Memorandum from the World Disarmament
Campaign
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The World Disarmament Campaign (WDC)
was founded in 1979 to work for the implementation of the Final
Document of the 1978 First Special Session on Disarmament of the
UN General Assembly, which was signed by every then member of
the UN. That remains our basic aim. Disarmament, both nuclear
and "conventional", is an essential component of any
progress towards long-term peace and security in a just and sustainable
world community, which is surely what all right-thinking people
desire.
1.2 We therefore welcome the decision of
the Defence Committee to conduct an inquiry into the White Paper
on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent, which has pre-empted
the Committee's previous planned series of inquiries into this
contentious topic. Many of the questions asked by the report of
the first of that series1 have not, in our view, been adequately
answered by the White Paper.
2. SUMMARY
2.1 WDC is totally opposed to all nuclear
weapons, everywhere. We question the whole concept of "the
deterrent", which contains within itself a fundamental contradiction.
We believe that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal
under International Humanitarian Law, under all conceivable circumstances,
since they are inevitably unpredictable and indiscriminate in
their effects. We further believe, as argued by many authorities,
that replacement of the Trident nuclear weapon system would be
a clear breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
with its obligation on the nuclear weapons states to "pursue
negotiations in good faith relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,...".
They do not increase the security of the UK or of the world. On
the contrary, they increase insecurity, both by their own existence
and by the encouragement they provide for proliferation.
2.2 In short, in the words of General Lee
Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the US Strategic Air Command,
"Nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive,
militarily inefficient and morally indefensible."2
3. DETERRENCE
3.1 We begin by repeating the point we made
in our submission to the previous Defence Committee inquiry. Any
weapon may be a deterrent in particular circumstances, but to
assume that it will always be so by virtue of its mere existence,
as is implied by the conventional terminology, depends on many
assumptions that in our view cannot be justified. Nuclear weapons
are always referred to as the "Nuclear Deterrent", or
even simply "the deterrent". We would challenge this.
"Deterrence" may be a function of a weapon, but it cannot
logically define the weapon itself. This (deliberately?) misleading
terminology tends to pre-empt the whole debate.
3.2 Further, the concept of deterrence contains
a fundamental contradiction. A "deterrent" can only
be effective if it is recognised that there is a realistic possibility
of its being used. As the White Paper rightly states: "...nuclear
weapons pose a uniquely terrible threat..." [page 17] If
the consequences of its use would be so horrendous that it is
inconceivable that any sane leader would sanction its use, then
it cannot fulfil the alleged function of a deterrent. However,
if it is ever used, it has clearly failed as a deterrent. The
White Paper makes no attempt to face up to this dilemma, but simply
evades the issue:
"we deliberately maintain ambiguity about
precisely when, how and of what scale we would contemplate the
use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations
of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances
in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities.
Hence we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons."
[page 18] (Our emphasis)
3.3 This last sentence encapsulates the
lack of logic in the whole argument: First use would surely be
the most abject admission of failure in history, and would be
one of the worst crimes against humanity in the blood-stained
history of the human race. Second use, in retaliation, would again
be the result of the complete breakdown of the deterrent concept.
3.4 We conclude that the belief in the "nuclear
deterrent" is an article of faith rather than a statement
of fact or of logical analysis of the real world.
4. HISTORY
4.1. The article of faith referred to above
is often expressed in the form: "nuclear weapons have kept
the peace in Europe since 1945", ie, throughout the Cold
War. But detailed analysis shows this to be a very simplistic
interpretation of the facts. There have been some 200 armed conflicts
around the world in that period, many of them surrogate wars for
the superpowers, and causing many millions of deaths. On a number
of occasions, in Korea for example, nuclear weapons came very
near to being launched.
4.2 The White Paper states that the original
rationale for the UK's "nuclear deterrent" was to address
the threat to the UK's vital interests from the Soviet Union.
