Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)
PROFESSOR RICHARD
L GARWIN, MR
PAUL INGRAM,
DR STEPHEN
PULLINGER, DR
JEREMY STOCKER
AND DR
LEE WILLETT
23 JANUARY 2007
Q160 Mr Jenkin: Are you talking military
or political?
Mr Ingram: Political. Thirdly,
it could demonstrate a certain amount of caution on the part of
many in the Ministry of Defence to ensure that, at all costs,
we have a boat out at sea at any one time, at all costs, and I
would say that this is a belt-and-braces approach illustrated
within the White Paper, I might add, by the statement, which I
believe is quite courageous, that we absolutely require four submarines
in order to have one submarine out at any one time when in actual
fact the average patrol length of a submarine is over three months.
What that is saying essentially is that it takes at least three
months to resupply a submarine once it has come back to port which,
as I say, I think is a complete belt-and-braces approach. Finally,
I think it is institutional momentum which I highlighted at the
beginning.
Q161 Mr Jenkin: We move on to the
role of deterrence. The White Paper states that "the fundamental
principles relevant to nuclear deterrence have not changed since
the end of the Cold War, and are unlikely to change in future",
yet arguments to support that thesis are singularly lacking from
the White Paper. Is that not rather a shortcoming and would the
panel like to comment on whether that is a valid statement?
Professor Garwin: I think there
is very little logic in carrying the so-called deterrent force
from the Cold War era into the present. One has to ask: will there
be a definable enemy with missile defences, for instance? That
would require a lot of nuclear weapons to keep them from what?
Well, we do not know and the Prime Minister says it is not knowable,
but, as has been indicated, there are many requirements here which
are all compounded. One assumes that the Americans and the British
will have a falling-out so that the UK has to operate at least
one boat at sea all the time because the Americans will never
provide the nuclear support. That is very unlikely. It may be
that there will be a falling-out and, under those circumstances,
then, in order to provide for its own deterrent, the UK will have
to operate one boat at sea at all times, but I should say, as
for buying in US submarines or Russian submarines, I proposed
very seriously when I received the Enrico Fermi Award in 1996
that the US buy tritium from Russia. That was absolutely necessary
for our nuclear weapons, but it has a lifetime of 12 years, so
you buy it long enough in advance that the stockpile is always
topped up and you have then five or eight years to start your
own production in case the Russians do not come through with the
sales in advance. The same thing is true here, except that the
lifetime of a submarine is at least 30 and may be 45 years, so
you have a time to start your own production if your supply source
raises the price or does not propose to sell you any more.
Q162 Mr Jenkin: Sorry, but I want
to talk about the role of deterrence.
Dr Pullinger: I think it is a
very good question because the public perception of deterrence
and our general assumption about nuclear deterrence has always
been in the context of the Cold War where we had nuclear weapons
in order to deter the Soviet Union, an ideological and potentially
hostile power, from attacking us. In that sense, the deterrence
scenario is essentially defensive, it is responsive and I would
say that it has the greatest capacity for credibility in that
sense because, if the survival of the United Kingdom is at stake,
then deterrence is increasing its credibility, but that scenario
does not exist any more, so we are trying to apply the deterrence
theory to the new sorts of scenarios we are likely to be facing
in the future. It is not for the Government to speculate about
this because I am sure they do all this thinking in Whitehall
of particular scenarios which they cannot publish in a White Paper,
so I suppose it is the duty of academics and think-tanks to try
and think through some of those issues in public.
Q163 Mr Jenkin: Do you honestly believe
that North Korea or China or Russia would behave in the same way
as they do now if the United States and the United Kingdom and
France no longer possessed nuclear weapons? Are you seriously
saying that it has no effect on their behaviour at all?
Dr Pullinger: No, I was not saying
that, no. I certainly would not want it to be a situation in which
North Korea and Iran had nuclear weapons and we did not or the
United States.
Q164 Mr Jenkin: Well, then the doctrine
of deterrence still applies, does it not?
