Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
SIR PETER
SPENCER KCB, DR
IAIN WATSON
AND LIEUTENANT
GENERAL ANDREW
FIGGURES CBE
12 DECEMBER 2006
Q120 Mr Hancock: Simultaneous?
Sir Peter Spencer: which means
that everything which is needed to operate those vehicles will
be in place, including the logistic support.
Mr Jones: Once you have got the in-service
date how long will it be after that that the vehicle will become
fully operational?
Q121 Chairman: Would there be a gap
between the in-service date and the operational availability of
the vehicle?
Sir Peter Spencer: No. The in-service
date will be defined to be operational capability.
Q122 Mr Jones: Fully?
Sir Peter Spencer: Fully. It depends
what you mean by "fully". If you are going to have a
programme which is incremental both in quantity and quality then
the procurement activity will continue for many years as we roll
out. We will not build more than 3,000 vehicles all in one year.
Q123 Mr Jones: There are a number
of different vehicles. For the light and the heavy vehicles, what
is the operational capability, is it going to be in different
phases?
Sir Peter Spencer: We will roll
out the utility vehicle first. The expectation is that the reconnaissance
variants will come next and the heavy variants will come after
that in a phased programme.
Q124 Mr Jones: What timescales are
we talking about?
Sir Peter Spencer: That is work
which is still being done in the assessment phase.
Q125 Mr Jones: Can I make one point
to you, Sir Peter. Can I ask you a question: how should we, as
parliamentarians, scrutinising your Department be able to see
whether or not you have been successful in delivering this programme
to the date which you have not yet come up with, which you are
quite prepared to share with industry but not with us, if we are
not going to get this information? Do you think it is very difficult
for us to try to get the bottom of this if you are being as evasive
as you are?
Sir Peter Spencer: I am not being
evasive on anything other than the date, which I am not empowered
to give. I am very happy to take that message back and I am very
happy, through ministers, to provide you with the information
that you are asking for if they agree. In terms of where we are
going on the assessment phase then you have got ample information
in terms of what we have given you to demonstrate the progress
which has been made in the assessment phase against the key dates
which were set out.
Q126 Mr Jones: The key date is the
in-service date, surely.
Sir Peter Spencer: Not during
the assessment phase. The assessment phase is the gradual understanding
and agreement of what the capability requirement is. We have had
Fleet Reviews of the Army which has been an incremental process.
We have now informed you as to what the Acquisition Strategy is
going to be and that there will be a great deal of activity over
the next 12 months which will then lead up to the first decision
which will be to go into the demonstration phase for the utility
variant in timescales which in armoured fighting vehicles compare
pretty favourably with anywhere else that you could find. Certainly
they compare favourably with our history in this nation where
the average time has been longer. I do not think the pre-initial
gate phase counts towards the programme timescales because we
are not committing to any dates at that stage, we are just looking
at technology. We have concept phase work going on in all sorts
of areas.
Q127 John Smith: I just wondered
what the military consequences of a considerable slip to the in-service
date of this vehicle are. The General tells us that there is a
clear military requirement for this concept vehicle but if it
slips into 2018-20, are there going to be any capability gaps
and what are the general consequences?
Lieutenant General Figgures: Yes,
there are going to be gaps and it then becomes my responsibility
to manage them as best we can. I think I have given an illustration
of where we dealt with the short-term operational requirement
in terms of the protected patrol vehicle and Mastiff. We would
have to run on the 430 series up-armoured and spend more money
on that. It would mean that we would not realise our investment
in our command and control and information systems network enabling
capability that we would propose and that goes back to my point
about we would not fight as we would wish to fight. I go back
to the point that the Army, my organisation and the DPA are very
closely engaged in this. It is a judgment in which the Army, the
Chief of the General Staff and those responsible for delivering
the capability of the Army are heavily involved in making that
assessment, so a year, two years, are we capable of managing the
gap, that we will get something which we can bring into service
and which will enable our soldiers to execute their duty in the
manner in which they have been trained to do and would wish to
do, it is worthwhile.
Q128 Mr Holloway: General, would
there be any gaps between yourself and the Admiral's department?
Within your organisation is there a more immediate requirement,
a greater hunger for this, than perhaps there is with the DPA?
Lieutenant General Figgures: No,
because there are people like me in this uniform in the DPA.
Q129 Mr Holloway: Can you answer
my question?
Sir Peter Spencer: We follow the
requirements which are set by the military. We do not have a view
on pace and priority, we resource our drive to the expectations
of the military, so why you would imagine that there is a difference
between us. I find incomprehensible.
Q130 Mr Holloway: I will tell you
why. Having served in the Army, often finding oneself with the
wrong equipment, and speaking to soldiers now who find themselves
with the wrong equipment, I think it is an entirely reasonable
question.
Sir Peter Spencer: So much of
the DPA has military people, all I can say is that people are
doing their best at the time.
Lieutenant General Figgures: I
do not think there is any lack of a sense of urgency. There have
been many occasions when in order to provide what is required,
urgent operational requirements, integrated projected teams, both
in the DPA and the DLO, have worked seven days as many hours as
they can, you just eat, drink and get a bit of sleep. There is
no lack of will to get what we want. After all, we are all human,
we cannot magic these things.
Q131 Chairman: You said there is
no lack of a sense of urgency. The talk of the 2017 in-service
date will make the soldiers who are serving currently feel that
is exactly what is going on there, will it not?
