House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Seventh Report

4 Meeting the requirement in the longer-term

23. The MoD's first approach to meeting the requirement for a medium-weight vehicle was to enter a collaborative programmes with other nations: firstly TRACER and secondly the MRAV 'Boxer' programmes.

24. The Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) programme was a UK-American collaborative project, begun in 1998, which intended to produce a land command vehicle fitted with Information Surveillance Target Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR) equipment.[34] The TRACER programme was terminated in October 2001[35] following a "joint UK / US decision".[36] The Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) told us that the US pulled out of the project because it "was not what they wanted and we were left stranded".[37] In total, the MoD had spent £131 million on the TRACER project before it was terminated at its concept stage. CDP told us that this expenditure was not entirely wasted because work on TRACER was fed into the initial work on FRES:

…the project teams that were available at Abbey Wood would have drawn on the documents and the information which was learned from that work and used it as part of …their fund of knowledge as to what the requirement was and what sort of technologies were going to be needed to meet it.[38]

25. The Multi Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) 'Boxer' programme, which began in 1999, was initially a UK-German development programme joined later by the Netherlands. The programme was intended to provide a replacement capability for the Army's armoured and mechanised force roles currently provided for by "Saxon, the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) and the FV430 armoured personnel carrier series of vehicles".[39] The MoD's submission states that the MoD withdrew from the MRAV programme in 2002 "because it was judged that MRAV would not be ideally suited to the type of operations envisaged under the Strategic Defence Review New Chapter and other developing policy work" and "the need for rapid deployability in expeditionary operations" as borne out by the experience of operations.[40] MoD expenditure on the MRAV programme totalled £57 million.[41]

26. The TRACER and MRAV programmes cost a combined total of £188 million. The MoD asserts that output from these programmes has informed work on the FRES programme, but it is not clear how. The MoD should explain in its response to this report how the work carried out on the TRACER and MRAV programmes has contributed to the FRES programme.

FRES 2001-2003: "the in-house concept phase"

27. In 2001, the MoD began a UK programme to meet the requirement, FRES. The MoD described this initial work as "in-house concept studies".[42] In October 2002 the MoD let a non-competitive contract to Alvis Vickers (as the prime contractor) to work on FRES[43] in partnership with BAE Systems (as Systems Engineers) and General Dynamics UK (providing network-enabling expertise).[44] During our evidence session on 12 December 2006, CDP at first stated that he was unsure of the exact purpose of the Alvis Vickers contract, but subsequently described it as a "pre-initial gate concept phase contract".[45]

28. According to the MoD, the Alvis Vickers contract was completed in July 2003 at a cost to the MoD of £4million.[46] Press reports stated that in addition to that expenditure, Alvis Vickers had invested "considerable amounts of their own funds….[and] developed a dedicated FRES facility in Leeds".[47] BAE Systems, which bought Alvis Vickers in June 2004,[48] have told us that "the contract was terminated in July 2003 by the Defence Procurement Agency after the procurement strategy for a non-competitive approach was not approved by the Investment Approvals Board".[49]

29. When we asked CDP what tangible output had resulted from the work carried out by Alvis Vickers, he told us that "this is a typical piece of procurement where we do some pre-initial gate work and then we decide what the parameters are going to be for the assessment phase".[50] The MoD's further written submission states that the work by Alvis Vickers produced "the development of initial cost estimates and a programme schedule, which formed the baseline for planning future activities with a particular focus on the Assessment Phase".[51]

30. Following the completion of the work carried out by Alvis Vickers, the Initial Gate Business Case was approved in April 2004. This is the date regarded by the MoD as "formally the start point of FRES as a programme".[52] On 5 May 2004 the Minister of State for the Armed Forces announced that the FRES programme would begin a two year initial Assessment Phase.[53]

31. Following the completion of the work carried out by Alvis Vickers between 2001-03, and over six years after the requirement for medium-weight forces was articulated in the Strategic Defence Review, FRES remained no more tangible than a concept.

