Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-239)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT
MP, MR PAUL
ARKWRIGHT AND
MS MARIOT
LESLIE
15 MARCH 2007
Q220 Robert Key: Do you know when
those decisions will be made?
Margaret Beckett: Because it is
an MoD review I do not really. I would have thought in the not-too-distant
future but I do not have a timeline, I am afraid.
Q221 Robert Key: Our understanding
is that there is a dispute about the cost of this. It is about
£11 million a year for services—
Margaret Beckett: I am not sure
there is a dispute about the cost; there may be a dispute about
who pays.
Q222 Robert Key: But you are not
going to pay, is that right? It would fall on the defence budget?
Margaret Beckett: I am not sure
how much of this is in the public domain—
Q223 Chairman: I think we are drawing
rather heavily on the Daily Telegraph. I must be transparent
about this.
Margaret Beckett: All I am able
to say at this moment in time is, I am sure everybody realises,
it is going to be a stretching public spending round and in the
FCO we have to look very carefully at what are going to be very
limited resources and make the best possible use we can of them.
Q224 Robert Key: What effect would
any cut, but certainly one as great as half, have on the Foreign
Office's ability to properly scrutinise licences for the export
of arms and sensitive goods?
Margaret Beckett: That is exactly
the kind of issue that I am sure Ministry of Defence will be taking
into account. What is the role, the scope, for their network and
consequently perhaps considering, although as you say all we have
is the Telegraph report at present, what that means, but
my understanding is what the Ministry of Defence is looking at
is the tasking of their defence attaché, and it may even
lead to a greater clarity about what that tasking is, and it would
certainly be more within Ministry of Defence's own remit. But
areas which would be of concern for us in this matter will obviously
also be of concern to Ministry of Defence, I would have thought.
Q225 Peter Luff: Foreign Secretary,
I suppose my concern is I understand the financial pressures you
are under, and Ministry of Defence and DTI, but I see our foreign
posts apparently are a coalition of at least three departments,
possibly more, all of whom are taking individual decisions to
cut posts which could have a cumulative impact on the issues we
are discussing in this Committee today, because I know UKTI are
withdrawing posts from very important places as well. It worries
me that the sum total could be very great as individual departments
decide to do things for their own personal reasons. Can you reassure
me there is oversight of the total impact of our representation
in the individual posts?
Margaret Beckett: You are making
a very strong point, Mr Luff. I think there is not any doubt that,
whichever the department, the Government as a whole has come to
the view that we need to have a keener sense of where our major
priorities lie. We are, for example, in our own department very
much reprioritising, beefing-up our posts in areas where we believe
the challenge and need will be greater in the future and in consequence
reducing areas where it would be enjoyable, comfortable, to continue
to maintain posts at the level we do. But given that resources
are limited, recognising we may have to reduce some where there
is perhaps a less pressing need in order to put resources where
there is definitely a need and where I am sure in this House and
across the board people would want us to put those resources.
Q226 Peter Luff: "We" as
a corporate "we", not as an FCO "we"?
Margaret Beckett: Yes—well,
perhaps I ought to say at the FCO that that is definitely what
we are doing. My understanding is that is what my colleagues are
also seeking to do; I am not trying to speak on behalf of my colleagues'
departments.
Q227 Chairman: The Committee absolutely
recognises that the scrutiny of individual licence applications
on a case-by-case basis is the foundation of the export control
regime, and it is critical and of supreme importance. However,
do you not agree that the only thing that really matters in relation
to arms exports is end-use? End-use is the be-all and end-all
of the control regime, and whilst the scrutiny of the original
licence application is central to trying to assure appropriate
end-use and not inappropriate end-use, the value of overseas posts
is in being able to spot, and this has happened in the past as
we all know, circumstances where UK arms are in the wrong place—perhaps
even, as we suggested, a more proactive scrutiny of exports to
particular destinations. Do you appreciate, Foreign Secretary,
our concern that that part of the exercise should not, in our
view, be diminished? Indeed we really feel that the opposite could
be justified?
Margaret Beckett: Yes, of course,
I appreciate your concern, and if you want to make a case to me
that the FCO ought to maintain and expand its posts anywhere in
the world I would be very happy to take delivery of it, and urge
you to raise it in other quarters!
Chairman: I did not quite say
that. Robert?
Q228 Robert Key: The arms market
is growing and over the past decade about a third of UK arms exports
went to regions of instability, to Saudi Arabia, Oman, India.
