Memorandum from Andrew Dorman
It is an apposite time for the British government
to ponder the issue of replacing its existing nuclear deterrent.
The nations of the world, led by the United States, and with the
United Kingdom playing the loyal supporting role, are wrestling
with the issue of North Korea becoming a bone fide possessor of
nuclear weapons, despite the best efforts of the world community.[80]
Similarly the United Kingdom has been cooperating with its French
and German partners to try and persuade Iran to place limits on
its civilian nuclear programme and shy away from any attempt to
also develop its own nuclear weapons.[81]
At the same time the United Kingdom's armed
forces are struggling to meet their existing commitments.[82]
Ever since the new Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard
Dannatt, raised queries about Britain's deployment of forces in
Iraq and the potential breaking of the army on this commitment
there have been a series of public and private rebukes by serving
and retired officers with the horror stories of defence housing
being just the latest.[83]
It is within this context that the Prime Minister
made his statement to the House of Commons outlining the government's
case for maintenance of the British strategic nuclear deterrent.[84]
This statement, much of which had already been leaked, instantly
received the full support of the Conservative opposition whilst
the Liberal Democrats argued that no decision needed to be taken.[85]
The statement and the accompanying white paper
set out the government's intention to replace the existing Trident
force with three to four new submarines each equipped with updated
Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles at an estimated
cost of £15-20 billion.[86]
In an attempt to placate the anti-nuclear lobby within his own
backbenches, Tony Blair also announced a further reduction in
the overall size of the British nuclear arsenal from approximately
200 warheads to less than 160.[87]
In other words he effectively sought to standstill.
The justification for this decision was threefold.
Firstly, Britain must have such a system; secondly, that a decision
needed to be taken now; and thirdly that a new force of nuclear
submarines equipped with Trident missiles was the most sensible
way forward.
The need for an independent nuclear deterrent?
The government's case although re-packaged remains
the same as that confronting the Attlee government in 1946. Firstly,
in an uncertain world, the United Kingdom needs to have the ultimate
insurance policy that a nuclear deterrent is seen to bring.
It is just that, in the final analysis, the
risk of giving up something that has been one of the mainstays
of our security since the war, and, moreover, doing so when the
one certain thing about our world today is its uncertainty, is
not a risk I feel we can responsibly take. Our independent nuclear
deterrent is the ultimate insurance.[88]
The deterrence argument was easier to make when
there was an obvious potential foe in the form of the Soviet Union.
However, when, as the white paper suggests it involves non-state
actors, such as al-Qaeda, it is far harder to justify and Blair
argued in favour deterring would be supplier nations. This raises
the question of whether the United Kingdom would ever be prepared
to use nuclear weapons to punish a state whose regime has allegedly
supplied nuclear material. It is extremely doubtful that any government
could justify such a response, especially after Iraq and the dodgy
dossier saga.
Secondly, that the retention of a Rolls-Royce
system is needed if the United Kingdom wants to remain a major
player in the international system. This is the classic "Boys
and Toys" argument and was reinforced in Blair's statement
to the House of Commons by his reference to the other P5 members.[89]
Put crudelycould any Prime Minister ever contemplate abandoning
this prestige item, especially whilst the French retain an independent
nuclear deterrent? The answer is clearly a resounding no and thus
defence is potentially saddled with not a white elephant but a
black submarine that nobody quite knows what to do with. In reality
would any Prime Minister want to be remembered in history as the
one who abandoned the nuclear deterrent especially if it is their
successor's that will have to foot the bill? Legacies remain an
important part of politics and explain why Harold Wilson did a
rapid u-turn in 1964 over the nuclear deterrent. More recently
John Nott continues to associated with cutbacks to the Royal Navy
that "were only saved by the Falklands War".[90]
The reality was significantly different and few remember him as
the Secretary of State for Defence who began the move towards
expeditionary warfare and facilitated the reorganisation of the
British Army's approach to conventional warfare.
THE NEED
TO REPLACE
NOW
A number of statements have been made by politicians
from various parties and spokespersons for various pressure groups
about the timing issue. The government have argued that at best
the Trident force can have its' existing 25 year boat life extended
by a maximum of five years which means that by 2024 it would become
impossible to maintain a boat continuously at sea.[91]
The main argument that such a decision can be delayed has focused
on the American decision to undertake a much longer life extension
programme for their Trident boatsthe Ohio class. According
to this argument it follows that if the Americans can lengthen
the life of their boats so can the British.
There are a number of weaknesses in this argument.
Firstly, there are no direct comparisons. We may have a similar
type of car to our neighbour but it does not mean that they will
both last the same length of time. It is clear that the British
and American boats are built to different designs, have differing
safety requirements based on differing reactor authorising bodies
and have been operated differently.
Secondly, the Americans have a greater number
of boats which means if a fault does begin to emerge in one or
two boats they will still be able to maintain their deterrent.
The much smaller size of the British force means that there is
little built in redundancy and such risks cannot be taken. This
was clear at the end of the lives of the Polaris fleet which struggled
to continue in service whilst the Vanguard-class was built. The
government line is therefore plausible given the available information
and the Liberal Democrat one nonsensical.
THE CHOICE
OF TRIDENT
The government's white paper outlines four potential
options and indicates that others were considered. These are a
new fleet of Trident boats; a surface force of three large warships
equipped with Trident missiles; a force of 20 civilian aircraft
carrying an unnamed nuclear cruise missiles with its own dedicated
tanker fleet; and a force of Trident missiles in hardened silos
in the United Kingdom.[92]
The white paper argues that overall the most cost effective is
a follow on to the existing Trident force.
