Memorandum from Greenpeace
The White Paper CM 6994 on the future of the
United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent lacks factual backing in a
number of key areas such as those of the nature of any perceived
future threat, cost, and the design of submarine.
Prime Minister Tony Blair states in the foreword
to the White Paper:
"Those who question this decision need to
explain why disarmament by the UK would help our security. They
would need to prove that such a gesture would change the minds
of hardliners and extremists in countries which are developing
these nuclear capabilities. They would need to show that terrorists
would be less likely to conspire against us with hostile governments
because we had given up our nuclear weapons. They would need to
argue that the UK would be safer by giving up the deterrent and
that our capacity to act would not be constrained by others."
Greenpeace UK would argue that before taking
this important decision the opposite is the case and that the
onus is on the UK government to show how possession of nuclear
weapons has in the past or would in the future protect us against
terrorists, hardliners and extremists, would halt countries such
as North Korea from continuing to develop their nuclear capability
and how such countries are likely to threaten or have any reason
to attack the United Kingdom.
Has the possession of nuclear weapons by Britain
and the United States halted the Taliban in Afghanistan or insurgents
in Iraq? This White Paper fails to convincingly provide any justification
for the continued need for Britain to possess nuclear weapons
and fails to outline any realistic threats to the United Kingdom
in the near or distant future.
Furthermore, the justification used throughout
the White Paper that there are still close to 30 thousand nuclear
weapons in the hands of an elite few is an insufficient reason
for deciding to retain a nuclear arsenal. If all countries took
that approach, as North Korea has, we would end up in a nuclear
free for all.
Given all the uncertainties that remain in the
Government's White Paper Cm 6994, the clear lack of any justification
for Britain retaining any form of nuclear weapons system, and
our legal obligation under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Greenpeace UK believe that the Government's pursuit of a replacement
system to Trident is ill-considered, unnecessary and illegal.
SECTION 2: THE
POLICY CONTEXT
1. Government's over-arching policy on nuclear
weapons remains unchanged from that outlined in the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review yet much has changed in the world in those nine
years.
2. Much was made in the White Paper that
the actual physical number of UK nuclear warheads has declined
and that our stockpile accounts for "less than 1% of the
global inventory" and that it is "the smallest".
Whilst physical numbers have changed, the actual capability of
Britain's nuclear weapons stockpile has increased. Trident has
increased greatly the range and accuracy of the UK nuclear stockpile,
whilst the potential arsenal carried by a Vanguard submarine on
patrol remains unchanged despite any wider stockpile changes proposed
in the White Paper.
3. No account has been taken in the White
Paper of the international implications on the international nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament arena. Please see separately
Appendices A-C for Greenpeace's position regarding the relationship
of the White Paper to international and humanitarian law.
4. One of the principal objectives of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as stated in its preamble
is that its signatories declared "their intention to achieve
at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament".
and that:
"Desiring to further the easing of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order
to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons,
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination
from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control."
5. This is reflected also in Article VI
of the NPT which states:
"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control."
Yet, how can one say that the UK is abiding
by the NPT when a matter of months before its signatories meet
to discuss its future at the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
meeting at Geneva in May 2007, it has decided to retain an operational
nuclear arsenal until at least 2040?
6. In 2000 NPT member States met to review
progress on achieving the aims and objectives of the treaty. Britain
along with the other four nuclear weapon States agreed to implement
13 "practical steps for the systematic and progressive effort
to implement Article VI". These commitments included further
efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, concrete
measures to further reduce operational status of their nuclear
arsenals, increased transparency and a diminishing role for nuclear
weapons.
7. Yet when NPT member States met in 2005
they failed to reach agreement on any way forward on the 13 steps
to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons. One of the fundamental
issues at that and every other year they have met is the failure
by the five recognised nuclear weapons States to take any meaningful
steps to disarm.
8. The intentions in the White Paper will
be used as yet another example by the more than 180 countries
who are NPT member States and do not have nuclear weapons of gross
hypocrisy and a clear lack of commitment to Article VI of the
Treaty and the 13 practical steps agreed to in 2000.
