Memorandum from the Acronym Institute
for Disarmament Diplomacy
SUMMARY
1. The Government's White Paper on The
Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent to the House
of Commons, was introduced to the House of Commons on 4 December
2006.[93]
It employs a succession of unsubstantiated assertions and circular
arguments. Not only does it fail to make a convincing military
or political case to justify retaining the current, cold-war-designed
Trident nuclear system, but it then argues for procurement of
a similar submarine-based system.
2. The Trident Lite option would carry UK
nuclear weapons beyond 2050. The "20% reduction" in
the "stockpile of operationally available warheads"
[p 8 and Section 2] looks good, but though the new ceiling of
160 makes a probable virtue of necessity, it will not satisfy
other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As
detailed below, this "reduction" may not require any
actual reduction of the current stockpile. Most importantly, this
offer does not imply any reduction in the number of nuclear weapons
deployed on the submarines when they go out on patrol.
3. The possibility of commissioning three
rather than four submarines is canvassed, but the UK's deployed
nuclear forces are likely to remain at current levels. The White
Paper supports the MoD desire to retain the current "continuous
deterrent patrolling" at sea, which it argues is essential
for "invulnerability and assuredness" and to "motivate
the crews".[94]
4. In pushing to renew Trident the White
Paper ignores the growing body of analysis and intelligence that
indicate that perpetuating nuclear weapons will undermine rather
than enhance our national and international security, especially
in view of potential proliferation and terrorist risks.
5. A decision this year is premature. It
is neither necessary nor desirable to vote on the White Paper
in March. MPs need to ensure that the full consultations that
were promised are carried out before they vote. In view of the
importance of getting Britain's nuclear policy right, the very
least that MPs should demand is that the government undertakes
a comprehensive security and defence review that combines the
perspectives of foreign affairs, defence, non-proliferation and
international law, with representation from civil society and
security practitioners.[95]
6. The White Paper provides no consideration
of practical options for non-nuclear deterrence and does not seriously
engage with the fundamental questions relating to common security,
deterrence or reducing nuclear dangers. It parodies alternatives,
and dismisses without adequate discussion some compelling arguments
about the positive role Britain could have in devaluing nuclear
weapons and creating the conditions to facilitate more effective
multilateral disarmament.
7. Nuclear and conventional weapons are
juxtaposed as if these were the only defence tools available.
Though it relies on a projection of new or "unknown"
threats, the White Paper glosses over 21st century complexities
and dumbs down consideration of alternatives to nuclear weapons.
It simultaneously claims Britain's importance, for example as
an "independent centre of nuclear decision-making",
while implying that the UK is just a passive bystander, incapable
of influencing the security and non-proliferation environment
if we took a decision to renounce nuclear weapons.
8. Warheads with smaller yields may contribute
to the government's statistic of reducing "the overall explosive
power of its nuclear arsenal [from the height of cold war levels]
by around 75%" [2-5], but deploying such smaller warheads
for "sub-strategic" purposes may also lower the threshold
of nuclear weapon use, and so increase threats and dangers, and
contradict the government's assurance that nuclear weapons are
not intended for use in conflicts.
9. Contrary to the White Paper's assertions,
neither renewing Trident nor the uses of nuclear weapons envisaged
in UK doctrine and policy would be compatible with the UK's international
and legal obligations, particularly under humanitarian law and
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
10. The White Paper associates Britain's
continued possession of nuclear weapons with deterring hostile
forces that might arise over the next 20-50 years, particularly
"re-emergence of a major nuclear threat", "emerging
nuclear states", or "state-sponsored terrorism".
Such potential dangers should undoubtedly be of concern, but the
government signally fails to explain how UK nuclear weapons will
deter either the development of such threats or the use of nuclear
weapons against Britain or others.
11. Contemporary analyses of the kinds of
potential aggressors identified in the White Paper conclude that
they are unlikely to be deterred by nuclear weapons; on the contrary,
their game plan may be to provoke a nuclear or similarly disproportionate
retaliation, so states with nuclear weapons could well be putting
themselves at greater risk of a devastating WMD attack. Then what
do we do? Play into terrorists' hands by launching Trident? The
White Paper talks vaguely of influencing states that might assist
a nuclear terrorist. How? Whomever we chose to target in a retaliation,
UK nuclear weapons would make any situation worse and could kill
hundreds of thousands of non-combatants. Such a threat is not
sufficiently credible to deterand if we were actually to
carry it out, we would be condemned across the world.
