Memorandum from Abolition 2000 UK
BACKGROUND
Abolition 2000 UK is the UK arm of Abolition
2000, an international network of about 1,700 organisations in
over 90 countries committed to work for the worldwide abolition
of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000 was set up after the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 1995, which
made that treaty permanent. We welcomed the famous 13-step programme
for nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 15 of the gloss
on NPT article VI in the final report of the 2000 review conference.
We lobby government agencies both national and international,
co-ordinate cooperative actions, and publish papers on the problems
of nuclear weaponry. We are the main UK distributor of "Security
and Survival—The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention",
containing the text of the model nuclear weapons convention (designed
along the lines of the chemical and biological weapons conventions)
as well as supporting arguments and comments on the problems to
be overcome to secure such a convention. Copies can be provided
for members of the Defence Select Committee if desired.
1. The lifetime of the present V-class submarines
The US plans to retain and refurbish as necessary
its present Ohio-class nuclear missile carrying submarines for
a prolonged period. Yet on page 10 of the white paper we have
the claim or admission that the UK V-class submarines are not
as robust as the US Ohio type. The committee may wish to examine
the truth and details for this claim. It would seem to imply,
relative to the US situation, either deficiencies in UK submarine-building
capability or earlier and careless governmental cost-cutting or
both. Apparently all previous UK-built submarines were designed
to last no more than 25 years and there are serious risks as well
as costs to a life extension programme. The committee may wish
to examine the evidence for this and its implications. Abolition
2000 UK does not claim expertise in naval technology although
other submissions to the committee may be from those with such
expertise. Yet we urge the committee to consider the likelihood
that the political cost of a new submarine programme will outweigh
the financial costs of merely maintaining the current fleet. The
white paper's reference to "difficulties in the Astute programme"
is troubling. We suspect that design of nuclear missile submarines
to modern standards of safety and security will present even greater
challenges. The need to fill the "design gap" and to
provide jobs for the design teams will surely be better met by
the design of other naval vessels of a more conventional and hence
usable kind.
2. Plans for the Trident missiles
A change in missile design or capability would
be a significant increase in the perceived threat represented
by the UK nuclear weapons (NW). But the missiles are US designed
and built, and the UK just has notional title to those in its
part of the armoury. Assurances have apparently been received
(see page 11 of the white paper) that the present missiles will
remain available until 2042 with some modest life extension planned.
Abolition 2000 UK welcomes the presumption that there have been
and will be no changes in payload, in range or in missile accuracy
over this time period—representing a half century stasis
in missile technology. But we would like to be made sure of this,
as perhaps would the committee.
3. The status of the UK as a Nuclear Weapons
State (NWS)
3A. On page 13 the white paper refers to
the 2000 NPT Review Conference and mentions UK support for the
"13 steps" towards nuclear disarmament agreed at the
NPT Review Conference in 2000. Abolition 2000 UK welcomes this
statement but questions its consistency with the proposals contained
elsewhere in the white paper. And we disagree with some of the
white paper's interpretations of the NPT and other international
legal commitments. For example, on page 14 (International Obligations)
NPT "recognition" of UKs status as a nuclear weapons
state (NWS) is described. Although this avoids the use of the
word "legal" concerning the five 1968 NWS and previously
employed casually by Defence Minister Geoff Hoon and others in
parliament, there is in fact no implication in the Treaty of either
a recognised or a legal status for the weapons then and now in
the hands of the five. Words like "recognition" or "recognise"
are nowhere used in the treaty; NWS are simply defined (in article
IX) "for the purposes of this treaty" as those who tested
before 1967.
3B. We also note that the white paper claims
compliance with NPT articles I and VI. But with the later reference
to the 1958 mutual defence agreement, and in view of the UK's
apparently having obtained warhead neutron generators directly
from the US, it is evident that we are close to violation of the
NPT article I on nuclear weapons components transfer. US transfer
of warhead design information is arguably a violation of article
I; transfer of manufactured warhead components is almost certainly
such a violation.
3C. We also note and regret the defensive
mention of the fanciful general disarmament clause inserted after
the article VI comma as well as the remarks in this part of the
white paper about the absence of a definite nuclear disarmament
timetable. Inclusion of any such timetable would in any case have
been inappropriate in the original treaty. But here surely reference
could be made to the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
opinion which indicated that immediate negotiations were indeed
called for. The UK is not currently involved in any such negotiations.