9. Admitting, as they do in paragraph 7-4,
that the UK will be working with the US on a new nuclear warhead
for their replacement system will certainly ensure that the UK
government's repeated assurance in the White Paper that they are
"committed to working towards a safer world in which there
is no requirement for nuclear weapons" will fall on deaf
ears.
10. Whilst all the measures outlined in
Box 2.1 are laudable the reality is that all international fora
concerned with nuclear proliferation issues are stagnated. For
example, the Conference on Disarmament, the only UN body with
a mandate to negotiate universal treaties on these important issues,
has done no significant work since it completed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
11. In the policy area of "counter-proliferation"
the UK government is also applying a double standard. The White
Paper refers to the 40 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) having the "technical ability and means to initiate
a viable nuclear weapons programme" yet they have done nothing
to stop, and have in fact encouraged, the continued reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel and the return of an essential ingredient
of nuclear weapons, namely plutonium, to countries such as Japan.
12. Also through the NSG the UK government
has sat silent watching the United States (a member of the NPT)
and India (a possessor of nuclear weapons and not a member of
the NPT) cement a nuclear cooperation agreement that will inevitably
free up nuclear material and technology in India so they can concentrate
on developing further their nuclear arsenal outside of international
control.
13. If the UK government were serious about
its "counter-proliferation" obligations it would stop
allowing the selling of nuclear technology, reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel and decide to use its diplomatic and political influence
to halt such matters as the nuclear deal between the US and India.
SECTION 3: NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE IN
THE 21ST
CENTURY
1. The 2003 Defence White Paper, Delivering
Security in a Changing World confirmed and extended a new direction
for British military thinking, with the focus on expeditionary
operations, effects-based warfare and "Network Enabled Capability"
(NEC), aimed at countering threats from terrorism and asymmetric
warfare.
2. As then Defence Secretary Hoon said in
the foreword:
"Our focus is now on delivering flexible
forces able to configure to generate the right capability in a
less predictable and more complex operational environment..."
3. Greenpeace UK would argue that there
is nothing "flexible" about nuclear weapons and that
their continued possession does not fit with the new British military
thinking outlined in the 2003 Defence White Paper.
4. Some significant changes from the Strategic
Defence Review of 1998 and the updated "New Chapter"
following 11 September 2001 attacks were notable. In particular
British military thinking now included a goal of being able to
sustain three concurrent small-medium operations instead of two,
of which one would be a long-term peace support operation. Geographically,
while the SDR expected that the key areas of operations outside
Europe would be the Mediterranean and Gulf regions, the White
Paper envisaged operations further afield, especially South Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa.
5. The 2003 White Paper envisaged that most
operations would be in coalitions, although Britain would be prepared
to take the lead role in those in which the US is not involved.
However, large scale operations—against state adversaries—would
only be undertaken as part of a US-led coalition. Thus, interoperability
with US forces, both in terms of technology, doctrine and operational
tempo, are given a high level of importance.
6. As a result, the 2003 White Paper called
for new equipment and organisation to fill this new role including
new giant aircraft carriers and a Joint Combat Aircraft to enable
Britain to project power from sea to land. Other programmes include
the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) family of medium-weight
land vehicles designed to increase the capability for rapid interventions.
7. The capability to defend against a major
conventional threat to the UK or its allies was no longer considered
as necessary in the 2003 White Paper although "the continuing
risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons" was briefly noted.
8. Now, three years later, the Government
are stating, without any factual back-up, that we need to have
a new nuclear weapons system because "we cannot rule out,
over the 2020-50 timescale, a major shift in the international
security situation which puts us under threat" of nuclear
attack.
9. Greenpeace UK would agree that as long
as there are nuclear materials and technology available and that
nuclear weapons are regarded as being essential to the security
of a few nations, there will remain a risk of further proliferation
of nuclear weapons.
10. Another rationale used to justify possession
of a nuclear arsenal is increased pressure on natural resources
such as energy and water creating international instability and
risk of interstate conflict. They also include in the list increases
in population, global economic development and climate change
as possible factors in creating instability.
