Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
pay tribute to those Service people who have lost their lives
or suffered injury and extend our deep sympathies to their families.
The commitment given by our entire Armed Services has been shown
to be outstanding. (Paragraph 17)
2. Afghanistan has
experienced 30 years of strife. In the short term, ISAF's primary
purpose is to secure stability and deny the Taliban and Al Qaeda
the environment in which to operate. In the longer term, it will
require a sustained military and financial commitment by the international
community, working with the Government of Afghanistan, to create
the environment in which enduring democratic institutions can
be established. If that commitment is to succeed, its size and
strength must be very great, and in our view considerably greater
than the international community is at present willing to acknowledge,
let alone to make. (Paragraph 24)
3. We commend the
achievement of HQ ARRC in overseeing the establishment of ISAF
authority into the challenging provinces of South and East Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 27)
4. Coordinating the
international effort in Afghanistan is a huge task. The Government
should encourage the United Nations to work towards the appointment
of a high-profile and authoritative individual with responsibility
for coordinating the international effort in support of the Government
of Afghanistan. (Paragraph 30)
5. While we note the
assertion made by the MoD that the Taliban does not present a
"strategic threat" to security in Afghanistan, we are
concerned at reports that violence is increasing and spreading
to the relatively peaceful Kabul and the Northern Provinces. We
are also concerned about the increased use of improvised explosive
devices and suicide bombings in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 35)
6. We regret the number
of civilians killed as a result of military activity in Afghanistan.
Our Forces try their utmost to minimise civilian casualties on
operations and it is to be hoped that the introduction of precision
weapons such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System should
help minimise civilian casualties further. Every life lost is
a tragedy, causing misery to families and destruction to communities.
Moreover, civilian casualties undermine support for ISAF and the
Government of Afghanistan and fuel the insurgency, further endangering
our troops and the objectives of their mission. (Paragraph 38)
7. Operational success
should not be measured in terms of the numbers of dead enemy combatants.
Accurate and verifiable figures for the numbers of Taliban killed
by ISAF are difficult to obtain, and many of those killed on the
front-line may not be hard-core Taliban but rather farmers hired
to fight. Exaggerated reports of insurgent casualties following
ISAF operations can serve as useful propaganda for insurgents
and undermine support for the ISAF mission. (Paragraph 41)
8. While we note the
progress that has been made in reducing national caveats, we remain
concerned that national caveats risk impairing the effectiveness
of the ISAF mission. The Government should continue to press ISAF
partners to reduce further the restrictions placed on the use
of their Forces. (Paragraph 45)
9. Despite the Secretary
of State's assurances, we remain deeply concerned that the reluctance
of some NATO members to provide troops for the ISAF mission is
undermining NATO's credibility and also ISAF operations. In response
to our report, the Government should explain its strategy for
engaging other NATO Governments in addressing the deficit in the
CJSOR. (Paragraph 49)
10. The MoD, in consultation
with NATO colleagues, should consider the feasibility of extending
the operational tours of key personnel. This would allow sufficient
time to build and maintain relationships with Afghans and other
key figures in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 51)
11. We note the MoD's
assessment that some ANA units are now trained sufficiently to
be deployed alongside ISAF troops on operations, but we also note
that they are some way off operating independently. (Paragraph
54)
12. We commend the
role played by the UK in training the Afghan National Army. The
UK's Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are highly valued
by the Afghan National Army. The MoD should continue to provide
the necessary resources for the OMLT programme. (Paragraph 57)
13. We note the widespread
concerns about the Afghan National Police reform programme. Police
failure and corruption alienate support for the Government of
Afghanistan and add to grievances which fuel the insurgency. The
formation of a well-trained and disciplined ANP is vital to the
long-term security of the country. The Government should work
to create a greater coherence to the international effort to establish
an effective ANP. (Paragraph 61)
14. The MoD should,
in its response to this report, clarify the purpose of the Auxiliary
Police in Southern Afghanistan and provide detail about how its
members are recruited. (Paragraph 62)
15. The Government
should press the international community to give greater emphasis
to the judicial reform programme. This should include measures
to address alleged corruption in all areas of society. (Paragraph
65)
16. Improving relations
between Pakistan and Afghanistan is of vital importance to both
countries and the wider region. We note the recent move towards
increased cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and call
on the UK Government to continue to encourage dialogue between
the two countries. (Paragraph 70)
17. We note the role
Iran has taken in undertaking development work in Western Afghanistan
and welcome Iran's pledge to check the flow of narcotics across
its border with Afghanistan. We also note with concern reports
that explosives originating from Iran have been used by insurgents
in Afghanistan. This underlines the urgent necessity for the West,
particularly the US and UK, to foster constructive dialogue, and
to build confidence in relationships, with as many parts of the
Iranian Government and its offshoots as possible. (Paragraph
75)
18. We note that the
number of UK Forces, and the firepower they have at their disposal,
has increased significantly since the first deployment of UK Forces
to Helmand in May 2006. (Paragraph 80)
19. During our visit
in April 2007 to UK Forces in Southern Afghanistan, Service personnel
emphasised the international nature of the mission in Southern
Afghanistan and expressed satisfaction both with the command structure
of Regional Command (South) and the professionalism of other national
troops they fought alongside. (Paragraph 83)
20. The UK's mission
to bring stability to Helmand will require a long-term military
and humanitarian commitment if it is to be successful. We recommend
that the Government clarify its planning assumptions for the UK
deployment to Afghanistan and state the likely length of the deployment
beyond the summer of 2009. (Paragraph 89)
21. Before the deployment
to Southern Afghanistan, the MoD anticipated that the insurgents
would adopt asymmetric tactics against the deployment. That assessment
was inaccurate and the MoD concedes that the conventional warfare
tactics used by insurgents was unexpected. (Paragraph 95)
22. The polling conducted
by the Senlis Council states that support for the insurgency is
on the increase, but the MoD states that the "overwhelming
majority" of Afghans continue to support UK troops. (Paragraph
98)
23. The Platoon Houses
in Northern Helmand were established at the request of the then
Governor of Helmand Province—in other words at the request
of the civilian power. The long-term military consequence of this
strategy is unclear. (Paragraph 101)
24. The agreement
brokered in October 2006 between the Governor of Helmand and tribal
elders to exclude Taliban Forces from Musa Qaleh Province proved
ultimately unsuccessful. However, the achievement of establishing
peaceful conditions in the town for 143 days should not be underestimated.
