Memorandum from Professor William Walker
1. Nuclear weapons give their possessors
the ability to commit acts of indiscriminate annihilation of lives
and worlds. For some, they are morally repugnant and no state,
the UK included, is justified in acquiring and deploying them
in any circumstance. This absolutist position is hard to sustain,
however, if renunciation places a state and its people at the
mercy of a nuclear-armed aggressor. Yet the possibility that some
state might threaten nuclear attack sometime in the future does
not warrant another absolutist conclusion—that all states
have a right and responsibility, following the precautionary principle,
to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. The consequences of a
general international consent to deploy nuclear forces would be
intolerable.
2. To justify the UK's retention of its
nuclear deterrent, it follows that the Government should be able
to present particular reasons, beyond simple legality, why the
UK—rather than other states—should possess them. In
addition, the risks invoked when applying the precautionary principle
should be substantial and credible, and the means proposed for
addressing them should be appropriate and give rise neither to
other unacceptable risks and costs nor to the foregoing of major
opportunity.
3. The decision on Trident cannot be straightforward
as it requires the balancing of many judgements in conditions
of uncertainty. In my view, the arguments presented in the White
Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent
are not persuasive enough to justify Trident's replacement.
The Government has not identified the particular reasons why the
UK should retain a nuclear deterrent, nor has it allayed concerns
about the risks, costs and lost opportunities associated with
its proposals. Furthermore, Mr Blair is incorrect in claiming
in his Foreword that "the Government's decision followed
a careful review of all the issues and options, which are set
out in full in the White Paper". Important issues and options
are omitted, evaded or receive inadequate attention in the White
Paper.
4. After brief comment on the White Paper's
observations about future threats and Trident's contribution to
collective security, attention will be drawn here to two sets
of issues. The first concerns the UK's treaty obligations and
non-proliferation policies, and international ramifications of
a decision to replace or not to replace Trident. Secondly, I wish
to highlight a reality ignored by the White Paper: that the politics
of Trident and its replacement are inextricably bound up with
the politics of the Union, probably to the detriment of both.
The White Paper only considers external risks to the UK's survival.
It does not consider the internal risk that Trident will contribute
to the Union's disintegration, nor that its operation out of Scotland
might become politically infeasible even under devolution during
the 20 years of its replacement, let alone the 50 years over which
the new system would be replaced and operated. If the Government
had applied its own precautionary principle, it would have given
greater weighting to military options that could be located in
England.
5. My concluding point is that this is the
worst of times to be making a decision of such gravity, given
the current volatility of domestic and international politics.
FUTURE THREATS
AND TRIDENT'S
CONTRIBUTION TO
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
6. In the White Paper's paragraphs 3-9 to
3-11, the Government identifies three types of threat justifying
possession of a nuclear deterrent between 2020 and 2050: the re-emergence
of a "major threat" from an established nuclear weapon
state; the emergence of nuclear-armed states with lesser capabilities
that could "nevertheless pose a grave threat to our vital
national interest"; and the sponsorship of nuclear terrorism
by a nuclear-capable state. These paragraphs contain general descriptions
of possible developments in the international arena which cannot
be discounted. They are nevertheless extremely vague. Little effort
is made to explain how and why they pose particular threats to
the UK, and why—if the threats do not exist today—they
are sufficiently tangible and probable to merit paying such a
heavy insurance premium.
7. The Government may understandably hesitate
in naming specific states as future threats. It should nevertheless
have provided clearer indication of the kinds of future circumstance
that would compel the UK to threaten nuclear attack in its own
defence. Otherwise, Parliament is being asked to base its decision
largely on conjecture and intuition, and there is danger that
the debate will be steered by Pavlovian suggestion rather than
by public reason. In this age of "evidence-based policy",
the case for adopting such an extreme remedy should also be accompanied
by evidence of specific occasions on which the deterrent has shown
its worth, especially since the end of the Cold War. Have there
been any such occasions if truth be told?
8. A more solid case for Trident's replacement
might have been presented by stressing its contribution to collective
security. Besides the transatlantic alliance, it could have been
argued that the British and French deterrents together provide
assurances that Europe could respond to threats levelled against
it, and that Europe would not have to rely solely on the US deterrent
which might turn out to be unreliable. Removal of the UK deterrent
might, by the same token, be politically and strategically unsettling
in Europe, with unpredictable consequences. These arguments are
not made in the White Paper. Beyond vague allusion to collective
security in the fourth bullet point in paragraph 3-4, there is
silence.
