Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

HCDC FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

(Q)  The DMA considers that without a real increase in the MoD's research investment many of the aspirations in the Defence Technology Strategy will remain unfulfilled. How much defence research investment does the MoD think is needed to deliver the aspirations set out in the Defence Technology Strategy?

  (A)  The Defence Technology Strategy is affordable within the current research budget provided that both MoD and industry invest to develop and sustain the necessary technology base. The Defence Commercial Director will work with the Defence Industries Council to develop research funding models which allow a better match of risk and return for industry, and provide a basis for joint funding of technology development. The key tasks are prioritising research spend—DTS sets out MoD's views on priorities—and ensuring that MoD bridges the "Valley of Death" described by the NAO by improving exploitation and alignment of technology and industry strategies.

  The Government has set a target to raise the national investment in R&D to 2.5% of GDP by 2014 and has increased its own national R&D spending to meet this target. UK industry needs to play a part in this endeavour. The DTS brings clarity to MoD's R&D priorities and requirements for up to 20 years in the future and will give industry a better understanding of the areas that MoD will invest in.

(Q)  Does the MoD expect the proportion of defence equipment contracts which are let competitively to drop in the future and, if so, by how much [the DIS states that over the past four years some three-quarters of the MoD's contracts, by value, had been let competitively].

  (A)  Over the past four years some three-quarters of the MoD's contracts, by value, have been let competitively. It will remain central to our acquisition strategy that competition should be considered in all procurements and pursued wherever it offers the potential to secure best long-term value for money. Procurement for non-warlike goods and services will continue to be conducted in accordance with the European Union Procurement Regulations. However, the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) recognised that there are occasions when competition may not be able to deliver the best long term value for money or sustain key UK defence industrial capabilities. We will not pursue competition beyond the point where it can offer long term advantage or where the cost of running a competition is demonstrably disproportionate to the benefits that might be achieved.

  Whilst there has been a reduction in the total number of contracts let over the last four years as the market moves to longer-term arrangements, there has so far not been a significant drop in the proportion, by value, that are subject to competition. There is an underlying assumption that as DIS is more widely implemented the proportion of contracts let by competition may decline; however, in parallel the MoD will be seeking to work more closely in long-term partnering arrangements which would place a responsibility on primes to compete requirements at a sub-prime level wherever possible with full transparency of the value of work being offered across the supply chain.

(Q)  How many long-term partnering arrangements were agreed in 2006, and in what areas? In which other areas are long-term partnering arrangements being considered?

  (A)  In June 2006, the MoD signed a Strategic Partnering Arrangement (SPA) and contractually-binding Business Transformation Incentivisation Agreement (BTIA) with AgustaWestland (AW). This represented a key early deliverable of the Defence Industrial Strategy and will incentivise and drive forward business transformation across the full spectrum of MoD business with AW. The SPA and associated BTIA will provide better value for money by improving speed of delivery, reducing costs and increasing operational availability. It will also help ensure a long term, viable and cost effective support of the MoD's helicopter fleet.

  However, partnering is a broad term and there are many programmes which have elements of partnering. In addition to the above, in 2006 MoD entered into agreements for availability contracts for through-life support of major assets including the £450 million Merlin Integrated Operational Support contract let in March, the £200 million Chinook Through Life Customer Support contract let in February and the £1.52 billion Hercules Integrated Operational Support contract let in June.

  In 2007, work will continue to progress other LTPAs:

    Complex Weapons—positive progress is being made on a Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA), but there remain areas where negotiation is needed. Speculation on a date for finalising this work is premature. The primary objective for MoD and industry is to develop and deliver a robust agreement.

    Fixed Wing—MoD and BAES are working together to explore the viability of a long-term partnering agreement with the objective of sustaining a healthy fixed wing sector with industrial capabilities, skills and technologies crucial to our ability to support and upgrade our fleet over the next 30 years.

    General Munitions—a Framework Partnering Agreement, that jointly addressed the Munitions Acquisition—the Supply Solution (MASS) procurement strategy and Framework partnering Agreement (FPA) issues, is under consideration. Currently we are exploring the commercial issues to provide assurance that a single source procurement strategy would be better value for money than other practical alternatives.

    Armoured Vehicle Support Initiative (AVSI)—As part of the need to maintain reliability and availability of the AFV fleet and provide better value for money, MoD has a desire to secure future industry support and on-shore capability. One of the procurement options being considered is partnering with the Design Authority.

(Q)  How is the MoD addressing the concerns expressed by some sub-primes and suppliers that they will not get an opportunity to compete for the work underlying long-term partnering arrangements?

  (A)  The MoD has acknowledged this concern and is taking a range of measures to ensure that sub-primes and SMEs will have the opportunity to compete for work in future.

  MoD is working closely with Industry, at all levels, to ensure that best practice is applied in all our supply chains so that sub-primes and suppliers, including SMEs, are treated fairly. This includes:

    —  More in-depth understanding of the make-up of the supply chains in each Industrial Sector in terms of criticalities and vulnerabilities.