We were told that similar agreements are being negotiated in Helmand
and elsewhere. While agreements of this kind carry risks, it is
only through dialogue with local communities that a lasting peace
will be achieved. (Paragraph 105)
25. The anticipated
insurgent Spring 2007 offensive in Helmand did not materialise,
probably owing to the pre-emptive tactics of the ISAF mission.
(Paragraph 107)
26. We note that the
MoD is in the process of providing the Army with a range of vehicles
which provide Service personnel with greater protection. We welcome
the MoD's assurance that Mastiff and Vector are being deployed
to Afghanistan according to schedule. It is essential that UK
Forces have the opportunity to train on appropriate vehicles prior
to deployment. (Paragraph 111)
27. While we welcome
the additional commitment of helicopters since the initial deployment
in 2006, we recommend that the MoD make even greater efforts to
increase the provision of appropriate helicopters to UK Forces
and sufficient trained air and ground crew. UK helicopter operations
in Afghanistan are not sustainable at the present intensity. (Paragraph
116)
28. A reliable airbridge
is key to the morale of Service personnel and ultimately operational
effectiveness. (Paragraph 117)
29. The MoD should
continue to press NATO allies to provide sufficient air support
to operations in the South. In the meantime, we welcome the MoD's
commitment to extend the deployment of Apache helicopters and
the Harrier GR7 / GR 9 squadron until June 2009. (Paragraph 121)
30. The MoD acknowledges
that reconstruction and development, rather than military power
alone, is the key to winning Afghan hearts and minds in Helmand.
After a slow start, it seems that coordination between the military
and government departments has improved and development work has
begun. The people of Helmand will need to see tangible improvements
soon or else ISAF and the UK will lose support for the mission.
(Paragraph 127)
31. The consent of
the people living in Helmand province will not be gained through
the deployment of superior military force alone. Once security
has been established, it is vital that development projects follow
swiftly. The military has provided much-needed immediate reconstruction
in Helmand. A balance has to be struck between quick impact reconstruction
provided by the military and longer-term development best delivered
by Government and NGOs in close cooperation with Afghans. Projects
such as the ambitious Kajaki dam project will, in time, create
jobs and demonstrate to Afghans the commitment of the international
community; however, the Government should also ensure that smaller-scale
projects are undertaken which involve Afghans closely in their
design and construction. (Paragraph 132)
32. The Government
should continue to support the Government of Afghanistan in its
attempts to bring drug traffickers to justice. To have maximum
impact, the particular focus should be on punishing those people
involved in the funding and large-scale trafficking of narcotics.
(Paragraph 139)
33. We are very concerned
at the indications of closer links between the Taliban and the
narcotics trade. (Paragraph 140)
34. We support ADIDU's
focus on working with the Government of Afghanistan to encourage
opium farmers to pursue alternative livelihoods. We note that
Helmand provides the potential for alternative livelihoods to
be pursued. (Paragraph 145)
35. The MoD's position
is that it will not take part in the eradication of poppy until
alternative livelihood schemes are available. We call on the Government
to ensure that this message is communicated clearly to farmers
in Helmand. We are deeply concerned that uncertainty has arisen
among Afghans about ISAF's policy towards, and role in, poppy
eradication and that UK Forces, under ISAF command, may consequently
have been put at risk. This uncertainty undermines the effectiveness
of the entire ISAF mission. (Paragraph 146)
36. Ending opium production
in Helmand will require a long-term commitment by the international
community to create a secure environment in which farmers can
be encouraged to pursue alternative livelihoods. We recommend
that the Government continue to pursue imaginative ways to policies
to address narcotics production in Afghanistan but we are not
persuaded that licensed production is a viable alternative strategy
at this time. (Paragraph 150)
37. Success in combating
the narcotics trade will be crucial to the future stability of
Afghanistan. We remain concerned that the coalition's counter-narcotics
policy lacks clarity and coherence. We recommend that, in its
response to this report, the Government set out in detail the
international counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan, including
its assessment of progress to date and targets for the years ahead.
(Paragraph 151)
38. We are concerned
that the Government is not communicating key messages to the British
public about the purpose of its operations in Afghanistan effectively
enough. (Paragraph 154)
39. ISAF is bringing
tangible improvements to the lives of Afghans, but there is evidence
that news of such improvements is not being communicated effectively
to Afghans. Indeed, there is a strong suggestion that the Taliban
is ahead in the "information campaign". We recommend
that the Government work together with its allies to coordinate
more effectively the presentation of ISAF's objectives and the
way in which developments in Afghanistan are reported. (Paragraph
158)
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