Select Committee on Defence Thirteenth Report


2  The ISAF mission

The strategic context

19. ISAF and the international community are operating in an extremely challenging environment in Afghanistan. Dr Shirin Akiner described a country which had experienced thirty years of political turmoil and violence, had little infrastructure and had social indicators that were on a par with the West African state, Burkina Faso.[12] Ms Norine MacDonald and Mr Rory Stewart told us that Afghanistan was a deeply conservative Islamic society which exercised a strong social control on the role of women and had a suspicion of outsiders.[13] Other witnesses told us about the low average life expectancy and high rates of illiteracy, particularly among Afghan women.

Table 2: Key social indicators
Afghanistan: Key social indicators
Average life expectancy is 44.5 years (UNDP, 2005)
1 in 6 babies dies during or shortly after birth (UNDP, 2005)
20% of children die before reaching the age of 5 (UNICEF, 2005)
17,000 women die each year from pregnancy-related causes (UNICEF, 2005)
12% of the population have adequate sanitation (World Bank, 2005)
13% of the population have clean drinking water (World Bank, 2005)

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Purpose

20. ISAF describes its objective in Afghanistan as being,

21. The aim of ISAF is to deliver what Dr Michael Williams, Head of Transatlantic Relations, RUSI, described as the "comprehensive approach". This involves the military creating the secure conditions in which reconstruction and development work can be delivered by government officials and NGOs. To coordinate the reconstruction effort, ISAF has established 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) around the country and given individual nations lead responsibility for the activities within their PRTs. Dr Williams told us that each country approached its PRT very differently depending on the security conditions prevalent in their particular Province. PRTs in the less stable South required a greater military presence than those in the relatively more stable North.[15]

22. All of our witnesses agreed that it was in the interest of the international community to ensure that the Taliban did not return to power and that Al Qaeda was no longer able to operate in Afghanistan. However, Mr Robert Fox believed that there was some divergence of aims within the ISAF coalition about the purpose of the mission with most European nations seeing the mission as about providing development and the US seeing the mission as "part of the global war on terror and enduring freedom".[16]

23. Mr Rory Stewart expressed doubt that ISAF's aims were attainable as he considered them to be overly ambitious and lacking coherence.

    We are now in a situation in which we are simultaneously trying to pursue quite different objectives that stretch from counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, state building, development, democratisation. Very few of these issues are logically connected and each one of them could be pursued on its own.[17]

24. Afghanistan has experienced 30 years of strife. In the short term, ISAF's primary purpose is to secure stability and deny the Taliban and Al Qaeda the environment in which to operate. In the longer term, it will require a sustained military and financial commitment by the international community, working with the Government of Afghanistan, to create the environment in which enduring democratic institutions can be established. If that commitment is to succeed, its size and strength must be very great, and in our view considerably greater than the international community is at present willing to acknowledge, let alone to make.

ISAF numbers and structure

25. As of June 2007, there were some 36,750 troops drawn from 37 countries operating in Afghanistan under ISAF command.[18] Within the current command (known as ISAF X) the US provides the largest number of troops (15,000) and the UK the second largest (7,700). The ISAF operation is commanded by US General Dan McNeill based in the Command Centre in Kabul. There are four regional commands covering provinces in the North, West, South, and East.

HQ ARRC leadership of ISAF May 2006-February 2007

26. From 2001 to 2005, ISAF was commanded by a succession of eight NATO countries on a six-monthly rotation.[19] HQ ARRC, a NATO High Readiness Force Headquarters staffed predominantly by UK personnel, took over command from Italy for a period of nine months between May 2006 and February 2007. During this nine-month period, the ARRC oversaw the expansion of ISAF from its confines around Kabul and the Western provinces, to the less stable Southern and Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan (known as Stage 4). The task, which involved a significant extension of ISAF's territorial reach, coincided with an increase from around 10,000 to approximately 36,000 today.

27. On 24 April 2007, General David Richards, Commander of the ARRC, said the greatest success of the ARRC's operation "was to extend NATO command over the more difficult South and East".[20] He paid tribute to his colleagues, describing the ARRC as "a real prize that the UK possesses", and said that the ARRC had demonstrated that "NATO can do the most demanding of operations".[21] General Richards told us that the ARRC's other achievements were bringing greater coherence to the international effort and achieving a psychological ascendancy, through military operations, over the Taliban.[22] We commend the achievement of HQ ARRC in overseeing the establishment of ISAF authority into the challenging provinces of South and East Afghanistan.

