Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380-399)
RT HON
DES BROWNE,
MR DESMOND
BOWEN, MR
TOM MCKANE,
REAR ADMIRAL
ANDREW MATHEWS
RN, MR NICK
BENNETT AND
MS MARIOT
LESLIE
6 FEBRUARY 2007
Q380 Willie Rennie: I am obviously
not an expert in these areas but is there not a possibility of
doing a kind of random approach to deterrence at sea where you
can vary the length of time that we are at sea and not always
have a continuous deterrence? Is that not a possible option?
Des Browne: I am no expert either
but can I just say to Mr Rennie that I came to this job as the
Secretary of State for Defence with a degree of scepticism about
continuous-at-sea deterrence. I asked all of those questions in
my early days in the department, and some of the people here will
remember me asking them, just simple questions like, "Why
do we need to keep a boat at sea all of the time? Why do we need
to do this when we are saying that at the moment there is no capability
and intent that amounts to a threat?" I have to say that
as I have come to understand the nature of what we are doing and
what we are asking people to do, and, importantly, the effect
that deploying a submarine into an environment of conflict or
potential conflict might have on that, the aspect of this that
most persuaded me was the need to be able to maintain these boats
at an operational level, which was a very high and demanding thing
to do, and our ability to be able to step that up. I have come
to the view that it is a key strand of maintaining a credible
deterrent in this form. I do not know whether the Rear Admiral
wants to add to this but he is among those who have persuaded
me of this and I seek to share with you the way in which I was
persuaded.
Rear Admiral Mathews: I have little
to add to what the Secretary of State has said apart from the
fact that it drives a real ethos into the programme and I do not
think you can put a value on that. You have to be part of it to
understand it. The maintenance of continuous-at-sea deterrence
and the demands it places on the system and the tests it places
it on the system are of real value. It drives operational preparedness,
it drives crew training, it drives the whole way the team operate.
I do not know how you value such a thing as ethos but I think
it is absolutely pivotal to the way we have run this programme
and would wish to continue to run it.
Q381 Willie Rennie: I have to concur
with the comments abut the submariners. I had the benefit of going
up to Faslane and the professionalism was quite impressive, and
how they can live in those tight conditions for such long periods
of time is beyond me, I have to say. The Prime Minister said that
you might go down to three boats in the future, and we might get
that decision at a later stage, and still have the continuous-at-sea
deterrence. What cost savings would be involved in going down
to three boats and roughly what time will you make that decision
in?
Des Browne: That is an ambition
and it is an ambition we have put in the White Paper as a challenge
to those who will be doing the concept and assessment phase of
this process, but we are not certain that we can maintain continuous
deterrent patrols in the future with three submarines. I have
to say, and the White Paper says this, that from the evidence
of Resolution and Vanguard four hulls were required to sustain
continuous patrolling but, as the White Paper says, once we are
clear about the design, about the operational procedures, the
maintenance regimes for the new submarines, we will reach a conclusion
about whether we need three or four hulls to sustain continuous
patrols. Apart from all the issues that we have already discussed,
continuous-at-sea deterrence is important in terms of the invulnerability
of our system and I think people accept that now. If all the boats
were in port at any one time our deterrent would be vulnerable.
It could be attacked in port, as it were, but keeping one boat
out there all the time means we can take advantage of the opaqueness
of the sea, which we have considered. We certainly will not take
risks. At the end of the day this will be a very hard-nosed decision.
Q382 Mr Borrow: Secretary of State,
you have dealt with the issue of the UK moving from continuous-at-sea
deterrence to basically mothballing submarines and then bringing
them back if the situation changed and the risks inherent in doing
that, but it has been suggested that if we were not using the
submarines round the clock that would extend the life of the existing
boats. Is there any truth in that?
Des Browne: Not in my understanding
but I will defer to the Rear Admiral on the detail of this. The
critical time from the point of view of when we measure the life
of a boat is from when the reactors first go critical. My understanding
is that you may well be able to bring the boat in but you cannot
switch the reactor off and there are other parts of the system
which will age no matter whether the boat is at sea or not, but
I am sure the Rear Admiral will be able to give you more detail.