It repeats the commonly accepted justification that NATO did not
possess sufficient conventional military forces to defeat an attack
by the Warsaw Pact. However, although this is rarely questioned,
it is not really so clearcut. In 1987 the American military analyst
Tom Gervasi produced a commentary on the Pentagon's Guide to Soviet
Military Power which went through that document page by page and
point by point, showing that in almost every instance there was
significant exaggeration of the capabilities of the Soviet forces,
and that comparisons which would show the advantage held by the
equivalent US forces were omitted. He concludes: "Both the
nuclear and conventional balances of power in Europe have always
heavily favored NATO and continue to do so."3
4.3 This is not to deny that the Soviet
Union did possess huge quantities of arms, nuclear and conventional,
and might have been prepared to use them. Had war broken out it
would have been even more devastating than World War 2. But there
is little or no evidence that there was ever any serious plan
to overrun Western Europe. There were enough problems maintaining
a grip on its satellites in Eastern Europe to inhibit such an
adventure: East Germany in 1953; Hungary in 1956; Czechoslovakia
in 1969 (the Prague Spring) and again in 1977 (Charter 77); Poland
in 1980s, and, of course, the final break-up of the Soviet Union
in 1991.
4.4 It is true that during the Cold War
Soviet missiles were targeted on the UK (indeed, probably still
are) and that they were never used. Would they have been used
had the UK not had nuclear weapons? It cannot be proved either
way, but it may be noted that since the demise of the Soviet Union,
the revelations that have emerged have not included any that indicate
either the intention or even contingency plans to do so except
in the context of an all-out superpower conflict. The UK's primary
role was always as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the US,
and it was this that made it a target, not any direct and irreconcilable
conflict of interests between the UK and the USSR or Soviet plan
to add Western Europe to its empire.
5. PRESENT AND
FUTURE: UNCERTAINTY
5.1 We welcome the fact that the White Paper
at least attempts to respond to some of the criticisms of the
government's policies [Box 3.1, pages 20-21], although we find
the arguments fairly weak.
5.2 Whatever one believes about the role
of nuclear weapons in the past, there is no doubt that the situation
today is totally different. The White Paper recognises this. "Currently
no state has both the intent to threaten our vital interests and
the capability to do so with nuclear weapons." [Paragraph
3-8, page 19] Following this, however, it attempts to justify
retaining nuclear weapons by projecting hypothetical threats that
might emerge in the future. This is a counsel of despair and a
complete contradiction of the NPT. So long as nuclear weapons
exist, there will be a possibility that they will be used. The
longer they continue to exist, the greater the probability that
they will be used; in fact the scenario painted by the White Paper
leads to the conclusion that their use will eventually become
almost inevitable. As we will show below, there are better ways
of preventing this than the UK's contributing further to the nuclear
madness.
5.3 The real threat, not to the security
of the realm, but to human security everywhere, is terrorism.
That nuclear weapons are no defence against terrorism has been
argued so many times by so many authorities and so cogently that
there is no need to repeat the arguments here. It should be self-evident
that "deterrence", whatever merit it may have in relation
to potential conflict between states, is totally irrelevant to
this particular threat by non-state actors. This is accepted by
the White Paper. However, the argument of the White Paper that
our nuclear weapons could influence the decision-making of any
state that might consider transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear
technology to terrorists is naive, to say the least. Would any
such state loudly proclaim to the world: "Yes, we have given
six nuclear missiles to Osama bin Laden", and hence invite
Armageddon to be rained on it? Or would the decision be based
on "intelligence" such as that which was used to justify
the attack on Iraq? How to respond to terrorism, and in particular
the alternatives to the current "war on terror", are
undoubtedly difficult questions, but certainly we believe that
nuclear weapons have no useful part to play in protecting the
people of the world from terrorist attacks.
5.4 That the future is uncertain is a truism.
We have no crystal ball any more than the government. But that
does not mean that nothing can be done to influence it in a favourable
direction. On the other hand, the White Paper's argument would
still be valid when a Trident Replacement needs replacing in 20
years, in 50 years, or 100 years; ie, it is a recipe for the retention
of nuclear weapons for ever. And that, as already noted above,
is a recipe for almost certain disaster.
6. "MINIMUM
DETERRENT"
6.1 The government claims, as it always
has, that it maintains only a "minimum deterrent". This
is currently assessed as 200 warheads, and the White Paper concedes
that this could be reduced to 160. But the calculation on which
this or any other number is based is never revealed. Each Trident
submarine carries up to 48 warheads, each of explosive power eight
to 10 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Can it be conceived that
the threat of 48 Hiroshimas-plus is necessary to influence these
hypothetical adversaries in the uncertain future? It could be
argued that a single such warhead, with a guarantee that it would
reach its major city target, would deter any state leader who
was not completely mad. Conversely, any such leader would be unlikely
to be deterred by any number.