12. The most sensible way to reduce the
dangers from the kinds of developments evoked in the White Paper
would be to devalue nuclear weapons in all their aspects and make
more coherent and concerted efforts to keep the weapons and materials
out of circulation. This conclusion was compellingly drawn in
a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by a very eminent group
of former US policymakers, including Secretaries of State Henry
Kissinger and George P Schulz, Defence Secretary William J Perry,
and the architect of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme,
Senator Sam Nunn. Coming from diverse political backgrounds, they
all agreed that the world needed now to build "a solid consensus
for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital
contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially
dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the
world".
13. Section 6 deals with Industrial Aspects,
but fails to address the problems with BAE and the Barrow shipyard,
and gives short shrift to the expensive, difficultand unresolvedissues
relating to decommissioning and disposal, especially regarding
radioactive materials used in the current as well as any future
nuclear weapon system. These issues must be addressed before any
decision is made to procure a further nuclear system that would
likely exacerbate current difficulties.
SUBSTANTIVE CRITIQUE
OF THE
WHITE PAPER'S
MAIN ASSUMPTIONS,
CLAIMS AND
CONCLUSIONS
"it will take around 17 years to design,
manufacture and commission a replacement submarine" [p 6
and Section 1].
14. The White Paper distorts the facts when
it pushes for a decision to be taken now. The current Vanguard-class
submarines have a longer life expectancy than the government is
now claiming.[96]
15. The White Paper's recommendation is
for three to four similar submarines equipped with more robust
nuclear reactors than the Vanguard-class. This reactor has already
been developed and tested, so only very bad management would entail
a 17-year construction schedule.
16. The government qualifies its "intention
to build the new SSBNs in the UK", saying "this is dependent
on proposals from industry that provide the right capability at
the right time and offer value for money" [6-3]. BAE is mired
in corruption scandals and the Barrow shipyard is behind in fulfilling
its current contract for Astute-class submarines, so there is
the risk that a hasty decision could compound the problems and
might result in corners (including safety) being cut on the Astute
or Trident programmes. Alternatively, in view of Barrow's problems,
the order may go to a foreign (probably US) shipyard instead,
despite use of the "jobs argument" to garner support
for renewing Trident.
"Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has underpinned
our ability to [secure international peace and security]... it
has been used to deter acts of aggression against our vital interests,
never to coerce others." [p 6][97]
17. Though it has been convenient for many
in the UK to treat the assertion that Britain's bomb deterred
the Soviet Union as a "truism", it is open to serious
question in light of documents from the Soviet era that are now
becoming available. At best, the proposition is unknowable. We
can only speculate about the relative weight to accord various
Cold War variables, but there is no credible way to demonstrate
the significanceor notof nuclear weapons per se.
18. Labelling a succession of different
kinds of nuclear weapons "the nuclear deterrent", as
repetitiously done in the White Paper, may bind the concepts of
nuclear weapons and deterrence together linguistically, but it
does not say anything about the real world or create a logical
or factual connection if one does not exist. Naming a cat "dog"
does not confer the ability to bark. Whether UK nuclear weapons
deterred in the past or are capable of deterring specific, unforeseeable
or unknown threats in the future are questions that require examination,
evidence and argument. The White Paper fails to do this, and relies
instead on unsubstantiated assertions and slogans. Before making
any binding decision, Parliament should insist on seeing a deeper
analysis of nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence.
19. Contrary to the "truisms"
that pepper the White Paper, history provides evidence that US
and/or British nuclear weapons demonstrably failed to deter some
very serious conflicts involving "acts of aggression"
against what were perceived as our "interests". These
include the Korean War; Vietnam War; Falklands War; and the invasion
of Kuwait, leading to the first Gulf War. The first two appeared
as part of the quintessentially Cold War contest of "Western
values versus communism". US nuclear weapons failed to deter,
prevent or influence the conduct and outcome of these conflicts.
20. With regard to the Falklands War and
invasion of Kuwait, despotic leaders calculated correctly that
they would not incur nuclear retaliation for their aggressive
actions, despite not having nuclear weapons of their own. Far
from being an effective deterrent, the evidence indicates that
UK nuclear weapons were completely irrelevant to the decisions
of the Argentinian generals; or of Saddam Hussein when he paraded
British captivesincluding the UK ambassadoron Kuwaiti
and international television, in what was a calculated public
humiliation for Iraq's former colonial master.
21. Deterrence requires some level of shared
values and reliable communications among protagonists, which took
time to develop during the Cold War and is unlikely to work with
the kind of threatsincluding terrorists and failed states
with weapons of mass destructionthat the government now
envisages. In addition, to make an adversary believe that a nuclear
weapon threat is credible, it is necessary to demonstrate a preparedness
to use the weapon. This entails concomitant risks of miscalculation,
inadvertence or accident, as was clearly shown when the Cuban
Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of catastrophe in
1962. It was clear then, and for the rest of the Cold War,
that nuclear weapons increased global insecurity.
