Supplementary memorandum from the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE QUAD COMMITTEE DURING
THEIR VISIT OF 26 APRIL 2007
1. Which applications for export licences
are not seen by the FCO and why and whether the DTI's sifting
assessment is checked by a second officer within DTI?
The FCO's parliamentary responsibilities in
terms of export licensing were set out in Peter Hain's statement
to the House of 26 October 2000:
"All relevant individual licence applications
are circulated by DTI to other Government departments with an
interest, as determined by those departments in line with their
own policy responsibilities."
The FCO therefore has the remit to decide which
export licence applications (ELAs) it sees. The FCO chooses not
to see the following licences under standard circumstances:
No Licence Required (NLR): The FCO does not
have the capability or knowledge to analyse or question the technical
assessment and subsequent NLR rating that DTI Export Controls
Organisation make. The FCO would add no value by seeing these
licences.
Licence Required—End Use (LR-END): The
FCO routinely assesses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related
ELAs that are caught by the Multi-lateral Control Regimes eg Wassenaar,
MTCR, NSG. However, other ELAs for WMD-related material, which
fall outside of the regimes, but are "Licence-required"
because of concerns about the end user, are not seen. With such
ELAs the decision to refuse is dependent on a technical assessment
of the goods, coupled with intelligence which gives reason to
believe that the end user, is, or may be, involved in a WMD programme.
The FCO is entirely dependent on MOD and DTI input in these areas
and would add no value to the assessment process. We have therefore
decided not to see these applications, unless specifically requested
to do so by other Government Departments. FCO ministers have agreed
this policy.
Dealer to Dealer OIELs: The FCO does not assess
these applications. The EC Weapons Directive allows, with an export
licence, UK dealers to ship small arms and ammunition to their
counterparts in EU member states. The Exporter must inform the
Home Office of the details of the shipment at least 48 hours prior
to export. The Home Office passes these details on to the appropriate
Ministry in the recipient country. The FCO does not believe that
it would add anything to this process because of the safeguards
already in place and the low risk associated with these destinations.
The FCO will make an assessment of any ELA when
requested to do so by another Government department. In practice
other Government departments still seek our advice, where it is
appropriate, on more contentious cases. Interdepartmental consultation
within the export licensing community is increasingly close, and
other Government departments are well aware of FCO interest. The
FCO continues to attend the export licensing community refusals
meeting. All possible refusals for ELAs, including those for WMD-rated
goods (see paragraph 4), are discussed at this meeting.
Licensing supervisors in the DTI assess which
cases need to be circulated, against a number of criteria. Team
leaders in the DTI also carry out a check on all cases to sensitive
destinations to ensure that they have been processed correctly
before the finalisation of a case.
2. Whether the Government's discretion to
revoke an export licence is fettered in any cases by the need
to pay compensation to the exporter?
HMG has complete discretion to revoke an export
licence. Subject to due process and proper consideration, this
discretion is not fettered in any way, including the possibility
that compensation may need to be paid.
3. Whether, excluding countries subject to
an embargo, are there any countries whose human rights records
are so bad that the UK will not grant any exports?
As the Committee will know, all export licences
are assessed on a case by case basis at the time of application.
There are no "blanket bans" on exports from the UK.
As set out in Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National
Export Licensing Criteria, we will recommend refusal of any export
licence where we believe there to be a clear risk that the goods
to be exported might be used for internal repression.
May 2007
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