Annex 1: Conclusions of the Committee's
earlier Reports on the Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
Summary to the Eighth Report of Session 2005-06:
The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic
Context
Decisions on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent are likely to be required during the course of the current
Parliament. The Government has promised a free and open debate
on the issue before any decisions are taken. To date, it has offered
no explanation of the nature of the decisions that are required.
Nor has it sought to clarify the timetable within which those
decisions would need to be taken and implemented. This report
seeks to encourage and inform the public debate by examining the
strategic context and timetable for decision-making.
Decisions on the future of the nuclear deterrent
will be taken, for the first time, outside the international political
and military context of the Cold War. The ending of that conflict
transformed our security environment and changed our security
needs.
The UK will need to examine whether nuclear deterrence
remains relevant in the current strategic environment. We must
take into account the nature of the threats currently facing our
country and examine how those threats could evolve over the lifetime
of any potential Trident successor. And we must consider whether,
and in what ways, retention of a strategic nuclear deterrent capability
might assist the UK in addressing those threats.
Before any decisions on the future of that deterrent
are made, it will be important to address the extent to which
the possession of nuclear weapons enhances the UK's international
influence and status and whether such a reason adds significantly
to the justification for retention of a strategic nuclear capability.
It will also be essential to decide what level of
dependence upon the United States the UK is willing to accept
in any possible Trident successor. We must consider the potential
policy implications of any technical dependencies upon the US
and the differing concepts of independence adopted by the UK and
France.
We welcome the Government's promise of a full and
open debate in Parliament, and in the country at large, on the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. But the Ministry
of Defence has refused to participate in our inquiry. We are surprised
and disappointed by this refusal.
A genuine and meaningful debate is only possible
with the active participation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The public should know what decisions will be required, when they
must be taken and implemented, and what factors are driving consideration
of the issue now. We call upon the MoD to engage fully in our
forthcoming inquiries into the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent. We hope the MoD will make a substantive response to
this report and that it will address openly the issues we have
raised.
Conclusions and recommendations to the Eighth
Report of Session 2005-06: The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent: the Strategic Context
1. We
welcome the Government's promise of a full and open debate in
Parliament, and in the country at large, on the future of the
UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We are surprised and disappointed
that the Ministry of Defence has refused to participate in our
inquiry. We believe that a genuine and meaningful debate is only
possible with the active participation of the MoD. We call upon
the MoD to engage fully in our forthcoming inquiries into the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We hope the MoD
will make a substantive response to this report and that it will
address openly the issues we have raised. (Paragraph 12)
2. The UK's strategic
nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the other established
nuclear powers. (Paragraph 45)
3. In considering
the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the UK will need
to examine whether the concept of nuclear deterrence remains useful
in the current strategic environment and in the context of the
existing and emerging threats to the security of the country.
We will have to consider whether those states and non-state actors
posing such threats can, in reality, be deterred from instigating
acts of aggression by either existing or new approaches to nuclear
deterrence. We will also have to consider how the UK's nuclear
capability should be adjusted to meet new strategic realities.
Trident was developed during the final decade of the Cold War,
and was designed to counter the threat posed by the size and technical
capabilities of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: we need
to consider whether the form of the UK's current nuclear deterrent
is best suited to today's and tomorrow's strategic challenges.
(Paragraph 55)
4. We believe that
it is essential that, before making any decisions on the future
of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the MoD should explain its
understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear
deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident
successor system. (Paragraph 56)
5. Before any decisions
on the future of the deterrent are made, it will be important
to consider whether the possession of nuclear weapons enhances
the UK's international influence and status and whether this contributes
to the justification for retention of a strategic nuclear capability.
(Paragraph 57)
6. It is clear that
there is a difference of views and no clear consensus that international
influence is, of itself, a reason to retain the strategic nuclear
deterrent. We recommend that the MoD make clear whether the Government
believes the possession of a nuclear deterrent is an important
contributor to the UK's international influence. (Paragraph 65)
7. The public debate
over the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent should
address:
- the independence of the UK's
current system; and
- the operational and diplomatic impact of any
potential dependency on the United States of any future UK nuclear
deterrent. (Paragraph 66)
8. It
is important to distinguish between two different types of independence:
independence of acquisition and independence of operation. We
heard that independence of acquisition is what the French have
opted for at a significantly higher cost to the defence budget.
