the American brokering law either for brokering offences
carried out within the United States or for offences carried out
overseas." She went on to say that she was not interested
in laws which look good on paper, but wanted a law which would
"actually have some practical effects." (HC (2002-03)
620, Q107) The Committee heard from EGAD that "it is extraordinarily
difficult (or even impossible) to bring successful extraterritorial
prosecutions". (QM14) In the light of these comments, how
does the Government justify the continued use of extra-territorial
controls, particularly in relation to brokering and trafficking?
The Committee has here drawn attention to one
of the most difficult issues that is going to confront the Government
in the course of the forthcoming review. The Government has always
adopted a cautious approach towards the imposition of extra-territorial
controls, reflecting the sentiments expressed above by the then
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. That is why extra-territorial
controls have been introduced in a strictly defined range of circumstances,
usually when the activity to which they relate could never be
regarded as in any way acceptable to the Government—for
example, the supply of weapons to embargoed destinations, the
supply of torture goods, or provision of assistance to Weapons
of Mass Destruction programmes. In these limited circumstances,
it has been judged that the difficulties inherent in enforcing
such controls were outweighed by the need to create a legal framework
that enables the Government to refuse to sanction UK involvement
and perhaps, to deter UK citizens who might be considering becoming
involved.
Whilst numbers are small, experience has shown
that the UK has been able to prevent some undesirable activities
taking place as a result of the imposition of these controls.
Whether this is sufficient to justify the retention of these extra-territorial
controls, and whether convincing evidence can be produced to support
arguments for extra-territorial controls to be extended into broader
areas, will be key issues for the Government's forthcoming review.
4. The operation of extra-territorial controls
must involve some degree of cooperation with third countries.
Likewise, to the extent that third countries, notably the United
States, also operate extra-territorial controls, they must also
require a degree of assistance from time to time. Will you elaborate
on the type of cooperation with third countries necessary in order
to investigate and enforce extra-territorial controls? Will you
also detail the types of assistance the UK gives to third countries
such as the United States in relation to the administration of
their domestic regimes?
Third countries' control regimes, and their
enforcement, are a matter for the administrations of those countries.
The Government does not assist in the enforcement or prosecution
of those countries' extra-territorial controls, but will take
action under the relevant UK legislation if information provided
by the third country demonstrates that actions taken in the UK
have also led to a breach of UK export controls Co-operation with
other countries in the broader area of export control is however,
strong, and takes place on a number of levels. The Government
provides general advice and guidance to countries in shaping their
control regimes, through its international outreach programme,
and works closely with a number of other countries on general
counter-proliferation issues.
On the enforcement side, HM Revenue and Customs
regularly co-operates with law enforcement agencies in other countries
for the purposes of sharing and gathering information. Where activities
are internationally condemned, for example breaches of UN Sanctions,
cooperation can generally be expected from foreign Governments
and enforcement agencies. This is normal practice within the law
enforcement community in areas where there is commonality of enforcement
objectives.
General information sharing, with a view to
gathering information to help identify breaches, is usually carried
out under Mutual Administrative Assistance (MAA) agreements or
Memorandum of Understanding arrangements. This might involve requesting
information from a company in another country or looking into
particular transactions of concern. HMRC regularly provides assistance
in relation to US requests under such agreements, in order to
assist with the enforcement of strategic export controls
Request for information in respect of alleged
offences, where prosecution may result would usually be carried
out under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). Such requests
might, for example, involve executing a search warrant or summonsing
a witness in another country. Other countries would provide information
to HMRC , only by consent and there would be a general expectation
from the recipient country that HMRC's requests should relate
to a type of activity that would also constitute an offence in
their own country. If the activity was carried out legally in
accordance with the laws of the country concerned, HMRC could
not expect to be given the required assistance. This would be
a consideration when considering any further extension of UK extra-territorial
controls.
5. EGAD have argued that there may be cases
where an individual may find himself in breach of US extra-territorial
provisions if he does not take a certain course of action and
in breach of the laws of the UK if he does. (QM14) Have there
been any conflicts between domestic legal provisions on the one
hand and the operation of extra-territorial controls of third
countries on persons or circumstances occurring within the UK
on the other? If so, how was the conflict resolved? If not, what
is the Government's view on how such a conflict would be resolved?