Dr Pullinger: What are we deterring
them from doing? That is the question. We can contain North Korea
and deterrence will play a role in that and we can deter Tehran
from taking certain actions in the Middle East, but what I am
saying we should try and investigate is a scenario such as that
of the Iraq situation. When we were going into Iraq to challenge
their weapons of mass destruction programme, if they had actually
been armed with nuclear weapons, to what extent would we have
been self-deterred from taking serious action against them?
Q165 Mr Jenkin: Well, we did not
rule out a first strike on the Soviet Union when we considered
the Soviet Union a threat and they had nuclear weapons.
Dr Pullinger: But we never directly
confronted the Soviet Union because—
Q166 Mr Jenkin: Thank God!
Dr Pullinger:— we knew the
ramifications of what might happen.
Q167 Mr Jenkin: Yes, so the doctrine
of deterrence is, therefore, quite useful in preventing large-scale
wars.
Dr Pullinger: In terms of Iran,
which is the one I am trying to think about, yes, but I am saying
that it is going to be a strategy of containment rather than we
are going to be prevented from taking physical action for disarming
Iran once it has nuclear weapons which can deter us. That is the
point.
Q168 Chairman: You said in your opening
comments that there was a gap in the White Paper in relation to
the theory of deterrence. What did you mean?
Dr Willett: Well, I endorse to
an extent what Dr Pullinger says in that, as we have been seeing
just now, something like the issue of the deterrence theory is
a very open-ended question subject to much interpretation and,
arguably, it is effectively an academic exercise and it can be
very murky in its background and its conclusions.
Q169 Chairman: Is that different
from the past?
Dr Willett: It has always been
the case and, if you look at the White Paper compared to the SDR,
for example, there is a far greater discussion of deterrence and
its principles than there was in 1998, but it is very difficult
for the Government, I think, to delve into it in the White Paper
for two reasons. First of all, it may convey any thinking to a
potential adversary and, secondly, as I say, it is an academic
exercise generally, so the Government may leave its thinking open
to intellectual criticism and perhaps a White Paper, being a policy
paper, is not the right forum to raise such murky and ill-defined
questions. I think on the key point about whether the deterrence
does, or does not, work, there are two points worth bearing in
mind here. First of all, since the end of the Second World War,
we have had the existence of nuclear weapons, but no major state-on-state
wars. Yes, there have been major and minor wars by proxy, but
there have been no major state-on-state wars. One of the questions
to ask here is: does the existence of nuclear weapons mean that
we are effectively living with nuclear weapons, but with no major
state-on-state war, or, if we get rid of them, are we looking
at an increased risk of major state-on-state war? The second point
to make is that of course what is new, however, is that we have
to have a better understanding of how deterrence works in these
new scenarios with new actors in mind and with new future actors
in mind. I would disagree that there is no direct threat to the
UK at the moment, and the whole point of that is that we just
cannot see what threats there will be in 50 years' time. The Third
Reich, for example, rose and fell in just 30 years.
Mr Ingram: Firstly, I disagree.
I think the White Paper did put its big toe into the idea of the
potential for deterrence and I think that is one of its problems.
For example, it raises the possibility of using nuclear weapons
to deter state-sponsored terrorism and the very major weakness
of that possibility is actually thinking through the genuine scenarios.
Let us say, a state supplies a terrorist with nuclear weapons,
those terrorists then independently go off and blow up a nuclear
weapon in London, Aldermaston comes in, looks at the traces and
finds out that this material originated from Tehran or wherever.
Are we seriously talking about several weeks, perhaps even months,
after this explosion dropping a nuclear weapon on Tehran? It does
not bear credibility and this is one of the major weaknesses of
trying to extend deterrence into the terrorist situation. Secondly,
we all agree, I believe, that we do not actually face today, tomorrow
is another issue, but today we do not face that threat, so why
do we today have a submarine out at any one time?
