Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240-259)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT
MP, MR PAUL
ARKWRIGHT AND
MS MARIOT
LESLIE
15 MARCH 2007
Q240 Sir John Stanley: As you know,
Foreign Secretary, the present Government to its credit has a
very creditable record in relation to antipersonnel land mines.
Is it not surprising and, I would say, most regrettable that given
the stance which the British Government has taken on antipersonnel
land mines it has not, to my knowledge, on the record made a single
public denunciation of the sowing of what are effectively antipersonnel
land mines, those that do not detonate, over this hugely wide
area of southern Lebanon, and can I say to you, Foreign Secretary,
in terms of chapter and verse the UN Secretary General's report
on Resolution 1701 of 12 September last year says that according
to the United Nations Mine Action Co-ordinating Centre, "an
estimated 90% of all cluster bombs were discharged between the
time of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701/2006
on 11 August and the actual cessation of hostilities on 14 August".
Surely that statement from the UN should be the subject of a significant
public condemnation of the sowing over a huge area of what are
effectively anti personnel land mines in southern Lebanon?
Margaret Beckett: We certainly
are extremely concerned at the overall impact of the conflict
in Lebanon, including the activities to which you refer and the
remaining munitions and the problems with which the Government
of Lebanon has been left to grapple. We continually throughout
the period of the conflict sought ways which we judged would be
most effective to maintain pressure on all of those involved in
the combat, from whichever quarter, to bring it to an end as soon
as possible, to minimise all the humanitarian damage, and to act
in accordance with international law. We made those statements
repeatedly and in public and maintained that pressure all the
way through and we maintain it today.
Q241 Chairman: May I ask, Foreign
Secretary, why it should take the UK until 2015 to withdraw cluster
bombs from use by British forces? Why cannot we do it immediately?
Margaret Beckett: It is not really
a question for me but I believe we are hoping to try to do it
earlier.
Ms Leslie: I think the Ministry
of Defence keeps it under review all the time, and it is very
much a question for them.
Q242 Richard Burden: We have been
trying for some time to understand how our export policy works
in respect of arms exports to Israel and our report asked for
some further information about this because Britain's policy for
some time has been not to export arms, including weapons equipment
or components which could be used aggressively in the Occupied
Territories. Now, when we have asked what that means what we have
been told, and it is a formulation that is used in reply to us
and in reply to Parliamentary Questions and so on: "All applications
are considered on a case by case basis against the Consolidated
EU and National Export Licensing Criteria. Any licence which we
assess is inconsistent with the Criteria will be refused. This
includes taking into account Criterion 4, the preservation of
peace, security and stability." We still do not understand
what that means in the context of Israel.
Margaret Beckett: I am not sure
what you believe we sell to Israel by way of arms, Mr Burden,
but first of all there is a small amount of trade. I believe something
like 0.1% of Israel's total arms imports comes from the United
Kingdom and we have not sold main equipment like tanks or artillery
or warships to Israel since 1997, so it seems to me we are visibly
taking Criterion 4 into account.
Q243 Richard Burden: Are we saying
that "deployed aggressively" is synonymous with Criterion
4?
Margaret Beckett: Well, we do
not sell them anything particularly. We just do not have a ban
on sales.
Q244 Richard Burden: I have not got
the figures to hand but I think you will find that arms exports
to Israel have been going up in recent years.
Margaret Beckett: The figure I
have is it is 0.1% of their total arms imports. It is miniscule.
We do not sell them anything major, as I say, precisely because
we do take account of Criterion 4, as you would wish us to do.
Q245 Richard Burden: So do you see
the Occupied Territories as a separate country from Israel?
Margaret Beckett: We are extremely
mindful of all the political connotations of the relationship
between Israel and the Occupied Territories but I repeat, we look
very carefully at these issues, we take the Criteria into account,
and we make almost no sales to Israel.
Q246 Richard Burden: You see, there
have been a number of questions put down from myself and others
about this and this is the first time I have actually been told
that the application of Criterion 4 is something to do with the
amount of arms we export to Israel—
Margaret Beckett: I am not saying
that.
Q247 Richard Burden: Before that
what was said was that cases are assessed on a case-by-case basis
and that there is regular monitoring of uses to which arms exports
from the UK, directly or indirectly, are being or could be put.
In fact going back to your predecessor's time one of the reasons
why that monitoring was meant to be going on was because it had
been discovered some years ago that goods that had been exported
from this country with an assurance from Israel that they would
not be used aggressively on the Occupied Territories and they
were being so used. Now, presumably some of those goods could
still be there, so what monitoring does take place?