11. We fail to see how nuclear weapons will
halt the impacts of climate change, ensure adequate birth control
for the world's poor or make any nation economically richer and
not poorer. We also fail to see how a British nuclear weapons
system has even been a factor in stopping atrocities such as that
occurring in Darfur.
12. The rationales outlined in the White
Paper that because of the "continued existence of large nuclear
arsenals, the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear
weapons in combination with the risk of increased international
instability and tension" Britain still needs nuclear weapons
are, we would argue, exactly the rationales for why Britain should
do its utmost to eliminate them.
13. Needed now are not new rationales for
possessing nuclear weapons but increased diplomatic effort and
initiatives to rid the world of nuclear weapons, materials and
technology. A greater concentration of efforts by the UK government
on other military tasks such as humanitarian assistance and response
and peacekeeping would demonstrate a deeper commitment to the
goals of peace and security.
SECTION 4: ENSURING
EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE
1. The White Paper states that:
"If they are to have the required deterrent
effect, our nuclear forces need to continue to be credible against
the range of risks and threats described in Section 3."
2. As argued above, Greenpeace UK reiterate
that British nuclear weapons are not a credible weapons system
to combat risks and threats such as interstate conflict or the
impacts of climate change. The idea that at some point in the
future a Dr Strangelove figure will appear, develop a secret nuclear
arsenal and threaten the UK with it is somewhat unrealistic.
3. Greenpeace is concerned that the Government
continues to view the facility of an adjustable yield on the warhead
as a benefit, as stated in paragraph 4.9. Being able to adjust
the yield downwards lowers the nuclear threshold, making nuclear
conflict, and the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states,
more likely. Perception of the nuclear arsenal as therefore more
"useable" only serves to destabilise global security,
provoke proliferation, and heighten the possibility of nuclear
use. Greenpeace would welcome the Committee seeking a further
elucidation of the Government's position on this shadowy area
of strategy and warhead development.
SECTION 5: DETERRENT
OPTIONS, SOLUTIONS
AND COSTS
1. The White Paper states that the procurement
costs will "need to be refined as the concept and assessment
phases is taken forward with industry" and that more "accurate
cost estimates" will only be available when they come to
place a contract for the new submarines in five to seven years
time. The Government then states rather boldly that their initial
estimate of the cost is £15-20 billion at today's prices.
2. Greenpeace UK suggests that the Defence
Select Committee revisit their own inquiries and those of the
National Audit Office on the vast cost overruns of the Trident
system to remind themselves how unlikely it is that this will
be the actual cost and that in fact, as history shows, it is likely
to be much higher.
3. A recent example was the two new aircraft
carriers which are not as technically challenging as building
an SSBN. Initial Gatei approval for the carriers was given in
December 1998, with Main Gate approval originally intended for
2003-04, but the Assessment Phase was extended in 2004ii. The
project has now moved from the Assessment to the Demonstration
phase, but with no new date set for full Main Gate approval, which
will be required before the Manufacture phase can beginiii. Originally,
the Assessment Phase was forecast to cost £118 million, but
this figure has increased to £300 millioniv. The intended
in-service dates for the two carriers were originally 2012 and
2015. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee, in December
2005, suggested that the planned in-service date may now be delayed,
and described the lack of a target for Main Gate as "extraordinary".v
4. As the White Paper itself admits in Section
6:
"Designing and building new SSBNs and integrating
them with other elements of the overall system, will be a significant
technical challenge for the Ministry of Defence and for industry."
and that SSBNs are:
"one of the most complex and technically
demanding systems in existence."
5. Greenpeace UK reiterates that such a
high risk strategy with unknown future financial outlay would
be ill-advised even if there were proven to be a real need.
6. The White Paper also fails to adequately
take into account and underestimates the associated costs of supporting
infrastructure required such as those of warhead construction
and maintenance that can also prove to be substantial if new warheads
and facilities are required.