Independence of operation is an alternative concept of independence
and it is this which the UK has opted for at a lower price. (Paragraph
80)
9. We call upon the
MoD to clarify the technical dependencies of the UK's Trident
system upon the United States and to respond to the argument that
the UK's nuclear deterrent is not truly independent. In weighing
the importance of maintaining independence, attention needs to
be paid to the differing concepts of independence adopted by the
UK and France. (Paragraph 84)
10. The public debate
about the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent must
take into account:
- the nature of the threats facing
the UK;
- how those threats could evolve over the lifetime
of any potential Trident successor system; and
- in what ways retention of a strategic nuclear
deterrent might assist the UK in addressing those threats. (Paragraph
85)
11. The
most pressing threat currently facing the UK is that of international
terrorism. Witnesses to our inquiry overwhelmingly argued that
the strategic nuclear deterrent could serve no useful or practical
purpose in countering this kind of threat. (Paragraph 88)
12. Witnesses to our
inquiry did not believe that the UK currently faced a direct or
impending military threat from any of the established nuclear
weapons states, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel,
North Korea, or, of course, from France or the United States.
(Paragraph 95)
13. There are difficulties
inherent in anticipating future threats to the security of the
UK. It is not possible to predict accurately the nature of the
future strategic international environment and to identify with
any certainty the threats the UK is likely to face. (Paragraph
96)
14. We call upon the
MoD to consider publicly the threats the UK faces today and how
those threats may evolve in the future. Such a threat assessment
will shape any decision on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent. We accept that future threats are unknowable, but,
clearly, a world in which nuclear proliferation had taken hold
would create deep uncertainties in international relations. For
this reason, the UK may wish to retain a strategic nuclear capability
as a guard against the unknown. If the MoD believes in the value
of the nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy, rather than in
response to any specific threat, we believe it is important to
say clearly that is the reason for needing the deterrent. (Paragraph
103)
15. The Government
has stated that decisions on the future of the UK's strategic
nuclear deterrent will be required during the course of the current
Parliament. To date, it has offered no explanation of the nature
of those decisions. If there is to be a meaningful debate on the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, the public should
know what decisions will be required, when they must be taken
and implemented, and what factors are driving consideration of
the issue now. (Paragraph 104)
16. A fundamental
political decision needs to be made on whether or not the UK should
retain a strategic nuclear deterrent. There is no clear point
at which this decision has to be made and there is a risk that
- by taking a series of decisions to keep options open - we could
find that we have in practice taken the decision to keep the deterrent.
Conversely, if we do not keep those options open, we could find
we are left without a deterrent. In our view, the UK should make
a clear decision on whether to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent.
It is important that a decision of this magnitude is not taken
by default. It should be made only after a full public debate.