Rear Admiral Mathews: There are
two parts to the answer. First, there is the crew, and one of
the reasons we need to keep operating submarines is to maintain
our operational capability to operate them, and so training and
operating them is a vital part of that brief. The second thing
was about could we just wrap them up in cotton wool and bring
them out when we need them. It would help to extend, for instance,
the core life. We put a core in these submarines now that will
fuel them for around 20-25 years. We planned on 25 years for an
SSN and that is what this core was designed to do. For an SSB
it will be slightly less because the boat is bigger and we use
them in a slightly different way, so we would save fuel. There
are other bits of the boat, for instance, the hull, and Professor
Garwin mentioned hull fatigue. Hull fatigue is not an issue for
the UK. The hull itself is good for as long as we want to operate
these submarines, so you are not making savings there. However,
there are issues just about the ageing of things like cables,
which do not depend on operating; it is a time-related thing.
There is still a whole host of things that you would have to do
if you just wrapped them up. Other parts of the submarine you
would continue to operate very likely, such as, you have to remove
heat from the reactor because it continues to produce heat, so
you have to run pumps. You have to maintain the chemistry, so
there are things you are doing and there is therefore maintenance
you have to do. It is not a straightforward "if you just
shut them down for five years you gain five years in their life";
it would not be like that.
Q383 Chairman: Secretary of State,
am I right in thinking that you have to get away at quarter to
four?
Des Browne: It would certainly
be helpful, yes.
Chairman: We will do our utmost to get
you away by then.
Mr Jenkins: I expect a note on this then
rather than going through all the figures, Secretary of State,
but we are told it is 17 years between making the decision and
getting one in the water, but that would take us to about 2024,
yet our first one was out of service in 2022, so there is a two-year
gap, so we would be down to three ageing boats to keep continuous-at-sea
service, and then if we do that we would have the three boats
but then we would have six years and if we cannot make the decision
at the end of six years that takes it a bit further. Can you give
us some indication on that timescale of when the existing boats
are going to go out, when the new boats are going to come in and
when the decision needs to be made to add the fourth boat, and
how do you get the experience of running three boats but then
make the decision in time, sort of thing? Would you let us know
about the thinking on that, please?
Q384 Chairman: Would it be possible
for you to send us a note?
Des Browne: I am happy to write
about that.
Mr Jenkins: If you would write it would
be very helpful.
Q385 Chairman: Although to some extent
it is covered in your memorandum.
Des Browne: It is, yes.
Rear Admiral Mathews: It is the
same question we virtually answered at the last session.
Q386 Robert Key: Secretary of State,
the United Kingdom is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the White Paper says that we are fully compliant with all
our NPT obligations, and the White Paper goes on, "Nevertheless,
we will continue to press for multilateral negotiations towards
mutual balance and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons".
What is the Government currently doing to press for those multilateral
negotiations?
Des Browne: Mr Key, we not only
say that; we actually set out in some detail in a fact sheet and
an annex to the White Paper itself how we address our international
legal obligations and particularly the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, so there is no need for me to read that. In summary, and
we have set out in the White Paper what we have done over the
last 10 years in dismantling our maritime tactical nuclear capability
and the RAF's WE177 freefall bomb, reduced the maximum number
of operational warheads, and our ambition is to reduce that further,
and ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
We have in my view, and I think this has been recognised even
in evidence before this Committee, a good record in living up
to our international obligations in this regard. For the future,
we continue to support and we have made progress in 13 practical
steps towards the implementation of Article VI agreed in 2000;
we have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; we
have increased our transparency by publishing historical accounting
records of our defence fissile material holdings; we have pursued
a widely welcomed programme to develop expertise in methods and
technologies that could be used to verify nuclear disarmament
on which we have produced a series of working papers culminating
in a presentation to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Looking to
the future, our priority remains to press for negotiations in
the Conference on Disarmament of the Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty; we welcome the draft text which the United States tabled
last year; we hope that all concerned are able to accept the very
broad mandate proposed and agree to open negotiations towards
a treaty without delay, and we are also actively engaged in the
global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism where we will be
playing a key and active role in shaping and contributing to the
forward-looking programme of this important new development. That
is all to be read in the context of what we have already put into
the public domain with the White Paper and in the accompanying
fact sheet.
Q387 Robert Key: That is a stunning
answer, Chairman. I congratulate the Secretary of State. I think
our most cynical witnesses, who have all, interestingly, agreed
that you are making steps in the right direction, might argue
that they are not big enough steps. Some have argued that they
are not being made in good faith, but I think that that is a pretty
good catalogue of success, but, of course, we will all wish to
hold you to the forward-looking part of it. Could I turn to the
deterrent effect of upgrading our deterrent here as regards international
terrorism? How will upgrading our deterrent add to the security
of the UK in the face of international terrorism?