The requirement

32. The MoD states that the FRES programme is expected to deliver over 3,000 vehicles in up to 16 battlefield roles and comprise three families of vehicles: Utility, Reconnaissance and Heavy.[54] The FRES programme is currently focused on delivering variants of the Utility family of vehicles: the Protected Mobility, Command and Control and Medical vehicles. The Reconnaissance and Heavy vehicles will be delivered "sometime thereafter".[55] CDP told us that the current working estimate for delivering the three vehicle variants of FRES was £14 billion.[56]

33. The FRES Utility vehicle will "equip UK Armed Forces with new medium-weight armoured vehicles that will be effective across the full spectrum of operations including rapid intervention, enduring peacekeeping and peace enforcement".[57] The MoD's submission states that:

FRES will deliver increased capability with higher levels of strategic deployability, survivability and lethality than our existing lighter armoured vehicles, with the potential to further enhance its capability as new technology becomes available.[58]

34. The MoD told us that FRES must deliver four core capabilities:[59]

Survivability: through the integration of "passive and active armour and other vehicle protection technologies";
Deployability: it must be able to be transported by an A400M;
Networked enabled capability: it must incorporate Bowman and ISTAR[60] and other advanced digital communication systems (both data and voice) to allow full integration of the vehicles into the wider military network; and
Through-life upgrade potential: It must be capable of being developed and throughout its expected battlefield life of 30 years.

35. In addition to providing a new capability, FRES is expected to replace the Army's ageing Saxon, Scimitar and elements of the FV430 series of vehicles.[61] According to the MoD, the average age of its FV430 vehicle is 41 years; for the CVR(T) it is 34 years; and for the Saxon it is 17 years.[62]

36. The MoD describes the FRES requirement as "complex and challenging".[63] The scale of the challenge is illustrated by the expectation that each FRES vehicle will have "an on-board [electronics] system of similar complexity to a small aircraft".[64]

The weight challenge

37. CDP told us that operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular the threat posed by the latest generation of IEDs, had resulted in an adaptation of the FRES requirement. In particular, it had been decided that FRES should be more heavily armoured than originally envisaged:

[FRES]...in 2001, was conceived largely to be a capability which would be used in conventional, high-intensity operations. What we have seen over the last few years is a much greater use of this sort of capability in peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations. It puts you into a totally different position vis-à-vis your ability to defend against a threat, and we have uncovered a whole lot of much more difficult threats in the last few years than had previously been anticipated.[65]

38. The requirement for additional armour inevitably added to the weight of the FRES requirement. MoD notes that some of its capability requirements can be contradictory and that trade-offs between them have to be made.[66] General Figgures told us that:

if we wish to provide protection against every known anti-armoured weapon we would end up (and it is absurd) with something that might weigh 160-odd tonnes. That is of no military use so we are going to have to make some judgments about survivability, capacity and so on, against what is possible and what has military utility in the hands of the soldiers.[67]

39. Increasing the armour of the proposed FRES vehicle has increased the weight specification from 17 tonnes to between 20-27 tonnes.[68] The increased weight specification in turn resulted in the MoD dropping its requirement that the Utility vehicle be transportable by a C-130J Hercules transport aircraft and instead specifying that it be transportable by the proposed C-130J replacement, the A400M.[69] CDP told us that:

There is no nation in the world today that has a plan for being able to produce a vehicle that light which has the degree to be able to be transported in a C-130J and to be able to have the protective mobility when it is deployed and goes on operations.[70]

40. The A400M project has itself been subject to programme delays. CDP told us that any further delays to the A400M project would delay the deployment of FRES.[71] We intend to examine the progress of the A400M project shortly, as part of an inquiry into strategic lift.