It must not be made by the Government in secret. (Paragraph 106)
17. A service life
extension programme would allow the UK to postpone decisions on
whether to replace Trident until around 2010, on the basis that
a service life extension programme would add an additional five
years to the existing system and that procurement of a Trident
replacement would take approximately 14 years. By this time, it
is possible that the strategic environment might be clearer. But
it is likely to be an expensive process. Such an expensive option
should not be used only as a means of deferring a decision on
the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph
110)
18. It is important
that the Government continue to invest in the UK infrastructure
and skills base until a decision on whether to retain or abolish
the nuclear deterrent is made. Unless this investment is forthcoming,
the Government is likely to find that its options will be constrained
and that certain choices for the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent
will no longer be available. (Paragraph 115)
19. Given the new
investment at Aldermaston, and the widespread expectation that
a new warhead will not be required until well into the 2020s,
the timelines for manufacturing a replacement warhead is not a
key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph 121)
20. Since the Trident
II D5 missile will be in service in the United States until 2042,
this component of the system is not a key driver of the current
debate. (Paragraph 124)
21. The platform is
generally regarded as the crucial factor driving the current debate
on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph
126)
22. If the MoD believes
that the UK should retain the Continuous-at-Sea Deterrent cycle,
it must either extend the life of the Vanguard-class submarine
or procure a new platform to be in service by 2020. In the light
of the reduced threat we currently face, an alternative possibility
would be to retain a deterrent, but not continuously at sea. (Paragraph
130)
23. We believe that
the maintenance of onshore infrastructure and the domestic UK
skills base is an issue of paramount importance in considering
the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. We have decided that
this will be the focus of the next in our series of inquiries
into the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent. In that inquiry
we will also address the linkage between the Government's Defence
Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement,
or abolition of the UK's Trident system. (Paragraph 138)
Summary to the Fourth Report of Session 2006-07:
The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing
and Skills Base
In its White Paper on the future of the UK's nuclear
deterrent, the Government recommends the retention and renewal
of the submarine-based Trident weapons system. This will require
the procurement of a new generation of nuclear-powered Trident
submarines to replace the existing, but ageing, fleet of Vanguard-class
SSBNs.
This report does not assess the White Paper. That
will be the focus of our next inquiry. In this report, we highlight
the manufacturing and skills base issues which will need to be
addressed if a decision is made to renew the submarine-based deterrent.
The Government should respond to this report before the debate
on the White Paper in March.
Building and maintaining a new generation of nuclear
submarines will require a uniquely skilled and specialised workforce,
and a dedicated manufacturing and support infrastructure. These
already exist within the UK. But maintaining them is a key challenge.
Once lost, the skills base may prove impossible or prohibitively
expensive to recreate. Continuity of work on new boats is needed
in order to sustain the UK's capability to design, manufacture
and maintain nuclear-powered submarines.
Even if the Government's proposal to procure a replacement
for the Vanguard-class submarine is rejected, the UK will need
to maintain infrastructure and a skilled workforce to support
the Royal Navy's conventionally-armed nuclear submarines and to
carry out the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and nuclear
warheads.
Affordability must be a fundamental consideration
in any new submarine programme. If the UK goes ahead with procuring
a successor to the Vanguard-class submarine, industry must collaborate
more effectively to drive down costs. This will be important at
all levels in the supply chain.
In turn, the Ministry of Defence must provide industry
with clarity and consistency about operational requirements and
specifications. It is vital that lessons are drawn from the problems
experienced with the Astute-class programme.
Developing a Vanguard successor would be a huge undertaking.
The Ministry of Defence will need the capacity to manage such
a programme effectively. Any shortfalls in its preparedness must
be addressed as a matter of priority.
Sustaining the skills base at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment will also be important if the UK decides to retain
its nuclear deterrent. The current investment in skills and infrastructure
is understandable and justifiable. But the level of that investment,
in advance of decisions in principle on the future of the deterrent,
is a source of concern and the Government should clarify to what
extent this is a result of the requirements of the regulator.
Large-scale investment should follow, and not precede, policy
decisions of such paramount importance to the nation.
Conclusions and recommendations to the Fourth
Report of Session 2006-07: The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base
1. This
report does not seek to assess the findings and conclusions of
the Government's White Paper. That will be the focus of our next
inquiry. (Paragraph 6)
2. Any decisions on
the future of the UK's deterrent should be taken on the strategic
defence needs of the country. Our intention in making this report
is to ensure that the House of Commons, and the public, are aware
of the manufacturing and skills base issues which will need to
be addressed if a decision is made to renew the submarine-based
deterrent. We recommend that the Government respond to this report
in good time for publication before the debate in the House of
Commons on the White Paper in March 2007. (Paragraph 7)
3. The Ministry of
Defence believes that the UK should retain onshore a sovereign
capability in the design, construction, operation, maintenance
and decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines. It is important
that the public understand clearly the reasons for this. We call
upon the MoD to provide, in its response to this report, a fuller
explanation of the need for this sovereign capability. (Paragraph
31)
4. Witnesses to our
inquiry maintain that the UK's current manufacturing and skills
base is already at the minimum level necessary to sustain a viable
onshore submarine industry. (Paragraph 39)
5. Witnesses to our
inquiry agreed that the complexity and uniqueness of a nuclear
submarine, and of the environment in which it operated, called
for special skills, facilities and oversight not supported by
any other shipbuilding programme. (Paragraph 42)
6. We share our witnesses'
concern about the shortage of science and engineering graduates,
project managers and skilled and experienced technical staff,
but this raises questions which go far beyond the scope of this
report. (Paragraph 45)
7. The UK submarine
industry draws on a uniquely skilled and specialist workforce.