Are UK exports adding to regional tensions?
Margaret Beckett: No, I do not
believe so. That is obviously one of the areas we look at very
carefully bearing in mind, of course, that even in regions where
there is instability and there are difficulties, people have a
legitimate right to self-defence, which indeed might be even more
urgent if they are in regions of instability, but it is one of
the things that people do look at very carefully, as to whether
or not we might be—inadvertently no doubt—exacerbating
a situation.
Q229 Robert Key: How does that interface
with criterion 4 of the EU code about preserving regional security?
It seems to me there is contradiction here, that that particular
criterion is ineffectual?
Margaret Beckett: No, I would
not say that. I would strongly urge on the Committee the fact
that that is very much something we do take into account. Obviously
we assess any proposals against all the criteria, and we recognise
that as being one of the important ones.
Q230 Robert Key: The market is growing
fastest in those nations which are increasing their military capability
and modernising their Armed Forces, like India, for example, so
will we be exporting more to, for example, India and other countries,
just because they are growing faster and they are going to get
more of our arms exports, and will that not exacerbate instability
in these regions?
Margaret Beckett: We look very
carefully at applications in those circumstances precisely to
weigh whether or not these are applications for things which might
cause difficulty in times of instability, and, indeed, there are
applications which are rejected on very similar grounds.
Q231 Robert Key: Could you give us
an example of that?
Margaret Beckett: Can I send you
a note about it?
Robert Key: Thank you.
Q232 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Secretary
of State, could I ask you about the end-use of particular aircraft?
There was a recent case of maritime-patrol aircraft sold to the
Indian government which now wants to supply Burma with them, and
there is no explicit ban on that in the original contract. Do
you think there should have been?
Margaret Beckett: With the benefit
of hindsight I suppose one could say it might have been desirable
but I think the original contract would have been rather a long
time ago, possibly even decades, I am not quite sure, because
we are talking about quite elderly aircraft, but certainly obviously
that is something that if a similar export took place today one
would consider. We have been in touch with the Government of India
to express our concern and they have assured us that these are
unarmed aircraft and it is thought that that will remain the position,
and obviously we would look very carefully to see whether any
requests that were being made for military components in the future
might be relevant to these aircraft because, exactly as you say,
there was nothing in the original contract. Does anybody know
how long ago that contract was?
Ms Leslie: The 1980s.
Q233 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Could I
ask you about an allied issue of surplus military equipment? I
have asked a series of Parliamentary Questions about the disposal
of equipment to non governmental purchasers. The regulations are
quite good about supplying governments with this but I was very
surprised to be told by the Department of Defence that there is
no register of non-governmental buyers and no single set of general
rules relating to the disposal of equipment to non-governmental
purchasers. As a lot of the threats we face are non-governmental,
do you think there is a problem here? This is perhaps a slightly
detailed question.
Ms Leslie: I think all four of
the departments would apply the same criteria to non-governmental
purchasers as they would to governmental ones so in that sense
all of us including the Ministry of Defence would have a stake
in it, but in looking at a non-governmental purchaser we would
want to look at all the criteria in the export control regime
and look at it particularly carefully, because we would want knowledge
about a non-governmental purchaser and it might be more difficult
to come by than for a governmental one.
Q234 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Could I
suggest that in an age where non-state actors, as the vogue phrase
has it, are becoming more important this might be revisited? Particularly
I am really quite disturbed that there is no list of them and
no general rules so I think we ought to extend, as it were, to
private purchasers of these weapons really the same controls.
Could I suggest that perhaps we follow that one up?
Margaret Beckett: I think we can
follow it up during the review of the Export Control Act, because
it is a valid point.
Q235 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
paragraph 1(i) of the Oslo Declaration on the International Instruments
to prohibit cluster bombs that was promulgated on 23 February
says that this international agreement is going to, "prohibit
the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of those cluster
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians". Can
you tell us, Foreign Secretary, which categories of cluster bombs
in the British Government's view do not have the capacity of causing
"unacceptable harm to civilians"?