41. A vital requirement for FRES is that the vehicle will provide sufficient protection against Improvised Explosive Devices and Rocket Propelled Grenades. In the light of operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MoD has revised upwards its armour requirement for FRES. Consequently, the weight requirement for the vehicle has increased from 17 tonnes to between 20-27 tonnes. We consider it vital that UK troops are provided with sufficient protection and that the FRES requirement must be adapted to reflect this.

42. We note the tension between the requirements that the FRES Utility vehicles provide sufficient protection and that they be quickly deployable. The requirement that the FRES Utility vehicle should be transportable by the Hercules C130J proved over-ambitious. It remains to be seen whether transportability by A400M is achievable.

43. We are concerned that there could be a vicious circle of delays as the requirement is continually revised. It is unrealistic for the MoD to seek a perfect solution to its medium-weight vehicle requirement. If it is impossible to develop sufficient armoured protection for the FRES Utility vehicle while remaining within current weight requirements, the MoD should make a decision as to which is its priority. Failing to make the decision will simply cause further delay.

An off-the-shelf solution?

44. In January 2006 the Army held a "Fleet Review" to consider whether any current armoured vehicles met the FRES requirement.[72] Dr Watson, Operations Director of Information Superiority, told us that Piranha III, manufactured by Mowag, a Swiss company owned by General Dynamics,[73] was rejected because "it does not meet the protection, mobility or capacity needs that we require".[74] The US Stryker vehicle, a variant of Piranha, developed and deployed to Iraq within 24 months, was also considered but rejected owing to "its limited development potential".[75] We asked the MoD what credible options had been considered when deciding whether or not to procure an off-the-shelf vehicle. CDP told us:

you could not go and buy something off-the-shelf today which would meet that. We have tested it. We did the research, we held a fleet review with the Army, with representatives of all parts of the Army who had an expert view on this, and presented to them what the products available today are. On the Utility variant the Army unanimously said that it did not want to go for one of those products.[76]

45. CDP told us that the key issue was the capacity of a vehicle to be developed through its life (estimated as 30 years) to meet future operational threats.[77] General Figgures told us that the MoD was looking for a vehicle which could withstand the additional weight of armour and new technology over the vehicle's lifetime "in the order of between ten and fifteen per cent" without compromising the vehicle's manoeuvrability.[78]It is the MoD's judgment that no vehicle currently in production meets that requirement.

46. The MoD considers that there is no off-the-shelf vehicle available which would be capable of meeting its FRES requirement. It bases this judgment on its requirement that the chosen platform should be capable of supporting upgrades for the next thirty years.

47. The MoD must ensure there is scope to upgrade FRES in the future. This must include the scope to insert new technologies which must increase the vehicle's protection. Without this, the MoD would have to procure vehicles off-the-shelf every time operational threats changed. This would be unacceptable.

48. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen UK Forces deployed alongside the forces of the United States and other NATO countries. We asked the MoD whether it had ruled out collaborating with other nations on developing a vehicle such as the USA's Future Combat System (FCS) or other European projects. CDP told us that:

…the Americans fight in a very different way, their doctrine is different, so we are responding to a requirement which is set by the British Army and there will be a lot of the technology which is potentially relevant, certainly it is vital that we remain interoperable, but there are no plans at the moment to do a co-operative programme based on FCS with the Americans.[79]

49. The European Defence Agency (EDA) submission provides a list of European armoured vehicles currently in use or being developed for deployment within the next ten years (including the MRAV programme which the UK had been a partner until 2002).[80] The EDA submission notes that collaborative projects within Europe on armoured vehicles are rare at the system level with cooperation more commonly occurring "on sub-system programmes".[81]

50. A further submission stated that the user requirement for FRES is "very similar" to Sweden's SEP (Spitterskyddad Enhets Platform) armoured vehicle programme being developed by BAE Systems Hägglunds. The submission also states that for the Swedish Government "a bilateral co-operation with the UK has a high priority".[82]

51. We consider it surprising that the MoD has found no scope for collaboration with international partners on developing FRES, particularly at the sub-systems level. The MoD should consider whether there is any scope for exploiting synergies with the programmes of other nations aimed at meeting a similar requirement to FRES.