7. LEGALITY OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
7.1 The White Paper quotes the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding
the legality or otherwise of nuclear weapons, but it does so selectively
and misleadingly. The ICJ, in Paragraph 105 (2) E of its Advisory
Opinion4, stated that: "the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law." It also stated
that if the use of any weapon is illegal under IHL, the threat
of such use is also illegal. [Paragraph 47] The Court could not
"...conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be
at stake." (our emphasis) This is very far from stating,
as the White Paper does, that the Court "rejected the argument
that such use would necessarily be unlawful" [section 2.11,
page 14] In his Declaration, the then President of the Court,
Judge Bedjaoui, emphasised that this possible reservation did
not constitute an authorisation of use, and that any such use
would still have to accord with IHL in respect of indiscriminate
effects; ie, it would have to be capable of distinguishing between
military and civilian targets.
7.2 It should be noted that even this reservation
did not receive unanimous backing from the members of the Court.
A minority of judges disagreed, including Judge Christopher Weeramantry,
then Vice-President of the Court. He entered a dissenting opinion
which concluded that threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
illegal in all circumstances.
7.3 It should also be noted that "...the
very survival of a State..." goes far beyond the formulation
of "vital interests" consistently used by the government
when challenged on this, and in the White Paper.
7.4 In the 10 years since the Opinion was
given, many international lawyers have further analysed the judgement
and other information and concluded that nuclear weapons are indeed
illegal in all circumstances. These include Judge Weeramantry
again, Louise Doswald-Beck of the University Centre for International
Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Professor Philippe Sands, QC, Rabinder
Singh, QC, and Professor Christine Chinkin. 5, 6, 7, 8 The reasons
given are the unpredictability of the effects of nuclear weapons.
Any use of nuclear weapons creates a highly radioactive fireball
which generates an intense blast wave, a heat flash, "prompt"
radiation and radioactive fallout. The fallout in particular is
very unpredictable. Any use is therefore likely to cause "superfluous
injury and unnecessary suffering" to targeted combatants
and to expose non-combatants (civilians of an attacked state or
of neutrals or even of the attacker) to the risk of radiation
sickness, to leukaemia and other cancers for decades to come,
and perhaps genetic change leading to harmful mutations in succeeding
generations.
7.5 It is not only lawyers who have declared
that nuclear weapons are illegal. Kofi Annan, recently retired
UN Secretary-General, has stated "...by clinging to and modernising
their own arsenals, even when there is no obvious threat to their
national security that nuclear weapons could deter, nuclear-weapon
States encourage others—particularly those that do face
real threats in their own region—to regard nuclear weapons
as essential, both to their security and to their status. It would
be much easier to confront proliferators, if the very existence
of nuclear weapons were universally acknowledged as dangerous
and ultimately illegitimate."9
7.6 When the government is challenged with
these judgements, as it has been many times in recent years, it
simply repeats its view that "...maintaining a minimum nuclear
deterrent is fully consistent with all our international legal
obligations...". [Box 3-1 paragraph 7, page 21] This would
not be considered remotely good enough in any other legal situation.
The government should publish in full whatever legal advice it
has which purports to justify its position, and should be prepared
to test this in an appropriate court. That court might be the
International Court of Justice.
8. NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY
8.1 The NPT was opened for signature in
1968 and came into force in 1970. Article VI, as already noted,
reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control." No such negotiations
have ever taken place in the 37 years since then, and there are
no proposals for such negotiations to start on the table at present.
8.2 "In Para. 105 (2) F of its Advisory
Opinion4, the ICJ interpreted Article VI as an obligation to pursue
such negotiations and bring them to a conclusion. (our emphasis)
This obligation is simply ignored by the government.
8.3 In the years immediately following the
introduction of the Treaty, not only were there no negotiations,
but all the nuclear powers continued to develop their nuclear
arsenals in both quantity and quality. In more recent years there
has been some reduction in numbers, in the case of the UK to the
present 200 Trident missiles, but to claim that this in some way
fulfils the Article VI obligation is disingenuous, or worse. Exact
comparisons, taking into account explosive power, range, accuracy,
etc, are not available, but one may suspect that the actual destructive
power of those 200 Tridents is greater than was the case in 1970,
although less than the peak which occurred in the late 1980s.
The US and Russia, of course, still have many thousands of nuclear
weapons in their stockpiles, and they too are in flagrant breach
of their obligations.
