Memorandum from Scientists for Global
Responsibility
ABOUT SGR
Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) is
an independent UK membership organisation of approximately 850
science, design and technology professionals. Our main aim is
to promote and support science, design and technology which contribute
to social justice, environmental sustainability and the reduction
of conflict. The issues raised by the potential replacement of
UK nuclear weapons obviously have strong links with these concerns.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SGR believes that the security of the UK—and
the world—is best served by not replacing the Trident nuclear
weapons system. We think that the case laid out in the White Paper
is fundamentally flawed.
Our reasons are summarised as follows, with
more detail in the subsequent sections:
1. The UK faces no current or short-term
threats against which nuclear weapons could conceivably be effective.
2. Trident replacement will undermine efforts
to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons thereby increasing
both short- and long-term security threats.
3. A decision not to replace Trident could
be a stepping stone to a more defensive military and foreign policy.
4. Security needs to be viewed in a broader
context—threats such as climate change are far greater than
conventional military threats.
5. With shortages in science and technology
skills, these need to be deployed to maximise the benefit to society.
1. The UK faces no current or short-term
threats against which nuclear weapons could conceivably be effective
Strategic nuclear weapons such as Trident had
their origin in the Cold War where the aim was to counter a threat
of nuclear devastation with an ability to respond in kind. This
threat no longer exists and thus the original justification given
for deploying Trident has been removed. Indeed, it is widely believed
that the UK does not face "a direct or impending military
threat from any of the established nuclear weapon states"1.
There are also no major threats from large conventional military
forces. The only current, significant weapons-based threat to
the UK is from non-state actors, ie terrorists, and it has been
acknowledged by Tony Blair that nuclear weapons are ineffective
against such threats2.
The only argument left—which is the one
used in the White Paper—is that of the "unknown".
That is, at some stage in the next 50 years, the UK will again
face a nuclear-armed foe with the ability and intention to hit
its shores. However, this is an argument which can be used by
each and every nation in the world (in many cases with rather
more credibility than in this country) and hence this argument
needs to be balanced against the likelihood that others will see
the UK's actions as encouragement to pursue their own nuclear
agenda—as discussed in the next section.
2. Trident replacement will undermine efforts
to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons thereby increasing
both short- and long-term security threats
The White Paper argues that, despite the lack
of a current major military threat, the UK needs to retain nuclear
weapons for at least the next 50 years in case such a threat re-emerges.
At the same time it denies that some other countries may use this
argument to justify their interest in or acquisition of nuclear
weapons. This hypocrisy has contributed to the stalling of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is currently the
main instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.
Under this treaty the UK (together with USA, Russia, China and
France) is committed to pursuing negotiations towards complete
nuclear disarmament. If the UK opts for Trident replacement, it
will further undermine the treaty and increase the prospect of
nuclear proliferation in the future. Indeed, recent legal opinion
suggests that such action by the UK may actually be illegal3.
Hence we believe Trident replacement will make the UK less secure.
SGR believes that the UK could and should use
the opportunity afforded by considering the future of its nuclear
weapons system to kick-start multilateral negotiations on the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. An important starting
point would be to follow the recommendations of the Weapons of
Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, which were
published in 20064.
3. A decision not to replace Trident could
be a stepping stone to a more defensive military and foreign policy
The UK is currently pursuing a heavily interventionist
military and foreign policy which we strongly believe is failing
to increase either UK or global security, not least in relation
to Iraq. Such policies have undermined the UK's position on the
world stage and arguably increased the threat from terrorism.
They are also leading to huge spending on new military technology,
such as aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines, fighter aircraft
etc5.
The abandonment of Trident replacement could
be the first step in a new policy which helps to restore the UK's
moral authority and allows us to take the lead in effective negotiations
on international arms control and disarmament. It would also free
up valuable resources which could be used for sustainable development
and hence support international security.
As part of the process of realigning our military
policy, the UK also needs to open negotiations with the USA to
remove the 110 nuclear weapons that they currently deploy on aircraft
on UK soil.
4. Security needs to be viewed in a broader
context—threats such as climate change are far greater than
conventional military threats
The debate on nuclear weapons and military policy
in general needs to be seen in a broader context, especially given
the major resources that would be required to build a Trident
successor.
Currently, as acknowledged by the government,
climate change represents a huge threat to human society both
in the UK and across the world. The potential scale of casualties,
refugees, economic damage and wider impacts of "business
as usual" has been set out by many, not least the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change6, the World Health Organisation7 and the
Stern Review8. However, the action being taken by government and
society across the world does not come close to meeting that required.