    —  Improved supply chain intelligence through direct links from MoD to the supplier databases maintained by relevant Trade Associations and the British Defence Equipment Catalogue.

    —  Review of the joint MoD and Industry Commercial Policy Group code of conduct on best practice supply chain management to reflect the means by which best value is realised from the supply chain, at all tiers.

    —  Our support for industry initiatives such as recently launched "21 Century Supply Chain" (SC21) initiative led by the SBAC

  MoD works with industry to provide access and opportunity to compete for work in the Defence Supply Chain, in particular:

    —  The Defence Supplier Service provides a focal point for advice and guidance to companies interested in becoming defence suppliers.

    —  MoD's Prime Contractors are encouraged to advertise their sub-contract opportunities in the Defence Contracts Bulletin which provides a gateway to new business opportunities for companies, large and small, who wish to compete for defence business.

    —  A wide range of shop window events are organised for SMEs where they can access the range of capabilities that the MoD is currently seeking to address.

  In 2005-06 SMEs were directly awarded some 43% of all contracts placed by MoD, with a total value of almost £1 billion.

(Q)  How much will it cost the MoD to implement the DIS? Will the funding needed to support operations reduce the funds available to implement the DIS?

  (A)  DIS implementation costs within MoD are estimated at being £23 million in the current financial year, and some £30 million for the coming financial year. These costs include dedicated sector teams taking forward sector implementation, specialist legal and financial advice as support to those teams, and the initial costs of the Defence Acquisition Change Programme. Recognising the criticality of DIS implementation to the future of the UK industrial base and the affordability of our equipment programme, each budget holder has found these costs within their existing budgets. Set against the £18.2 billion of contracts that MoD placed during the last financial year, this is a small investment for the future with the potential for major payoff.

  Funding to support operations should not effect DIS implementation although operational experience often drives future equipment requirements which may become part of the DIS. MoD attaches priority to operational needs, but recognises the need to strike a sensible balance between short term needs and the long term sustainment of an efficient and competitive industrial base.

(Q)  In its first inquiry into the DIS, the Committee examined the issue of munitions and security of supply. What progress has been made with Project MASS? Has the MoD decided how best to sustain the required access to general munitions and, if so, what was the decision?

  (A)  Project MASS was charged with delivering a value for money and secure supply of general munitions. At Initial Gate in December 2004 approval was given to pursue a long term partnering agreement with BAES Land Systems Munitions (LSM), based on an integrated manufacture/supply/storage solution. The integrated solution failed to prove value for money, leading to a review of the way ahead. Subsequently LSM adopted a more radical modernisation agenda and produced a transformational proposal. This revised partnering arrangement offers a potential value for money solution, and is in accordance with DIS guidance on the retention of indigenous capabilities.

  Currently we are exploring the commercial issues to provide assurance that a single source procurement strategy would be better value for money than other practical alternatives. We expect to identify the preferred procurement strategy early this year.

  By the End of 2007 we aim to have made a firm investment commitment to proceed with MASS, to have completed any necessary performance/cost trade offs, and confirmed that the UK is not being disadvantaged in cost terms when compared to other nations who have a similar requirement.

  A joint MoD/Industry General Munitions and Energetics Technologies (GMET) Steering Group has been established to facilitate cooperation on delivery of DIS and Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) objectives for all general munitions and the underpinning energetic materials technologies. Within this forum a draft General Munitions Industrial Strategy (GMIS) has been drafted and is being developed openly with industry.

  In summary, no decision has yet been taken on how best to sustain the required access to general munitions but the ongoing work with Project MASS and the General Munitions Industry Strategy (GMIS) will provide the basis for this decision.

(Q)  During its first inquiry into the DIS, the Committee was told that the Royal Ordnance Factory sites at Bridgwater and Chorley would not be closed until a secure alternative supply of the munitions existed. Have alternative suppliers been identified and, if so, how has the MoD assured itself that there is security of supply?

  (A)  Following the first inquiry into the DIS, BAES Land Systems Munitions (LSM) are now finalising the alternative supply arrangements to replace production at Bridgwater and Chorley. Most of the initiator production is being transferred to the Nobel Energetics site at Ardeer in Scotland. The high-value and high technology aspects of explosive manufacture are being transferred to the BAES LSM site at Glascoed in Wales, supported by considerable investment from the company. Raw materials for explosive manufacture will be imported from Holston in the US (run by BAES under a government-owned, contractor operated arrangement) and from Eurenco in France for some specialist products.

  These proposed supply arrangements have been carefully scrutinised by MoD officials. The new manufacturing sites have been visited and inspected, contractual arrangements reviewed and supply chains assessed. Should the unforeseen happen and supply be interrupted from one source, BAE Systems will retain the technical ability to switch to the alternative (Holston or Eurenco), or draw on existing stockpiles. The Defence Ordnance Safety Group has been testing the quality of the new raw materials and, although not quite complete, results are excellent thus far. All of the companies being considered as new suppliers have excellent track records in meeting our production standards and quantity requirements. A top-down review of the site rationalisation programme was conducted in November 2006 and all sides were content to allow it to continue.