22. Though the bilateral treaties and measures
put in place to enhance East-West communication and control and
reduce nuclear build-up helped the US and USSR to avoid direct
nuclear confrontation and mutual annihilation, it is a stretch
too far to claim that their nuclear weaponsor Britain'sunderpinned
international peace and security. Arms sales continued to grow
across the world, and many millions died as the major powers pursued
proxy conflicts with each other by arming and fuelling wars in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Europe was spared, but the government
has failed to provide any evidence to suggest that war was averted
in Europe because of our nuclear weapons, rather than, say, the
development of the European Union, less offensive military intentions
on the part of the Soviet leadership than was assumed (or presented
by US/Western leadership) at the time.
23. Soviet archives indicate that far from
planning to invade Europe, the Soviet Union was put under great
stress by having to divert resources into trying to match the
US nuclear arsenal because of the fear generated by the perceived
threats from US (and then British and French) nuclear weapons.
Hence, the development and build-up of nuclear weapons by one
side provoked the build-up of nuclear weapons by others. If Moscow
had had any political or ideological impulse to undertake military
adventurism in Europe, history suggests that it was most effectively
deterred by its own compelling economic and political constraints.
24. From President Kennedy's Defence Secretary,
Robert McNamara, to General Lee Butler, President George H W Bush's
Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Command (1989-91), senior military
practitioners have expressed growing scepticism about the efficacy
of nuclear reliance, even during the Cold War.[98]
25. Not only does the White Paper fail to
justify its premise that our nuclear weapons aided peace and international
security and deterred acts of aggression against the UK and its
vital interests; the available evidence appears rather to point
in the opposite direction. At the very least, the British public
should expect the government to make a case based on more than
the repetition of unsubstantiated assertions. Too much of our
future security is at stake to rely on cold war myths and voodoo
mantras about deterrence. The government needs to provide and
examine evidence from the real world, based on the record of what
actually happened in the past 51 years.
26. Even if nuclear weapons did play a role
in deterring war among the major Cold War powers, relying on them
in the manifestly different conditions the UK now faces reveals
a naive and complacent stretch of faith. Adherence to a policy
of nuclear reliance in a proliferating world increases the risks
that deterrence will fail. If nuclear deterrence fails, remaining
decision-makers (or even the submarine commanders, in a worst
case scenario), may feel compelled to use UK nuclear weapons in
retaliation, which could kill thousands, perhaps millions more
civilians, as well as escalating the threats for Britain and the
rest of the world.
"...the global context does not justify complete
UK nuclear disarmament." [p 6]
To back up this assertion, the government makes
five specific claims:
(i) "significant nuclear arsenals remain,
some of which are being modernised and expanded".
27. The circularity of this argument is
superficially persuasive, but deeply flawed. The government appears
to be justifying its desire for Britain to retain its current
nuclear weapons in perpetuity by citing similar decisions by others.
By committing to acquiring a system to follow on from Trident,
with upgraded submarines, perhaps also incorporating modified
(modernised) warheads, Britain is excusing itself by creating
an excuse for everyone else. Across the world, national legal
systems and normal morality rightly reject the "others are
doing it too" defence, even (especially?) by gang members
who may genuinely feel threatened by knife or gun cultures that
their own posturing with such weapons perpetuates and provokes.
(ii) "the number of states possessing
weapons has continued to grow"
28. It depends where the baseline is drawn,
but there were more nuclear weapons and more states with nuclear
weapons 15 years ago than now. The enhanced political value placed
on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in the early 1990s
played a major role in enabling South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine
and Kazakhstan to close down nuclear weapons facilities and dismantle
or give up the nuclear weapons on their territory. They subsequently
joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Brazil, which at
one time was expected to become the fifth nuclear threshold state
(after Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa), also renounced
any ambition in that direction and finally joined the NPT a few
years after they signed up to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing
a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.
29. In that time, only one stateNorth
Koreahas sought to withdraw from the NPT. Though North
Korea's nuclear test on 9 October 2006, and its claim to have
produced some nuclear weapons are undoubtedly a set-back for the
nonproliferation regime, it is simply nonsense to suggest that
this justifies UK nuclear weapons. If anything, the North Korean
example illustrates the predictable consequences of military threats
and nuclear sabre-rattling, as practised since 2001 by the Bush
administration, in a context when major nuclear powers are revaluing
and modernising their nuclear forces and undermining international
law and the multilateral nonproliferation regime.
