Conclusions and recommendations
1. The requirement for a new medium-weight
fleet of vehicles was identified in the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review. The experience of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has
strengthened the urgent operational need for this requirement.
The Snatch Land Rover is very mobile but has proved vulnerable
to attack from Improvised Explosive Devices and Rocket Propelled
Grenades, whereas the Warrior is sufficiently armoured against
most threats but lacks mobility. If the UK is to execute its expeditionary
policy effectively, the Army urgently requires a fleet of vehicles
which are rapidly deployable yet provide sufficient protection
for Service personnel. (Paragraph
12)
2. We welcome
the MoD's action in meeting the immediate operational need for
a medium-weight armoured vehicle in Iraq and Afghanistan. But
the procurement of Mastiff and Vector does not provide a long-term
solution to the Army's medium-weight vehicle requirement.
(Paragraph 20)
3. We welcome
the fact that the Treasury has funded the procurement of Mastiff
but are disappointed that it did not make the funds available
for the Vector procurement. On present plans the post-operations,
through-life maintenance costs for Vector and Mastiff will fall
on the defence budget. The Treasury should make additional funds
available to the MoD for the through-life support and maintenance
of Vector and Mastiff. (Paragraph 21)
4. The procurement
of Mastiff and Vector must not deflect the MoD from working to
meet the requirement for medium-weight vehicles over the longer
term. (Paragraph 22)
5. The TRACER
and MRAV programmes cost a combined total of £188 million.
The MoD asserts that output from these programmes has informed
work on the FRES programme, but it is not clear how. The MoD should
explain in its response to this report how the work carried out
on the TRACER and MRAV programmes has contributed to the FRES
programme. (Paragraph 26)
6. Following
the completion of the work carried out by Alvis Vickers between
2001-03, and over six years after the requirement for medium-weight
forces was articulated in the Strategic Defence Review, FRES remained
no more tangible than a concept. (Paragraph
31)
7. A vital
requirement for FRES is that the vehicle will provide sufficient
protection against Improvised Explosive Devices and Rocket Propelled
Grenades. In the light of operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the MoD has revised upwards its armour requirement for FRES. Consequently,
the weight requirement for the vehicle has increased from 17 tonnes
to between 20-27 tonnes. We consider it vital that UK troops are
provided with sufficient protection and that the FRES requirement
must be adapted to reflect this. (Paragraph
41)
8. We note
the tension between the requirements that the FRES Utility vehicles
provide sufficient protection and that they be quickly deployable.
The requirement that the FRES Utility vehicle should be transportable
by the Hercules C130J proved over-ambitious. It remains to be
seen whether transportability by A400M is achievable.
(Paragraph 42)
9. We are
concerned that there could be a vicious circle of delays as the
requirement is continually revised. It is unrealistic for the
MoD to seek a perfect solution to its medium-weight vehicle requirement.
If it is impossible to develop sufficient armoured protection
for the FRES Utility vehicle while remaining within current weight
requirements, the MoD should make a decision as to which is its
priority. Failing to make the decision will simply cause further
delay. (Paragraph 43)
10. The
MoD considers that there is no off-the-shelf vehicle available
which would be capable of meeting its FRES requirement. It bases
this judgment on its requirement that the chosen platform should
be capable of supporting upgrades for the next thirty years.
(Paragraph 46)
11. The
MoD must ensure there is scope to upgrade FRES in the future.
This must include the scope to insert new technologies which must
increase the vehicle's protection. Without this, the MoD would
have to procure vehicles off-the-shelf every time operational
threats changed. This would be unacceptable.
(Paragraph 47)
12. We consider
it surprising that the MoD has found no scope for collaboration
with international partners on developing FRES, particularly at
the sub-systems level. The MoD should consider whether there is
any scope for exploiting synergies with the programmes of other
nations aimed at meeting a similar requirement to FRES.
(Paragraph 51)
13. The
success of the FRES programme is dependent on the knowledge and
experience of a wide range of Army personnel, including those
who will use the vehicles, being applied to the programme. The
MoD must ensure that the interests of the soldiers who will use
FRES are considered fully when defining the FRES vehicle requirement.
(Paragraph 58)
14. We note
with interest the appointment of a Systems House and recognise
the potential benefit to the MoD of a source of independent project
management expertise. We recommend that the MoD publish the performance
criteria by which the contribution by Atkins to the FRES project
will be judged and their subsequent performance in meeting them.
(Paragraph 61)
15. We welcome
the MoD's insistence that intellectual property rights to FRES
should remain in the UK. For such a vital project, the UK must
retain the essential systems knowledge within the UK.
(Paragraph 71)
16. Retaining
the intellectual property rights within the UK will enable the
MoD and defence companies residing in the UK to exploit fully
the potential export market for FRES. UK-based companies producing
the FRES vehicle for export would not only benefit the UK economy
but also help support the UK's defence industrial base.
(Paragraph 72)
17. The
FRES Utility vehicle ISD must be challenging but achievable. Although
the Defence Industrial Strategy states a planning assumption of
delivery by "the early part of the next decade", the
Systems House, appointed by the MoD for its project management
expertise, considers there to be little evidence that FRES will
be in-service before 2017. (Paragraph
81)
18. The
Army's lack of suitable medium-weight armoured vehicles has meant
that the MoD has had to devote considerable sums on the ad hoc
purchase of Mastiff and Vector armoured vehicles and upgrading
the FV430 series of vehicles. If FRES does not enter service until
2017-18 further interim purchases are likely to be necessary at
considerable cost. (Paragraph 82)
19. We acknowledge
the increased rigour that Lord Drayson's leadership has brought
to the MoD's procurement process and note the reasons he gives
for not announcing the ISD for FRES before it has passed its Main
Gate review. However there is a legitimate public interest in
knowing at least the planning assumptions of when equipment is
expected to be delivered to our Armed Forces and the MoD should
be more transparent about this. (Paragraph
85)
20. We acknowledge
the need for Ministers to have bargaining power with industry.
However, sparing Ministers from political difficulties is not
a sound reason to not announce targets for the delivery of programmes.
The decision not to announce a target Main Gate for FRES might
give the impression that the programme is being driven by the
concerns of the DPA rather than by military need. In its response
to this report, the MoD should explain its overall approach to
negotiating procurement contracts. (Paragraph
86)
21. The
MoD gives no indication of when the Heavy and Reconnaissance variants
of FRES will enter their Initial Assessment Phase. As with the
Utility variant, it remains unclear when the Heavy and Reconnaissance
variants of FRES will enter service. The procurement of a successor
reconnaissance vehicles is particularly important owing to the
ageing fleet of the CVR(T) vehicle. (Paragraph
91)
22. This
is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements
and delay. We are concerned that the FRES requirement may simply
be unachievable without a major technical breakthrough. The tension
between the survivability and deployability is particularly acute:
satisfying both requirements may prove impossible. It is high
time the MoD decided where its priorities lay. We shall take further
evidence on the FRES programme in the Autumn of this year.
(Paragraph 93)
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