Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
1. THE GOVERNMENT'S
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
OF THE
DETERRENT OPTIONS,
INCLUDING SUBMARINE-BASED
CRUISE MISSILES
We published a detailed assessment of the principal
deterrent options that were considered, and the process involved,
in Section 5 and Annex B of the White Paper. Clearly, this represented
a high level summary of a great deal of work, much of which is
necessarily highly classified. As the White Paper makes clear,
options based on aircraft, land-based silos or surface ships are
manifestly less capable, in some cases wholly impracticable and
in all cases at least as expensive as continuing with submarines.
As most commentators have agreed, the only credible alternatives
for retaining a nuclear deterrent are options within a submarine
solution. The Defence Secretary and his team will of course be
happy to answer any detailed follow-up questions when he appears
before the Committee on 6 February.
As for the option of cruise missiles launched
from submarines, we are clear that, in both cost and capability
terms, retaining the Trident D5 missile is by far the best approach.
A comparison between cruise and ballistic missiles is set out
in detail in Box 5-1 of the White Paper.
An option based on submarine-launched cruise
missiles would, like the option we have decided on, require the
procurement of new nuclear-powered submarines to fulfil the deterrent
role, as the existing conventional role submarine flotilla, and
the Astute class which will replace them, are required to undertake
other key defence tasks. Indeed, given that a much larger number
of cruise missiles, compared to Trident D5 missiles, would be
required to meet our minimum deterrence requirements, moving to
a deterrent based on submarine-launched cruise missiles could
well lead to a requirement for additional submarine hulls.
Because of the costs and capability disadvantages
of cruise missiles set out in the White Paper, we have not undertaken
a detailed analysis of what the requirement for submarine hulls
would be.
It is also the case that moving to a submarine-based
cruise missile solution would necessitate the procurement of new
nuclear-capable cruise missiles and also the development of a
new nuclear warhead suitable for use with a cruise missile, both
at considerable cost and technical risk. Thus, such an option
would have significant disadvantages in both cost and capability
terms compared with the option we have chosen.
2. A FULL BREAKDOWN
OF THE
ESTIMATED COSTS
OF THE
WHOLE DETERRENT
PROGRAMME, AS
PROPOSED BY
THE GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING ACQUISITION,
SUPPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SERVICE
DELIVERY COSTS,
OVER THE
LIFETIME OF
THE NEW
SSBNS; AND
COMPARABLE COSTS
FOR THE
OTHER OPTIONS
The White Paper provided the broad granularity
of information on costs which is the most the Government believes
it would be prudent to make public at this early stage. As the
White Paper made clear, engagement with industry during the concept
and assessment phases of the project will produce more refined
cost estimates by the time we come to place a contract for the
detailed design of the submarines.
The initial estimate of the range of likely
costs is based on extensive work which drew on historic cost comparisons
as well as analysis of the risks and uncertainties inherent in
the costings. Inevitably, not all elements of the underlying detail
will be accurate at this stage, and although we are confident
that the overall range is of the right order, we will want to
bear down on the through life costs to the maximum extent possible
as the project matures. It is for these reasons, and to avoid
compromising commercially sensitive information, that the Government
does not propose to provide a more detailed breakdown of the estimated
costs of the future deterrent programme at this stage.
We have already stated that the £15-20
billion acquisition cost estimate includes some £11-14 billion
for the submarines, £2-3 billion for the possible refurbishment
or replacement of the warhead and £2-3 billion for infrastructure.
The submarine costs include provision for system concept and assessment,
platform, propulsion plant and strategic weapon system development.
The warhead costs are additional to the running costs and ongoing
programme of investment in new facilities and manpower at the
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston. The infrastructure
costs, likewise, are additional to provision for ongoing maintenance
of infrastructure, which is contained in our in-service cost estimates
for the current deterrent and its replacement.
Turning to the options which were discarded
in favour of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines,
the White Paper made clear that the reasons for not selecting
them were a mixture of cost and capability. In the case of the,
significantly more expensive, silo and large aircraft options
the acquisition costs were much higher than in the case of the
submarine option, and represented a substantially larger share
of the through life costs. The in service support costs were also
higher. Both the acquisition and in-service costs for the surface
ship option were of the same order as for the submarine option.