Des Browne: I sought earlier to
answer that question put to me in a slightly different way. We
have a very particular strategy which we have invested in quite
significantly over the last eight years to deal with international
terrorism and it is presently under review, as is known, by the
Home Secretary. There is in the White Paper a reference to terrorism
in a very particular context as part of the explanation of the
potentially changing environment that we live in, but we do not
seek to deploy this weapon as part of our arsenal, as it were,
against terrorism. That is not the purpose it is for. The purpose
it is for is to deter threats of the nature that would threaten
the strategic integrity of our country.
Q388 Robert Key: I can see, Secretary
of State, how that might work for state-sponsored terrorism, but
surely, if you are talking about something that is not state-sponsored
terrorism, you are beginning to talk about a sub-strategic weapon,
are you not?
Des Browne: Quite specifically
I am not. I will try and put this even plainer. This is a strategic
deterrent which is designed to deter a strategic threat. We recognise
that we need to have a strategy to deal with international terrorism.
This is not part of that strategy, but we also recognise, I think
realistically, that we may in the future live in an environment
where a rogue state may seek to use a terrorist or a terrorist
organisation as a proxy, and that could be part of the strategic
threat.
Q389 Robert Key: So do you agree
that a nuclear weapon is a political weapon, not a military weapon?
Des Browne: That is a question
of the nature of the question that the Chairman asked me.
Q390 Robert Key: What is the answer
though, Secretary of State?
Des Browne: I think the answer
is that it is, yes.
Robert Key: Thank you.
Q391 Chairman: Will you not answer
my question, Secretary of State?
Des Browne: I thought I did answer
your question, Chairman. My view is, as I recollect the answer
I gave you, Chairman, was that I thought that deterrence was a
sub-set of defence.
Chairman: Ah, right; I see.
Q392 John Smith: Much has been made
from some quarters about the impact of the White Paper on our
international reputation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
I do not know if any of our witnesses can respond to this question,
but has there been any response since the White Paper was published
on 4 December?
Mrs Leslie: I can reply to that
if you wish. Only one country has actually issued any public statement
about that and that was South Africa, which was indeed critical,
but we have had contacts First of all, after the Prime Minister
had made his announcement we used our overseas network of Foreign
Office posts to brief all countries who would have a legitimate
interest in this, all our NATO allies, all the other nuclear weapon
states, all other countries who are taking an active role in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in order to explain what
the Government was saying in the White Paper and what the basis
of that was and to talk to them about any further questions they
had. We found a gratifying degree of understanding for the Government's
decision on the part in particular of our NATO allies but also
a large number of other countries. There were one or two countries,
and these were diplomatic exchanges and I would rather not name
them but it was only three or four, that were critical and they
were people who perhaps we had expected to be critical on the
basis of the stance they very often take in the Conference on
Disarmament, but we were quite pleased by the degree of understanding
for the nature of the decision that the Government was taking.
One other point which is perhaps relevant, and also, I think,
relevant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 13 practical
steps there, is that a number of countries went out of their way
to congratulate the Government on the degree of transparency it
had gone in for in the White Paper. Transparency, of course, is
one of the practical steps among these 13 practical steps.
Q393 Chairman: Secretary of State,
can I ask a question about the number of missiles in the submarine,
16 on a Vanguard? Is there any need to have 16 missile tubes on
a successor? Could we make do with perhaps 12? Would it have a
reduction in the costs? Would it have any effect on the deterrent
capacity of the submarine, or would you like Rear Admiral Mathews
to answer that?
Des Browne: I will answer the
question. I am sure Rear Admiral Mathews will add to the answer,
but I suspect that it will not come to much more than that we
are at the very beginning of the design phase and, of course,
we will have at the forefront of our mind our policy obligation
to have a minimum deterrent. All of these options will need to
be explored in depth by the MoD and the industry team but I am
not in a position at this stage, and I doubt if the Rear Admiral
will be, to be any more specific than that, but I will give him
his opportunity.
Rear Admiral Mathews: I think
behind part of the question is, is the number of missile tubes
a major cost driver to the design of the submarine? It is not
a major cost driver. It will make a contribution, but taking four
tubes off does not save a quarter of the cost of the submarine,
for example.
Q394 Linda Gilroy: The White Paper
says that the design of Vanguard's successor will seek to maximise
the commonality with the current submarines, but, in fact, if
we want to drive through-life affordability is there not a case
for a completely new design?
