Memorandum from the Senlis Council
INTRODUCTION
1. The Senlis Council is an international
policy think tank established by The Network of European Foundations,
with country offices in Kabul, London, Ottawa, Paris and Brussels.
The Council's work encompasses foreign policy, security, development
and counter-narcotics policies, and aims to provide innovative
analysis and proposals within these areas.
2. The Senlis Council's extensive programme
in Afghanistan focuses on global policy development. The Council
is committed to conducting in-depth field research, investigating
the relationships between counter-narcotics, military and development
policies, and their consequences on reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. Senlis Afghanistan has field offices in the cities
of Lashkar Gah, Kandahar and Jalalabad.
UK MISSION IN
SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN
IS AT
CROSSROADS: THE
URGENT NEED
TO SUPPORT
THE COMMENDABLE
JOB OF
BRITISH MILITARY
3. The UK stabilisation mission in Afghanistan
is at crossroads: should the UK insist on the same, unbalanced
and ineffective policies, its mission is bound to fail. British
forces in southern Afghanistan are doing a commendable job in
an increasingly hostile environment. The deployment of extra British
troops represents is a necessary step for the British forces and
the UK to make a positive impact in achieving stability, but the
deployment will prove an irreparable failure if there is no fundamental
change in the overall policy portfolio.
4. It is time for a reality check: the UK
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and British troops in southern Afghanistan
are lacking sufficient support from other NATO countries, faced
with extremely difficult circumstances. The MoD is bearing a great
share of the military burden when compared to the negligible contribution
of most NATO countries.
5. The MoD and British forces are also insufficiently
supported at home by other Government Departments. An ineffective
and expensive FCO-led counter-narcotics strategy that focuses
primarily on poppy eradication, in conjunction with DFID's lack
of effective development compromise military operations, forcing
British troops to fight in an increasing hostile environment and
putting their lives at risk. A coordinated plan to reconcile counter-insurgency,
counter-narcotics and development strategies is imperative in
order to support the efforts and operations of British troops
in southern Afghanistan.
Recommendation
6. By seeking to defeat the Taliban militarily
and at the same time destroying people's livelihoods through misguided
policies, the stabilisation mission in southern Afghanistan is
at great risk. The UK Government can address the problem of conflicting
objectives and support the immense task British troops are facing
by aiming to reconcile counter-insurgency, development and counter-narcotics
efforts. An immediate response that focuses on the provision of
effective development and aid and an effective counter-narcotics
strategy is required.
DFID'S LACK OF
EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT
AND FOOD
AID UNDERMINES
THE MILITARY
OPERATIONS OF
BRITISH TROOPS
IN SOUTHERN
AFGHANISTAN
7. The counter-insurgency efforts of the
British forces in Afghanistan are directly affected by the lack
of impact of the UK's broader development policies. Southern Afghanistan
is ravaged by extreme poverty. The system of food aid is dysfunctional
and inadequate; it does not even address the minimum needs of
the thousands of victims of poppy eradication and bombing campaigns
and drought. Moreover food distribution to the large camps of
displaced persons was halted in March 2006. DFID's lack of effectiveness
in delivering essential food aid and effective development has
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and has fuelled public disillusionment
against the British troops.
8. Crucially, the failure to address the
population's basic needs has led to the rise of a growing grassroots
insurgency and British forces are now faced with an increase
in Taliban activity. Building on the local grievances, the Taliban
have gained widespread local support, fuel. Impoverished rural
communities and refugee camps across southern Afghanistan have
now become the recruitment centres for the Taliban's Afghans living
in refugee camps under appalling conditions are often the victims
of poppy eradication and aerial bombing campaigns that have destroyed
their villages
9. Grassroots insurgency is also reinforced
by the perception that the Karzai government is controlled by
foreign governments. It is essential that Afghans see that they
control their future with the support of the international community
to address the needs of its people. Understanding the insurgency
realities in southern Afghanistan dictates the appropriate response.
In order to gain local confidence and support for their counter-insurgency
efforts, the British effort in Helmand needs to be closely associated
closely associated with reconstruction efforts, enabling immediate
aid to reach the population in need and actively supporting initiatives
that help to bring economic development and stability in the short
term.
Recommendation
10. Counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan
must be a complete package of diverse development-based interventions
along with a military response. The UK must ensure that its troops
are being supported by appropriate aid and development strategies.