Sir Peter Spencer: The whole purpose
of next year will be to see to what extent we can improve on that
and we expect to improve on it substantially, but I am not in
a position to tell you by how much.
Q132 Chairman: To what extent, General,
would you say that the Army will need these vehicles for the idea
of 2017 or earlier, if it can be brought back?
Lieutenant General Figgures: I
think I have explained—at the risk of repetition—we
need them in order that we can fight as we would wish to fight.
I believe it was on 19 January that the Army Board, the Chief
of Defence Procurement and my predecessor spent the best part
of a day scrubbing through all this so we all understood the requirements,
the means of satisfying the requirements, the trades we might
have to make. Of course, military men are impatient to get things
done. Yes, we want it tomorrow but we do recognise we are dealing
with a very complex area and it is the art of the possible. I
am in no doubt that the Defence Procurement Agency is under no
illusion about the need to bring it into service as quickly as
is possible, but which satisfies our requirement. There is nothing
worse than having a piece of equipment to which one has looked
forward for some time, in which one has invested time and money,
and it does not meet the threshold requirement.
Q133 Chairman: Is there not a risk
that over the years we will need so many urgent operational requirements
and things will be needed so much now that we will end up with
a fleet of completely disparate vehicles that are there to solve
the immediate problem and all the money will have been spent on
Cougars and Mastiffs and we will not have the FRES at all because
the best has been the enemy of the good.
Lieutenant General Figgures: I
share your concern. The logistic support of the vehicles that
we procure to fill gaps complicates the business of the Defence
Logistics Organisation and the field army deployed in support
of those vehicles, hence I think our sense of urgency and the
sense of urgency of the DPA to bring this in as soon as is possible.
There is no point in promising us something unless there is a
high confidence of it being delivered and, therefore, I respect
Sir Peter's reluctance to commit to something that he cannot sign
up to in blood.
Q134 Mr Hancock: I do not have a
problem with Sir Peter's point of view, I think it is a legitimate
one and is based on his integrity, is it not, to not give us information
that he does not believe at this stage he can accurately predict,
and I think it is right for us to challenge ministers. But we
were sent a memorandum by General Dynamics and they raised the
issue of the Piranha vehicles and it states quite clearly here
that it has an outstanding survivability, considerable growth
potential, it is 26 tonnes, it is capable of doing nearly everything
you have asked of it, and we have properly evaluated the suitability
of this vehicle and we have turned it down as saying that it will
not meet our requirements, just the 80% of the requirements we
have at the present time. Reading this memorandum, it seems to
me that it is clear that this vehicle has everything that we require
plus the potential for future development and I am at a loss to
understand how you dismissed it from your thinking.
Sir Peter Spencer: They are in
the business of wanting to sell us equipment.
Q135 Mr Hancock: Of course they are.
Sir Peter Spencer: They will be
judged alongside everybody else. All I can tell you is in terms
of their current products they do not have the available potential.
They will have the opportunity to compete in the trials of truth
and demonstrate that they can produce something which has potential.
Q136 Mr Hancock: No. You told us
you had dismissed these vehicles and that is why you were going
for this refined vehicle that we were going to design and build
ourselves. We were going for a completely new vehicle. You told
us you had already done this evaluation and this vehicle was ruled
out. It would be interesting from this Committee's point of view
if you would supply us with the evaluation that you did of this
vehicle which allowed you to discard it.
Sir Peter Spencer: We can do that.
That would be very sensible because it would clarify your own
understanding.
Q137 Chairman: That would be extremely
helpful. [5]
Dr Watson: May I interject on
Piranha. It is the case that in early January we went to the executive
committee of the Army Board with the outcome of the Fleet Review.
That Fleet Review covered a large number of different ways of
trying to meet the FRES requirement. Included in those different
ways were a selection of vehicles starting from military off-the-shelf,
that is to say vehicles which are in operation today, vehicles
which were in current development, that is to say they are not
in operation but we are part of a committed programme, and new
design and build vehicles. The conclusion of that review was the
area we should be operating in is current development vehicles.
These are vehicles which are in various stages of maturity which
have the opportunity for enhancement to meet the specific needs
of FRES but which require additional investment and, critically,
proof of their current capability. Piranha 4 falls into that category.
We expect to see General Dynamics as one of the bidders offering
us a Piranha variant into these trials that we intend to conduct
next year. That will provide us with material proof as to whether
or not the vehicle is as capable as suggested and, incidentally,
the design background to tell us whether we can stretch that vehicle
and in what ways, and a proposition for that stretching. We intend
to go down exactly this path but we do not know the outcome until
we have measured the results. When we have measured the results
we will then know what the level of investment needs to be and
the timescale. We may then be able to reach an ISD.
Q138 Mr Hancock: Many of the countries
who have bought these vehicles are in NATO, allies of the United
Kingdom. The latest Piranha that is actually in-service could
deliver most of the capability that we have been told the Army
require.
Dr Watson: That is not so. The
latest variant in-service is the Piranha 3 and it does not meet
the protection, mobility or capacity needs that we require.
Q139 Mr Hancock: So their statement
that the survivability rate is very high and it has growth potential
is not correct?
Dr Watson: You can see this clearly
in operations in Iraq where Stryker, which is a variant of Piranha
and derived via a complex development route, is heavily enhanced
in a very ad hoc kind of way in order to meet the current threat.
5 See Ev 27 Back
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