The Government is not aware of any conflicts
between UK and third country legislation. As set out above, the
Government does not directly assist in the enforcement or prosecution
of third countries' extra-territorial controls. In complying with
the extra-territorial controls of third countries, UK companies,
may consider that such a conflict arises in practice. The Government
does not however, involve itself in resolving these perceived
conflicts.
In the context of the forthcoming review though,
and any potential further extension of UK extra-territorial controls,
the Government will certainly be interested in evidence from industry
and others on these issues and will need to consider in particular,
whether the UK extra-territorial controls that are currently in
force have placed UK citizens overseas in unacceptable positions.
The Government will seek specific evidence on these points.
6. In its recent evidence to the Quadripartite
Committee EGAD stated that "the trade controls which encompass
an extraterritorial dimension do [... ] act as a potential discriminator
against the employment of UK nationals by firms overseas"
(QM14). The Committee would welcome the Government's response
on EGAD's assertion? In addition, was it the Government's intention
in framing the legislation to apply the control regime to a UK
national working abroad in the example quoted by EGAD?
When framing the extra-territorial controls
that were introduced in 2004, it was the Government's intention
to control the extra-territorial activities of UK citizens where
they were related to the supply of a strictly defined range of
goods or services. We suspect that few would argue against the
principle of controlling overseas activities by UK citizens that
would facilitate the supply of torture goods, WMD or of military
equipment supplied to embargoed destinations (notwithstanding
the practical difficulties referred to above). However, because
they control acts related to the supply of the whole range of
Restricted Goods" as defined by the legislation,, these extra-territorial
controls currently encompass the supply of other goods, such as
long range missiles and unmanned air vehicles. The example quoted
by EGAD refers to long range missiles and does raise valid questions
about what equipment should fall within the Restricted Goods definition.
7. What ancillary services—such as
transport and financial services—have been brought within
export control? How are the controls enforced? How many breaches
have been subject to prosecution or sanction such as a warning
letter?
Ancillary services have been brought within
export controls only where those services are provided in relation
to restricted goods or to the supply of controlled goods to an
embargoed destination. Such services are specifically exempted
from controls when provided in relation to other controlled goods.
The legislation lists these ancillary services as:
(a) Transportation services.
(b) Financing or financial services.
(c) Insurance or reinsurance services.
(d) General advertising services.
Thus, services that fall under these four categories
are subject to control only when provided in relation to restricted
goods or the supply of controlled goods to embargoed destinations.
There have been no HMRC prosecutions of transport
companies or finance companies in relation to strategic export
controls and neither has HMRC issued any formal warning letters
to transport companies or finance companies. However, if, during
the course of an investigation, it were found that a UK transport
company or finance company had committed an offence, HMRC would
take appropriate action, up to and including reporting the case
to the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office.
8. The Working Group on Arms in its evidence
to the Committee suggested an additional category of goods to
which some extra-territorial controls could apply (QM15, para
13). The new category would cover small arms and light weapons.
Does the Government envisage any practical problems in applying
the extra-territorial controls to an additional category of goods?
As indicated in our answer to question 3, there
will always be some degree of practical difficulty in applying
UK export controls extra-territorially and so arguments for further
extension need very careful and cautious evaluation. That however,
does not mean that we should rule out further extensions; it is
a question of striking the correct balance. We will be certainly
be giving the suggestion from the Working Group on Arms serious
consideration.
TRANSIT AND
TRANSHIPMENT
9. In its evidence to the Committee the Working
Group on Arms stated that "the current licensing requirements
regarding transit and transhipment of controlled goods are extremely
confusing, to the point where industry itself is not clear as
to its obligations. Even the use of the terms `transit' and `transhipment'
is confusing, and may not tally with usage by the World Customs
Organisation, of which the UK is a member". (QM15, para 32,
and see also paras 33 and 34) The Committee requests the Government's
comments on the Working Group's assertion.
The Government is not aware of any significant
practical difficulties that are faced by UK exporters in these
areas, but will of course be interested in any evidence that industry
and others might put forward during the course of the forthcoming
public consultation. However, in the course of its preparatory
work, the Export Control Organisation has noted a few areas where
some legal tidying up work might be of value in making the intention
of the controls clearer and will consider this point in the same
light.