WORKING IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

28. Many of the submissions to this inquiry pointed to the difficulty of coordinating the actions of the international community in Afghanistan.[23] The Secretary of State recognised the complexity of the multi-national mission in Afghanistan and told us that

    the fundamental challenge lies in the ability to get at the proper strategic level, that is, at the national level in Afghanistan, a strategic overall campaign plan which is not an aggregate of every single country which has an interest in this, in other words bilateral interests. There is, of course, the United Nations Special Representative there and I look to that part of the infrastructure to provide the leadership for that campaign plan on the ground.[24]

29. General Richards believed he had brought greater coherence to the international effort in Afghanistan but acknowledged that there was more to do.[25] A key development towards bringing greater coordination was the establishment under his leadership of the Policy Action Group (PAG). The PAG, chaired by President Karzai, was a forum in which the

    UNSRSG, principal ambassadors, people like me, would debate the key issues and agree, with President Karzai chairing one in every three or four, the agreed strategy or way ahead on whatever particular issue, and we were responsible for ensuring it was all coherent.[26]

We suggested to General Richards that the international mission might benefit from leadership provided by a high-profile individual. He told us that he had established the PAG to fill a "vacuum" and that

    I do think that there is a strong case for a dominant international partner alongside President Karzai as his trusted adviser and friend to whom he can turn when necessary and with whom he has a very good relationship.[27]

30. Coordinating the international effort in Afghanistan is a huge task. The Government should encourage the United Nations to work towards the appointment of a high-profile and authoritative individual with responsibility for coordinating the international effort in support of the Government of Afghanistan.

THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION

31. The MoD submission describes the security situation across Afghanistan as "broadly stable, if fragile in places".[28] The Secretary of State told us that although the Taliban-led insurgency contained some "violent and dangerous people", it did not constitute a "strategic threat" to Afghanistan.[29] The submission from the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) describes the general security situation as being worse in the South but states that "Increasing insecurity is now the greatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Over the past six months, levels of violence have been at their highest since 2001".[30]

32. Some of the reported increase in insecurity has been attributed to the movement of ISAF Forces to areas where previously there had been no military presence. Others suggest it is a consequence of counter-terrorism operations conducted by OEF. However, some of the reported violence has occurred in the previously more peaceful Northern and Western provinces where ISAF Forces have been operating since 2002.[31] On 12 June 2007, the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), issued a statement on the security situation:

    The conflict between Afghan and international and armed opposition groups in Afghanistan has significantly intensified and spread over the past 12 months, no longer confined to the South, but spreading to parts of the East, West and North.[32]

33. When we asked General Richards whether ISAF was defeating the Taliban insurgency, he told us:

    I believe we are still winning the war; if you like the campaign is going our way. That does not mean that in a particular area…things have not deteriorated in the sense that there is more activity, and that certainly is the case in Northern Helmand.[33]

According to General Richards, a key battle against the Taliban-led insurgency was Operation Medusa fought in Kandahar Province in September 2006.

    If Kandahar fell, and it was reasonably close run last year, it did not matter how well the Dutch did in Uruzgan or how well the British did in Helmand. Their two provinces would also, as night followed day, have failed because we would have lost the consent of the Pashtun people because of the totemic importance of Kandahar.[34]

34. Since the defeat of the Taliban by ISAF Forces in Operation Medusa, concern has grown that the Taliban insurgents might adopt more 'asymmetric' tactics against ISAF including increasing their use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to Anthony Cordesman, Chairman of the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), there has been an increase in suicide attacks from 18 in 2005 to 116 in 2006 and an increase in attacks from IEDs from 530 to 1,297 in 2006.[35] The devastating impact of such attacks was demonstrated over the weekend of 16 / 17 June 2007, when a suicide bomber exploded a device in the North Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, and the following day, a similar exploding device killed 35 people in Kabul.[36]

35. While we note the assertion made by the MoD that the Taliban does not present a "strategic threat" to security in Afghanistan, we are concerned at reports that violence is increasing and spreading to the relatively peaceful Kabul and the Northern Provinces. We are also concerned about the increased use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings in Afghanistan.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

36. Assessing civilian casualties in Afghanistan is difficult. Human Rights Watch estimates that there were 1,000 civilian deaths in 2006. What is certain, is that civilian casualties are of increasing concern to Afghans. During our visit to Kabul we met representatives of the Afghan International Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), a body which reports to the Afghanistan National Assembly about human rights issues in Afghanistan.[37] The AIHRC told us that ISAF had pledged in December 2006 to take measures to limit civilian casualties but that since December 2006 civilian casualties had in fact increased and that, as a consequence, public support for ISAF had weakened.