Rear Admiral Mathews: There is
a case for a bit of both. What we have to do here is to take the
through-life approach. We have to get the support community tied
into the build community better, and that is part of our intention
for this project should it be approved, and we have to take a
proper through-life approach. Clearly some parts of the submarine
are obsolete and that means we have to redesign those, and we
have to be more reliant on, where we can, commercial, off-the-shelf
type technology rather than do what we have done with Astute,
which is end up with a submarine that is pretty bespoke. In big
handfuls, two-thirds of what we put into Astute is made for Astute
and Astute only. That makes for a very expensive submarine design
and we need to learn from that.
Q395 Linda Gilroy: From that I take
it that there might only be reasonably modest changes in the new
submarine. No? You are shaking your head.
Rear Admiral Mathews: No.
Q396 Linda Gilroy: I think at the
bottom of this question is that a lot of people are very sceptical
about why it should take 17 years, why the decision now if there
is a degree of commonality, whatever that degree is, with the
current submarines? Can you convince those sceptics rather than
me that 17 years is necessary?
Rear Admiral Mathews: Let us start
with the design. There are a lot of people who say, "Why
do you not take Astute, cut it in half and stick your missile
compartment in?". If we do that let us just think about what
we end up with. We end up with a bigger submarine, so we need
bigger ballast tanks. We need more air then to surface the submarine,
so we need bigger air bottles, we need bigger compressors, we
need more electrical power to run those compressors. You need
more people, so you need more accommodation. You need more air
for them to breathe; therefore you need more atmosphere purification
equipment. You need a bigger galley to feed them. People produce
waste. It comes in liquid, solid and gaseous form, all of which
you have to manage. The point I am making is that once you start
unpicking a submarine design, because it is so integrated what
you have to do is that you unpick one bit and you just open Pandora's
Box: you end up redesigning it all whether you really meant to
or not. We tried to do it when we went from Valiant. We said,
"Right; we will just cut it in half and put a missile section
in and call it Resolution". There is very little of a Resolution
class, apart from the engine room, that looks like a Valiant class
submarine. It was a completely different design in the end. It
is not about taking an Astute. It is about taking some of the
systems, some of the components, some of the equipments and then
designing them where we can into the future and saying, "Can
we have common systems across these classes of submarines?",
but it is also about taking Astute and using Astute as the vehicle
to spiral development into the future classes, and that is what
we want to do with the back end of the Astute programme, to de-risk
the deterrent programme by doing those changes to the Astutes.
Q397 Linda Gilroy: I understand why
you are making the comparison with Astute but the people who are
sceptical abut it very often tend to make the comparison with
the current Vanguard class. Just now you said, I think pretty
well, and I am paraphrasing, that the hull could go on for a great
deal longer.
Rear Admiral Mathews: Yes.
Q398 Linda Gilroy: As an idea of
the relative proportion between what goes into the design of the
hull and the stuff that is inside it, I have had the advantage
of seeing what goes on at Barrow and Devonport and just how much
like rocket science all of that is. It is like putting a spaceship
into outer space, which I think many people do not really understand,
but therefore why can we not just take Vanguard as it is and,
with the things that you said needed to be changed, just slot
that into the hull?
Rear Admiral Mathews: But it is
back almost to the same arguments we used with Astute. There are
things in Vanguard we would not put into Vanguard in the future
because we could not afford to operate 50- to 60-year old equipment,
as it would be almost when it went into service, let alone when
it came out of service, so you again start changing things, and
once you start making changes you are into a redesign. I used
the analogy last time of building an onion but it is working from
the outside of the onion and trying to put the layers inside the
onion to finish it. A submarine is like that, so once you start
unpicking it, because it is so integrated it is quite a difficult
process, and so why we have argued the 17-years is that it is
about two years to get through our concept stage: are we going
to unpick a Vanguard design, are we going to unpick the Astute,
how many missile tubes, those sorts of decisions; seven years
in design to come out of that with a mature design that we do
not want to change once we start construction because change,
once you have started building (and that is my onion again), means
you have to unpick it all to work out again, so it is about seven
years to design, seven years to build, and then the final bit
is taking it on sea trials, testing it, proving it, training the
crew, putting the missiles in, test-firing the missile and putting
it on operational patrol: total duration about 17 years. How do
we compare with the rest of our competitors, so to speak? The
same as the Americans, they think about the same time; the same
as the French. That 17-year model we are pretty confident about.
Q399 Linda Gilroy: The other million-dollar
question is why do we not buy it from the Americans? Would it
not just be cheaper just to do that, like we do with the missiles?
Des Browne: In a sense there is
a political answer to that: because we do not think they would
sell them to us, and in any event people do not sell—
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