Margaret Beckett: Obviously cluster
bombs are designed for inflicting injury on the battlefield but
they do have a potential also for causing harm to civilians, so
it is not so much that we think there is a category that could
not potentially cause harm; it is the distinction, as I am sure
you are well aware, Sir John, between so-called dumb and smart
weapons; that there are some which have perhaps a greater capacity
to be used in a more targeted way, or which lose their capacity
perhaps after time to inflict that kind of injury, and others
which do not, which having been dropped just stay there as a potential
lethal weapon under all circumstances, and it is the distinction
between the one and the other, where one has an even greater capacity
to cause harm to civilians, that is intended, I believe, in the
wording of the Oslo Declaration.
Q236 Sir John Stanley: But, Foreign
Secretary, does not that distinction fall wholly to the ground
depending on the use which is made of cluster bombs, and it is
immaterial whether a cluster bomb is a smart cluster bomb or a
dumb cluster bomb if it is dropped on an area which is populated
by civilians? Is it not the case that it is bound to cause civilian
casualties?
Margaret Beckett: I think there
are two distinctions here. One is whether or not there is a proper
use of weapons, and any weapon can on occasion be misused; the
other is perhaps the general point about the use of cluster weapons
as against alternatives which are not cluster weapons at all,
and you will be much more familiar with this than me, Sir John,
from your experience in the Department of Defence but it is my
understanding that the military argue that, if one did not have
the opportunity to use cluster weapons, then in order to achieve
the same goal in a conflict situation it is likely you would have
to use much more substantial and heavier and much less well-targeted
munitions, which would be even more likely to cause even greater
damage to civilians. That is the military case, as I understand
it, for continued deployment of cluster weapons.
Q237 Sir John Stanley: So are we
right in concluding that the British Government's objective in
this forthcoming treaty will be to apply the treaty to dumb cluster
bombs only?
Margaret Beckett: We are happy
to work with the Oslo Declaration but our objective is to work
through the CCW process to try to get agreement. There is nothing
wrong with the Oslo process and that is why we were happy to go
along and to be part of it and encourage it, but engaging those
countries who are producers and users of cluster bombs seems to
us to be a more productive way forward and that is why we are
seeking in parallel to work through the CCW process. That does
not envisage, however, as you quite rightly identify, asserting
that there should be a ban on the use of cluster weapons at all,
for exactly the reasons I have just given.
Q238 Sir John Stanley: So can you
then confirm that the British Government's objective is to apply
the treaty provisions to dumb cluster bombs only?
Margaret Beckett: Our objective
is to phase out the use of such bombs and to encourage others
to phase them out and to get a treaty that bans them, yes.
Q239 Sir John Stanley: Thank you.
One other aspect on the use of cluster bombs, if I may. As I am
sure you are aware, Foreign Secretary, in the conflict in the
Lebanon last year the UN reports estimate that there were approximately
four million bomblets dropped in the course of that conflict,
and the UN also estimates that 90% of those four million bomblets
were dropped in the 72-hour period between the adoption of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 on 11 August and the
coming into effect of the ceasefire on 14 August, and those four
million bomblets were dropped over an area approximately one and
a half times the area of Greater London. Do you not agree, from
a humanitarian point of view, that to drop that number in that
particular timescale after the UN Resolution had been adopted
was an utterly indefensible action by the Israeli Government,
and can you point to one single public statement of condemnation
by the British Government in relation to the dropping of 90% of
the cluster munitions in that particular time period?
Margaret Beckett: First, I am
not familiar with the figure of four million that you give but
I do know there were very substantial cluster munitions used.
I do not know what the proportions are as between what was used
in the previous period and what was used in the last 72 hours,
but I have been into Lebanon and seen the work which we are substantially
funding and which is being done also by very many extraordinarily
courageous Britons involved in the relevant charities and groups
and so on there in order to try to clear up this whole area and
to try to remove all the remaining munitions. Obviously that will
take a period of some time. We have urged the Israeli government,
and continue to urge the Israeli Government, to issue to the United
Nations maps of where they believe any of this material could
have been distributed at whatever time in the conflict. I certainly
share the view, and I believe indeed the Israeli Government expressed
concern when these allegations were first made, that there had
been a misuse against regulations of some of this material and
are themselves I believe holding an inquiry, which I do not think
has yet reported. So certainly we share the concern that you have
expressed if events of the kind that are being suggested took
place. As to the issue of the final 72 hours, I think it is a
fairly open secret that we were among those who would have liked,
once the resolution was carried, the resolution to come into effect
at once, and put such an argument. It was not our decision that
there was a time delay between the resolution being carried at
the United Nations and it being implemented and brought into effect.
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