3D. The comments here on the 1996 ICJ advisory
opinion are in our opinion weak or misleading; it cannot be truthfully
said that the advisory opinion rejected the argument that NW use
would necessarily be unlawful. The only circumstance in which
the court felt that it was unable to determine whether the use
or threat of use was lawful or unlawful was when the actual survival
of the state was threatened. That threshold for possible (but
still not certain) lawfulness is much higher than any suggested
within the white paper (cf paragraph 5 below).
4. The UK NW policy and NATO
4A. On page 17 of the white paper we have
mention of NATO and Warsaw pact in an historical context but none
of current NATO policy nor of the relationship of the UK Trident
programme to that policy. The white paper contains nothing here,
or even under "international obligations", about any
treaty and practice obligations that the UK has with respect to
its nuclear arsenal within NATO. The only other comments concern
defence of NATO allies (fact sheet 3 and page 19), but neither
is presented in the context of NATO NW policy. The committee might
wish to determine the relationship between UK NW and NATO, and
whether the declared NATO policy of potential first use (not quite
the same as saying neither first use nor no first use) is consistent
with UK policy and UK responsibilities in international law.
4B. It could be argued that the two strongest
reasons for maintaining at least a provisional NW capability—if
not new submarines—would be (a) the need to discuss this
within NATO (because the substrategic role of Trident is currently
seen as part of NATO nuclear policy) and (b) the need for UK cross-party
agreement on such a key issue. Neither is clearly addressed in
the white paper. Yet the UK's acceptance of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference 13 steps under article VI implies this country's preparedness
eventually to move towards nuclear disarmament. That means that
a future decision will be made to abandon UK weapons. To lay the
ground for such a decision, however far it may lie in the future,
the government will need to discuss how broad agreement could
be achieved, both at a national level, with the opposition parties,
and an international level, with our NATO allies. Decisions on
the Trident programme in the immediate future could affect the
possibility of achieving such agreement or even meaningful discussion
in the slightly longer future. The committee might thus look at
the proposed plans in the light of our international treaty commitments,
including those within NATO, and the historic patterns of those
UK defence policies that have been the subject of general and
especially cross-party agreement.
5. The purpose of the UK Nuclear Weapons
We welcome the statement that the declared focus
of UK nuclear policy is on preventing nuclear attack and that
UK nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during a
local or narrowly regional conflict. The committee might wish
to try to make this more firm. We note that this contradicts some
of the remarks by then Defence Minister Geoff Hoon prior to and
during the 2003 Gulf war concerning the possible threat of a nuclear
response to CBW use against troops in the field outside the UK.
The white paper text also seems to limit NW to deterrence of (serious
or only nuclear?) "acts of aggression against vital interests",
wording which is close to but not identical with that in the ICJ
"survival of the state" case. But then on p 18 it is
said that "we will not rule in or out first use". This
could be read as a retreat from the traditional ("cold war")
first use policy which we understand remains the NATO position—that
potential first use is an intrinsic part of NATO nuclear strategy—or
not. The committee might wish to examine and clarify this. The
idea that the US or France might not support us if we were attacked
and not nuclear-armed is courteously placed as a belief that an
"enemy" might have, rather than one that we might have
ourselves. But the logic there is close to circular. The discussion
of the role of nuclear weapons in situations involving "weak
and failing states, terrorists etc." is in our opinion one
of the weaker areas of the document. We believe that a closer
examination of the usefulness or otherwise of nuclear weapons
in any situation that did not involve a confrontation with a nuclear-armed
power is needed and that the committee might usefully look at
this.
6. UK Nuclear Weapons and the NPT
On page 20 a further attempt is made to refute
the argument that the UK is guilty of hypocrisy by planning to
retain its own weapons while denying such weapons to others. This
attempt again involves referring to the UK as "recognised"
as a NWS in the NPT. It always needs emphasising, and the committee
might look into the questions of legal language involved, that
the distinction between NWS and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)
in the NPT is simply to be a practical one based upon the state
of play in 1968. Had the treaty been signed into law more recently
the NWS list would have included at least India and Pakistan if
not Israel and the DPRK. The treaty obligations on NWS and NNWS
are essentially the same. In our view the treaty does not give
any special status to the then and now signatory five NWS; it
calls upon them to disarm while calling upon all others not to
become nuclear-armed.