Q170 Mr Jenkin: Can I challenge you
on that very point? The reason we do not face that threat today
is precisely because we have a submarine on patrol every day.
If you took that submarine away and took away the deterrent, then
the global politics would change and we would be facing those
threats again. Okay, the Americans are in this as well, but that
is why the world is like it is.
Mr Ingram: We could have a debate
about that, but what I would focus on particularly is about the
submarine being out. If we were to maintain the submarine deterrent,
but not have a continuous sub-sea deterrence, which was an option
raised by the Committee back in June in its report—
Mr Jenkin: Are you seriously suggesting—
Chairman: Just let Mr Ingram answer the
question.
Q171 Mr Hamilton: Chairman, the Committee
is not here for a debate.
Mr Ingram: Exactly, which is why
I am trying to avoid the bigger debate. The focus particularly
on the continuous at-sea deterrence, if we were to withdraw the
boat, I believe, and you can believe differently, I believe that
this would have no impact on Britain's security today. It may
do in the future, but today it would mean that we could extend
the life of the existing system dramatically. Thirdly, in terms
of deterrence into the future, this whole idea of the insurance,
I think we have to treat our responsibilities as one of the five
formally recognised nuclear weapon states in the NPT more seriously.
If we go back to our commitments in the year 2000 at the NPT review
conference, we see very, very significant and major progress in
the agreement of 13 steps.
Chairman: Mr Ingram, we will be coming
on to the NPT in a few minutes' time. We are trying at the moment
to explore the role of deterrence.
Q172 Mr Jenkin: Is there a case,
as you suggest, for a comprehensive review of deterrence?
Dr Stocker: I think there is.
To answer your original question about whether there is a gap
in the White Paper in terms of it saying that the deterrence had
changed or the fundamentals had changed, I think there is a gap
there because deterrence and particularly its nuclear dimension
is as relevant as it was in the Cold War, but the nature of that
deterrence has changed fundamentally. It has changed fundamentally
for the UK probably more than anybody else, with the possible
exception of France. The context within which we might have to
conduct deterrence in the future, other than in the scenario of
a resurgence of a hostile Russia, has changed completely and all
of the kind of assumptions and policies that we worked out during
the Cold War and learned quite painfully and over a protracted
period of time, most of those assumptions no longer apply. Deterrence
is as salient as it ever was, but it is a very, very different
kind of deterrence. I would focus in on one in particular from
the UK's point of view, which was that, during the Cold War, we
had to deter a much larger, much more powerful and overtly hostile
power with relatively slender resources and that meant that we
had to threaten to maximise the damage to Soviet society with
the resources available. In today's so-called "second nuclear
age" where national survival is probably not at stake, threatening
to devastate another society in total or in large part is neither
appropriate nor credible, so actually deterrence credibility may
now be based on our ability to threaten the least amount of damage
to another society, but in a scenario in which nuclear weapons
are relevant because somebody else is threatening to use nuclear
weapons or other WMD.
Q173 Mr Jenkin: And it would be okay
to have this review in public?
Dr Stocker: I think elements of
it, yes. Clearly the MoD is not going to talk about how many missiles
or what kilotonnage are aimed at which city and would be used
under which scenario, but the White Paper says very little about
deterrence. The little bits that it does say, like the independent
centre of decision-making which is the Cold War second centre
of decision-making reinvented, the studied ambiguity which it
makes passing reference to is also a hangover from the Cold War.
The White Paper really says very little about deterrence and in
order to argue the Government's case and in order to present the
policy that would make deterrence more credible to the people
we want to deter, I think the Government probably does need to
do considerably more in spelling out a deterrence policy as well
as a policy for the deterrent, which is actually what the White
Paper is all about.
Q174 Chairman: Dr Stocker, when the
White Paper says, "We deliberately maintain ambiguity about
precisely when, how and on what scale we would contemplate use
of our nuclear deterrent", you would say that was wrong,
would you?