9. Outside the White Paper, Mr Blair made
the following statement in his letter of 7 December 2006 to President
Bush: "a future UK deterrent submarine force... will be assigned
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and except where the
United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests
are at stake, this successor force will be used for the purposes
of international defence of the Atlantic Alliance in all circumstances".
What does this familiar mantra mean in the post-Cold War environment,
and is it credible to commit Trident to be so used "in all
circumstances"? Could any UK Government credibly promise
to sacrifice London or Glasgow to protect a distant ally in a
conflict that did not involve the UK's survival?
TRIDENT REPLACEMENT,
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
ORDER AND
THE NPT
10. Although their predictions are cautious,
the Government and White Paper's subliminal messages are that
nuclear proliferation is accelerating, nuclear weapons are regaining
salience in relations among great powers, and the NPT and other
arms control institutions are eroding and may collapse. This depiction
of the future rests on an extrapolation from the past decade's
trends and events. Assessment of its validity has to rest on understands
of why, after remarkable progress in the years following the end
of the Cold War, so much has gone wrong.
11. There are two main reasons. Firstly,
a handful of states which had nurtured nuclear weapon programmes
during the Cold War either became less secure after its end (eg
North Korea), or their governments became caught up in a nationalistic
striving for great power status (notably India). Their behaviour
and the clandestine character of Iraq, Iran and North Korea's
weapon programmes exposed weaknesses in the NPT and its safeguards
system and opened international divisions on how best to respond.
Secondly, the United States' strategy for promoting international
nuclear order took a disastrous turn. It brought punishment, regime
change and counter-proliferation into the foreground of nuclear
politics without simultaneously deepening its own and everyone
else's commitment to the norms and rules underpinning the international
nuclear order, of which the non-proliferation regime was only
part. Furthermore, it sought to free itself from external restraint
by rejecting a swathe of arms control measures and proposals while
expecting others to exhibit ever greater restraint. This behaviour
tore the NPT and the political bargains upon which it rested.
12. Whether there is progress or regress
in international nuclear relations therefore depends on much more
than dynamics of armament that have been let loose in the post-Cold
War environment. It depends crucially on the direction of US policy
(which may be shifting despite the present confrontation with
Iran) and whether, after a period of divergence, the policies
of leading states will again converge on the achievement of order
through international law and treaty processes accompanied by
the prudent use of power. Above all, it depends on whether they
recommit themselves to honouring the NPT and its Conference decisions.
The decision on Trident and its supporting argumentation have
to be viewed against this background.
13. Over the past decade, the UK's international
nuclear policies have become increasingly confused. On the one
hand, it has maintained its traditionally strong support for arms
control and the NPT and, as the White Paper correctly observes,
has gone further than any other nuclear weapon state in reducing
its capabilities to the minimum necessary, honouring its international
obligations and promoting measures to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime. On the other hand, Downing Street has worked assiduously
to prevent the opening of clear blue water between UK and US policies:
it has discouraged criticism of US strategies, reined in its enthusiasm
for multilateral arms control, and supported the Bush administration
in its military action against Iraq and in the rationale underpinning
it. The one exception has been its joining with France and Germany
in the "E3" diplomatic initiative, in the teeth of US
opposition, to bring Iran into compliance with its NPT obligations.
14. Although the shadowing of US policy
has reflected various judgements about British interests and international
security, the desire to maintain and replace the Trident force
has been an important factor. This desire could not be satisfied
without permanent US assistance. Looking to the future, Parliament
should worry less in my view about the operational independence
of the deterrent than about the independence of UK foreign and
security policy. Trident replacement will inevitably extend the
UK's political dependence on the US with a consequent loss of
autonomy.
15. Regarding the effect of decisions concerning
Trident on the non-proliferation regime, it can be stated emphatically
that (a) a decision to replace the deterrent would injure the
regime, and (b) a decision to abandon it would benefit it. The
only question is how much injury and how much benefit.
