Memorandum from Philip Wilkinson
1. The Defence Committee inquiry of 31 January
2007 into the UK's deployment into Afghanistan states:
The inquiry will examine progress made in
assisting the Afghanistan Government's programme to bring stability,
security and development to Afghanistan and whether NATO partners
have provided sufficient resources, both personnel and equipment,
to the mission.
2. From September 2004 until July 2006,
I was the Director of the UK's support program to the Office of
the National Security Council (ONSC). The ONSC office block is
situated alongside the President's office block in the Arg Palace
in Kabul. I was the only permanently based non-Afghan policy advisor
in the Palace. My job, and that of my small team was in three
parts; the provision of policy advice to the National Security
Advisor, Dr Zalmai Rassoul, and institutional development and
capacity building and training in the ONSC. Dr Rassoul is fourth
in the national protocol list and, in Pashtunwali, style spent
most of everyday with President Karzai, including dinner. My discussions
with Dr Rassoul and everyday interactions with his directors in
the ONSC gave me unprecedented access to palace opinions. While
I kept many of these opinions in confidence, when I felt there
was an issue that was or could have a direct impact on UK's best
interests, I did pass those along to the Ambassador or relevant
Embassy staff. It is not my intention to name individuals in this
statement because I felt that many were under such pressure to
deliver diktats from either the Reid group or No 10 that their
ability to deliver ground reality, which was contrary to these
diktats was a pointless exercise and therefore they did not push
as hard as they might if there had been a more receptive recipient.
3. In early 2005, when NATO force levels
for the Phase 3 roll-out plan into the South became known we (those
in the ONSC) were incredulous. At that time we were in the process
of reviving the National Threat Assessment (an annual document,
first produced in 2004) and were well aware of the threat levels.
Helmand province has a land area of 20,058 sq miles as compared
to England's 50,698 sq miles. No central government in Kabul has
ever exerted the rule of law into Helmand, the provincial political
infrastructure, where it existed was corrupt, the province was
rife with drug-lords and we knew the province was heavily infiltrated
by the Taliban and AQ with a large re-supply and reinforcement
capability across the border in Pakistan. Yet we were deploying
a force that could deploy at best 500 soldiers on the ground at
any one time to police an anarchic area a little less than half
the size of England. The general consensus in the ONSC, concerning
Dr Reid's statements that the mission was the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and hopefully it would not be necessary to fire a single
shot were considered extremely unrealistic. I certainly passed
those views to the Embassy and British military in country at
the time. Unfortunately when NATO forces and Lt Gen David Richards
conducted their reconnaissance missions to Afghanistan, I never
got to brief them even though David and I are friends of very
long standing, and I made that known to the Embassy staff. I know
Dr Rassoul had the same concerns but in his polite Afghan manner
he would have expressed his concerns very diplomatically. I have
no idea whether our concerns were passed back to London.
4. The consequence of the failure to deploy
sufficient troops, in a balanced combat package was entirely predictable.
The drug-lords, the Taliban and AQ were not deterred but encouraged
to attack robustly; leaving those NATO forces no option but to
take robust defensive measures. This was not the mission and killing
Afghans runs counter to the long term goal of the mission and
the creation of a secure environment in which reconstruction activities
can deliver tangible benefits to the Afghan people and persuade
them to support the central government.
5. Let me make some comments about NATO/ISAF
forces generally. The Afghans call ISAF the International Shopping
Assistance Force because the only time in Kabul they see NATO
forces outside of their speeding vehicles, with the honourable
exception of the Brits who conduct foot patrols, is when they
stop to do their tourist shopping before going home. I believe
that the second largest amount of money spent (after support to
the ANP) by the Germans in Afghanistan has been to build a "Fort
Knox" type camp for themselves to EU standards. Unless things
have changed since I left, German military patrols are not allowed
out of their secure camp after dark, which tends to limit their
patrol range. In 2005, as part of the burgeoning DIAG (disbandment
of illegal armed groups) program, the GoA proposed conducting
a simple pilot scheme; one small IAG in the south and one in the
north. However, the German Ambassador objected as he claimed this
disbandment had the potential to raise the threat level to German
troops in their area. The use of national "red flags"
is a major inhibitor of operations.
6. In 2005, the Reid Group deployed an RAF
Group Captain to the Embassy in Kabul to try and stitch together
the activities of DfID, the FCO and military into one coherent
strategy. This was an admirable ambition which would indicate
that up to that point coordination had been poor. A major concern
then and now (I am still in regular contact with the ONSC staff)
is the failure of the development community, including DfID to
deliver tangible benefits to the ordinary people of Afghanistan.
The oft repeated saying in the ONSC was, at least the Soviets
delivered some reconstruction. If we fail in Helmand it will
be more to do with the failure of the development community than
the military. The argument that security and development are inextricably
linked needs no rehearsal but works both ways.
7. Looking at DfID's strategic plan for
Afghanistan, their strategic objectives relate to the disbursement
of money not the delivery of tangible benefits. Making the GoA
responsible for the management of their own budget, including
donor funds is fine up to a point in terms of capacity building.
However, if there is no oversight and accountability in ministries
that are not yet competent in themselves, not only tolerates inefficiency
but also encourages corruption and impunity. And unfortunately
they and the WB have often relied upon the wrong people to deliver.
In 2005-06, there was a clique of smartly suited Afghans in government
who were all able to chant the development mantra but who were
actually corrupt and plotting against President Karzai. They were
known in the Palace as "the tie wearing Taliban". We
had proof of their corruption and subversive activities however,
because these individuals were being so strongly supported by
DfID, the UKG and WB, President Karzai had difficulties getting
rid of them. He did eventually but only against the wishes of
their supporters. During this period when this support was causing
the UK to lose influence in the Palace I produced the strongest
of briefs to the Ambassador only to be dismissed as a trouble
maker—I was told that it was considered that I had gone
native.
8. While the military has been doing the
best that it can with limited resources in Helmand Province, the
abject failure of DfID to deliver tangible benefits to the ordinary
Afghan people is a disgrace. DfID is culturally anti military
and they would rather see no reconstruction than seriously fund
the military to take on the role. Their argument that only civilians
know how to do development owes more to their institutional bias
than reality and runs counter to the achievement of mission success
in Helmand and Afghanistan generally.
My background is military (32 years), I retired
in 2000 and my last job as a colonel and my appointment was Assistant
Director for PSO at the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. I
then moved into a DfID funded post in the Conflict Security and
Development Group at Kings College. I am no longer at Kings but
a research associate at Chatham House and a member of the Royal
Swedish Academy of War Sciences. In the last seven years, I have
been employed as a strategic security policy (Security Sector
Reform) advisor at the national level in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda,
Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan. I am currently working on a US
DOD funded program looking at Phase 4 operations—nation
building.
27 February 2007
|