A comprehensive development policy that tackles the real causes
of the rise in grassroots insurgency and addresses the real needs
of the Afghan people must be in place. This calls for an immediate
widespread distribution of food aid until medium-term development
can provide sustainable assistance.
ILL-FATED
RESPONSES TO
AFGHANISTAN'S
OPIUM CRISIS
IMPEDE THE
STABILISATION MISSION
OF BRITISH
FORCES
11. Years of failed counter-narcotics policies
have been at odds with counter-insurgency efforts. Although the
UK Government has proclaimed the endorsement of poppy eradication
only where there is good access to legal livelihoods, poppy eradication
is widespread in southern Afghanistan where development aid is
essentially non-existent. In particular, an extensive eradication
campaign is currently underway in Helmand province. In fact, the
FCO is now keen to test the efficiency of ground-based spraying
over manual and mechanical eradication methods. In effect, such
ill-advised, extremely costly campaigns destroy the only source
of sustainable livelihood, thus alienating rural communities.
By opposing aggressive poppy eradication, the Taliban not only
generates financial gains from the illegal drugs industry but
it also draws important political gains and legitimacy amongst
the population.
12. There is no rational justification
and assessment of the poppy eradication policy, especially no
frank evaluation of the negative impact on counter-insurgency
and reconstruction efforts. There is ample evidence showing that
there is no correlation between the levels of poppy eradication
and opium cultivation. There is however a strong correlation between
poppy eradication and the rise in insurgency. Optimising the authority
of military forces to engage in forceful counter-narcotics activities
and to "push it to the edge", as called for by the Commander
of NATO forces, jeopardises both the safety of the troops and
the stabilisation mission.
13. An effective and positive counter-narcotics
policy is a necessary and decisive factor in winning the hearts
and minds of the Afghan people and creating a conducive environment
for British troop operations The UK must immediately cease the
eradication campaign and ensure that the counter-insurgency efforts
of British troops are instead facilitated by a village-based Poppy
for Medicine response to the drugs crisis. Poppy for Medicine
is an immediately effective policy which recognises the opium
poppy as a potential economic resource for Afghanistan and, thus,
improves the livelihoods of Afghan rural communities. The key
feature of the model is that village-cultivated poppy would be
transformed into codeine and morphine tablets in the Afghan villages.
By maximising Afghanistan's renowned tradition of strong local
control systems, the economic profits will remain in the village,
providing the necessary leverage for the diversification of economic
activities. In light of the increasing global shortage of poppy-based
medicines including the growing shortage of diamorphine in the
UK, Afghanistan is ideally positioned to address this substantial
gap. This would put the local Afghan population in a commercial
position to support the Karzai government. We are willing to undertake
pilot projects in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the next planting
season, aimed at testing the controllability and economic effectiveness
of this counter-narcotics initiative.
Recommendation
14. With forceful poppy eradication operations
leading to a backlash and threatening to plunge southern Afghanistan
into further chaos, the UK Government should support the implementation
of Poppy for Medicine. This is an effective response to Afghanistan's
opium crisis, allowing for economic development and contributing
to British forces' stabilisation mission.
ADVANCING RELATIONS
BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN
WITH PAKISTAN
15. The relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan are critical for the stability of both countries and
in evolving regional dynamics. The porous border between the two
countries is a major cause of instability. The border between
Helmand province and Pakistan is of particular concern—by
exploiting the ill-defined border, the Taliban is regrouping and
gaining more power. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan will benefit
from a close relationship aiming to address their shared problems
and achieve stability.
16. The UK and the international community
could assist both Pakistan and Afghanistan by proposing the establishment
of a joint presidential committee, co-chaired by the Presidents
of both countries, with the sole purpose of working together—constructively
and persistently—on joint problem solving. Such a joint
presidential committee could be facilitated by a neutral third
party in the short term that has the trust of both presidents.
For example, General David Richards, Former Commander of NATO-ISAF,
is intimately familiar with the challenges facing both countries,
particularly from a security point of view, and has the respect
and trust of both Presidents.
Recommendation
17. As part of a cohesive strategy to address
the crisis in Afghanistan and promote long-term stability, the
UK should support Afghanistan and Pakistan to establish a joint
presidential committee, in order to collectively address shared
problems.
15 March 2007
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