Retaining that skills base will be essential if the UK decides
it wants to continue to design, build and maintain nuclear-powered
submarines. The skills base is now at a critical level. Any further
erosion of the workforce may have significant implications for
the future of the submarine programme. Sustaining skills in this
sector is only possible with regular and continuous submarine
work. (Paragraph 46)
8. Even if the decision
is taken not to procure a Vanguard successor, a specialist skills
base will have to be retained in order to build SSNs and maintain
and finally decommission the UK's existing fleet of nuclear-powered
submarines. Some indication of the order of costs would be helpful
in considering arguments about affordability and we ask that the
MoD provide some information about this in their response to this
report. (Paragraph 47)
9. The submarine construction
supply chain is fragile and is particularly susceptible to gaps
in the programme. Extended gaps are likely to result in an erosion
of the UK's submarine manufacturing and skills base. There is
also a risk that single source suppliers will abandon the supply
chain in pursuit of more regular and assured work. If the UK intends
to build a successor to the Vanguard-class, or maintain an SSN
capability beyond the current Astute order book, the supply chain
will have to be sustained. To achieve this, the MoD must give
clear direction and certainty about the future submarine programme
in order to encourage industry to invest. We call upon the MoD
to provide, in its response to this report, an assessment of whether,
how and at what cost the submarine supply chain could be maintained
for the construction of future SSNs in the absence of a positive
decision on a Vanguard successor. (Paragraph 54)
10. Without a new
SSBN it is possible that there would be insufficient demand for
nuclear submarines to sustain the industry. It is important to
recognise that there is an interrelationship between SSN and SSBN
construction. (Paragraph 61)
11. It is clear that
the gap between the Vanguard and Astute submarine programmes had
a serious and debilitating impact on the UK's submarine industry
and put at risk the future of the UK's submarine fleet. If the
Government wants the UK to continue to design and build nuclear-powered
submarines, it will be essential to maintain a regular rhythm
of submarine construction. Reducing the frequency of construction
below 22 months would be risky. Without a regular build "drumbeat",
the UK skills base will erode and it may prove impossible or prohibitively
expensive to recreate. (Paragraph 64)
12. It is important
that the MoD and industry agree promptly on a price for future
Astute-class orders. Clarity and certainty about the future submarine
programme is necessary if industry is to continue to invest in
the manufacturing skills base. The MoD must also demonstrate that
it has learned the lessons from the Astute programme, and implemented
a much tighter contractual relationship with BAE Systems, before
it commits expenditure to a new SSBN build programme. (Paragraph
65)
13. The Government
will need to consider carefully whether the potential long-term
benefits of designing a completely new submarine, in which through-life
affordability is built in from the start, could outweigh the cost-benefits
of maximising commonality of design with existing submarines.
And it will need to judge whether efforts to maximise commonality
with existing submarines would be enough to sustain the specialist
submarine design base in the UK. (Paragraph 67)
14. Using a well-tried
reactor in the new submarines would minimise design-related risk,
but in the longer term there might be benefit in both safety and
design costs in investing in a new generation of reactor technology.