Margaret Beckett: I would make
two points. First, I am not saying that Criterion 4 is judged
in terms of quantities; I am simply saying that the facts as we
understand them as to the quantities of sales are evidence that
we are not ignoring Criterion 4 which, if I understood it, was
your original assertion. Secondly, on monitoring, this goes back
to the question we were discussing before about how we carry out
monitoring. Our Embassy keeps a very close eye on these things;
they are extremely conscious of the interest, the concern and
the political sensitivity of these matters, and if there are any
reports that indicate that there is misuse of material that might
have been exported many years ago then clearly they look at it
and draw it to the attention of the relevant authorities. So we
monitor to the greatest degree we can but we go back again to
the other question I was asked earlier by Mrs Gilroy of the difficulty
of detailed end-use monitoring.
Q248 Richard Burden: If it was discovered,
theoretically, that there were arms or components exported from
the UK that were being used by Israel in attacks such as the one
embarked on against Lebanon last year, would those, if they were
discovered, be regarded as being in breach of Criterion 4?
Margaret Beckett: Well, they might
be in breach of a number of the criteria. If we discovered that
equipment had been sold to Israel on the basis of it not being
used and, inconsistent with the Criteria, was being so used then
we would regard that with grave concern and we would make sure
we did not issue licences for such equipment in the future.
Q249 Richard Burden: Is there any
reason why, if the attack on Lebanon would have been regarded
as in breach of Criterion 4 and if there were arms being used
for that, the Government did not impose an arms embargo on Israel
when it attacked Lebanon?
Margaret Beckett: Well, we are
drifting rather into the territory of a discussion about the conflict
in Lebanon last summer, which I did not think was the purpose
of this inquiry—
Q250 Chairman: It is Mr Burden's
last question on this.
Margaret Beckett: Obviously we
looked at all the implications but, as I say, our arms involvement
with Israel is so small that it was really not particularly relevant
to the conflict. Our concern was much more to do everything we
could in the way we judged to be likely to be most effective to
bring that conflict to an end as early as possible and it was
to that that we devoted our efforts.
Q251 Malcolm Bruce: I was one of
a number of MPs who gave evidence to the OECD Peer Review on Britain's
performance on anticorruption and bribery—
Margaret Beckett: Supportively,
I am sure, Mr Bruce!
Q252 Malcolm Bruce: Not entirely
but then nor were the OECD entirely impressed, not least because
the then Chairman of the Defence Select Committee said that everybody
knew that arms sales were corrupt and he would be very surprised
if British arms contracts were not secured without bribery and
corruption, which possibly did not help the outcome. But can I
say that we have seen that the OECD have now returned to this
and their Anti Bribery Group has met this week and has expressed
serious concerns on the fact that the BAE al-Yamamah investigation
has been halted and are sending examiners next year to review
Britain's performance on corruption. How do you react to that
proposal from the OECD?
Margaret Beckett: Calmly, Mr Bruce.
We were due to have our performance on corruption reviewed in
any event so all they are saying is they will continue to do what
they were already going to do.
Q253 Malcolm Bruce: I do not think
that is the case. What they said was, and I quote from the Financial
Times and Mark Peith, the Chairman of the Anti Bribery Group:
"The action on the UK was very, very tough and reflected
anxiety that the BAE case highlighted more general concerns about
Britain's failure successfully to investigate and prosecute alleged
foreign bribery", and, indeed, these are not just external
suggestions. The largest pension fund in the city, Hermes, says
that this decision has deeply damaged the City of London and Britain's
reputation as a financial centre. So can you say in the light
of the OECD's reaction what credibility this leaves the United
Kingdom with in the international fight against bribery and corruption?
Can I also say as Chairman of the International Development Committee,
where governance and anti corruption is the hallmark and the touchstone
of the Department for International Development's White Paper,
that it is not a very helpful backdrop with which to be trying
to engage developing countries on integrity and anti corruption,
if we are being investigated in this way by the OECD?
Margaret Beckett: I repeat that
my understanding is that the OECD was due to look at it. I am
aware that the Working Group has published a report. I have not
had the opportunity to look at it, other matters have been taking
my time over the last 24 hours, but I would simply make two points.