30. It is true that India and Pakistan have
gone more overt, declaring themselves nuclear weapon states after
conducting underground test explosions in May 1998. After
initial condemnation, the international community did not take
long to accept them back into the fold, particularly when President
Bush has embraced them so closely as allies in the "war on
terror", resuming arms sales to Pakistan and, most recently,
concluding a nuclear deal with India that is widely perceived
as undermining some of the basic principles and practices of the
nonproliferation regime, including export controls on nuclear
technology.
31. The "nuclear ambitions of Iran",
cited in Tony Blair's introduction to the White Paper, are still
many years from a nuclear capability. This is not to say that
the world can afford to be complacent. Though we are right to
be very concerned, Iran's ambitions are not going to be thwarted
by British nuclear weapons. Quite the reverse: Iran's ambitions
may be contained and kept as unfulfilled as Libya's, but the strategies
for doing so will require at a minimum the devaluing of nuclear
weapons, strengthening the nonproliferation regime, and reducing
the status, value, additional security and power projection that
many in Iran think are being bestowed on Israel, India and Pakistan
by their possession of nuclear weapons.
(iii) "ballistic missile technology
has also continued to proliferate"
32. As for ballistic missiles, one of the
foremost US nonproliferation experts, Joseph Cirincione, noted
in January 2007: "The ballistic missile threat is often exaggerated
by government officials in their justification for favoured programmes.
The "missile scare" of the past 10 years provoked by
the inaccurate assessment of the 1998 Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States chaired by Donald
Rumsfeld, has proven to be a false alarm. None of the threats
predicted by the commission developed. No new nation acquired
ballistic missile technology over the past nine years (in fact,
no new nation has started a ballistic missile program in the past
20 years). Nor did North Korea, Iran or Iraq develop an ICBM,
as the commission predicted they would. The only missile development
of any consequence has been the testing of medium-range ballistic
missiles by North Korea and Iran, with ranges of 1,000-1,300 kilometres.
Efforts by North Korea to develop longer-range missiles have failed;
Iran has announced programs to extend the range of their Scud-based
missiles but without any demonstrated success."[99]
33. Cirincione concludes, "the ballistic
missile threat Europe faces today is limited and changing very
slowly. Russia's arsenal is steadily declining and this decline
could be accelerated through negotiated reductions. China's arsenal
is limited and could be limited further through negotiations.
Iran is the only other conceivable threat but there is little
evidence that Iran could develop a long-range missile capable
of hitting Central Europe with nuclear warheads within the next
15 years. Here, too, internal political developments and diplomatic
efforts and measured military preparedness could deter and even
eliminate this threat before it develops."[100]
34. In an article outlining two multilateral
approaches to constrain the proliferation of missiles, President
Clinton's former ambassador for nonproliferation, Thomas Graham,
and Indian expert Dinshaw Mistry noted that the major impediment
to getting a global missile nonproliferation treaty would be the
nuclear powers, who would "seek to retain their nuclear missiles
in any such treaty".[101]
35. This again exposes the circularity of
positions relied on in the White Paper: it justifies Trident replacement
as necessary to defend against a possible future threat that we
would be in a much stronger position to prevent here and now if
we weren't so bent on keeping our nuclear options as wide open
as possible.
(iv) "most industrialised countries
have the capability to develop chemical and biological weapons"
36. This is technically true but very misleading.
Most pharmaceutical manufacturers and kitchens also have the "capability"
to develop some kinds of chemical and biological weapons (CBW),
but that does not mean that there is an increased threat from
chefs and people who work for Boots and Superdrug. To constitute
a threat requires not only capabilities and know-how, but intentions
and concealment, as the government well knows. This assertion
therefore carries uncomfortable echoes of the exaggerations and
innuendos in the "dodgy dossiers" crafted in 2002-03
to create sufficient fear to propel sceptical MPs into voting
for the war on Iraq.
37. Two further aspects embedded in this
assertion need to be unpicked. Including it here implies that
Trident would have some role to play in countering biological
and chemical weapon threats. First, in accordance with Britain's
international legal obligations and security assurances, nuclear
weapons cannot lawfully be used to counter a biological or chemical
threat from a non-nuclear state. As Professor Michael Clarke of
the University of London points out, "There is no comparison
between the strategic destructive power of nuclear weapons on
the one hand and of chemical and biological weapons on the other."[102]
Nuclear weapons would not be a proportionate response even in
the event of a significant attack using biological or chemical
weapons, and so would violate humanitarian law and the laws governing
armed conflict.