FRES 2004 to date

The Initial Assessment Phase

52. On 5 May 2004 the Minister for the Armed Forces announced a two year Initial Assessment Phase (IAP) for the FRES Utility vehicle programme. The MoD describes the objectives of the IAP as: defining the requirement; understanding and mitigating the risk; and recommending an optimum acquisition strategy.[83] There is a wide range of interests involved in the delivery of the FRES IAP: the MoD, the Army, the Systems House and defence companies.

53. The IAP was originally scheduled to be completed by November 2006. It was subsequently extended until July 2007 "to take full account of the outputs from the Technology Demonstrator Programmes contracts which were awarded later than originally planned".[84] The MoD submission states that it expects to spend £120 million on the IAP phase of FRES Utility vehicle.[85]

THE ROLE OF THE MOD

54. Within the MoD, the responsibility for delivering the FRES programme falls on the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) led by CDP.[86] CDP told us his main role with regard to FRES was to provide the resources for FRES and sit as a member of the Investment Approvals Board.[87] Reporting to CDP, the Operations Director oversees the FRES Integrated Project Team (IPT).[88] The project sponsor and 'customer' for FRES is the Deputy Chief of Staff (Equipment Capability), Lieutenant General Andrew Figgures. General Figgures told us that as project sponsor he had to "identify the requirement and ensure that we have optimised it; and then ensure that I put enough…money to it to ensure that we deliver it".[89]

55. CDP told us on 12 December 2006 that 42 DPA staff were working on the FRES programme: 29 civilians and 13 Army personnel. Including Service personnel and secondees from industry the FRES team totals 125.[90] He added that he anticipated recruiting a further 14 staff in the near future.[91]

56. Staff from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), the MoD agency responsible for providing scientific and technical research and advice to the MoD, provide technical support to the IPT in the areas of armoured vehicle engineering.[92] We are currently examining the work of Dstl in a separate inquiry.[93]

57. In our Defence Procurement 2006 inquiry, CDP acknowledged that front-line users were not consulted regularly enough on equipment procurement projects.[94] We were keen to determine whether the ultimate front-line user of FRES, the soldier, was consulted adequately throughout the FRES programme. General Figgures told us that representatives of people at all levels were involved in specifying the FRES requirement including gunners, infantrymen, radio operators and command post operators.[95]

58. The success of the FRES programme is dependent on the knowledge and experience of a wide range of Army personnel, including those who will use the vehicles, being applied to the programme. The MoD must ensure that the interests of the soldiers who will use FRES are considered fully when defining the FRES vehicle requirement.

THE ROLE OF THE SYSTEMS HOUSE

59. The Integrated Project Team (IPT) is assisted by Atkins Defence, the defence arm of Atkins, a management and engineering consultancy.[96] Atkins' role is 'Systems House' to the FRES project. Atkins was appointed to the Systems House role in November 2004.[97] Dr Watson of the MoD told us that the purpose of the Systems House was to:

provide us with a significant volume of expert help in order to undertake the detailed engineering and technical assessment that was necessary to define the solutions base for the FRES requirement. Their principal work has been in helping us with detailed system engineering and, …with risk assessment of meeting the FRES requirement.[98]

60. The MoD told us that Atkins was appointed as Systems House owing to its independence from the armoured vehicles supply.[99] We asked the MoD whether Atkins' lack of experience in armoured vehicle production had brought any disadvantages. The MoD told us that it had not and Dr Watson told us:

I think they have added a significant technical expertise. They have added some pretty hard questioning of timescales and technical judgments. They have also provided us with a more flexible resource pool than we would have been able to provide from Ministry sources.[100]

Dr Watson identified the advice provided by Atkins on the acquisition process as an area where the input from the Systems House had been weaker.[101]

61. We note with interest the appointment of a Systems House and recognise the potential benefit to the MoD of a source of independent project management expertise. We recommend that the MoD publish the performance criteria by which the contribution by Atkins to the FRES project will be judged and their subsequent performance in meeting them.

TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATOR PROGRAMMES

62. Following the fleet review of vehicles in January 2006, Atkins recommended an assessment of the technology programmes currently in development. Atkins' submission states that it recommended

running parallel prototype contracts between two competing consortia during the demonstration phase, and moving the main investment approval, Main Gate, from its planned point at the end of the assessment phase to the end of the demonstration phase—so that it could be based on the evidence of proven prototypes when a much better view of performance, cost, time and risk would be available.[102]

63. Beginning in February 2005, Atkins awarded, following open competition, nine Technology Demonstrator Programme (TDP) contracts to UK and international defence companies.[103] The MoD states that the purpose of the TDP contracts is to "de-risk, through rigorous testing, the potential technologies for FRES".[104] The contracts awarded to date are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: FRES Technology Demonstrator Programmes

Title Contractor Status

Stowage & Capacity Defence science and technology laboratory Contract placed: Feb 05
Completed: in May 06

Hard Kill Defensive Aid System Akers Krutbruk Contract placed: May 05
Completion due: Dec 06

Chassis Concept TDP (AHED) General Dynamics UK Contract placed: August 05
Completion due: Feb 07

Chassis Concept TDP2 (SEP) BAES Contract placed: December 05
Completion due: Sep 07

Electronic Architecture TDP 1 Lockheed Martin Contract placed: Aug 05
Completion due: March 07

Electronic Architecture TDP 2 Thales Contract placed: August 05
Completion due: March 07

Electric Armour Lockheed Martin / Insys Contract placed: December 05
Completion due: June 07

Integrated Survivability Thales UK Contract placed: December 05
Completion due: Nov 06

Gap Crossing BAE Systems Contract placed: December 05
Completion due: October 07

Source: MoD[105]

64. During this inquiry we received submissions from BAE Systems and General Dynamics UK who are working on the two "chassis concept" TDPs, developing prototypes for the FRES chassis.[106] The chassis development is fundamental to the whole FRES solution because it is the framework within which the technology is incorporated.

65. BAE Systems' prototype for the FRES Utility vehicle is an 8x8 wheeled vehicle capable of carrying a 2-man crew and 8 infantrymen. The BAE Systems submission states that its prototype is a conventional-drive vehicle adapted from the "BAE Systems / Hägglunds SEP programme to develop 6x6 wheeled and tracked electric drive vehicles" for the Swedish Army.[107] The BAE Systems 8x8 conventional drive prototype vehicle was due to commence trials in January 2007.

66. The FRES Utility solution proposed by General Dynamics UK is the "Piranha Evolution", a 26 tonne 8x8 wheeled armoured fighting vehicle which it describes as having "outstanding survivability and considerable growth potential".[108] The Piranha Evolution is a modified version of the "Piranha V".

67. The chassis TDP is expected to culminate in 'vehicle proving trials' to be undertaken by the Army in the summer of 2007. The MoD refers to these trials as the 'trial of truth'. The MoD submission states that a winner of the trials will be announced in November 2007 and that the chosen vehicle from the trial will be "fitted with the necessary systems and vehicle modifications required to meet the UK need".[109]

ACQUISITION STRATEGY

68. The MoD's written submission states that the acquisition strategy will be consistent with the framework provided by the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS).[110] Specifically with regard to FRES the DIS states:

The most likely solution (for FRES) will be a team in which national and international companies co-operate to deliver the FRES platforms, including the required sub-systems, led by a systems integrator with the highest level of systems engineering, skills, resources and capabilities based in the UK.[111]

On the face of it, this approach is similar to the Alliance strategy adopted by the MoD for the future carrier programme.[112]