First, the Chairman of the Working Group is entitled to say what
he chooses. I reject utterly any suggestion that this Government
has behaved in any way which was less than honourable or that
this casts any doubt, and I am surprised if somebody in the City
is so foolish as to have said so, on the determination of our
Government to deal with corruption and those policies, which as
you quite correctly say is in many ways the work and the responsibility
of my colleague in DFID, and responsibilities which are discharged
very honourably. But I think there are many who it suits to disregard
the clear advice of the Attorney General, that having looked carefully
and in-depth at the cases being considered he had come to the
conclusion that it was unlikely, even after substantial further
investigation, to reach fruition, and that was the precisely the
nature of the decisions that the Attorney General and the Serious
Fraud Office have to take. I am mindful of the fact that the predecessor
of the present Director General of the SFO, Rosalind Wright, interestingly
volunteered on to the public record both that it was not at all
unusual in the work of the SFO for detailed cases of this kind—and
I do not mean in this area but cases of this detail and complexity—to
be pursued through investigation for a considerable period of
time and then for it to be found that they could no longer be
pursued because it simply was not going anywhere, that there was
nothing at all unusual about this, and she also went out of her
way—which I thought was very helpful considering the tone
of some of the media comment on anything he does at present—to
say how impressed she had always been with the meticulous, thorough
and entirely scrupulous and honourable conduct of the Attorney
General in dealing with all these cases.
Q254 Malcolm Bruce: I can understand,
and it is quite normal, that public prosecution cases are abandoned
because of disproportionate time and effort but that is not what
the Attorney General said when the announcement was made. What
he said was that it was to safeguard national and international
security.
Margaret Beckett: No, with respect,
Mr Bruce. It depends on what coverage you read, I know. I recognise
that most of the media concentrated on the issues of national
and security interest but I assure you the Attorney General was
very clear, particularly in his earlier statements, where he stressed—and
I remember very distinctly seeing comments in which he made this
plain—that he had spent not hours but a considerable amount
of time, days at least, going through the material in-depth and
had come to the view that this was a potential prosecution that
was not going anywhere—
Q255 Malcolm Bruce: Finally—
Margaret Beckett: —and he
laid initially all his emphasis on that, but of course it was
the other that was more interesting to people.
Q256 Malcolm Bruce: Finally, and
shortly, then, is it not still a matter of concern that since
we passed the law in 2001 we have not been able to bring any prosecutions
in this situation, and therefore that argument may be valid but
at some point or other we do need to have a successful prosecution
to reassure people we mean to do it?
Margaret Beckett: There is other
work continuing, as you know, and other investigation, and there
is no suggestion that it should not continue. It will be within
your memory, I know—and I am not in any sense criticising
the SFO—that there is a concern about whether we are getting
as much success, and this is nothing to do with the bribery and
corruption now, in this considerably difficult area.
Q257 Peter Luff: The FCO's Human
Rights Annual Report is an extremely valuable document, obviously,
and of use to this Committee in particular, and by definition
when a country is listed as being a "major country of concern"
in that Report it is going to have a bad human rights record.
What I want to try and tease out is how explicit the link has
to be between an export and the risk of its use for internal repression
before an export licence is refused, and being a practical person
can I use two hypothetical examples? It is quite obvious that
any application to export riot control equipment to Zimbabwe would
clearly be completely unacceptable at present, and would have
been for a long time, but what about armoured trucks for the Vietnamese
Army which could be used to defend Vietnam but also used to repress
public demonstrations?
Margaret Beckett: I do not know
whether what I am about to say will help your query or not, Mr
Luff. Obviously we take a certain amount of account of the country—for
example, if it were Burma then we just would not be selling anything—but
the emphasis on scrutinising and taking human rights issues into
account is more on the basis of what is the equipment rather than
the top of the list being what is the country, so that is always
what you would look at. First, is this equipment that could be
misused in this way, and then one would look at whether these
are circumstances in which one might anticipate it would be safe
to let such equipment go, or not so safe. I think I have that
right.
Q258 Peter Luff: But equipment can
have a dual use in the sense it can be used for strictly defensive
purposes or purposes of repression.
Margaret Beckett: This is why
this is such an interesting and complex area of work, and I have
great sympathy with those who engage in it day-to-day. I am happy
to say it is something that does not cross ministers' desks all
that often.
Q259 Peter Luff: Would it not simplify
your job immensely to have a presumption of denial for countries
on the list?
Ms Leslie: Possibly. If I may
remind the Committee of Criterion 2 which is about human rights,
it says in that: "The Government considers that in some cases
the use of force by a government within its own borders, for example,
to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals,
is legitimate and does not constitute internal repression".
I can think of a number of countries where we might have serious
concerns about human rights but rather good co-operation on counter
narcotics, for instance, and there might be occasions in which
we wanted to give potential dual-use equipment to a counter narcotics
force provided we were very satisfied with all the measures we
would take to assure ourselves we could be satisfied that we could
give or sell material to a counter narcotics force and work with
it in the mutual interests of dealing with crime, for instance.
So I think a blanket criterion that removed the ability to take
a case-by-case approach to this would not necessarily be in our
interests.
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