38. Additionally, there are widely adhered-to
international treaties and agreements that prohibit biological
and chemical weapons. These have created international norms that
will act as a much more effective deterrent on any government
contemplating the use of such weapons. Even though Saddam Hussein
was hanged before he could be tried for using chemical weapons
against Iranian forces and the Iraqi-Kurdish town of Halabja in
the 1980s, the fact that this use has been widely condemned as
a war-crime will give the deterrent effect a personal dimension
for the leader(s) of any regime that might consider CBW use in
the future.
(v) some countries might in future seek to
sponsor nuclear terrorism from their soil
39. As Tony Blair said, "I do not think
that anyone pretends that the independent nuclear deterrent is
a defence against terrorism."[103]
He is right, and it is misleading for the White Paper to try to
draw a link by asserting "retention of an effective nuclear
deterrent by the UK has a role to play in reducing the potential
threat from state-sponsored nuclear-armed terrorists". [p
20] This evoking of nuclear terrorism as a threat to justify Britain
holding on to nuclear weapons has the same flaws as the previous
assertion about CBW. Nuclear pre-emption or retaliation would
inevitably kill thousands of innocent non-combatants and violate
the legal requirement of proportionality.
40. The nuclear threat in these cases would
be far less likely to deter than existing collective political,
diplomatic and economic tools, and any nuclear use could profoundly
compromise Britain's security and international standing in the
longer term.
41. The taboo on using or assisting others
to use nuclear weapons is even stronger than the taboos on CBW
use. Moreover, UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) has
placed an obligation on all governments to enact domestic legislation
to comply with the treaties and do everything in their power to
prevent non-state actors from acquiring the materials and technologies
that might lead to biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. While
this does not guarantee against a CBW or nuclear terrorist attack,
it will give serious pause to any government, manufacturer or
political group that might be tempted to assist or turn a blind
eye to terrorists seeking to acquire any kind of weapon of mass
destruction.
42. Finally, there is a post 9/11 twist
that fatally undermines the concept of nuclear deterrence with
regard to extremists driven by religious or political ideologies.
Not only would such aggressors not be deterred by nuclear or other
WMD held by their target countries or anyone else; on the contrary,
their game plan could include provoking a nuclear or similarly
disproportionate retaliation in order to turn moral outrage against
the retaliator and recruit more people to their causes.
43. As Professor Malcolm Chalmers noted,
"Far from being deterred by nuclear weapons, terrorists would
be delighted to provoke a Trident retaliation, fully aware of
the global opprobrium that this would bring on Britain. Even a
nuclear attack on the UK by an identifiable "rogue"
state could not justify a British nuclear response in which the
main victims would be thousands of innocent civilians. Regime
change using conventional forces would be a more appropriate,
and moral, response."[104]
"We can only deter such threats in future
through the continued possession of nuclear weapons." [p
7]
44. On the contrary: as analysed above,
Britain's nuclear weapons cannot provide us with security or convincing
deterrence, but they may increase our insecurity by making us
a more attractive and vulnerable target than countries without
nuclear weapons.
45. In the absence of any evidence, arguments
or attempt to make a case for nuclear deterrence having had efficacy
in the past or how it would work with regard to potential future
threats, one of the ploys utilised assiduously in the White Paper
is to refer only to the "nuclear deterrent", sometimes
qualified by "independent" or abbreviated to "the
deterrent". This is an advertising technique, as when a drink
is labelled "naturally good" to distract consumers from
the fact that it is packed with sugar and chemical colour and
flavour enhancers. Such labels are not only dishonest; they function
to influence decision-making. It is psychologically harder for
MPs to vote against having a "deterrent", however tenuous,
than if the words "nuclear weapons" were straightforwardly
used in the government's discussions.
46. The White Paper's case for gaining public
acceptance (and MPs' votes) for renewing Trident rests entirely
on its unproven (and generally unprovable) assumptions and statements
about deterrence. People may consent to nuclear weapons that are
there in order not to be used, as government spokespeople used
to proclaim, while magically preventing anyone else from using
nuclear weapons against us. The idea of renewing Trident becomes
far less attractive when put in terms of nuclear weapons that
a political leader in the future might decide to launch against
another country, where they could kill hundreds of thousands of
people.
47. Though the White Paper goes further
than most such documents in explaining why it prefers Trident's
particular capabilities in terms of range, readiness and the diversity
of targets it can hit simultaneously, it does not, for obvious
reasons, discuss targeting doctrine and strategy. Information
on this is classified in Britain, but available in an unclassified
version from the United States, with which UK doctrine and targeting
are harmonised.[105]
UK officials insist there are some critical differences between
British and American doctrines and targeting policies, but have
failed to provide information on what these differences are and
why.