ENFORCEMENT
10. EGAD was challenged to provide evidence
that there really was a large amount of non-compliance—either
deliberate or inadvertent—taking place. In its recent submission
EGAD assured "the Committee that, through our contacts within
Industry, especially with those who are involved and seek advice
when they become aware that export controls do, in fact, affect
their activities, we do, indeed, KNOW that this is happening"
but EGAD was precluded by confidentiality from supplying detailed
evidence. (QM14) The Committee may raise the matter with HM Revenue
and Customs but would welcome DTI's view on EGAD's assertion and
how it can be tested?
As with any illegal activity, scientific quantification
of the extent of non-compliance would be impossible and any attempt
to do so would be extremely resource intensive. The Government
believes that the principle weapon in the fight to improve compliance,
is, on the one hand, working with industry to improve awareness
and on the other, a robust compliance auditing regime. A good
deal of effort has already gone into this, and this is continuing,
but the Export Control Organisation is open minded about suggestions
to improve awareness activity or focus it specifically on identified
problem areas.
CROWN EXEMPTION
11. Does the Government apply the EU Code
to government-to-government transfers?
All forms of government-to-government transfers
are subject to rigorous examination against the Consolidated EU
and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria before being approved.
Where the transfer of ownership of surplus goods
sold to overseas governments takes place in the UK, the purchasing
government is required to obtain a UK export licence before collection.
Disposal sales are also made through UK contractors who, if they
sell to overseas customers, are required to apply for export licences
in the normal way. There are a small number of Government-to-Government
supply agreements. Under these arrangements goods are supplied
through UK contractors and exported under export licence. In all
the above circumstances, export licence applications are required
and are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated
Criteria.
Government-to-Government transfers also include
military items handed over by the UK as gifts. Such transfers
are assessed in accordance with the F680 process administered
by the Ministry of Defence, in consultation with Other Government
Departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
F680 applications are considered case-by-case against the Consolidated
Criteria.
12. Has the use of Crown exemption been raised
in the EU working group COARM?
This issue has not been raised at COARM.
13. Are there any practical difficulties
in ending Crown exemption from export control?
There would be significant practical difficulties.
We invoke Crown immunity where the Government has ownership or
right of disposal over items that are required to be transferred
overseas both for its own use, and for certain transfers to other
Governments being made as gifts. Where items of military equipment
are gifted by the Government this is subject to assessment in
accordance with the F680 process as set out above, and such gifts
are reported in the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls.
The Ministry of Defence, including UK Armed Forces, transfers
its military equipment overseas for its own use, including for
operations and training, the transfer of which without Crown immunity
would otherwise be subject to export control. The Committee will
appreciate that these are not transfers in the normal sense of
the word, since the equipment remains in the possession and under
the control of the UK authorities. Licensing, including consultation
with Other Government Departments which is the bedrock of the
assessment of export licence applications, or the reporting of
such transfers, would not add any value in these circumstances.
EXPORT CONTROL
ORGANISATION
14. When it gave evidence to the Committee
on 7 December EGAD was critical of the changes to the Export Control
Organisation's website (Q 34). How does the department respond
to EGAD's criticism?
ECO is aware that a number of people have found
the ECO section of the DTI's Website difficult to navigate. We
are working with those responsible for the DTI Website to try
to address these criticisms.
UK SUBSIDIARIES OVERSEAS
15. When EGAD gave evidence last session
it told the Committee that "that the present licensing control
regime discourages licensed production overseas" and that
"the licensing regime makes the transfer of technology to
do that more difficult and imposes controls on it". EGAD
pointed out that "one of the things that the Export Control
Organisation examines when asked to give a licence for overseas
production is what the likely end-use is going to be of whatever
it is that is produced overseas" (HC (2005-06) 873, para
198). The Committee requests the department's comments on EGAD's
evidence and, if it concurs with EGAD's description, an indication
of the assessments which the Export Control Organisation makes
about the operation of a recipient county's export control system
and the end-use to which goods manufactured overseas may be put.
It would be of assistance to see an example of an application
and the Government's assessment, under the usual classification.
