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In May 2006, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) deployed UK Forces to Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. By the summer of 2007, the number of UK personnel deployed had risen from some 3,300 to approximately 7,700 troops. The vast majority are deployed in Helmand where security is fragile and UK Service personnel have suffered casualties when fighting insurgents. The commitment given by the UK Armed Forces has been outstanding.
Afghanistan has experienced thirty years of conflict. ISAF and the international community must focus on establishing security and denying the Taliban and Al Qaeda the environment in which to operate.
The ISAF mission was led between May 2006 and February 2007 by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). During the ARRC's leadership, ISAF expanded its area of operations first to the South and then to the East of Afghanistan. The challenge of leading a 37-nation coalition is considerable.
Ensuring a coordinated comprehensive approach to the reconstruction of Afghanistan requires energetic leadership. We call on the Government to press the UN to appoint a high-profile individual responsible for coordinating the international effort.
While the MoD asserts that the Taliban insurgency does not pose a strategic threat to Afghanistan, violence seems to be increasing and spreading to the previously more peaceful provinces in the North and West of Afghanistan and the capital, Kabul. ISAF should continue to minimise civilian casualties on operations and not measure success in terms of the number of insurgents killed.
NATO has not provided the required numbers of troops as stated in the Combined Joint Statement Of Requirement (CJSOR). We remain deeply concerned that the reluctance of some NATO members to provide troops for the ISAF mission is undermining NATO's credibility and ISAF operations.
Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA) is progressing well although ANA units are not yet capable of operating independently of ISAF. Reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is not progressing as well as reform of the ANA. Although 62,000 out of a target of 82,000 Police have been trained to date, the standard of the training is reported to be less effective. The international effort should put more emphasis on this training and in addressing corruption in the judicial system.
Sufficient air-lift and air support is vital to the UK operation in the South. The MoD has provided additional helicopters since the initial deployment but must make even greater effort to increase the provision of helicopters and crew. UK helicopter operations in Afghanistan are not sustainable at the present intensity.
After a slow start, there are signs that the UK effort in delivering reconstruction and development in Helmand has become coordinated better. But there remains much to do.
The UK is Afghanistan's G8 partner nation for developing a counter-narcotics policy but this policy is not being communicated sufficiently clearly. We are concerned that uncertainty has arisen among Afghans about ISAF's role in poppy eradication and that UK Forces, under ISAF command, may consequently have been put at risk. Ending opium production in Helmand will require a long-term commitment by the international community to create a secure environment in which farmers can be encouraged to pursue alternative livelihoods.
The Government is not communicating key messages to the British or Afghan public about the purpose of its operations in Afghanistan effectively enough.
Afghanistan's relations with its immediate neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, are vital to its future. We call on the Government to encourage dialogue between Afghanistan and these two countries.
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