69. Despite the clear expectation that the FRES solution will be delivered by a number of companies, some of which might be internationally based, the MoD submission states that it requires the intellectual property and design authority for FRES to be controlled by the MoD.[113] Hence, agreement to deliver 'UK residence' of all intellectual property and design authorities will be a pre-requisite for companies to enter into the FRES procurement process. It is our understanding that BAE Systems, General Dynamics UK, and Thales UK have agreed to this. The importance of the MoD retaining intellectual property rights for FRES has been highlighted by the MoD's difficulties in negotiating with the USA over access to the technology know-how for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme. This is an issue which we examined most recently in our report: The Defence Industrial Strategy: update.[114]

70. CDP told us that a further advantage of retaining intellectual property rights was the potential to exploit marketing opportunities for FRES abroad, "the first priority is to meet the needs of the Army and the second is to maximise export potential".[115]

71. We welcome the MoD's insistence that intellectual property rights to FRES should remain in the UK. For such a vital project, the UK must retain the essential systems knowledge within the UK.

72. Retaining the intellectual property rights within the UK will enable the MoD and defence companies residing in the UK to exploit fully the potential export market for FRES. UK-based companies producing the FRES vehicle for export would not only benefit the UK economy but also help support the UK's defence industrial base.

73. During our inquiry we were told that the Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Drayson, had in November 2006 written to the companies involved in the TDPs outlining the MoD's Acquisition Strategy for FRES. The submission we received from BAE Systems described the key points of the strategy as: a "three tier acquisition strategy…with a Systems of Systems Integrator, Platform Designer, and a Vehicle Integrator / Manufacturer".[116]

74. In December 2006 we asked the MoD for a copy of Lord Drayson's letter to the companies identifying the MoD's acquisition strategy. In response, the MoD declined to provide the letter on the grounds that it "could be prejudicial to the effective conduct of public affairs" as "Premature disclosure of information can lead to pressure to conclude studies in unrealistic timescales".[117] On 25 January 2007 we wrote again to Lord Drayson expressing our dissatisfaction that a Committee of the House of Commons had been denied information made available to companies. In response, the MoD agreed to provide us with the letter in confidence.

In-Service Date and Main Gate Approval: Utility variant

75. There remains no clear indication of when FRES will enter service. The ISD for FRES has been a matter of great interest to us and our predecessors since the initial work on the programme by Alvis Vickers began in 2001. Over the years, Ministers and MoD officials have provided us with different target ISDs for FRES that have moved progressively into the future.

76. In May 2004, the then Minister for Defence Procurement (Lord Bach) told our predecessors that he expected that the Utility variant of FRES would be in-service in 2009.[118] A year later, during our inquiry, Future Capabilities, General Sir Mike Jackson, then Chief of the General Staff, told the Committee that he doubted FRES would be available by 2010.[119] The MoD's Defence Industrial Strategy, published in December 2005, gives an ISD for "initial variants in the early years of the next decade".[120]

77. The MoD's submission does not commit to a specific FRES ISD. It states "Industry and the MoD FRES procurement team will be incentivised to meet the target date for the delivery of the first vehicles (Utility variants) to the British Army in the early part of the next decade".[121] The submissions from both BAE Systems and General Dynamics (UK) make clear that their planning assumptions for the delivery of the FRES Utility variant is nearer 2012 than 2017.

78. This optimistic assessment was undermined by the submission from Atkins:

It is Atkins's and the MoD's view that the FRES requirement can be met within the planned budget in a 2017-18 timeframe, and whilst it would clearly be desirable to achieve the required performance at the earlier date of 2012 there is currently little evidence to support this view.[122]

79. Atkins' submission also states that the Systems House "has had to be careful to ensure that the MoD is not lured into a 'conspiracy of optimism' for which it has been so often criticised in the past".[123]

80. During our evidence session on 12 December we asked CDP whether he agreed with Atkins' assessment of a 2017-18 ISD. He cautioned us not take Atkins' prediction "at face value"[124] and told us that:

My personal view is that it was pessimistic and that we ought to be able to do better, but how much better we can do will depend upon the further work we do in the next 12 months.[125]

81. The FRES Utility vehicle ISD must be challenging but achievable. Although the Defence Industrial Strategy states a planning assumption of delivery by "the early part of the next decade", the Systems House, appointed by the MoD for its project management expertise, considers there to be little evidence that FRES will be in-service before 2017.