8.4 Throughout the White Paper, there are
references to "the recognised nuclear weapon states",
from the Prime Minister's Foreword to the attempted refutations
of critics in Box 3-1. This phrase does not appear anywhere in
the NPT. Article IX simply states: "For the purposes of this
Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosion device prior
to 1 January 1967." This gives no special status to the earliest
possessors of nuclear weapons, except in so far as it is they
who have to disarm their weapons, whereas non nuclear-weapon states
just have to maintain their existing situation. Again it must
be emphasised that the basic obligation in the NPT is to pursue
negotiations in good faith... to nuclear disarmament.
8.5 The last clause in Article VI is sometimes
interpreted as meaning that nuclear disarmament is dependent on
a prior treaty on general disarmament. In Paragraph 2.10, page
14, the White Paper states: "Article VI of the NPT does not
establish any timescale for nuclear disarmament, nor for the general
and complete disarmament which provides the context for total
nuclear disarmament." While WDC is concerned with all types
of weapon, from the small arms which actually do most of the killing
around the world, to the nukes which are the subject of this paper,
via all the high-tech weapons such as the Eurofighter which can
themselves almost be categorised as Weapons of Mass Destruction,
and which absorb so much of the world's resources, this again
is disingenuous or worse. WDC would greatly welcome such a treaty,
but the NPT is specifically aimed at nuclear weapons. The crucial
word in the Article is "and" on a Treaty..." There
is a suspicion that this clause was included specifically to fudge
the issue. But in any case, the ICJ judgement is categorical:
"there is an obligation to pursue such negotiations and bring
them to a conclusion."
8.6 It is, therefore, a legitimate question,
which demands a clear and categorical answer from the government:
When will these negotiations be started, who will take the lead,
and when can the peoples of the world look forward to a world
free from the threat of nuclear annihilation? The UK is in an
ideal position to take the lead in this, if only it discards the
faulty logic exposed in this paper.
8.7 As a basis for the negotiations, there
is already in existence a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention, prepared
by a wide range of legal and other civil society authorities,
and deposited with the UN by Costa Rica. If there was a genuine
desire for nuclear disarmament, which all the nuclear powers profess
and are obligated to pursue, this could be converted into an effective
treaty in far less than the 20 to 50 years perspective of the
White Paper.
9. PROLIFERATION
9.1 Proliferation is undoubtedly a very
serious problem, both that which has already happened and possible
future. But it still does not constitute a direct threat to this
country. The nearest to a nuclear conflict that has occurred since
the end of the Cold War is the stand-off between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir. Outright war has been avoided so far, and relations
have improved to some extent, but it remains a potential flash-point.
9.2 Similarly, the Middle East is a powder
keg. Israel's nuclear weapons, although not explicitly admitted
by the Israeli government, are universally believed to exist and
constitute a major destabilising factor in the region. Should
Iran or any Arab countries obtain nuclear weapons, that would
be a recipe for disaster, but none of these would be targeted
on the UK. It is difficult to see in what way Britain's nuclear
weapons contribute to preventing this development.
9.3 The same argument applies to North Korea.
While it is deplorable that North Korea has withdrawn from the
NPT and developed its own nuclear weapons, it has never been suggested
that these are—or indeed could possibly be—aimed at
the UK. It should be noted that all these developments have taken
place while the UK has maintained its "minimum deterrent",
and the superpowers have maintained their thousands. In fact,
every state that has developed nuclear weapons, apart for the
first, the US, has cited the existence of others as among the
reasons for their doing so. In the case of North Korea, while
again wishing them to return to the NPT and fulfil their obligations
under it, it has been under nuclear threat from the US for may
years. In the Nuclear Posture Statement submitted to Congress
in December 2001, North Korea is still named as a potential nuclear
target.
9.4 Iran, on the other hand, does not currently
have nuclear weapons, and claims to have no intention of developing
them. One may well be sceptical about this, and in the complex
political scene that is Iran today it is almost certain that there
are elements in favour of going nuclear. But there is also a strong
element in the Islamic hierarchy that is opposed in principle
to doing so. Whatever one's view of this, it is difficult to see
how the UK's present or future nuclear weapons will influence
Iran's policies. They are certainly not used by Iranians of any
persuasion as reasons for not developing their own weapons. On
the contrary, when one reads statements such as "Within the
next 12 months, the Americans or the Israelis, possibly both,
are likely to launch military strikes aimed at crippling Iran's
nuclear ambitions. Those strikes my come sooner that later. And
they will probably be nuclear." (Douglas Davis, The Spectator,
6 January 2007) There could not be a stronger incentive for Iran
to develop its own "deterrent".