37. In the spring of 2007 there were reports of significant civilian casualties following ISAF operations, particularly those that involved air strikes.[38] On 12 June 2007, the ICRC issued a press release describing the effect of operations by both ISAF and the Taliban on the civilian population, and stating that "owing to the number of roadside bombs and suicide attacks, and regular aerial bombing raids…it is incredibly difficult for ordinary Afghans to lead a normal life".[39]

38. We regret the number of civilians killed as a result of military activity in Afghanistan. Our Forces try their utmost to minimise civilian casualties on operations and it is to be hoped that the introduction of precision weapons such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System should help minimise civilian casualties further. Every life lost is a tragedy, causing misery to families and destruction to communities. Moreover, civilian casualties undermine support for ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan and fuel the insurgency, further endangering our troops and the objectives of their mission.

39. In March, we asked the Secretary of State whether media reports of large numbers of insurgent deaths could prove counter-productive to gaining the support of Afghans. He replied that detail relating to insurgent fatalities following operations had not been given by UK sources, but rather by NATO sources, and that "on occasion they were revised quite significantly".[40] He also noted that:

    you will not find any of those figures in terms of the number dead coming from us because we disavowed that approach to success and / or failure. It is not about body count.[41]

40. General Houghton told us that he recognised the potential that "kinetic" activity against the Taliban could have on alienating the population both "locally and internationally".[42] He also stated that the deployment of the GMLRS artillery would enable greater accuracy to operations,

    we can then utilise equipment such as the GMLRS to bring effective and precise strike over significant distances, as I say areas up to 70 kilometres.[43]

41. Operational success should not be measured in terms of the numbers of dead enemy combatants. Accurate and verifiable figures for the numbers of Taliban killed by ISAF are difficult to obtain, and many of those killed on the front-line may not be hard-core Taliban but rather farmers hired to fight. Exaggerated reports of insurgent casualties following ISAF operations can serve as useful propaganda for insurgents and undermine support for the ISAF mission.

NATO FORCE GENERATION

Caveats

42. In our first report into operations in Afghanistan, we highlighted the difficulties that NATO had experienced in gaining commitments of troops from ISAF members for the ISAF Stage 3 expansion to the less stable South.[44] In early 2006, before Stage 3 began, some countries were reported to have refused to commit additional Forces to the mission and others were reported to have insisted on exercising "national caveats" from NATO's Rules of Engagement, effectively restricting their Forces from certain aspects of operations.[45] In the wake of Operation Medusa, in September 2006, there was some suggestion that some countries with Forces based in the Northern Provinces had not allowed their troops to be re-deployed to the South in support of ISAF troops engaged in war-fighting.

43. During our recent visits to NATO member capitals in Europe, as part of our Future of NATO inquiry, we were told about the constitutional reasons for some countries not participating in certain aspects of military operations. In Madrid, we were told by politicians and academics that while Spanish public opinion supported troops working on reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, it would not support a war-fighting role. In Berlin, we were told about the constitutional restrictions on Germany's military operating abroad although it was noted that the German Government had, in January 2007, approved the use of Tornado aircraft for reconnaissance missions.

44. The Secretary of State told us that progress had been made at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006 in reducing national caveats:

    The Dutch, the Romanians, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania and lots of others effectively came out of that with no caveats at all. There is progress being made, therefore, and indeed France and Germany agreed, as I reported to Parliament, that in case of emergency their troops would be moved [from the North to the South] to help.[46]

Despite the reduction in caveats agreed at Riga, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) commented that the continued existence of caveats risks "impeding the ability of ISAF commanders to employ all their available resources".[47]

45. While we note the progress that has been made in reducing national caveats, we remain concerned that national caveats risk impairing the effectiveness of the ISAF mission. The Government should continue to press ISAF partners to reduce further the restrictions placed on the use of their Forces.