  As has been previously stated, there are a number of existing agreements with our allies such as the "Implementing Agreement on Security of Supply" with France, Italy, Germany, Spain and Sweden or the US/UK Defense co-operation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which provide assurance on security of supply from these overseas suppliers. As an extra layer of protection and, due to the Department of Defense ownership of the Holston Army Ammunition Plant, officials have exchanged letters with the United States Armament Director to underline the importance of reliable supply between the various companies and to avoid any potential difficulties in the future.

  New arrangements to rationalise the production of Insensitive Munitions (IM) (including 105mm, 155mm and 4.5 inch ammunition) at Glascoed are dependent upon the continued development and proving of the new High Volume Filling Facility: the company is working hard to rectify this situation.

  As the Bridgwater site enters its final 12 months of production it faces considerable challenges in achieving its final production runs prior to closure due to legacy plant and equipment and the requirement to comply with new Health, Safety and Environmental regulations. The MoD is assured that the new arrangements will provide security of supply at least as great as that provided by Bridgwater and Chorley.

At the evidence session on 19 December 2006, the Committee asked for, or was offered, the following notes.

  A DIS checklist for 2007 [Qs 4 and Q101].

  To be provided to Committee by end of January

  A table showing on a year-on-year basis, for the next 10 years, the forecast spending (the financial commitments) on equipment procurement and the funding (budget) expected to be available. A separate table showing the forecast spend by sector (sea, land, air) would be helpful [Qs 68-71].

FORWARD EQUIPMENT PLAN

  The Equipment Plan (EP) is sub-divided into 11 capability areas which broadly match the way in which the Armed Forces operate. Examples of these capability areas include Above Water (AWE), Under Water (UWE), Ground Manoeuvre (Land Forces), etc Capability can generally be defined as "the ability to conduct defined tasks & effects within a given environment".

  Each of these capability areas manage a set of equipment projects where each projects has its own year-by-year funding line . There is a close relationship between the Directors of Equipment Capability who manage the capability areas and the Integrated Project Team Leaders and "Sector leads" in the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) who have direct interface with industry.

  The silt chart below sets out the Equipment Plan based (like the data in the DIS published in December 2005 on the outcome of the 2005 planning round), broken down by capability area, with a level of spend matched to our assumptions about the future level of resources available for equipment procurement, which may be adjusted by the outcome of the Department's current planning round, and which in the longer term is dependent on the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review.


GLOSSARY TO TABLE

  DAES (Directorate Analysis Experimentation & Simulation)—test and evaluation facilities (managed by QinetiQ)

  GM (Ground Manoeuvre)—covers armoured fighting vehicles, engineer vehicles, weapons and ancillaries, along with dismounted close combat systems (weapons and clothing systems) for the soldier, sailor and airman up to Battlegroup level.

  TA (Theatre Aerospace)—Responsible for the capability to achieve control and denial of theatre aerospace and effective operations in the air environment. Major equipment includes Typhoon, BVRAAM missile and the Advanced Jet Trainer.

  SP (Special Projects)—Special Forces equipment

  CBRN (Chemical, Biological Radiological & Nuclear)—DEC CBRN delivers a coherent CBRN defence capability for joint forces to be able to operate in a CBRN threat environment. Major equipments include General Service Respirator and biological detection systems.

  ALM (Air Littoral Manoeuvre)—Responsible for those capabilities that move personnel and material in and around the land and littoral environments by ship and helicopter. Platforms include Chinook, Merlin, Attack Helicopter, Puma, Sea King, and Lynx aircraft together with HMS Ocean, HMS Bulwark and Albion and the new Landing Ship Dock Auxiliaries.

  ELS (Expeditionary Logistics & Support)—Responsible for the delivery of logistics effects in the land environment for joint and combined operations. Major equipment includes Support Vehicle, Operational Utility Vehicle System(OUVS) and deployable accommodation.

  ISTAR (Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance)—responsible for capabilities relating to the collection and delivery of Intelligence and targeting data. Major projects include Watchkeeper and Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR)

  CCII (Communication, Control & Information Infrastructure)—responsible for equipment programmes covering defence communications and battlefield systems eg Bowman and other tactical radios, SATCOM and Falcon

  DTA (Deep Target Attack)—responsible for delivering of the capability required to attack surface targets . Major equipments include Tornado GR4, Harrier GR9, Joint Combat Aircraft, Stormshadow cruise missile, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), AS90 self-propelled howitzer, and MLRS.

  UWE (Underwater Effect)—Submarines (including Astute), torpedoes, Nimrod MRA4 and Merlin ASW helicopters.

  AWE (Above Water Effect)—AWE provides Control and Denial of the Above Water Battlespace. Major equipment projects include the future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), the new T45 Air Defence Destroyer and the Future Surface Combatant.

16 January 2007





 
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