48. Therefore, before jumping to the conclusion
that nuclear deterrence is a good or sensible thing, it is worth
looking at the kind of targets that are being explicitly considered
as part of US deterrence doctrine. While it is true that UK Trident
missiles are not currently targeted at anyone in particular, a
host of military and civilian targets anywhere in the world can
be programmed in as quickly as it takes to key the coordinates
into a computer.
49. Though the UK reduced the "notice
to fire" from hours to days in 1998, the UK's current "deterrent
posture" requires that whenever the submarines go on patrol
they are equipped with armed warheads attached to navigationally
primed missiles able to be launched at a moment's notice once
they receive the order which, according to the White Paper, can
only come from the Prime Minister. (If the Prime Minister has
been incapacitated, what then? While accepting this is the political
requirement, are we expected to believe that the commanders on
board the submarines do not possess the physical capability to
launch the nuclear weapons on board in extremis?)
"Conventional capabilities cannot have the
same deterrent effect" [p 7]
50. Again, this is an assertion without
a shred of evidence or analysis. The vast majority of the world's
nations, many of which are in far more volatile or vulnerable
regions than Britain, have concluded the opposite. This assertion
completely contradicts the premise on which the nonproliferation
regime is based. It severely undermines international efforts
to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries such
as North Korea and Iran, and if taken seriously, could provide
justifications for nuclear proliferation by many more governments.
For the government to make such an assertion is deeply irresponsible,
and flies in the face of history and Britain's broader security
and nonproliferation objectives.
51. The issue is not whether deterrence
is a useful concept for defence, but whether nuclear weapons are
an essentialor even usefulcomponent of actual deterrence.
To the extent that deterrence works, it is the product of the
interplay of multiple instruments, any one of which might fail.
As well as hard and soft power, psychological, cultural and communications
factors play important but not necessarily predictable roles in
deterrence. It is inappropriateand counterproductiveto
rest the weight of deterrence on a single weapon system: if that
were justifiable, all governments would feel duty-bound to provide
such protection to their populace.
52. Finally, the possibility that deterrence
may fail is inherent. Adherence to a policy of nuclear deterrence
in a proliferating world increases the risks of its failure, and
may then cause nuclear weapons to be used, which would likely
prove worse than the original threat.
Renewing [Trident] is fully consistent with all
our international obligations. [p 7]
53. On the contrary, renowned international
lawyers have concluded that:
The use of the Trident system would
breach international law, in particular because it would infringe
the "intransgressible" requirement that a distinction
must be drawn between combatants and non-combatants;
The replacement of Trident would
constitute a breach of Article VI of the NPT; and
Such a breach would, in legal terms,
be a "material breach" of the NPT.[106]
54. To justify its claim to legality, the
White Paper in Section 2 argues that the NPT "recognises
the UK's status" and that Britain has substantially reduced
its arsenal and is much smaller than the major nuclear powers.
In the hope of being perceived as complying with its nuclear disarmament
obligations under Article VI, the government goes a step further,
and offers to reduce the "stockpile of operationally available
warheads" by 20%, resulting in "almost a 50% reduction
compared to the plans of the previous government".
55. Previous governments' levels of overkill
are not disputed, particularly when the Conservatives brought
Trident into service in 1994, several years after it had been
rendered militarily obsolete by the end of the cold war. However,
other governments' failures to take their treaty obligations seriously
cannot constitute a justification for the present government to
make the same mistakes. The treaty obligations were made more
urgent and explicit in two consecutive meetings of NPT parties,
in 1995 and 2000. If a decision is wrong for Britain's security
and the nonproliferation regime, it isn't improved by making it
only 80% as bad as the previous lot.
56. As part of efforts to strengthen the
NPT, the obligations with regard to safeguards and disarmament
were clarified and further elaborated in 1995 and 2000, by consensus
agreement of all NPT states parties. In relation to this, the
P-5 nuclear-weapon states made an "unequivocal undertaking...
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals",
and committed themselves to a programme of "practical steps
for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article
VI".[107]
57. The withdrawal and ultimate decommissioning
during the 1990s of obsolete weapons such as nuclear artillery
and nuclear depth and free-fall bombs was, of course, welcome,
but the Article VI obligation is not just to reduce the nuclear
arsenals, but to eliminate them.[108]
58. By no legally admissible reasoning would
it be consistent with these obligations for Britain to procure
new submarines to carry continuously refurbished US ballistic
missiles with up to 160 refurbished or possibly new warheads,
with the intention of having this renewed nuclear weapon system
come into service in 15-20 years time and run for up to 30 years
after that.