9.5 The White Paper, again attempting to
answer critics, says: "There is no evidence or likelihood
that others would follow the UK down a unilateral route. There
would need to be compelling evidence that a nuclear threat would
not re-emerge in future before we could responsibly contemplate
such a move. It would be highly imprudent to mortgage our long
term national security against any such assumption." [Box
3-1, paragraph 3, page 20] But that is not the question. Has the
UK's possession of nuclear weapons influenced the proliferators
listed above? Obviously not. So it may well be true that they
would not follow the UK lead. But would the UK's giving up its
nuclear weapons give it a stronger position to influence current
non-nuclear states which are considering going nuclear? That is
at least an arguable proposition; it would eliminate the charge
of hypocrisy when attempting to put pressure on such potential
proliferators.
9.6 It seems a strange argument that the
UK's retention of its nuclear weapon system into the indeterminate
future will have a significant influence on that future, while
its abandonment and, hopefully, a start to the process of de-nuclearising
the world will have no effect whatever.
9.7 It is also worth noting that most of
the (small) advances that have been made have started as unilateral
initiatives, such as the Soviet moratorium on testing which led
ultimately to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And, of course,
every escalation in the nuclear arms race has been a unilateral
decision by one of the nuclear powers.
9.8 To sum up, the crucial step in preventing
further proliferation and proceeding towards a nuclear weapon
free world is for the major nuclear weapon states to fulfil their
obligations under the NPT and start serious negotiations ("in
good faith") towards their elimination.
10. GLOBAL SECURITY
AND HUMAN
SECURITY
10.1 Why does any state believe that it
needs nuclear—or, indeed, any other high-tech—weapons
to ensure its security? In Paragraph 3-7, page 18, the White Paper
says: "Increasing pressure on key resources such as energy
and water (which could be driven by a range of factors, potentially
including population growth, increasing global economic development
and climate change) may increase interstate tension. Two points
in response to this: (1) Most conflicts in recent years (apart
from Iraq and Afghanistan) have been intrastate rather than interstate.
Nuclear weapons are totally irrelevant to such conflicts; (2)
If a small proportion of the resources currently devoted to producing
weapons were to be applied to dealing with these problems, they
would become much less significant. For example, an adequately
funded UN Water Agency could probably provide almost every person
in the world with clean water within 10 years. The small scale
technology exists, but relying on non-governmental agencies like
Water Aid is totally inadequate. (The Millennium Development Goals
are far too modest, yet even they are not being achieved.)
10.2 Putting Human Security at the top of
the international agenda, rather than continuing the old, old
ways of power politics and "peace through strength"
would be a far more fruitful way to achieve a peaceful future
for mankind.
11. PRACTICAL
POLITICS
11.1 We recognise that MPs and political
parties have to take cognisance of public opinion, and the vast
majority of the electorate will never have access to the sort
of detailed argument presented in this paper. The instinctive
response of many people is likely to be: "We need our nuclear
weapons so long as others have them." This is a recipe for
nukes for ever and ever. So how can this be overcome?
11.2 Could a political party which proposed
to do away with the UK's nuclear weapons, either immediately,
or over a period by not replacing Trident, gain the support of
the voters in doing so? Past evidence (1983, 1987 and 1992 in
particular) would suggest not. But the situation is different
today. We are not currently in an election period, so it can be
debated without party point scoring (we hope). The cross-party
Defence Committee, if it concluded, as we believe it should, that
the case for Trident replacement has not been made by the government,
this would carry great weight and remove much of the emotional
baggage that has been invested in the issue in the past. It is
understandable that MPs, and political parties, do not wish to
espouse policies which they see as vote losers, whatever their
objective merits. But we strongly urge the Committee, if our arguments
are as convincing as we believe them to be, to make their decision
based on these arguments and not on perceived political repercussions.
11.3 In his Foreword to the White Paper,
the Prime Minister looks forward to a substantial period of public
and parliamentary debate in which the issues can be aired freely.
But the timescale is far too short for this, and there is no mechanism
for adequate public consultation. We urge the Committee to point
this out to the government, and request that a proper consultation
be put into operation. This should include provision for opponents
of Trident renewal to put their case. Small organisations like
WDC have no possible way of getting their case over to the public
without such provision.