(Paragraph 68)
15. We recommend that
the MoD make clear in its response to this report the timetable
for the procurement of the new submarines it proposes. This should
indicate by when it will need to decide whether to opt for radical
redesign or commonality of design for the submarine platform and
for the nuclear reactor, and when it will need to decide between
a three- or four-boat package. (Paragraph 69)
16. A decision to
abandon the construction of nuclear submarines would have a profound
impact upon local communities, particularly at Barrow. Nevertheless,
we believe that employment factors should not be decisive in the
debate on the future of the deterrent. (Paragraph 75)
17. If there were
no successor to the Vanguard-class submarine, there would be an
ongoing need to retain onshore a capability to support and, ultimately,
to decommission the current SSBN and SSN fleet. We call upon the
MoD to state in its response to this report how much it would
cost to sustain that capability. (Paragraph 76)
18. It is essential
that the Naval Base Review take into account the implications
for the future of the submarine industry. (Paragraph 97)
19. Affordability
must be a fundamental consideration in any new submarine programme.
The Government is right to emphasise that orders for a Vanguard
successor will be contingent on industry driving down and reducing
costs and ensuring value for money throughout the submarine programme.
Industry must deliver on this requirement. (Paragraph 98)
20. We are concerned
that insufficient attention has been given to the costs of through-life
support. While we understand that DML is not a supplier to the
Astute programme, it seems odd and regrettable that the company
responsible for through-life support on the UK's nuclear-powered
submarines has had so little input into the design of the class.
If the affordability of the submarine programme is to improve,
it is essential that through-life costs are taken into consideration
at the initial design phase. Far greater emphasis must be placed
on this consideration before the design of any Vanguard successor
submarine begins. (Paragraph 99)
21. If the UK goes
ahead with procuring a successor to the Vanguard-class submarine,
it is essential that industry collaborates far more extensively
than it has done to date to drive down and control costs in the
manner envisaged by the Defence Industrial Strategy. Promoting
greater industrial collaboration should be a key priority for
the MoD. In turn, the MoD must provide industry with clarity and
consistency about operational requirements and specifications.
It is vital that lessons are drawn from the problems experienced
with the Astute-class programme. (Paragraph 105)
22. Developing a Vanguard
successor would be a huge undertaking. It is essential the MoD
has the capacity to manage such a programme effectively. Any shortfall
in preparedness must be addressed as a matter of priority. The
MoD's shortage of systems engineers and project managers—skills
essential at the start of a programme of this kind—is a
cause of serious concern. If the decision is made to renew the
deterrent, it is essential the MoD commit sufficient resources
to the programme from the beginning. It will be desirable to bring
in skills from industry. We recommend that the MoD state, in its
response to this report, how it intends to address its skills
shortages. (Paragraph 115)
23. We recommend that
in advance of any debate in the House of Commons on the future
of the deterrent, the MoD clarifies what additional investment
the Government intends to make at the AWE as a result of the recommendations
contained in the White Paper. (Paragraph 130)
24. The MoD and the
AWE must apply the lessons from the A91 episode in managing the
new infrastructure investment at Aldermaston. (Paragraph 131)
25. Many observers
have seen the investment programme at Aldermaston as a sign that
the Government had already decided in principle to retain and
renew the UK's nuclear deterrent. We accept Ministers' assurances
that this was not the case. We accept too that investment in buildings
and infrastructure at AWE was becoming time-critical, which might
suggest that the decision on the future of the deterrent should
have been taken in the last Parliament. But we are less convinced
that investment in the new Orion Laser, the supercomputer and
hydrodynamic facilities could not have waited for a decision in
principle on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. If the
investment was made to respond to requirements of regulators,
the Government should state this in its response to this report.
Large-scale investment should follow, and not precede, policy
decisions of such paramount importance to the nation. (Paragraph
146)
26. The widespread
suspicion about the work of the AWE and the Government's investment
there is partly a consequence of the secrecy which surrounds its
work. We fully accept the need to maintain secrecy about some
aspects of its work, but there is a case for greater openness,
not least to ensure that the public is aware of the positive contribution
the AWE makes to the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. (Paragraph 147)
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