However, there is a good deal of smoke and mirrors
in these options and their associated costings. There are clearly
a number of assumptions that have been made which are open to
question. Considering each in turn:
1. Replacing Trident with Trident. The costings
for this proposal do not include the long-term disposal costs.
As the House of Commons Defence Committee have highlighted before
the issue of long-term disposal of nuclear submarines has not
been resolved and thus their associated costs are not included
within the white paper's calculations. Some external estimated
have indicated that this is quite considerable.
2. Surface force of three vessels equipped
with Trident missiles. The white paper dismisses this option based
on vulnerability and the costs associated with protection. These
seem logical but this solution usefully negates having to put
forward the submarines equipped with cruise missile argument.
According to the white paper this would involve having to develop
a new cruise missile. This is somewhat surprising given that the
existing SSN force is equipped with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles
which could be modified to carry a nuclear warheadthe Americans
equipped their submarine force with an earlier variant equipped
with nuclear warheads during the latter part of the Cold Waror
alternatively the French are acquiring a Storm Shadow variant
for their submarine force. This could have its conventional warhead
replaced by a nuclear one.
3. The civilian airliner option make a number
of assumptions that seem designed to inflate the cost. Firstly,
why would a new air base need to be built? The RAF is currently
in the midst of a major base realignment programme which is aiming
to reduce its number of bases. Secondly, why does the cruise missile
have to be a new one, why not just design a nuclear warhead for
the Storm Shadow cruise missile that is currently entering service?
Thirdly, why does the platform have to be a new civilian airliner,
what about extending the Nimrod MRA4 production line and thus
reducing the overall unit cost for the current Nimrod update programme?
Fourthly, why has the range requirement risen so sharply compared
to the existing trident force or its predecessors? Is this simply
to ensure the need for a dedicated tanker force and thus raise
the costs further? Fifthly, what compensatory savings would result
from the Royal Navy shifting away from nuclear powered submarines?
4. Land based Trident missiles. The UK abandoned
the idea of a land based system when it cancelled the Blue Streak
intermediate-range ballistic missile. Vulnerability is a big issue
and avoiding this option is a sensible one.
THE STATE
OF DEFENCE
It would appear that the Trident replacement
decision is now a foregone conclusion. Even if there is a significant
backbench revolt amongst the Labour Party the Conservatives will
ensure any vote is passed with the necessary majority. The white
paper estimates that the cost of replacing the existing system
as less than 5% of the defence budget thereby implying it isn't
too much. Yet Tony Blair himself has called for an increase in
defence spending.
A number of issues remain to be settled. Firstly,
is this "small" amount an addition to current defence
spending plans or to be found from within them? Given the concerns
expressed by a number of senior serving and retired officers"
about the state of Britain's conventional equipment and service
housing the nuclear decision may become the straw that breaks
the camel's back when it comes to the military covenant.
Secondly, the replacement issue remains an element
of where Britain fits within a post-Blair international system.
Does it want to remain closely aligned with the United States
using its military as a major lever of foreign policy or is time
to rethink where Britain actually fits and what it stands for?
18 January 2007
80 "PM condemns North Korea's nuclear test",
9 October 2006, www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10164.asp; Thomas Harding,
Damien McElroy & Richard Spencer, "Navy "too weak"
for big role in Korea blockade", The Daily Telegraph,
16 October 2006, p 1. Back
81
See Jack Straw, "Iran: The Path Ahead", Speech at the
IISS, London, 13 March 2006, www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1140690103808 Back
82
Tony Blair admitted in his recent defence lecture that commitments
were higher than those planned for. Tony Blair, "Our Nations'
Future-Defence", 12 January 2007, www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10735.asp Back
83
Toby Helm, "Army Chief went too far with his Iraq attack,
says Blunkett", The Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2006,
p 6; Benn Quinn, "Keep the general, sack the ministers",
The Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2006, p 6; "We're
going to see this through: General Dannatt on Iraq", Defence
News, 13 October 2006, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/WereGoingToSeeThisThroughGeneralDannattOnIraq.htm Back
84
Tony Blair, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Session
2006-07, 4 December 2006, (London: TSO, 2006), cols 21-4; for
accompanying White paper see "The Future of the United Kingdom's
Nuclear Deterrent: Defence White Paper 2006", Cm 6994, (London:
TSO, 2006). Back
85
David Cameron and Menzies Campbell, House of Commons Parliamentary
Debates, Session 2006-07, 4 December 2006, (London: TSO, 2006),
cols 24-6. Back
86
Tony Blair, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Session
2006-07, 4 December 2006, (London: TSO, 2006), col 23. Back
87
Tony Blair, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Session
2006-07, 4 December 2006, (London: TSO, 2006), col 23. Back
88
Tony Blair, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Session
2006-07, 4 December 2006, (London: TSO, 2006), col 21. Back
89
Idem. Back
90
See Andrew Dorman, "The Nott Review: Dispelling the myths?
Defence Studies Journal, Vol 1, No 3, Autumn 2001, pp 113-121;
Andrew Dorman, "John Nott and the Royal Navy: the 1981 defence
review revisited", Contemporary British History, vol 15,
no 2, Summer 2001, pp 98-120. Back
91
"The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent: Defence
White Paper 2006", Cm 6994, (London: TSO, 2006), p
10. Back
92
Ibid, pp 35-9. Back
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