Conclusions and recommendations
1. Our
intention is to encourage and inform the public debate on the
future of the nuclear deterrent by exploring the key issues and
questions which should be addressed in that debate. We do not
express a view on the merits of retaining and renewing the UK's
nuclear deterrent. Endorsing or rejecting the Government's proposals
will be for the House of Commons, as a whole, to decide. (Paragraph
3)
2. Decisions on the
future of the UK's nuclear deterrent should be taken on the strategic
needs of the country, not on industrial factors. However, whilst
industrial considerations should not affect the substance of decisions,
they will necessarily affect the timing of those decisions. It
is not unreasonable for the Government to take these factors into
account. (Paragraph 26)
3. One key difference
between the US and UK submarine deterrent programmes is that the
UK seeks to operate a continuous-at-sea deterrent with just four
boats whereas the United States is "generating two or three
hulls from 14". (Paragraph 40)
4. The White Paper
states that decisions are required now on the future of the UK's
strategic nuclear deterrent. It says that the life of the current
deterrent platform, the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine,
was designed for a service life of 25 years, which could be extended
to 30 years with a life extension programme, albeit not without
some risk. It maintains that procurement of a new submarine will
take around 17 years. On this basis decisions are required in
2007. Some witnesses to our inquiry challenged the Government's
timetable. On life extension, the evidence we received from critics
suggested the Vanguard-class, like the US Ohio-class Trident submarine,
could be maintained in service for up to 45 years. The Government
has told us that to plan for life extension beyond 30 years would
be unwise, given the 25 year design life of the Vanguard-class,
the operational demands placed upon it in order to maintain continuous
deterrent patrols, the experience of the declining reliability
and availability of previous submarines beyond the 25-year point,
and the design and construction differences between the Vanguard
and the Ohio-class submarines. (Paragraph 43)
5. A procurement timetable
of 17 years is three years longer than for the existing Vanguard-class
submarine. The Government says that the additional time is required
because of changes in the capacity of the UK's submarine industrial
base and because initial concept and development work on the Vanguard-class
was already underway when the Government of the day announced
its decision to acquire the Trident system. The Government says
that no such work has yet begun on a Vanguard successor and that
Parliament is being consulted at a much earlier stage than on
previous occasions. (Paragraph 44)
6. The challenge to
the Government's estimate of 17 years is partly based on the suggestion
that work has started on "concept options for platforms",
whereas the government timetable commences with the "detailed
concept work". We take it that these two things are different
and accept that the 14-year period which we commented on in our
previous inquiry commenced from a more advanced stage in the procurement
cycle (years rather than months away) after a period of detailed
concept work had been carried out. (Paragraph 45)
7. Neither the White
Paper nor the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and
the US President in December 2006 explain adequately why decisions
on UK participation in the Trident D5 missile life extension are
required by 2007. The Government should clarify why decisions
on the missile are required now. (Paragraph 50)
8. The White Paper
does not propose any fundamental change to the UK's nuclear weapons
policy. (Paragraph 52)
9. The UK's nuclear
arsenal is small in comparison to that of other established nuclear
powers. The UK has made very significant reductions in the scale
of its nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War. (Paragraph
56)
10. We welcome the
reduction in warhead numbers announced in the White Paper and
recognise that this follows the significant reductions previously
announced in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. We welcome this
arms reduction measure, but it is unclear whether this has significance
as a non-proliferation measure. Since the White Paper proposes
no changes to the number of warheads deployed on UK submarines,
it is unclear that this reduction has any operational significance.
(Paragraph 63)
11. The White Paper
states that the UK is committed to maintaining a "minimum"
nuclear deterrent. The Secretary of State told us that the Government
had conducted a very hard analysis of the nuclear capabilities
required by the UK with a view to ensuring that they were at a
minimum necessary level, but we are uncertain how the Government
determines what constitutes a "minimum" deterrent. The
Government should say how it calculates the scale of a minimum
deterrent. (Paragraph 64)
12. The White Paper
states that the concept of deterrence has not changed since the
end of the Cold War and it outlines the underlying principles
which shape the UK's current approach to nuclear deterrence. Some
witnesses to our inquiry questioned the continuing relevance of
nuclear deterrence while others argued that it remained as relevant
as it ever was during the Cold War. The Government should do more
to explain what the concept of deterrence means in today's strategic
environment. (Paragraph 74)
13. The Government
has stated that the UK will use its nuclear weapons only in "self-defence",
in "extreme circumstances", and in defence of the UK's
"vital interests", but has not defined these terms. It
argues that it is important to maintain ambiguity about the exact
circumstances in which the UK might use its nuclear weapons. Although
we understand the need for ambiguity, the Government should be
clearer that this ambiguity does not lead to a lowering of the
nuclear threshold. (Paragraph 81)
14. The Government
says it no longer uses the term "sub-strategic" in discussing
the UK's nuclear weapons. However, the White Paper refers to varying
the yield of the UK's nuclear warheads. We call upon the Government
to clarify how a reduced yield differs from a sub-strategic role.