82. The Army's lack of suitable medium-weight armoured vehicles has meant that the MoD has had to devote considerable sums on the ad hoc purchase of Mastiff and Vector armoured vehicles and upgrading the FV430 series of vehicles. If FRES does not enter service until 2017-18 further interim purchases are likely to be necessary at considerable cost.

83. CDP told us that it was no longer MoD policy to announce in-service dates for equipment procurement projects until they had passed their Main Gate review. On 19 December 2006, Lord Drayson told us he had changed policy in regard to announcing in-service dates for procurement projects in an attempt to improve the MoD's procurement process by strengthening MoD's position with industry: "Until Main Gate decision has been taken we do not publish, talk about, in-service dates because there is a negotiation [with companies] that takes place right up until the conclusion of the Main Gate".[126]

84. When we asked CDP about this change of policy in announcing Main Gate, he told us:

When I arrived in this job ministers had made a habit of announcing in-service dates before they finished the assessment phases and then found themselves in political difficulty when they announced changes. So Ministers were very clear in defining a policy that in-service dates would not be announced until a main gate decision was taken. [127]

85. We acknowledge the increased rigour that Lord Drayson's leadership has brought to the MoD's procurement process and note the reasons he gives for not announcing the ISD for FRES before it has passed its Main Gate review. However there is a legitimate public interest in knowing at least the planning assumptions of when equipment is expected to be delivered to our Armed Forces and the MoD should be more transparent about this.

86. We acknowledge the need for Ministers to have bargaining power with industry. However, sparing Ministers from political difficulties is not a sound reason to not announce targets for the delivery of programmes. The decision not to announce a target Main Gate for FRES might give the impression that the programme is being driven by the concerns of the DPA rather than by military need. In its response to this report, the MoD should explain its overall approach to negotiating procurement contracts.

The Heavy and Reconnaissance variants

87. It is the MoD's intention that the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants of FRES will be developed after the Utility variant enters production.

88. The Reconnaissance vehicle will be expected to fulfil a range of roles which the MoD describes as "Scout Ground Based Surveillance, Indirect Fire Control and Formation Reconnaissance capability".[128]

89. The Heavy variant is also expected to fulfil a number of roles: "Direct Fire and Indirect Fire Support roles; Manoeuvre Support covers the earth moving, obstacle breaching and bridge laying roles. As with the Utility and Reconnaissance families, the heavy family vehicles will have its own repair and recovery capability and a driver training vehicle".[129]

90. Development work on the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants is at an early stage. The MoD submission states that:

The preliminary scoping and planning work for the Assessment Phases for the Reconnaissance and Heavy roles has begun but substantial work is subject to further departmental approval.[130]

Although the MoD's submission does not give an indication of when the IAP for the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants will be begin, it states that it is likely to cost in "several hundreds of million pounds".[131]

91. The MoD gives no indication of when the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants of FRES will enter their Initial Assessment Phase. As with the Utility variant, it remains unclear when the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants of FRES will enter service. The procurement of a successor reconnaissance vehicles is particularly important owing to the ageing fleet of the CVR(T) vehicle.

34 Ev 27 Back

35 HC Deb, 19 September 2002, col 329W Back

36 Ev 27 Back

37 Q 67 Back

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40 Ev 27 Back

41 HC Deb, 17 July 2003, col 70W Back

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44 Jane's International Defence Review, "Future Rapid Effect System leads British forces' transformation", 1 September 2003 Back

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