When they apply for a licence to export controlled
goods or technology, exporters are expected to place all relevant
facts before the Export Control Organisation. Where it is apparent
that the export will pass through one end user on its way to another
destination, or will be used by the initial end user to make controlled
goods that will then be re-exported, the Government will need
to consider the risks posed by both the initial end user and any
known or potential end users after that. A more extended risk
assessment is therefore necessary in these cases than in many
others and ECO may need to contact the exporter to establish the
details of onward supplies more fully.
In the context of overseas production, the Government
would wish to examine any risks posed by the known or potential
end users of the licensed goods that will be produced overseas
(ie whether they are likely to use the licensed goods in ways
that might breach the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export
Licensing Criteria), plus, more generally to consider the extent
to which the country hosting the licensed production has any links
with countries or programmes of concern or represents a risk of
onward diversion. The Government therefore concurs that "what
the likely end use is going to be of whatever it is that is produced
overseas" is examined as part of the risk assessment process
involved in granting or refusing a licence.
The Government does not however, accept that
this extended risk assessment places excessive burdens upon the
exporter, but that they reflect the wider issues associated with
licensed production. It would be perverse to deny the export of
licensed goods to end users or destinations of concern, whilst
at the same time allowing to proceed unfettered, exports of technology
that would enable the same goods to be produced to achieve the
same end result.
The Government will seek to provide the Committee
with a case example, but this may prove difficult since the historical
database does not specifically identify licences granted in connection
with licensed production overseas.
16. In the view of the Government does the
Export Control Act 2002 provide that, for the purposes of export
controls, the actions of foreign companies in which UK persons
have a controlling interest could be deemed to be the actions
of those UK persons and, accordingly, made subject to the same
restrictions as they would be if they were acting as principal?
Where a UK company or national controls a foreign
company that acts overseas, trade (NB: not export) controls can
be imposed in relation to the acts of that company (see section
4(8)).
17. It has been suggested that governments
should also introduce a system for controlling re-exports of major
components once they have been incorporated into military or security
equipment. The US system has been cited as model under which,
for a specific list of "friendly" countries, the re-exporting
country is only required to notify the US government of any re-export
within 30 days of the export taking place but for all other destinations,
any re-export requires an additional export licence from the US
government. The Committee would welcome the Government's assessment
of the practicalities of running such a control regime.
The Government is not convinced of the merits
of extending UK controls so as to duplicate the export controls
of other nations, thus subjecting overseas customers to the need
to get approval from two licensing authorities for the same transaction.
We take account of known subsequent supplies when we initially
assess the application to export goods or technology from the
UK (see answer 15 above). Where those subsequent supplies would,
in our view, be likely to result in breach of the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, we will not issue
a licence. We believe that system is both simpler and more effective.
CONTROLS ON
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL OR
NUCLEAR (CBRN) MATERIALS18.
Have research institutions and funding agencies adequate arrangements
in place for the reviewing of research projects to ensure that
the risks of misuse are assessed and precautions taken to prevent
misuse for the development of WMD?
19. Are there national guidelines and codes
of practice for scientists operating in areas which could be used
for the development of WMD? Is the Government content with the
codes and guidelines, and with their operation?
20. What outreach does the Government carry
out to researchers to ensure they are aware of their legal and
ethical responsibilities about the publication or transfer of
information that could be used for WMD?
21. What assessment has the Government made
of the need for, and operation of, a system of accreditation for
scientific researchers?
22. Has the Government reviewed research
papers or vetted students?
23. Has the Government prevented or delayed
the publication of, or persuaded a researcher not to publish,
any research which could be used for WMD? Please give details
of the instances.
Questions 18 to 23 are all addressing the issue
of the impact of the new controls upon academic activity and the
steps taken by the government to raise awareness of these new
controls amongst that community. It would therefore probably of
more assistance to the Committee if the Government answers all
these questions together.
In the run up to the introduction of the new
controls in 2004, the Export Control Organisation (ECO) consulted
representative bodies for the academic community. Following these
consultations, ECO placed extensive guidance on its Website. Titled,
"Guidance on the Export Control Act for academics and researchers
in the UK", this guidance is specifically tailored to the
concerns of the academic community and includes a number of case
examples to illustrate how the new controls impact upon activities
that they regularly undertake.