7. On top of the acquisition costs there
are also the operational and maintenance costs, which the White
Paper estimates at up to 6% of the current Defence budget, which
would mean £1.8 billion per year. vi This is a considerable
increase on previous figures for Trident itself, and is driven
by increased spending at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston
(AWE), which the White Paper expects to continue and indeed increase
further.
8. However, this does not cover all costs
associated with maintaining and operating the UK's SSBN fleet.
A 1998 estimate by Scottish CND, based on Parliamentary answers,
also included allowances for the cost of conventional forces assigned
to the defence of Trident (£303 million), plus other costs
(£60 million, including an allowance for major refits over
the 30-year life span), giving £440 million per year in 2006
pricesvii. In line with the general tendency to increasing costs,
it is likely that this figure would be somewhat higher for a Trident
replacement, but the figure also gave the high-end estimate for
the cost of the conventional forces assigned to the defence of
Trident. On this basis, our preliminary research indicates a total
figure of around £2.24 billion per year simply for operational
and maintenance costs. Over 22 years, this gives a total cost,
for procurement and operations, of £75.5 billion, which is
very close to estimates produced by other recent studies. Greenpeace
is presently preparing a full briefing on the costs of Trident
Replacement, which it will provide to the Committee at the earliest
opportunity.
9. We also find it incredulous that the
Government is expecting to take a vote on a future replacement
system for Trident in March of this year when the White Paper,
paragraph 5.15, clearly states that:
"Decisions on the level of our investments
in nuclear and conventional capability will be taken in the Comprehensive
Spending Review..."
Surely it would be prudent to defer any decision
until the outcome of the CSR is clear and thereby the UK can establish
if it can afford a replacement.
SECTION 6: INDUSTRIAL
ASPECTS
1. There are several areas here that should
be of concern to the Defence Select Committee and Parliament as
a whole that need further elaboration than currently contained
in the White Paper.
2. Firstly, as noted above:
"Designing and building new SSBNs and integrating
them with other elements of the overall system, will be a significant
technical challenge for the Ministry of Defence and for industry."
and that SSBNs are:
"one of the most complex and technically
demanding systems in existence."
3. The White Paper also highlights the fact
that there was a failure in the early design stages to be able
to build the Astute class at the original estimated cost but that
lessons "have been learnt". However, the White Paper
also states that "more change is needed for industry to be
able to deliver".
4. This is further justification as to why
any decision to replace the Trident system at this juncture would
be ill-advised and premature until industry can prove to the satisfaction
of Parliament that they can actually meet this complex and technically
demanding challenge. Particularly, given that the White Paper
estimates it will take seventeen years for the first new submarine
to go out on its first patrol and it will be the early 2020s when
they start to retire Trident. If you follow the 25 year until
retirement timeline of logic, however, this is reduced to retiring
HMS Vanguard in 2019 as it went on its first patrol in 1994.
5. Whilst in Section 4 it is argued that
there is a need for the UK's nuclear forces to remain "fully
operationally independent" another concern for the Committee
should be that the White Paper suggests that there is no guarantee
that the replacement submarines will be built in the UK. This
will be "dependent on proposals from industry that provide
the right capability at the right time and offer value for money".
6. Does this leave open the possibility
that any replacement submarine could be built by a US or South
Korean shipyard? After all, the White Paper states that the MoD
will buy "some sub-system elements from overseas". In
this case, over the lifetime of the system we could find Britain's
"independent nuclear deterrent" not being able to function
because of a failure of an overseas supplier to replenish components
or to service the "sub-system" that they supplied.
7. Another area of huge financial uncertainty
is the final decommissioning costs of Vanguard or any replacement
system. However, having already decommissioned their predecessor,
Polaris, surely the White Paper should be able to provide at least
a rough ball park estimate for decommissioning an SSBN?
SECTION 7: FUTURE
DECISIONS
1. The White Paper states that a decision
on whether a new warhead will be required or the existing one
should be refurbished is "likely to be necessary in the next
Parliament" and that a detailed review is to be undertaken
with the assistance of the United States.