7. The number of new vessels needed
On page 26 it is suggested that only three new
submarines may be needed. The committee might wish to examine
the probable and indeed likely problems of cost overruns and also
the overlap between the stages of proposed Trident decommissioning
and of new submarine launches. The committee might also examine
the possibility that when all costs are included and in view of
future geopolitical uncertainties that a major programme of re-hulling
and refitting the current submarines over time might be preferred.
Were this to be done one submarine at a time the UK would continue
to have three such vessels available to it, a situation which
the country has faced in the past and apparently will face in
the future if the proposed new fleet were to contain only three
boats.
8. MoD requirements, the UK ship-building
industry and the choice of system
8A. We feel that the relationship described
on page 28 between the MoD and industry is an uneasy one. It proclaims
an intention to build new boats in the UK, but only if UK industry
can do it to specification, to cost and on time. We think that
the committee might wish to look again at these problems in the
light of the white paper and national policy. Plans for major
refitting of the current fleet could remove some of the problems
involved. A decision not to retire the current fleet until all
the potential problems are clarified would be another part of
such a policy. And a delay in any such planning, while this country
looked again at the likelihood of major developments in international
discussions on nuclear disarmament, would be a third reason not
to go ahead in such an uncertain state of mind.
8B. Re "afloat storage". On a
smaller point we note on p 29 the uncomfortable description of
"afloat storage" which is clearly unsatisfactory on
environmental, health and safety grounds. Are the decommissioned
V-class submarines to stay rusting in Devonport for ever? The
committee might wish to look into the possibility of more complete
if more expensive full decommissioning of all the submarines,
initially those that are no longer needed and eventually, and
in another context, of those currently seen as "needed".
8C. On page 36 the surface ship option is
placed in a surprisingly prominent position. And the suggestion
that only three such vessels would be needed indicates that it
could be a cheaper option (page 39). Yet such vessels would presumably
be more easily tracked than submarines. The committee may wish
to try to determine whether this suggestion is linked to a possible
increase in ocean transparency under surveillance by sophisticated
satellites. It is not clear to us how invisible the submerged
V-class submarines are to a technically sophisticated potential
enemy or even to some of our friends. But Abolition 2000 UK suspects
that the US navy always knows where the UK nuclear weapons submarine
patrol is. The committee might wish to obtain expert opinion concerning
current technical ability to track submerged vessels.
9. Relationship with the US, current missiles
and with warhead modification
9A. On page 31 we note that the white paper
describes and defends UK activities under the 1958 mutual defence
agreement with the US. The committee might wish to examine the
possibility that the 1958 agreement, which preceded the NPT, represents
at least in part a possible violation of NPT commitments under
article I of that treaty. Our participation in a successor to
D5 missile is assured with a promised exchange of open letters
with the US president. The committee might wish to examine the
details that we would like to see contained in such letters and
obtaining from the government a firm commitment to open publication
of the details if and when the time comes.
9B. We are apparently assured of D5 missile
successor compatibility with the new submarines (although the
committee might wish to examine this in more detail). But plans
for our warheads are less clear. If indeed no new warheads are
to be designed and manufactured we need a clearer explanation
from the MoD of the current increases in staff and scientific
capability such as the Orion laser at Aldermaston. Abolition 2000
UK is also concerned about the UK's commitment to both the letter
and the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT). Subcritical
testing of aspects and components of redesigned warheads in US
facilities is not consistent with the spirit and may come close
to violation of the letter of the CTBT. The committee might ask
the government to reiterate its support for the CTBT, to firmly
ask the US to ratify the treaty and to engage actively within
the UN to secure the other ratifications that would bring this
treaty into force.
10. The seven nation initiative and response
to opposing arguments
10A. Abolition 2000 UK welcomes the mention
on page 33 of the Norwegian-led seven-country initiative on nuclear
weapons and disarmament. We and perhaps the committee will be
pleased that as the UK is the only NWS among the 7 nations involved
in this initiative the government should be congratulated on setting
an example to other NWS, both the original five and those outside
the NPT. This is a possible source of progress that could vitiate
any need for new submarines, for other ships, or even for any
major refitting of the present fleet.
10B. Many of the arguments against Trident
renewal are listed and discussed in the white paper. This is a
positive signal and we congratulate HM Government on their attention
to our and others' views. We only wish that the white paper had
been a green paper and that a final governmental decision was
therefore still open. We urge the committee to ask the government
to change the colour of the document before us.
14 January 2007
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