16. A decision to replace Trident would
injure the regime and thus UK interests for five main reasons:
— the UK is located in one of the most
stable and secure parts of the world. The claim that simple uncertainty
about the future justifies its retention of a nuclear deterrent
will not gain international respect and sets an unfortunate example,
providing easy political shelter to states seeking to justify
acts of proliferation;
— the White Paper's claim that "the
UK's retention of a nuclear deterrent is fully consistent with
our international obligations" is contestable. Although the
NPT provides the UK and four other nuclear weapon states with
the right to hold nuclear weapons, that right is neither permanent
nor unconditional. The nuclear weapon states' obligation, as elaborated
in the 2000 NPT Conference's Final Document, is "to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament, to which all states Parties are committed under Article
VI". Replacing Trident is not easily reconciled with that
obligation;
— the steps indicating the UK's "Progress
on Nuclear Disarmament" in Box 2-1 in the White Paper were
set in train during the 1990s, particularly by the Strategic Defence
Review of 1998. The White Paper presents no new proposals which
might compensate for injury inflicted to the NPT. Nor does it
convey any vision of how the UK will achieve further progress
on arms control or disarmament at home or abroad. Experienced
foreign diplomats are likely to interpret Box 2-1 as a dilution
of UK policy on arms control and disarmament, for instance through
its massaging of the above quotation from the 2000 NPT Final Document
and the half-hearted reference to its "13 practical steps";
— the close cooperation in warhead
design and nuclear weapon systems under the US-UK Mutual Defence
Agreement of 1958 is anomalous. It increasingly offends against
the effort, advanced through the Proliferation Security Initiative
and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 among other things, to
inhibit international transfers of weapon-related technologies
and materials; and
— through this cooperation, the UK
may become associated with the Bush administration's exploration
of new roles for and designs of nuclear weapons. Internationally,
there is deep disquiet over where this exploration may lead.
17. The White Paper repeats the familiar
assertion that the UK's unilateral disarmament would not encourage
the disarmament of other states. "There is no evidence or
likelihood that others would follow the UK down a unilateralist
route." Although this is probably correct, at least in the
short term, it does not follow that their policies would be unaffected.
The UK's announcement of its decision not to replace Trident would
be a major international event with potentially wide consequences
(my understanding is that the Government has not carried out studies
of the consequences, which is regrettable):
— one of the five nuclear weapon states,
and one of the NPT's three depositary governments, would have
committed itself to eliminate its nuclear arms and to honour its
Treaty obligations in full. This would provide the UK with opportunities
to play a highly influential and prestigious if unfamiliar role
in international nuclear relations;
— the nuclear weapon states' ability
to act en bloc in international forums would be weakened,
just as the non-nuclear weapon states' ability to shape agendas
and influence outcomes would be strengthened. The unfortunate
coincidence of permanent membership of the UN Security Council
with membership of the NPT's nuclear club would also be broken
(there are no grounds for fearing that the UK would lose its membership
of the UNSC in consequence);
— the UK could offer to become a "nuclear
disarmament laboratory" where the processes and techniques
of eliminating a major weapon capability could be fully developed
and demonstrated, greatly extending the experience of practical
disarmament gained in South Africa, the Ukraine, Iraq and Libya
and through the reductions of nuclear forces by the US, Russia,
France and the UK itself. (It is regrettable that the White Paper
contains no reference to Aldermaston's pioneering work on verifying
the dismantlement of nuclear warheads.); and
— especially in the US, a decision
against Trident replacement would strengthen the hand of communities
inside and outside the military who are pressing for a major re-examination
of the future role of and reliance upon nuclear weapons. The article
promoting "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" by George
Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in The
Wall Street Journal on 4 January 2007 indicates the direction
in which the wind is beginning to blow in Washington.
TRIDENT REPLACEMENT,
SCOTLAND AND
THE UK
18. Scotland is not mentioned in the White
Paper as either the geographical place where Trident, and thus
the entire UK deterrent, is located, or as home of a devolved
Parliament and administrative system. This may be viewed as consistent
with the Scotland Act of 1998 which reserves defence and foreign
policy to London. The UK is a single state with a unified defence
policy, allowing no region of the UK rights to obstruct the sovereign
UK Parliament's decisions on defence.
19. Yet there is a Scottish dimension that
politically cannot be ignored (I examined it in detail in a book
co-authored with Malcolm Chalmers in 2001).[78]
Beyond the immediate surroundings of Faslane and Coulport where
Trident generates employment, there is a long tradition of Scottish
opposition to nuclear weapons in general and their basing in Scotland
in particular. It has been repeatedly expressed by the Churches,
the Iona Community and civil society groups and runs across political
parties. Furthermore, the Scottish National Party (SNP), which
may lead a coalition in the Scottish Parliament after the approaching
May elections and is pledged to hold a referendum on independence,
has long placed Scotland's renunciation of nuclear weapons at
the centre of its political programme.