2. Another economic and political uncertainty
is the need for a continuous supply of tritium for both the existing
warhead stockpile and any future design as the tritium-producing
Chapelcross reactors have been closed down since early 2004. Questions
need to be asked and answered about when the UK tritium supply
will run down, what alternatives there are and what the economic
cost of this could be.
3. Another area of uncertainty is that in
the 2002 Health and Safety Executive Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
review of the Rolls Royce decommissioning strategy, the Rolls
Royce Submarine Fuel Manufacturing plant in Derby was due to be
closed in 2017 and the Neptune reactor design facility in 2013.
viii This may have economic and political implications on any
future decision and also requires clarification.
4. In May of 2006 British Nuclear Group
were awarded a 36 year contract worth £230 million to store
submarine spent nuclear fuel. However, this fuel is not processed
in any way and a decision will have to be taken on how to treat
and store it in the long term which will certainly have cost implications
that require factoring into any future decision on a replacement
system.
5. What to do with existing submarine nuclear
reactors stored at Devonport and Rosyth remains another question
awaiting answer particularly as it is estimated that storage capacity
will run out in 2020. The only site so far identified has
been RNAD Coulport which is currently used to store Trident warheads.
If this site were to be chosen there are issues over how the replacement
system and any future submarine reactor would co-exist.
6. Given the other uncertainties outlined
above with costs and industrial capabilities of building an SSBN
it would be prudent to defer until everything is completed and
a clearer picture is presented on a whole system before taking
any decision on whether or not to proceed with a new SSBN, rather
than just one part of it.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Greenpeace recommends that no final decision
should be taken until after a genuinely full, informed and open
public debate takes place, as promised by the Government, which
should include further detailed inquiries by the Defence Select
Committee and initiation of inquiries by the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee.
2. Until such time as this debate is concluded,
Greenpeace recommends that Trident be taken off patrol, and its
warheads removed to an internationally monitored storage site.
Alongside the deferral of any plans to develop a new nuclear weapons
system, these would serve as confidence-building measures and
enable the UK to take a lead in strengthening existing disarmament
treaties and provide the platform to kickstart multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations.
REFERENCES i The
"Initial Gate" approval point for a project allows the
project to proceed to the Assessment Phase, which considers different
alternative procurement possibilities and comes up with a preferred
option. "Main Gate" approval allows the project to move
to the Demonstration and Manufacture stages.
ii Under the Smart Procurement Initiative
(SPI) process, Initial gate occurs at the end of the Concept Stage,
before the commencement of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
procurement process. Main Gate is an exacting approval hurdle,
between the Assessment and Demonstration Stages http://www.ams.mod.uk/ams/content/docs/ils/ils_web/ilsmgt/mg.htm
iii "Future Aircraft Carrier project
moves to next phase as assembly plans are agreed", MoD http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/FutureAircraftCarrierProject
MovesToNextPhaseAsAssemblyPlansAreAgreed.htm
iv National Audit Office, Ministry
of Defence Major Projects Report 2005, HMSO, November 2005.
v House of Commons Defence Select Committee,
"Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes",
Second Report of Session 2005-06, HC554, 13 December 2005, http://www.sbac.co.uk/community/news/files/3566/Future%20Carrier%20and%20Joint%20Combat%20Aurcraft%20
Programmes.pdf
vi Cm 6994, p 27.
vii According to Scottish CND http://www.banthebomb.org/archives/magazine/nfs992l.htm.
Defence Secretary George Robertson emphasised that the figures
he gave for forces committed to Trident did not represent the
cost that could be attributed to Trident, as these forces had
other duties as well; however, it would be hard to argue that
there is zero marginal cost. Dr Ainslie assigned the full cost
of forces "committed" to Trident, and 30% of the cost
of "contingent" forces. This figure is therefore open
to debate, but is not outrageous.
viii A review by the Health and Safety
Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the strategy
of Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations ltd for the decommissioning
of its nuclear sites, 22 May 2002 http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/qqreview/rrqqr.htm
22 January 2007
| 