3. CLARIFICATION
OF THE
TIMING OF
THE END
OF LIFE
FOR EACH
OF THE
VANGUARD SUBMARINES,
WITH OR
WITHOUT A
SERVICE LIFE
EXTENSION PROGRAMME,
EXPLANATION OF
HOW THESE
DATES WERE
REACHED AND
WHICH ELEMENTS
OF THE
SUBMARINE ARE
CRITICAL
The expected out-of-service dates for the four
Vanguard-class submarines, with and without any life extension
programme, are as follows:
| Commencement of Sea Trials/Reactor went critical
| Out of Service Date (no life extension)
| Out of Service date (with life extension)
|
| HMS Vanguard | 1992 | 2017
| 2022 |
| HMS Victorious | 1994 | 2019
| 2024 |
| HMS Vigilant | 1996 | 2021
| 2026 |
| HMS Vengeance | 1999 | 2024
| 2029 |
| | |
|
These dates are based on the date that the reactors on the
four submarines first went critical, the original design life
of the submarines (which was for a life of at least 25 years),
and—based on our experience of operating the Vanguard-class
submarines, experience with other classes of submarines, the results
of discussions with our internal experts, and the views of industry—our
assessment of the maximum additional in-service life that we believe
it is currently prudent to assume can be achieved through a life
extension programme.
Some details on those components of the Vanguard-class submarines,
which we believe are critical in terms of limiting the effective
service life of the submarines, are set out at paragraph 1-3 of
the recent White Paper. Life extension much beyond five years
is likely to require replacement of some of the systems critical
to submarine operations, such as external hydraulic systems, elements
of the control systems (plane and rudder), sonar systems, electrical
systems (including main battery) and refurbishment or replacement
of elements of the nuclear propulsion system. This would involve
some hull penetrations. Replacing these systems would require
extended additional maintenance periods resulting in loss of boat
availability and significant cost but would not enable significantly
increased life. Extension to both component safety justifications
and the whole reactor plant safety justification would also be
required (and could not be assured). Other systems would need
careful assessment and replacement of the turbo generators, secondary
propulsion gear and assemblies, deterrent missile hydraulics,
hatches and mechanisms, might be required. There would also be
increasing risks with the reliability of other major systems,
including potentially the main engine, gearbox shafting and propulsor,
all of which could require replacement.
As was made clear in the White Paper, we do not at this stage
completely rule out further life extension of the Vanguard-class.
The key point is that on current evidence it is highly likely
to represent poor value for money. Moreover, there is also serious
concern as to whether it will be technically feasible. The position
will be kept under review at each key stage of the programme to
design and build the replacement submarines. But given the severe
uncertainties associated with life extension beyond the 30-year
point, it would be grossly irresponsible not to start concept
and assessment work in time to ensure we can field replacement
submarines when the Vanguard-class reaches the 30-year point.
In this context, we would like to reiterate two points to
the Committee. First, we believe the most relevant comparison
with the Vanguard class—in terms of likely in-service life—is
our own classes of submarine and not the US Ohio-class, to which
some commentators have referred. The Ohio-class submarines are
different boats with different original design life and a different
manufacture, refit and maintenance regime, as made clear in paragraph
1-4 of the White Paper. The Resolution class submarines, for example,
were maintained in-service for from 25 to 28 years and experienced
serious loss of availability and significantly increased maintenance
costs towards the end of their lives. We have no wish to repeat
that experience.
Second, many commentators have contrasted the 17 years quoted
in the White Paper to design build and commission a new class
of SSBNs with the time between the decision to procure Trident
in 1980 and HMS Vanguard's first patrol in 1994. This overlooks
the point made clear in the White Paper that much of the concept
and assessment work for the Vanguard-class submarines, the stages
on which we are about to embark for the replacement SSBNs, was
carried out in secret in the decade before the decision to procure
Trident was taken in 1980. Again, we do not believe that it would
have been responsible or acceptable to have followed a similar
course on this occasion.
4. DETAILS OF
THE PROCESS
AND CONSULTATIONS
WHICH PRECEDED
THE PRESENTATION
OF A
PAPER TO
THE CABINET
ON THE
FUTURE OF
THE DETERRENT
The then Defence Secretary described the process by which
these decisions were to be taken in his evidence to the Committee
on 1 November 2005. Officials have undertaken work to assess the
range of security risks and challenges that we might face over
the next 20 to 50 years. Based on that assessment, officials considered
our future deterrence requirements and then considered how best
these requirements could be met, looking at the full range of
options and potential costs. Annex B of the White Paper describes
this process in more detail. This work involved discussions with
a number of different parties, including, on a confidential basis,
with industry and with some of our allies. Those assessments,
and their conclusions, were considered in detail by senior Ministers
and by the full Cabinet prior to the Cabinet discussion and final
publication of the White Paper on 4 December.
1 January 2007
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