20. There are difficulties even if independence
is not in prospect. Trident cannot operate out of Faslane without
the Scottish Parliament and Executive's close cooperation with
the Ministry of Defence and other UK governmental bodies. This
is because responsibility for policing, transport, land-use planning,
emergency services and the regulation of radioactive emissions
are devolved to Scotland. The commitment to cooperate on this
and other matters is expressed in the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding
between the UK Government and the representative Scottish, Welsh
and Northern Irish administrative institutions, and by a Concordat
on Defence which enjoins Scottish Ministers to "take account
of the need for the unimpeded conduct of the defence of the UK".
This MoU and Concordat are not legally binding: they are essentially
gentlemen's agreements. With Labour administrations ensconced
in both Holyrood and Westminster since 1998, the cooperation has
run smoothly. It could no longer be taken for granted if different
parties came to dominate the Parliaments. Indeed, the SNP has
already signalled that it will frustrate cooperation on Trident
by various political and legal means if it gains ascendancy in
the Scottish Parliament.[79]
21. The SNP's policies and interests are
nevertheless not straightforward. If it gains power in Holyrood
in May, its primary concern will be to demonstrate competence
and trustworthiness in government. It might then stand a chance
of winning a referendum on independence and establishing credentials
to bid for membership of the European Union and international
recognition as a sovereign state. These interests might eventually
draw it towards cooperation rather than obstruction of the deterrent
(possible basing arrangements with an independent non-nuclear
Scotland are discussed in the Chalmer/Walker book). For the moment,
however, the SNP seems determined to oppose Trident and extract
political capital from dissatisfaction with it.
22. As the Scotland Act allows, a debate
on Trident's replacement will probably be held in the Scottish
Parliament before it is debated in Westminster. This will present
acute difficulties for the Labour Party and administration in
Scotland, and for officials in the Scottish Executive who will
be loath to advise Scottish Ministers on such sensitive reserved
matters. It is conceivable that the Scottish Labour Party will
break ranks with the UK Party, declaring itself sceptical of the
case for Trident's replacement if not in outright opposition to
it. Come what may, a situation might well arise in which a UK
decision to replace Trident lacks legitimacy in Scotland, especially
if the vote in Westminster is won through support of a Conservative
Party which has little sway in Scotland, and if the votes of Scottish
MPs are divided and a majority is secured through Cabinet loyalty
and overt use of the Labour whip.
23. My fear is that a mood of "how
dare you" could develop on either side of the border which,
combining with other political currents, would have serious consequences.
How dare you Scots attempt to exercise a veto over a decision
to deploy a nuclear force that is vital to the UK's defence and
international standing? How dare you English impose this dangerous,
undesirable and immoral weaponry on the people of Scotland when
alternatives exist and the money can be better spent?
24. When the basing of Polaris was discussed
by the MacMillan government in the early 1960s, 10 possible sites
were considered. Six were in Scotland, three in England (Devonport,
Falmouth and Portland) and one in Wales (Milford Haven). The Ministry
of Defence now accepts that there is no plausible alternative
to the submarine base at Faslane, partly because it could not
gain political consent for opening nearby a facility equivalent
to the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport (a few miles from
Faslane) where the Trident missiles and warheads are stored and
loaded on to the submarines. The Government appears to have assumed,
when considering options for replacing Trident, that political
opposition in Scotland could be weathered and need not affect
the relative valuation of the three other generic options (reviewed
in Annex B) which could have been located in England or Wales.
As an influential former senior official in the Ministry of Defence
observed to me, it was being assumed that the situation in Scotland
was tricky but could be managed through some "deft politics".
This was complacent.
25. The White Paper extols prudence in the
face of uncertainty. Is it prudent to advocate spending tens of
billions of pounds on Trident's replacement in order to guard
against an undefined future threat, when it is uncertain whether
the deterrent could be operated reliably out of its base in Scotland
and whether the Union will still exist when the new system is
due to be installed?
THE DECISION'S
BAD TIMING
25. Whichever views are held on the UK deterrent's
future, the Government's timing of the debate and decision is
most unfortunate. A reliable conclusion is unlikely to be reached
against the background of such domestic volatility north and south
of the border and international volatility in the Middle East
and elsewhere. In addition, US foreign and security policies may
soon enter a period of major change, especially after the 2008
Presidential election, as the failings of its recent policies
become more and more evident. Although I have not addressed the
question of lead-times in this memorandum, I share the view that
a decision on replacement in 2007 is unnecessary.
17 January 2007
78 Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, Uncharted
Waters: The UK, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question (Tuckwell
Press, 2001). Back
79
See "SNP plan to criminalise pro-Trident politicians",
Sunday Herald, 7 January 2007. Back
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