Memorandum from the Campaign Against Arms
Trade
1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT)
is working for the reduction and ultimate abolition of the international
arms trade, together with progressive demilitarisation within
arms-producing countries.
2. CAAT would like to draw the Committee's
attention to issues with regard to Saudi Arabia; Israel; Libya;
the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) Strategic Marketing
Analysis; the export licence application process; and the Quarterly
figures.
SAUDI ARABIA
3. It is disappointing that the UK government
continues to court the rulers of Saudi Arabia and to excuse their
behaviour in the quest for arms sales. The desire to seal the
contract for the sale of 72 Eurofighters appears paramount, and
blunts the impact of stated ongoing concerns about the human rights
situation and lack of democracy in Saudi Arabia.
4. CAAT hopes that the Attorney General
will not accede to Saudi demands, reported in the Sunday Times
on 19 November 2006, that the Serious Fraud Office investigation
into allegations of corruption around deals with BAE Systems be
dropped. Unless the UK is genuinely serious about combating corruption,
its appeals to overseas governments to clamp down will appear
hypocritical and are likely to be ignored.
5. On a more general note, CAAT would suggest
that the Committee keep a watch on the financing of the Eurofighter
deal as it is clear from contemporary documents obtained from
the National Archive that there were significant concerns, not
least from the Treasury and the Bank of England, about the financial
arrangements for Al Yamamah 1 and 2.
6. The benefit to the UK of the Eurofighter
sale remains open to question, especially given the multi-national
production of the aircraft. For instance, CAAT has been told by
the Defence Procurement Agency that the only estimates of Eurofighter
Typhoon employment have been generated by industry, no independent
study has been undertaken.
ISRAEL
7. CAAT is amazed that, despite the frequent
use of arms against the Palestinians, the UK government continues
to licence the export of military equipment to Israel, both directly
and via the United States as components to be incorporated in
US supplied weaponry.
8. The amazement turned to bewilderment
and anger when no embargo was imposed during the war against Lebanon.
Although the UK is only a small supplier to Israel, an embargo
is nonetheless vital as it would send a strong message of disapproval
of that country's military actions.
9. It is even unclear how the UK government
monitors the use by Israel of equipment which includes UK parts.
Questioned by your Committee on 25 April 2006, Foreign Office
Minister, Dr Kim Howells MP, said that, on a visit to Israel,
he did not see any UK equipment being used. Since most of the
licences granted are for components, this is hardly surprising.
10. In its response to the Committee's report
for the session 2005-06, the Government says: "UK Overseas
Posts have standing instructions to report any misuse of UK-origin
defence equipment." Are the Posts given full information
about the licences granted, including of the equipment in which
the components are incorporated, in order that they are able to
monitor its use? Without such information, it would appear impossible
to monitor the use of UK-origin equipment in Israel.
11. CAAT would suggest that the Committee
ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for sight of all the evidence
it has collected of Israeli use of UK-origin equipment, and an
assessment of how it thinks its information is comprehensive.
LIBYA
12. The Committee's report for the session
2005-06 mentions that the European Union is considering introducing
a "toolbox" for countries emerging from embargo status.
Disappointment was expressed that the "toolbox" had
not be used with respect to Libya. In fact, far from acting with
any restraint after the embargo was lifted, Libya was immediately
seen as a major marketing opportunity.
13. The embargo was lifted in October 2004.
In June 2005 the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) held
a seminar on Libya as an emerging market; according to the Defence
Manufacturers Association News in July 2005, Libya was seen as
"a relatively sophisticated customer with a political will
to procure equipment from the UK". DESO opened an office
in Tripoli in January 2006.
STRATEGIC MARKETING
ANALYSIS
14. As a result of Freedom of Information
requests, DESO has made its Strategic Marketing Analysis (SMA)
for the previous year available in the form of a snapshot of the
website from March 2005. CAAT would like to suggest that it would
be helpful if your Committee examined the SMA on a regular basis
and to consider its appropriateness given export guidelines.
15. The SMA also identifies categories of
priority markets. In March 2005 these were as follows.
The Priority Markets: Greece, India,
Japan, Malaysia, Oman, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand
and the USA.
The First Tier: Bahrain, Brunei, Chile,
Iraq, Libya, Poland, Qatar, South Korea and Trinidad &
Tobago.
The Middle Tier: Australia, Brazil, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Italy, Kuwait, Pakistan, South Africa,
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
The Bottom Tier: Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
Finland, France, Germany, Kazakhstan, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
Future Markets: Russia and Vietnam.
Miscellaneous: Bulgaria, Hungary, New
Zealand and Slovakia.
Background information is given as well as details
of prospects for UK sales.
HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EXPORT
LICENCE APPLICATIONS
16. In order to assess how much weight is
given to human rights when assessing export licence applications
it would be helpful to have more information on the role played
by the Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance Group (HRDGGG).
17. Greg Mulholland MP raised this issue
and asked the Foreign Secretary (Hansard, 19.7.06, Col
492/3W) how many applications for a standard individual export
licence were referred to her Department by the Export Licensing
Organisation (ELO) in 2005; how many of these applications were
considered by the HRDGG; in how many of these applications the
Group initially advised against the granting of a licence; how
many were the subject of written submissions from the Group; and
in how many cases where an initial recommendation for refusal
was issued by the HRDGG her Department recommended to the ELO
refusing that licence.
18. The FCO replied that it "received
7,381 standard individual export licence applications in 2005.
It is not possible to give a further breakdown of departmental
assessment of applications since this information is not recorded.".
19. The Annual Reports on Strategic Export
Controls give details of how many specific licences are refused,
revoked or withdrawn and why, so it would appear that the information
is recorded somewhere. There is, presumably, also a check on,
or audit of, the figures provided in the Quarterly and Annual
Reports.
20. In these circumstances, it is puzzling
that the information requested by Greg Mulholland is not available.
It would help shed light on the export licensing process were
it to be.
QUARTERLY FIGURES
21. The figures for the April to June 2006
quarter appeared on the Department of Trade and Industry website
on 28 September 2006. They were not in an obvious place on that
site, and did not appear with the other figures on the FCO site
until mid-November. CAAT understands there was some incompatibility
with format.
22. This is not the first time CAAT has
raised with the departments the issue of access to the figures.
The lack of consistency with their location has meant that CAAT
has been asked for comment on them before being able to find them.
It would be helpful if your Committee could stress to the two
departments the need for figures to be placed on both websites
at the same time.
DSO BRIBERY
23. In your Committee's report for the session
2005-06 it says that you will consider in this session the contentions
concerning the accuracy of the Ministry of Defence's 2003 memorandum
refuting allegations that bribes had been paid by the former Defence
Sales Organisation. CAAT is very willing to assist in your investigation
of this matter.
November 2006
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