The Government should also state why a sub-strategic role was
thought necessary in 1998 but is no longer necessary now. (Paragraph
87)
15. The Government
states that the UK's nuclear deterrent will continue to be assigned
to NATO. NATO nuclear doctrine, however, explicitly involves a
policy of not ruling out first use of nuclear weapons and a policy
of sub-strategic deterrence. We call upon the Government to clarify,
in time for the debate and vote in the House of Commons, how the
UK's nuclear forces are integrated into the nuclear defence of
NATO and what the implications of the Alliance's first use and
sub-strategic policies are for the UK's nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph
90)
16. The Government
acknowledges that there is no current nuclear threat to the UK
but argues that nuclear weapons are needed as an insurance
policy against an uncertain future. Some of our witnesses
pointed to nuclear proliferation and noted that nuclear aggression
could only be deterred by the possibility of nuclear retaliation.
Others—including some who accepted the need for the deterrent—felt
that the Government's analysis of the threat was vague, flawed
and otherwise lacked logic, and many particularly expressed scepticism
about the efficacy of the deterrent in countering state-sponsored
terrorism. (Paragraph 100)
17. The Government
states that the retention and renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent
is fully consistent with its international legal obligations.
Some witnesses to our inquiry challenged the Government's position
and suggested that the proposals in the White Paper may constitute
a breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and may be illegal
under the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. The Government
rejects this suggestion. None of the witnesses to our inquiry,
however, believed that a decision to replace the Vanguard-class
submarines would, in itself, be illegal, though some argued that
the long-term retention of a nuclear capability, including the
decision to extend the life of the Trident D5 missile, was inconsistent
with the UK's obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith
to achieve nuclear disarmament. (Paragraph 114)
18. Witnesses to our
inquiry accepted that, ultimately, decisions on the future of
the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent were political and that,
in the absence of consensus, legal concerns were unlikely to be
decisive. (Paragraph 115)
19. The White Paper
states that the Government is committed to nuclear non-proliferation
and to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. It cites a variety
of ways in which the Government has sought to achieve these objectives.
Some witnesses to our inquiry, however, have argued that the White
Paper gives insufficient attention to the implications of the
Government's decisions for non-proliferation efforts. Some argued
that the Government's proposals may actually encourage nuclear
proliferation and undermine the authority of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Others have argued that whether the UK opts for or against
retaining its nuclear deterrent, the decision will have a negligible
impact on global proliferation. (Paragraph 126)
20. The reductions
in warhead numbers announced by the White Paper are significant
disarmament measures, but, in themselves, they do not amount to
a non-proliferation strategy. There is a need for a much stronger
narrative on the forward commitment of the Government to achieve
nuclear non-proliferation. The Government should not assume that
current activities such as those mentioned in respect of the Norwegian
7 Country Initiative have a wide currency. The Government should
explain how it will use its position at the Security Council,
as the only nuclear weapon state with a single platform and 1%
of the global arsenal, to give new momentum to what are widely
perceived as stalled non-proliferation treaty discussions. Without
a stronger narrative, the UK's decision to retain and renew its
nuclear deterrent might be seized upon by would-be proliferators
to justify their own efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, though
it remains the case that any non-nuclear state which is a signatory
to the NPT is in clear breach of its undertakings if it seeks
to acquire nuclear weapons. (Paragraph 127)
21. None of the witnesses
to our inquiry was surprised the Government had decided to opt
for a renewal of the submarine-based deterrent. Few of them considered
the SSBN option was the wrong one. But, of course, a great many
of them argued that the Government was wrong to renew the nuclear
deterrent at all, and a few thought the Government's justification
for its choice was inadequate. (Paragraph 131)
22. While many of
our witnesses disagreed with the Government's decision to renew
the nuclear deterrent, few challenged its choice of a submarine-based
ballistic missile over other deterrent options. However, some
have found the analysis of the options in the White Paper not
to have explored fully the option of a nuclear-powered submarine
carrying cruise missiles, noted as being the best alternative
option. The Government should set out in more detail what were
the comparative advantages of cost, range, operation and invulnerability
associated with cruise and D5 missiles which led them to conclude
in favour of the D5 missile. We believe the Government should
offer further details of its assessment of deterrent options.