59. The White Paper is not promising to
reduce its existing Trident system, which would be welcomed as
a step towards giving it up altogether. However it is dressed
up, the White Paper's actual proposal is to maintain at least
80% of Britain's nuclear weapons for a further 30 plus years,
representing an overall increase in capability and longevity.
60. This is not disarmament, but "nuclear
re-armament", as noted by Kofi Annan. In pursuing the renewal
or modernisation of existing arsenals, the outgoing UN Secretary-General
warned that the nuclear weapon states "should not imagine
that this will be accepted as compatible with the NPT".
VIOLATING THE
NPT
61. While the various steps that the UK
has taken towards reducing its arsenal since 1991 and ceasing
nuclear testing and fissile material production are welcome, these
should not obscure the fact that Britain will be violating the
NPT and several other international legal obligations if it acquires
and deploys a further generation of nuclear weapons, even if there
are "only" three submarines and 160 warheads and they
are designed to look almost exactly the same as the current Trident
system.
62. The White Paper makes misleading reference
to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), saying that it "rejected the argument that [the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons] would necessarily be unlawful".
In fact, three of the 14 eminent Judges hearing the case took
the view that any and all uses of nuclear weapons would be unlawful,
even if the very survival of the state was at stake, while seven
felt unable to make that determinationas the law then stoodand
the remaining four considered that the use of nuclear weapons
to ensure the survival of the state would be permissible under
international law. Though the White Paper provides only a thin
overview of doctrine and targeting policy, it is hard to see how
any envisaged use would pass this high legal threshold.
THE WHITE
PAPER PROPOSES
TRIDENT LITE
63. Trident Lite is that classic mistake
of weak governmentsan apparent compromise that resolves
nothing. There is no convincing military or political case to
justify retaining the current, cold-war-designed Trident nuclear
system at a cost of over £1 billion per year, and the government
has failed to make its case for buying and deploying the same
system all over again, albeit with three submarines and fewer
warheads.
64. Calculations based on the frequency
and size of the nuclear warhead convoys between Aldermaston and
Coulport suggest that Britain may not have manufactured more than
160-170 warheads for the current Trident system. The White Paper's
offer of a reduced stockpile may therefore be little more than
a political bid to make a virtue out of necessity. With 160 warheads,
Britain's nuclear arsenal would carry an aggregate explosive power
of some 16 megatonnes.
65. Since the cost savings of Trident-lite
over Trident are not very big, the government appears to be politically
banking on their slightly scaled down version being more acceptable
to domestic and international opinion than commissioning the full-blown
Trident or, worse still, a more flexible, provocative or vulnerable
air-, land- or sea (surface)-based system.
66. The Foreign Office has embarked on a
"charm offensive" to explain the government's decision,
with great emphasis being placed on presenting the 20% reduction
as a significant step towards fulfilment of Britain's article
VI obligations.
67. Trident lite will extend dependency
on the United States. Britain relies on US ballistic missiles,
which are manufactured by US arms giant Lockheed Martin, which
also owns 30% of the consortium that manages AWE Aldermaston.
UK warheads are manufactured using extensive research and design
cooperation from the United States and even some US-made components
and materials.
68. The current Vanguard submarines and
any envisaged follow-on will exacerbate tensions with Scotland,
where they are deployed at the Clyde Submarine base at Faslane.
A significant majority of Scottish public opinion, including several
political parties and the major churches, are opposed to nuclear
weapons, and resent having the UK nuclear forces foisted on them.
69. Scotland's concerns have been more prominently
voiced since the partial devolution of some responsibilities to
the Holyrood parliament. While defence and foreign policy decisions
remain with Westminster, Holyrood has responsibilities for environmental
safety and policing. In regard to this, questions have been raised
in the Scottish Parliament about the transporting of nuclear warheads
on the roads between Aldermaston and Faslane, and the costs and
problems of policing the nuclear base. A focus for local and international
protests for more than 25 years, disruptions of the Faslane base
and its access roads has intensified in recent months. Among the
thousands who have protested against Trident and its renewal in
recent months, over 450 have been arrested, including seven members
of the European and Scottish parliaments, eminent clerics, authors
and professors, and a former Assistant Secretary-General of the
United Nations. The costs of policing now exceed £1.75 million
per month, and are predicted to rise. In view of the costs and
risks to Scottish taxpayers, the Scottish National Party (SNP)
has proposed charging the UK government £1 million per nuclear
warhead that is transported on Scottish roads to Coulport and
Faslane.[109]
CONCLUSION
70. The Trident decision embodies both an
opportunity and a responsibility to examine Britain's security
needs and debate our role in the world for the 21st century. It
should not be rushed.