12. JOBS
12.1 Whenever cuts in public spending in
any field are proposed, the workers affected are naturally concerned
about their jobs. This is particularly true of the highly specialised
shipyard workers who produce the submarines. Some of the workers
in the Barrow shipyards have therefore campaigned for Trident
replacement, in order to save their jobs. This may be understandable,
but it is mistaken. Jobs cannot be the deciding factor, or even
a major factor, in determining policy on such an important issue
as nuclear weapons.
12.2 What should be done is tap into all
the skills and knowledge of these workers to find alternative
employment for those skills. For example, the impact of climate
change is starting to generate a resurgence of interest in waterborne
transport at all levels, as one of the most environmentally friendly
ways of moving both goods and people around. Post 1945 millions
of workers were redeployed from wartime industry and the services,
with great success. What existed then and what is needed now is
planning and the political will.
12.3 We would also suggest that the morality
of jobs being dependent on producing weapons of mass destruction
(see below) is also something to be considered.
13. COST
13.1 Many different figures have been suggested
for the cost of replacing Trident, ranging from £15-20 billion
in the White Paper, to £79 billion taking into account maintenance
costs over its lifetime. But the precise figure is not important.
Even £20 billion is a lot, which could and should be spent
on constructive purposes rather than means of destruction. If
the arguments in this paper are valid, then one penny is too much.
On the other hand, if nuclear weapons are essential to our security
and survival, then money should be almost no object. But it is
up to those who wish to spend money in this way to prove up to
the hilt that this really is so. We do not believe they can.
14. MORALITY
14.1 Moral issues are not usually considered
in matters of realpolitik, but surely they must come into play
when dealing with weapons with such potentially catastrophic consequences.
One does not have to be a Christian to recognise the importance
of the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill", as
an essential foundation for any civilised society. So how can
a "defence" policy predicated on the potential killing
of millions, and even the destruction of the whole of civilisation,
ever be justified? Such a policy must surely be abhorrent to any
morally educated person.
15. TAILPIECE:
THE SINNER
THAT REPENTETH?
15.1 If all the eloquence and logic that
has been mustered by the writer of this paper still fails to convince,
may we appeal to authorities that might even be accepted by the
most ardent of nuclear warriors.
15.2 "Nuclear weapons today present
tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. US leadership
will be required to take the world to the next stage—to
a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally
as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into
potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat
to the world... Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would
be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with
America's moral heritage... We endorse setting the goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions
required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined
above." 10
15.3 And who are these authorities? George
P Schultz, William J Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn, former
high level architects of the Cold War. 10
16. TAILPIECE
2: STOP PRESS
16.1 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
has just announced that the hand of the Doomsday Clock has been
moved forward by two minutes, to five minutes to midnight. A decision
not to replace Trident would be at least a glimmer of light in
this Stygian scenario.
REFERENCES: 1 House
of Commons Defence Committee, The Future of the UK's Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context; Eighth Report of Session
2005-06.
2 General Lee Butler, Speech to the
National Press Club Washington DC, 1996.
3 Tom Gervasi, SOVIET MILITARY POWER—The
Annotated and Corrected Version of the Pentagon's Guide, Sidgwick
and Jackson 1988.
4 Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons. ICJ Reports 1996.
5 Christopher Weeramantry, Main
findings of the Court and the legal developments since 1966*.
6 Christopher Weeramantry and Louise
Doswald-Beck, The International Humanitarian Law aspects of
the Advisory Opinion, *speeches delivered at Conference: Freedom
from Nuclear Weapons through Legal Accountability and Good Faith,
Brussels, 6-7 July 2006.
7 Philippe Sands QC and Helen Law (Matrix,
Gray's Inn, London WC1R 5LN), The United Kingdom's Nuclear
Deterrent: Current and Future Issues of Legality. Greenpeace,
November 2006. Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/8072.pdf
8 Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine
Chinkin. (Matrix, Gray's Inn, London WC1R 5LN) The Maintenance
and Possible Replacement of the Trident Nuclear Missile System.
Peacerights, December 2005. At: www.peacerights.org
9 Kofi Annan, Speech delivered at Princeton
University, 16 November 2006.
10 George P Shultz, William J Perry, Henry
A Kissinger and Sam Nunn, News: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,
Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, NY, 4 January
2007.
17 January 2007
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