1 Introduction
1. The Government's White Paper, The Future of
the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, was published on 4
December 2006.[1] It states
that decisions are required now on whether to retain the nuclear
deterrent in the long term and argues that delaying these decisions
would risk "a future break in the UK's deterrent protection".[2]
The White Paper maintains that retaining a nuclear deterrent is
essential to the UK's security and argues that the global context
does not justify the abandonment of the nuclear deterrent. It
says that we can only deter possible future nuclear threats through
the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Conventional capabilities
cannot have the same deterrent effect. While no direct threat
to the UK's vital interests currently exists, it says it is important
to guard against the re-emergence of such a threat in the future.
2. The White Paper announces no fundamental change
in the UK's policy on nuclear weapons. But it does announce changes
to the scale of the UK's nuclear warhead stockpile. It considers
various options for the future of the nuclear deterrent—air-based,
land-based and ship-based—but concludes that a renewal of
the submarine-based system provides the most effective and credible
deterrent. The White Paper announces the Government's intention
to procure a new generation of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs),
to commit to the US life extension programme for the Trident D5
missile, and to invest further in the UK's onshore deterrent infrastructure,
including at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston. It
provides an estimate of the costs involved and discusses the industrial
factors involved in the procurement process. It points to the
risk that, in the event of a significant gap between the end of
the work on the Astute-class conventional role nuclear-submarines
(SSNs) and the start of the detailed design work on the new SSBNs,
some of the difficulties and costs experienced on the Astute programme
would be repeated because of the loss of key design skills. It
states that these decisions are in full compliance with the UK's
international legal obligations.
3. In this inquiry, we set out to analyse the White
Paper: to consider the arguments put forward by the Government
for the retention and renewal of the UK's current Trident system;
to assess the White Paper's assessment of the role of nuclear
deterrence in the 21st Century; to examine the Government's
analysis of deterrent options, solutions and costs; to consider
the international treaty implications of the Government's decision
to retain and renew the deterrent and the possible impact of the
decision on the UK's non-proliferation efforts; and, to examine
whether decisions on the future of the nuclear deterrent are required
now. Our intention is to
encourage and inform the public debate on the future of the nuclear
deterrent by exploring the key issues and questions which should
be addressed in that debate. We do not express a view on the merits
of retaining and renewing the UK's nuclear deterrent. Endorsing
or rejecting the Government's proposals will be for the House
of Commons, as a whole, to decide.
4. This inquiry is the third in a series of inquiries
which the Committee has conducted into the future of the UK's
strategic nuclear deterrent in this Parliament. Our current report
should be read in the context of our earlier reports on the future
of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. The conclusions and recommendations
of these reports are printed in Annex 1 to this report.[3]
5. Our first report, published in July 2006, focused
on the strategic context and timetable for decision-making.[4]
We considered the threats which the UK's nuclear deterrent was
intended to combat and how these threats might evolve over the
lifetime of a potential Trident successor. We examined the independence
of the UK's nuclear deterrent and the extent to which possession
of nuclear weapons was relevant to the UK's international influence
and status. We sought to define more clearly the likely decision-making
timetable. And we called on the Government to fulfil its commitment
to facilitate an open and comprehensive debate in Parliament,
and the country at large, on the future of the nuclear deterrent.
6. Our second report, published in December 2006,
analysed the manufacturing and skills base issues that would need
to be addressed if a decision was made to retain and renew the
UK's nuclear deterrent.[5]
We examined the industrial infrastructure required to design and
manufacture a new generation of nuclear submarines, the challenges
involved in maintaining a specialist workforce, and the impact
of the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy for the
UK's submarine industrial base, including the issues of industrial
restructuring and the need for an affordable submarine programme.
We also examined the Government's expenditure at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment. And we considered the skills required by the Ministry
of Defence (MoD) to manage the delivery of any potential Trident
successor.
7. In the current inquiry, we took oral evidence
at Westminster from campaigning organisations, commentators and
academics, international legal experts and the Secretary of State
for Defence and MoD officials. We received a very large body of
written submissions from a wide range of experts, think tanks,
religious organisations and members of the public. We are grateful
to all those who provided oral and written evidence to our inquiry.
We also appreciate the assistance provided by our specialist advisers,
particularly Rear Admiral Richard Cheadle and Professor Michael
Clarke.
1 Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
Cm 6994, December 2006 Back
2
Cm 6994, Foreword, p 5 Back
3
Annex 1 Back
4
Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, The Future
of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context,
HC 986 Back
5
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2006-07, The Future
of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and
Skills Base, HC 59 Back
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