"Universities UK", a body representing
the interests of UK universities, is a standing member of the
Export Control Advisory Committee, (ECAC) a grouping co-ordinated
by ECO to bring together trade associations or other bodies who
are subject to UK export licensing regulations. ECAC provides
a forum for discussing export control issues or raising matters
of concern. Representatives of academia have attended ECAC meetings
on a number of occasions. ECO has also undertaken a number of
compliance visits to higher education establishments and has given
presentations about the new controls to academic audiences. This
awareness effort has been supplemented by awareness-raising efforts
from within the academic community.
As part of the preparations for the forthcoming
review of export controls, ECO has already been in touch with
a selection of academics and has arranged to meet them in February.
This meeting is primarily to seek their views on the impact and
effectiveness of the 2004 controls, but we will also discuss current
levels of awareness and what efforts both Government and academia
could take to enhance export control awareness.
Whilst in principle, all export controls apply
to academia in the same way as they apply to any other person
or entity subject to them, in practice, the main area of concern
has been the potential transfer of technology that may be of use
in Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes of concern. Controls
apply where the academic or researcher has been informed by the
Government that such a transfer is intended for a relevant WMD-related
use, or is aware that it is so intended, and may be used outside
the EC. As such, the controls are triggered more by the recipient
of the technology and the intended use, rather than by the intrinsic
nature of that technology. For these reasons, vetting of individual
research papers or publications is not part of the Government's
strategy for enforcing controls in this area.
The Government instead follows a two pronged
strategy. The first line of defence against unwelcome transfers
of technology is to prevent students of concern attending courses
where such technology might be imparted. Historically, this has
been achieved by way of the Voluntary Vetting Scheme, but this
is soon to be replaced by a more comprehensive, compulsory scheme
known as ATAS (Academic Technology Approval Scheme). Under this
pre-Visa scheme, which will be run by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, all non-EU students intending to undertake PhD and Masters
research in specific areas (broadly Maths, Engineering, Physics,
Chemistry, Biology and Computing) will need to apply for an ATAS
certificate. The application will be rigorously risk assessed
and a clearance certificate either granted or refused. Until the
student possesses the certificate they will not be able to apply
for a student visa or extension. The Government then sees export
controls as a second line of defence, with the awareness effort
as its key tool. A good deal of awareness raising with academics
has already taken place, as set out above, but the Government
is by no means complacent and will consider whether its efforts
can be expanded or improved in the light of our forthcoming discussions
with the academic community.
24. EGAD stated in its evidence to the Committee
that "there are still some areas of uncertainty within the
trade controls legislation" which need to be addressed. EGAD
pointed out that while the Export Control Organisation stated
that the transfer of software and technology was not controlled
as such under the trade controls, the transfer of technology can
be caught, where this was related to "restricted goods"
or "embargoed destinations", as the provision of technology
could be construed as "an act calculated to promote"
a trade deal. (QM14) What is the Government's view of EGAD's analysis?
EGAD's analysis is correct. The trafficking
and brokering of technology is not subject to export controls.
But where technology is not the subject of the export itself,
but is used by a UK concern as a medium, to promote the trafficking
and brokering of restricted goods or of controlled goods to embargoed
destinations, that act of promotion is controlled, whether it
is done by the provision of technology or by any other means.
A theoretical example of when this might happen would be when
an exhibitor attending a trade fair in the hope of cultivating
customers for Restricted Goods (say Unmanned Air Vehicles) might
feel that it was necessary to display technology relating to those
goods in a more professional manner. The exhibitor might therefore
ask a software house to produce an interactive display package.
In doing so, the exhibitor would pass, to the software house,
technology in hard copy form and receive back, technology in the
form of an interactive display package. In this instance, technology
has been used as a medium to promote, on behalf of the exhibitor,
the potential sale of Restricted Goods and so the provision of
it to that exhibitor would be subject to export control.
Although this is an area that is somewhat more
difficult to explain than others, the Government thinks that it
is clear when the controls apply. We are not aware that UK companies
are encountering significant difficulties in this area, but will
of course look seriously at any evidence that is put forward during
the forthcoming public consultation. We will also consider whether
current guidance adequately explains this distinction and take
steps to clarify it further if necessary.