(Paragraph 138)
23. We welcome the
Government's assurance that funding for the nuclear deterrent
will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities
required by the UK's Armed Forces. However, the Government has
not said how it would guarantee this, when expenditure on the
deterrent is included in the defence budget. We call on the Government
to specify in more detail how it will fulfil this assurance. It
is important that additional funding is provided not only for
the initial procurement costs, but also with any additional costs
of maintaining the system in-service. (Paragraph 148)
24. It is important
that Parliament be aware of the full costs of retaining and renewing
the UK's nuclear deterrent before it is asked to agree to the
Government's proposals. These costs include not only the acquisition
costs for a new fleet of SSBNs, but also the costs of life extension,
the costs of the missile and warhead programmes, the projected
infrastructure costs, and the personnel costs of operating and
maintaining the deterrent. The Government says that the overall
procurement and infrastructure costs are £15-20 billion and
that the annual running costs will be £1.5 billion at 2006-07
prices. (Paragraph 153)
25. The MoD proposes
to embark on a life extension programme for the current Vanguard-class
SSBNs, but has not offered a clear estimate of the costs involved
in that programme. The MoD should make it clear when it will be
in a position to give more accurate estimates and what work needs
to be done to achieve this. (Paragraph 154)
26. The House of Commons
should be aware that, even if it were to vote against retaining
the deterrent, certain costs would be involved. These would include
costs, such as onshore infrastructure, industrial costs, and regional
assistance to the areas affected by industrial closures. The
costs of investing in regions affected by any decision not to
go ahead with renewal of the present deterrent should be estimated
and included together with other costs so that those who argue
there is an opportunity cost to other public expenditure can see
what the full costs of such a negative decision are. (Paragraph
155)
27. The MoD states
that it is not possible to provide precise estimates of the costs
of decommissioning the Vanguard-class submarine. However, it says
that £827 million is included in the MoD annual accounts
for the decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines. Whether
or not the UK decides to replace the Vanguard-class submarine
with a new SSBN, the costs of decommissioning the Vanguard-class
will still be incurred. This must be taken into account when considering
the costs of retaining and renewing the nuclear deterrent. Equally,
procurement of a new SSBN will, in time, mean that the MoD will
incur ongoing decommissioning costs associated with the deterrent.
(Paragraph 160)
28. The Government
says that the cost of UK participation in US plans to extend the
life of the Trident D5 missile will be around £250 million.
We call upon the Government to state whether any further expenditure
will be needed to acquire the life-extended missiles over and
above the initial buy-in costs to the life extension programme.
(Paragraph 162)
29. The Government
states that greater industrial collaboration and affordability
are essential components in any new submarine programme and that
it needs to address its own shortage of skills in managing a programme
of the scale of a Vanguard successor. The MoD must ensure it has
the skills necessary to delivery any future submarine programme
to time and on budget. In the event of Parliament voting in support
of the renewal of Trident, industry and the MoD must work together
to drive down and control costs in order to deliver an affordable
submarine programme. (Paragraph 169)
30. It is probable
that a new generation of SSBNs could be designed to deliver a
higher level of reliability and availability, and it is possible
that this could allow continuous at sea deterrence to be ensured
with only three boats. But it is also possible that the cost-savings
would be small, and outweighed by the increased risk. The Government
should clarify when a decision will need to be made on the number
of boats in the new SSBN fleet, and what is the likely level of
savings from doing without a fourth boat. (Paragraph 175)
31. The Government
states that it is not yet possible to judge the potential costs
of procuring a successor to the Trident D5 missile. Given that
the Government intends to spend some £11-14 billion on new
ballistic missile submarines, it is essential that any successor
missile is fully compatible with the UK's future SSBN. (Paragraph
179)
32. We note the exchange
of letters between the Prime Minister and the US President, dated
7 December 2006—printed in Annex 2 to this report—to
effect collaboration in the life extension programme for the Trident
D5 missile delivery system. Given this exchange of letters took
place three days after the publication of the White Paper and
before debate in Parliament about the replacement of submarine
platforms to carry such missiles beyond the life of the current
Vanguard-class submarines, we look to the Government to explain
the effects, financial and otherwise, of this exchange of letters
agreeing the extension of this part of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
system. (Paragraph 180)
33. The Government
says that decisions on a new warhead will be required in the next
Parliament. We call upon the Government to state whether the cooperation
it envisages with the United States will include participation
in the US Reliable Replacement Warhead Programme and why the UK
could not re-manufacture warheads to the existing design. (Paragraph
182)
34. It
would be helpful if the Government could confirm whether the timetable
we suggest is accurate or in what respects it is wrong.
(Paragraph 184)
35. If
the White Paper's proposals to retain and renew the UK's strategic
nuclear deterrent are endorsed, it is essential that the Government
keep Parliament informed of the progress of the submarine, missile
and warhead programmes. We expect Parliament to be consulted at
each significant stage of the programmes before major procurement
decisions are made. (Paragraph 185)
36. The
Government deserves to be commended for exposing its proposal
to renew the strategic nuclear deterrent to public debate and
decision in Parliament, which previous Governments have not done.
We look to the Government to inform the House of Commons of any
errors of fact or interpretation in this report, before the debate
in March. And we hope that the Government, and the MoD in particular,
will learn for the future that greater transparency is to its
own, as well as to the public, advantage.
(Paragraph 186)
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