71. The White Paper has failed to grasp
the fundamental changes affecting UK security in the 21st century.
It proposes business as usual (only 20 % less), when Britain needs
to play a more visionary, coherent and pro-active role to prevent
threats that nuclear weapons will not prove capable of deterring.
72. Parliament should not vote on the issue
until there has been a much fuller consultation, involving experts
and civil society.
73. Though the Acronym Institute shares
some of the government's concerns about proliferation, the White
Paper places the wrong emphasis on the various elements of the
threats facing Britain, and specifically in relation to nuclear
risks. Much more should be done to support the multilateral treaties
and instruments that play a critical role in our national security
and as a major component of international deterrence against the
use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing
the development of further nuclear weapons is an integral part
of a successful non-proliferation policy.
74. Britain must not fudge this historic
chance to provide leadership and promote more effective strategies
to devalue nuclear weapons and enhance the non-proliferation regime's
credibility and reduce nuclear threats worldwide.
30 January 2007
uclear Doctrine in Rebecca Johnson, Nicola Butler
and Stephen Pullinger, Worse than Irrelevant? British Nuclear
Weapons in the 21st Century, Acronym Institute, London, October
2006.
93 The page numbers in brackets and all quotes used
as sub-heads in the detailed critique are taken from the government
White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
issued by the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Cm 6994, published 4 December 2006. Back
94
The White Paper dismisses suggestions from naval experts and
other analysts that continuous at-sea patrols are not necessary.
In holding open the possibility of building only three new submarines,
the MoD's premise is that enhancements in submarine (and reactor)
design would make it possible to have at least one submarine on
patrol, even with only three submarines. Back
95
Some of the arguments below are drawn from the detailed discussion
of the Trident decision published by the Acronym Institute before
the White Paper was issued. See Rebecca Johnson, Nicola Butler
and Stephen Pullinger, Worse than Irrelevant? British Nuclear
Weapons in the 21st Century, London, October 2006. Back
96
See Richard L Garwin, Philip E Coyle, Theodore A Postol and Frank
von Hippel, Comment on the Fuure of the United Kingdom's Nuclear
Deterrent, 23 January 2007. Back
97
All quotes used as sub-heads are taken from the government White
Paper, titled The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
issued by the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Cm 6994, published 4 December 2006. Back
98
General Lee Butler, for example, described nuclear deterrence
as "a rhetorical sleight of hand, deceptively packaged and
oversold". Speech to the National Press Club, Washington
DC, 5 December 1996. Back
99
Email communication with the author, 26 January 2007. Back
100
Ibid. See also, Joseph Cirincione, The Declining Ballistic
Missile Threat, 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington DC, February 2005. In this, Cirincione states:
"At present, neither the United States nor Europe faces a
serious threat from nuclear-armedballistic missiles. Russia still
fields some 3,550 warheads on over 900 intercontinental andsubmarine-launched
ballistic missiles, but absent an accidental or unauthorised launch
it isvery unlikely that these missiles would be used against another
nation. Russia's forces will likely shrink dramatically over the
next 10 years to under 1,000 warheads on a few hundredmissiles.
China fields only 20 warheads on 20 intercontinental ballistic
missiles, though it istrying to replace its aging force with a
new generation of missiles it hopes to field by the endof the
decade. No other potentially hostile nation has a long-range missile
that can reach Europe or the United States from its territory." Back
101
Thomas Graham and Dinshaw Mistry, "Two Treaties to Contain
Missile Proliferation" Disarmament Diplomacy 82 (Spring
2006). Back
102
Michael Clarke, "Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's
nuclear choices after Trident", International Affairs,
Volume 80, Issue 1, January 2004. Back
103
Tony Blair, House of Commons, Hansard, 19 October 2005,
column 841. Back
104
Malcolm Chalmers, "Long Live Trident?" Physics
World, August 2005. Back
105
See Appendix I on N Back
106
For a fuller discussion, including references to the analyses
of Charles Moxley, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin,
see Rebecca Johnson, Nicola Butler and Stephen Pullinger, Worse
than Irrelevant? British Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,
Acronym Institute, London, October 2006. See also Philippe Sands
QC and Helen Law, The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent: Current
and Future Issues of Legality, London, Matrix Chambers and
Greenpeace, November 2006. Back
107
Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
(Section on Article VI and preambular paras 8-12, Paragraph 15,
sub-paragraph 6), NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol 1, Part I and II), 25
May 2000. Back
108
See ??? Back
109
Paul Hutcheon, "SNP plan £1 million toll for Trident",
Sunday Herald, 21 January 2007, pp 1-3. Back
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