Dr Stocker: As far as it goes,
I think that statement is perhaps not right or wrong, it is inevitable.
Given the uncertain nature of deterrent requirements, there is
a certain inevitability to that. I read that as referring to who
we might deter under what circumstances and what we might do to
them. That is not the same as discussing deterrence policies and
mechanisms and how deterrence might work in the new environment.
You do not then have to say, "That means we will drop X number
of kilotonnnes on city Y under circumstances Z".
Dr Willett: To clarify that, again
one theory probably does not fit all because in the Cold War days
when there was one obvious adversary working out the calculations
were easier than working out how a more diverse set of adversaries
that we face now, how they may figure that the deterrence works.
In any new discussion of the deterrence theory, one model will
not fit all. We will need an understanding of how individual states
and individual actors work. There are those that argue that nobody
is not deterrable in some way, shape or form, but understanding
how that works on an individual case-by-case basis is very important.
The interesting point you make about the ambiguity issue, of course,
is in the Cold War our strategy was based on the certainty that
we would respond but now the premise is that because of the numerous
and more diverse potential threats, the ambiguity that we might
respond is what underpins the deterrence concept. One of the key
things that the White Paper raises, and will be important in discussing
the deterrents theories, is the whole issue of strategic and sub-strategic
deterrence and how that works. Sub-strategic was a post-Cold War
reaction to changing circumstances in the late 1990s and there
has not been a mention of it in great detail in the White Paper
and how that still applies, if at all, whether it is part of our
NATO commitment or in other circumstances, for example against
WMD threats, will be something that needs to be gone into. There
are some questions still and that is a good thing, but it merits
discussion in other forums.
Q175 Chairman: There are lots of
questions so, Dr Pullinger, very briefly.
Dr Pullinger: I was going to talk
about the sub-strategic element of the deterrent which is missing
from the White Paper but there has subsequently been a Parliamentary
answer in response to the question about why the sub-strategic
elements of the deterrent are missing and the explanation now
is that any use of British nuclear weapons would almost be by
definition strategic and I, to be honest, agree with that revision
because I think the sub-strategic elements in terms of the signalling
to an adversary that you are on the point of going strategic does
make a lot of sense in the sorts of scenarios that we are in.
Mr Jenkin: That is why you cannot keep
a submarine in port.
Q176 Robert Key: Could we turn to
the question of the deterrent as an insurance policy and could
I invite Dr Willett to answer my first question. In the Prime
Minister's foreword to the White Paper, he says: "We believe
that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential
part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the
future". Do you agree?
Dr Willett: Absolutely. The insurance
policy sound bite, if you like, has been much used and there are
those who argue that the whole point of an insurance policy is
that you do not cash it in and it is something that helps you
after the event, and worrying about what happens after the event
is not really what this debate is all about. Certainly I think
it is very important that we have this insurance policy in our
back pocket when we are talking about the Trident debate because
what it does provide is a hedge against a wider variety of threats
and perhaps "insurance" is the wrong word but it provides
the ability to protect ourselves against, first, nuclear blackmail,
secondly, against direct nuclear threats and, thirdly, as I said,
as something in our back pocket for this uncertain future. The
Government does have a dual-track policy on this deterrent issue
of maintaining minimum deterrence whilst also pursuing a multi-lateral
approach to arms control and arguably having that insurance policy
with a deterrent in your back pocket gives you the credibility
to be able to pursue both tracks of that policy.
Q177 Robert Key: Could I ask Dr Pullinger,
do you accept that the public finds the insurance policy argument
a persuasive one?