Troop numbers

46. General Richards told us that, during his leadership of ISAF, the level of troop numbers rather than caveats was his major concern:

    Simply being able to move their troops from the North to the South would not have been a solution to me at all because we have got just about the right number of troops in the North to contain the situation there, which is broadly stable… What I was really after was…an increase in the overall number of troops.[48]

47. The force element deemed necessary by NATO's Deputy Supreme Commander in Europe (DSACEUR) to fulfil the operational plan in Afghanistan is known as the Combined Joint Statement Of Requirement (CJSOR). General Richards told us that progress had been made at the Riga summit in meeting the CJSOR for additional troop numbers to the South, but stated that more progress was required.[49] Despite the increased commitments made by the US and the UK, the Secretary of State confirmed that only five of the required seven battalions had been agreed to.[50]

48. Dr Williams told us that ISAF needed more troop numbers on the ground if its deployment to the South was to be successful.[51] We questioned the Secretary of State about the impact that NATO's failure to meet the CJSOR might have. He told us that NATO had never fulfilled a CJSOR for any operation but he expressed his confidence that the missing elements of the CJSOR would not impinge on ISAF's operational capability.[52]

49. Despite the Secretary of State's assurances, we remain deeply concerned that the reluctance of some NATO members to provide troops for the ISAF mission is undermining NATO's credibility and also ISAF operations. In response to our report, the Government should explain its strategy for engaging other NATO Governments in addressing the deficit in the CJSOR.

TOUR LENGTHS

50. Both General Richards and the Secretary of State told us that there was a case for extending the tours of the more senior ISAF officers, as this would enable sufficient time for commanders to form relationships with local politicians and NGOs and gain operational knowledge.[53] However General Richards noted the effect on families that extended tours could have:

    I am all for it but you need to look at the conditions of service because everyone is working very hard and I think we must remember that it penalises our families. It is not fair on them if you do not give them a little bit of incentive, and there is balance to be struck, but in an absolute sense there is a definite case for longer tours. [54]

51. The MoD, in consultation with NATO colleagues, should consider the feasibility of extending the operational tours of key personnel. This would allow sufficient time to build and maintain relationships with Afghans and other key figures in Afghanistan.

Afghan National Army

52. The 2001 Bonn Agreement committed the international community to the reform and development of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The US has taken the lead in training and equipping the ANA and has committed $5.9 billion over the next 18 months to supporting the ANA, including providing weaponry and helicopters.[55] The UK's contribution has been focused on training the ANA through the establishment of an army training school in Kabul, which we visited in July 2006, and the provision of Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs), embedded in Afghan units.

53. In a generally positive assessment of the progress of the ANA, the Secretary of State told us in May that 35,000 troops (against an overall target of 70,000) had been trained so far. Four out of ten ANA Brigade Headquarters were judged as capable of planning, executing and sustaining counter-insurgency operations with coalition or ISAF support at company level.[56] General Houghton, while acknowledging the progress that had been made in training the ANA, told us that there were occasions when ANA units had been deployed on operations before they had been ready. He acknowledged that it would be "some time before the ANA is fully capable of conducting independent operations at the brigade level".[57]

54. We note the MoD's assessment that some ANA units are now trained sufficiently to be deployed alongside ISAF troops on operations, but we also note that they are some way off operating independently.

55. General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Afghanistan's Defence Minister, told us in Kabul that he was grateful for the support that the US and UK had given the ANA and praised the contribution that UK OMLTs had made to the training of the ANA. When we put this to the Secretary of State, he acknowledged the contribution that OMLTs had made to training the ANA and told us it "represented a good return on investment".[58]

56. General Wardak assured us that problems with the retention of Afghan troops, particularly during training, were being addressed through improved rates of pay. According to General Wardak, concerns that the ANA was insufficiently balanced in terms of ethnicity and regional representation were misplaced.

57. We commend the role played by the UK in training the Afghan National Army. The UK's Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are highly valued by the Afghan National Army. The MoD should continue to provide the necessary resources for the OMLT programme.

