Capability gap
7. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) White
Paper made clear the MoD's policy that the UK's Armed Forces should
switch from their Cold War posture of static deployments to a
more flexible posture in which forces were capable of being deployed
rapidly on expeditionary war-fighting and peace-support missions.
The 2003 Defence White Paper stated that the Armed Forces should
be configured to support this changed posture and identified the
requirement for a medium-weight armoured vehicle fleet to improve
the UK's ability to undertake expeditionary operations.[11]
8. The MoD's submission to this inquiry describes
its 'Balanced Force' concept which seeks to bridge the capability
gap between heavy and light forces. It aims to create "a
medium force which provides better protection and firepower than
light forces but without the deployment, logistic and mobility
penalties associated with heavy force".[12]
9. The Army's need for medium-weight armoured vehicles,
providing sufficient protection and mobility, has been highlighted
by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was made clear to
us by Service personnel during our visits to Iraq and Afghanistan
in the summer of 2006. In South East Iraq, we were told that Snatch
Land Rovers were fast and manoeuvrable but were particularly vulnerable
to attack from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Rocket
Propelled Grenades (RPGs).[13]
Similar concerns were expressed to us during our visit to UK forces
deployed in Afghanistan. The vulnerability of the soft skinned
Snatch Land Rover to IEDs is made clear by the fact that, as at
December 2006, 24 Service personnel had been killed in roadside
bomb attacks while patrolling in Land Rovers since 2000.[14]
10. On 6 July 2006, during a debate on Armed Forces
Personnel, the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Des Browne
MP, acknowledged the need to provide Snatch with greater armoured
protection and electronic counter measures.[15]
On 11 July 2006, in evidence given to us, Mr Browne said that
the threat of IEDs
has generated a set of circumstances where…we
need to look at whether there is a need for something between…Snatch
Land Rovers as a form of land transport and the Warrior.[16]
On 24 July 2006, the Secretary of State announced
that the MoD had procured "around 100" US-made Mastiff
and 100 UK-made Vector armoured vehicles to "address the
gap between Warrior and lighter patrol vehicles such as Snatch
in the…short term"[17]
(the procurement of Mastiff and Vector is covered in paragraphs
15-22).
11. The impression that the Army's current armoured
vehicle fleet lacks sufficient capability for expeditionary operations
was reinforced by General Figgures who told us that recent operational
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan had demonstrated that the Army
needs a medium force "in order that we can fight as we would
wish to fight".[18]
12. The requirement for a new medium-weight
fleet of vehicles was identified in the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review. The experience of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has
strengthened the urgent operational need for this requirement.
The Snatch Land Rover is very mobile but has proved vulnerable
to attack from Improvised Explosive Devices and Rocket Propelled
Grenades, whereas the Warrior is sufficiently armoured against
most threats but lacks mobility. If the UK is to execute its expeditionary
policy effectively, the Army urgently requires a fleet of vehicles
which are rapidly deployable yet provide sufficient protection
for Service personnel.
Table 1: Army's fighting vehicle fleet