Even in the UK, which has championed the issue at an international
level, carbon dioxide emissions are again on the rise9. It is
disturbing that major resources are being considered for Trident
replacement—to deal with such an unspecific threat—while
resources devoted to tackling such a huge, scientifically well-established
threat are still lacking.
SGR believes that the most effective security
policy would give much greater urgency to reducing the UK's greenhouse
gas emissions and moving to a low carbon economy, and that this
example would catalyse other countries to follow suit. The resources—financial,
material and technical—that would have been used on a Trident
replacement could make a key difference to success of such a strategy.
5. With shortages in science and technology
skills, these need to be deployed to maximise the benefit to society
The White Paper says that it is the dwindling
level of skills related to submarine design and manufacture that
have been a key factor leading to a decision on Trident replacement
being needed sooner rather than later. It has also been argued
that the construction of a new nuclear weapons capable submarine
fleet would create or secure thousands of skilled jobs.
However, such arguments need to be considered
in a broader context as we have discussed in a previous submission
to the Defence Committee10. The number of graduates in physical
sciences and engineering has fallen considerably in recent years,
despite the number of students in higher education increasing11,
12. This puts pressure on all sectors of the economy which depend
on such skills. For example, a recent report from the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) highlighted that the civilian, as
well as the military, nuclear sector is facing skills shortages.
Even without new nuclear power stations or Trident replacement,
the report argued that the whole sector requires about 30,000
new skilled recruits over a 15 year period simply to deal with
existing and planned activities, not least decommissioning13.
Added to that, some other key sectors are planning major expansions.
For example, the number of jobs in the renewable energy sector
could expand by as much as 27,000 by 202014. There is also major
demand for skills in expanding energy efficiency measures. And
there is also the huge programme on military technology planned
for the conventional armed forces discussed in section 3.
SGR believes that it is essential that key expansions,
such as that in the renewable energy sector, are not compromised
in the rush to Trident replacement. As we have stated, climate
change is much too serious a threat. Indeed, climate-related sectors
are likely to provide job opportunities for those who would have
to move if the UK decided not to retain nuclear weapons. For example,
offshore wind, wave and tidal projects require marine engineering
skills. Indeed, the government could initiate a comprehensive
"defence diversification" programme to ensure local
communities dependent on military industry were properly supported
during transition. In this context, it is also important to bear
in mind that many skilled staff will be retained in the military
nuclear sector for many years even if a Trident successor is not
built. For example, staff will be needed for submarine and warhead
decommissioning and for the UK's role in contributing to the monitoring
of international nuclear treaties.
SGR believes that an added benefit of pursuing
the policies laid out in this paper is likely to be an increase
in student interest in the physical sciences and engineering as
they become less associated with technologies with destructive
capabilities.
REFERENCES 1 House
of Commons Defence Committee (2006). The Future of the UK's Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context. The Stationery Office.
p 25, paragraph 95.
2 House of Commons Debate (2005). 19
October, Col 841.
3 Peacerights (2005). The Maintenance
and Possible Replacement of the Trident Missile System, joint
opinion, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin. 19
December.
4 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
(2006). Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Arms. Final report. WMD Commission: Stockholm. http://www.wmdcommission.org/
5 For example, see: Ministry of Defence
(2005). Defence Industrial Strategy. White Paper. http://www.mod.uk/
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (2001). Climate Change 2001: synthesis report. Cambridge
University Press. http://www.ipcc.ch/
7 World Health Organisation (2003).
Climate Change and Human Health—risks and responses. WHO
Press. http://www.who.int/
8 Stern M (2006). Stern Review on the
economics of climate change. HM Treasury. http:// www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
9 DEFRA (2006). e-Digest statistics
about the global atmosphere: UK emissions of greenhouse gases.
7 August. http://www.defra.gov.uk/
10 Scientists for Global Responsibility
(2006). Submission to Defence Committee Inquiry on "The Future
of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the UK manufacturing and skills
base". December. http://www.sgr.org.uk/
11 Coverdale T (2002). Nuclear and radiological
skills study. Report of the Nuclear Skills Group. Department of
Trade and Industry. p 8. http://www.dti.gov.uk/
12 HEFCE (2006). Undergraduate students
in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) subjects.
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/hefce/2006/stem/students.pdf
13 Coverdale (2002)—as [11] —p
69.
14 Department of Trade and Industry (2004).
Renewable Supply Chain Gap Analysis. http://www.dti.gov.uk/
18 January 2007
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