Dr Pullinger: Yes, I think they
do. I have never argued that we should abandon our nuclear weapons
while other people's potential threat to us have done, but I think
it is only part of the argument of this insurance policy because
I think that we do have to prepare to meet the eventuality that
we are confronted by another threatening nuclear weapon state,
but I do not think that is the primordial nuclear threat that
we are going to be facing in the future. I think we are potentially
heading towards a world of 12, 15 or 20 nuclear weapon states
and that is not just me saying that, the Wall Street Journal
in the first week of January, Henry Kissinger, amongst others,
said: "We are on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear
era". I think we should be investing much more political
energy in ensuring that we do not fall over the edge. I think
our non-proliferation priorities should be much higher. I am not
saying abandoning deterrents by any means, but arguably it is
no longer the most important part of that. In a world of 15 or
20 nuclear weapon states, you are going to have them deployed
in many volatile regions of the world, lots of people, lots of
scientists working on the technology, the skills of how to make
nuclear weapons that will be producing vast quantities of new
weapons grade material which will have to be controlled. In that
situation you are not going to be able to create lots of stable
deterrence relationships around the world. Although Britain will
be in a fairly benign situation one hopes with nuclear weapons,
we will still be affected by the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
whether or not we are a target of those nuclear weapons and, of
course, all the time we will have these non-state actors, terrorist
groups on the fringes trying to get hold on the black market of
all this vast quantity of weapons grade material that is being
used. The repercussions for us will be very damaging in terms
of our long-term security, so it is a re-ordering of those nuclear
priorities that I would like to emphasise.
Dr Willett: I think part of the
question that we have not answered yet and the White Paper does
not answer, and this relates to the insurance policy, is what
position the UK sees itself playing in the world. People argue
that there are many other nations and they reel off dozens and
dozens that do not see themselves as requiring a deterrent and
that is because they do not have, or think they have, the kind
of profile that we have and try and play the kind of role that
we think we try to play. If we are happy to be lower ranking,
assuming that we see ourselves as a global power, if we were happy
to step away from that as a Government, as a country and as people
and have a lower rank in the world then, yes, we would not need
60,000 tonne aircraft carriers, we would not need the major Armed
Forces that we have, we would not need nuclear powered submarines
and nuclear deterrence. At the moment we have a policy decision,
and if you like, a decision within the country as a whole to try
and be that player. There is an insurance premium that goes with
that and we have to ask the key questions here about insurance
premiums, there is a value that having deterrence and securities
that it offers, there is a price to that and are we prepared to
pay that price and how much value does it deliver to the UK as
a whole?
Q178 Robert Key: Do you think that
the British public understands that we are not the fifth or fourth
biggest economic power in the world by accident, it is precisely
because of the projection of power in the 19th and 20th centuries
that has put us there and because we are predominantly a trading
nation facing globalisation, if we wish to maintain that we need
to be able to defend our interest in free trade, shipping and
air power.
Dr Willett: We have a global,
if you like, economic foreign defence and security policy and
a deterrent is one of the pillars that underpins that. One can
argue that in the post-Second World War phase when we were having
the financial problems that we had at the end of the war, the
problems with the empire, our arrival as a nuclear power was one
of the things that kept us having that high global profile at
a time when other elements of that power were falling away. Today,
arguably, when we have conventional Armed Forces that are reducing
in size, quality and affordability challenges for the defence
budget, perhaps a deterrent is one of the things that still continues
to give us that global profile.
Q179 Robert Key: In the BASIC submission
to the Committee you say on page eight: "Delay would allow
an informed and proper and public parliamentary debate to take
place. Discussion over this decision has until now been stifled
by an information blackout within Whitehall". What do you
mean by that?
Mr Ingram: I mean that until the
White Paper was published on 4 December, any questions that were
directed at the Ministry of Defence essentially were, "Wait
until the White Paper, the information will be there". Clearly
the information is not in the White Paper. We have got many questions
here today based largely on speculation and the answers that we
have been given have been based largely on speculation because
the information that is required to make a truly informed decision
is not there in the public. What I mean is that if we were to
defer the decision, if the Ministry of Defence were to engage
with some real information, information that would not prejudice
the national security of this country but would give us a proper
debate in this area, then I think we would be in a much better
position to analyse exactly the sorts of issues such as the insurance
policy and the technical ability to delay this decision much more
effectively.
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