Justice sector reform

58. Key to the future development of Afghanistan is its ability to apprehend, prosecute and detain alleged criminals, including those involved in the illicit drugs trade. This is dependent on the successful reform of its Police and Justice sector. The programme, under the leadership of Germany, has trained 62,000 Police out of a target of 82,000 but the MoD states that, in contrast to the progress made in respect to the ANA, the quality of Afghan National Police (ANP) training has not been as good as that for the ANA.[59]

59. The submission from Olivia Holdsworth describes an inconsistent approach to Police reform in which Germany and the US have adopted very different approaches to the type of force that the ANP should be. According to Olivia Holdsworth, Germany favours a gendarmerie-style force and the US a more militaristic force, and this difference in approach had prevented "necessary leadership, coherence and strategic thought and assistance from the international community".[60] In Afghanistan, we heard widespread criticisms of the pace and content of the German police reform programme. In October 2006, the EU established an ESDP Police mission to Afghanistan with the aim of establishing more effective coordination of Police reform,[61] and General Richards told us that the US was providing a huge amount of money for the training of the ANP.[62]

60. During our visit to Afghanistan in April 2007, we heard concerns about the newly-formed Auxiliary Police in Helmand. Some people told us that it acted more like a militia than a police force. General Richards told us that the Auxiliary Police in Helmand had been established because of "a shortage of troops and Police in Helmand".[63] The Secretary of State told us that the Afghan Auxiliary Police was an attempt to bring local community policing to Helmand and that corruption would be avoided by the stipulation that its members had to apply to join the Police proper within one year.[64]

61. We note the widespread concerns about the Afghan National Police reform programme. Police failure and corruption alienate support for the Government of Afghanistan and add to grievances which fuel the insurgency. The formation of a well-trained and disciplined ANP is vital to the long-term security of the country. The Government should work to create a greater coherence to the international effort to establish an effective ANP.

62. The MoD should, in its response to this report, clarify the purpose of the Auxiliary Police in Southern Afghanistan and provide detail about how its members are recruited.

63. The submission from Olivia Holdsworth also expresses concern about the pace of reform to Afghanistan's judicial system. It alleges that the judicial reform programme, led by Italy, has suffered from a lack of coherence and been undermined by the existence of an alternative, non-state administered, legal system which is "exercised not through state institutions but remains in the hands of individual powerbrokers, tribal structures and warlords".[65]

64. During our visit to Afghanistan we were frequently told that corrupt practices were common at all levels of Afghan society and that the failure to address corruption was undermining support for the Afghan Government. On 19 June 2007, the Attorney General, Abdul Jabbar Sabit, was reported to be requesting help from the international community to address corruption.[66]

65. The Government should press the international community to give greater emphasis to the judicial reform programme. This should include measures to address alleged corruption in all areas of society.

The influence of neighbouring countries on Afghanistan

66. Throughout our inquiry we received much comment about the poor relations and mutual distrust that exist between the Governments and people of Pakistan and Afghanistan. A commonly-held perception amongst the people we met during our two visits to Afghanistan was that Pakistan, through its Inter Service Intelligence agency, had encouraged the training of Taliban fighters in madrasas (Islamic religious schools) and that Pakistan allowed them to cross freely over the border into Afghanistan to fight ISAF troops.

67. During our visit to Islamabad, Pakistan, in July 2006, senior politicians and senior military personnel denied any involvement in training Taliban insurgents. We were told that the Pakistan Army had deployed 80,000 troops in Waziristan to stop insurgents crossing the border and had suffered significant casualties as a consequence. It was also noted that Pakistan was currently home to up to 2.5 million refugees from Afghanistan who had fled there during the Taliban regime.

68. When we asked General Richards about the role of Pakistan, he told us that relations with Pakistan had been a central concern during his leadership of the ARRC and that his experience of dealing with the Pakistan Government and military had been positive. He told us that:

General Richards also noted that Pakistan had cooperated with ISAF on military operations during his command of the ARRC.[68]

69. When we asked the Secretary of State about the border issue he noted the difficulties in securing any territorial border not least one that was 2,500 kilometres long and largely unrecognised by the tribal people who lived there.[69] He told us, that ultimately, there "needs to be a shared political solution to this which identifies the difficulties, and we encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite their differences, to continually talk to each other".[70] He was encouraged that recently Presidents Karzai and Musharraf had been speaking to each other more regularly.

70. Improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is of vital importance to both countries and the wider region. We note the recent move towards increased cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and call on the UK Government to continue to encourage dialogue between the two countries.

Iran

71. While it borders Pakistan to the South and East, Afghanistan shares a border with Iran in the West. Dr Akiner told us that:

    For all the Central Asians, Iran is a historic centre, a cultural centre and at times has been the political centre…they still look to Iran as playing an important role in the development of the region. In Afghanistan, too, Iran has always played quite a significant role, culturally especially, and to some extent economically.[71]

72. During our visit to India and Afghanistan in April 2007, we were told that Iran led a number of development projects in Western Afghanistan. We were also told that the Iranian border was a favoured route for drug traders transporting narcotics out of Afghanistan, an issue which the Secretary of State told us "the Iranians themselves devote quite a substantial amount of resource to trying to deal with".[72]

73. During our visit to the region in April 2007, we gained the impression that Iran's influence in Afghanistan was regarded as largely benign. On 13 June 2007, the Governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan agreed to cooperate more closely in stopping the smuggling of narcotics across their borders. The United Nations Office on Drugs Control (UNODC) Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa, was reported as describing the agreement as "a turning point in the fight against Afghanistan's drug problem".[73]

74. In June 2007 some press reports put the influence of Iran in Afghanistan in a rather less positive light.[74] On 11 June 2007, it was reported that Iranian-made shaped charges had been discovered in Kabul. On 15 June 2007, there were reports that Iran was forcibly deporting up to 2,000 Afghan refugees per day, many of whom had lived in Iran for many years.[75]

75. We note the role Iran has taken in undertaking development work in Western Afghanistan and welcome Iran's pledge to check the flow of narcotics across its border with Afghanistan. We also note with concern reports that explosives originating from Iran have been used by insurgents in Afghanistan. This underlines the urgent necessity for the West, particularly the US and UK, to foster constructive dialogue, and to build confidence in relationships, with as many parts of the Iranian Government and its offshoots as possible.


12   Q 110 Back

13   Qq 160, 193 Back

14   www.nato.int/ISAF/mission/mission_role.htm Back

15   Q 180 Back

16   Q 167 Back

17   Ibid. Back

18   www.nato.int/isaf/ Back

19   HC (2005-06) 159 Back

20   Q 204 Back

21   Ibid. Back

22   Ibid. Back

23   Ev 87, 93, 107  Back

24   Q 364 Back

25   Q 204 Back

26   Q 220 Back

27   Q 218 Back

28   Ev 84, para 3 Back

29   Q 37 Back

30   Ev 100, para 1 Back

31   "Afghanistan conflict worsening", The Guardian, 12 June 2007 Back

32   www.icrc.org  Back

33   Q 231 Back

34   Q 224 Back

35   "Winning in Afghanistan: The Challenges and Response", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, February 15 2007 Back

36   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6760791.stm Back

37   www.aihrc.org Back

38   "Civilian deaths prompt NATO rethink," The Independent, 20 May 2007 Back

39   www.icrc.org  Back

40   Q 43 Back

41   Q 42 Back

42   Q 22 Back

43   Q 25 Back

44   HC (2005-06) 558 Back

45   "UK tries to form coalition to fight in Afghanistan", The Guardian, 15 November 2005 Back

46   Q 54 Back

47   "Assessing ISAF: A Baseline Study of NATO's Role in Afghanistan", British American Security Information Council, 2 March 2007 Back

48   Q 270 Back

49   Q 265 Back

50   Q 335 Back

51   Ev 94 Back

52   Q 339 Back

53   Q 323 Back

54   Q 215 Back

55   Ev 85 Back

56   Q 376 Back

57   Ibid. Back

58   Q 377 Back

59   Ev 86, para 21 Back

60   Ev 1113, para 46 Back

61   Q 385 Back

62   Q 271 Back

63   Q 220 Back

64   Q 384 Back

65   Ev 108, para 3 Back

66   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia, 19 June 2007 Back

67   Q 281 Back

68   Ibid. Back

69   Q 388 Back

70   Q 78 Back

71   Q 118 Back

72   Q 82 Back

73   www.unama-afg.org Back

74   "Iran forcibly deports 1000,000 Afghans", The Guardian, 15 June 2007 Back

75   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia Back


 
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