25. To what extent, if at all, does the Government
consider that transfers of technology are covered by trade controls?
The Committee should appreciate any examples which might illustrate
this issue.
Technology is controlled where it relates to
the export from the UK of goods that are controlled for strategic
purposes, and, in the context of Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes,
under the provisions of the Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology
and Provision of Technical Assistance Order 2003. This Order controls
the transfer of software or technology by any person in the UK,
or by any UK person overseas, where that person is aware, or has
been informed that the technology may be used in support of a
Weapons of Mass Destruction programme of concern outside the EU.
DUAL-USE
26. At its meeting on 7 December 2006 the
Quadripartite Committee received evidence supporting the extension
of "catch-all" provisions from WMD to dual-use items
with a military end-use and to items used for torture. The Committee
would be grateful for the Government's views on two aspects of
such a control. First, catch-all brings within control specific
goods which the Government has notified should not be exported.
What evaluation has the Government made of the effectiveness of
such a control if applied to dual-use goods used for a military
purpose and to items used for torture? Second, there is a requirement
for a degree diligence on the exporter. What level of diligence
does the Government expect from an exporter for items that could
be used for WMD? In the Government's view could a similar level
of diligence be applied if catch-all were to be extended?
The Committee has again highlighted one of the
key issues for the Government's forthcoming review. As with many
other issues, it will undoubtedly be difficult to balance the
need to stop inherently undesirable activities with the need to
do so in a practical and enforceable way and without imposing
unreasonable burdens.
Exporters have a legal obligation to contact
the Export Control Organisation if they know or suspect that their
export will be used in connection with a Weapons of Mass Destruction
programme or associated WMD delivery systems. The ECO Website
provides extensive guidance to exporters, highlighting a number
of factors that could reasonably raise the exporter's suspicions.
Whether the same practices could be mirrored if catch all provisions
were extended to new areas will be one of the factors in which
evidence is specifically sought by the Government in the course
of the forthcoming review and will form part of the evaluation
at the end of that process.
27. On dual-use does the Government envisage
any practical problems with a threshold system as operated by
the USA?
The Government's stance is as set out in the
response to Question 17.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
28. In its evidence to the Committee EGAD
stated that companies in those areas where the broadest possible
level of control has been sought such as the Chemical Biological
Radiological and Nuclear sector, and dealing with "Restricted
Goods" have encountered compliance issues which we do not
believe had been foreseen or intended. EGAD cited the requirement
on Jane's Information Group "to apply for trade control licences
for the production of its publications, where they are carrying
advertising for `restricted goods', or for companies to have to
have export control compliance coverage in place for submitting
CBRN-related technical information to our own Armed Forces (and
blue light services) here in the UK, prior to contract signature,
cannot have been foreseen or identified as having been amongst
those proliferation threats which needed to be brought under control,
as aspirations for the new legislation by HMG". (QM14) Does
the Government agree with EGAD's assertion?
The Government sees two separate issues here.
The Jane's Information Group example raises
questions about the coverage of Restricted Goods (see answer to
question 6 above) and about whether the legal provisions relating
to restricted goods are perhaps overzealous in bringing within
export controls, general advertising services such as those provided
by Jane's. The Government is open minded about both these issues;
we will continue to work with stakeholders to identify possible
solutions and will look very carefully at the evidence that is
brought before us as a result of the forthcoming public consultation.
The CBRN equipment issue is somewhat different.
In recent months, the Export Control Organisation has been working
very closely with EGAD to review the current coverage of OGELs.
A number of alterations to OGEL coverage have been agreed in principle,
and the necessary drafting work is now being undertaken with a
view to releasing a package of OGEL changes within the next two
months. Part of that package will be an extension to the Government
and NATO End Use OGEL, so as to allow that OGEL to be used for
supplies of the listed goods and technology where they are for
detection and identification purposes. In this way, OGEL coverage
for supplies by the CBRN equipment industry—which whilst
related to WMD are by definition, not of concern—will become
available. The Government believes that this will in large part
deal with the concerns raised above.
December 2006
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