Memorandum from Dr Gilbert Greenall
1. BRITISH INVOLVEMENT
IN AFGHANISTAN
1.1 It will be difficult to be successful
in Afghanistan without the support of the British public. They
are at best sceptical and there is a deep historical unease about
operations in Afghanistan. Without public support it will be very
difficult for the Government to fund this operation properly.
There has been little information about why we are there. It is
now over six years since we invaded to remove the Taliban and
destroy the AQ training camps. After five years of relative peace
why should there now be a war in Helmand Province? A commonly
understood reason is the counter narcotics policy. This is generally
ridiculed for the practical reason that it is very unlikely to
be successful and is morally questionable.
1.2 In Afghanistan the information initiative
is held by the Taliban who has had no difficulty in persuading
Afghans to see British troops as the invader, the destroyers of
their livelihoods and the enemies of their fellow Moslems in Iraq.
The British military information campaign is now a key priority.
2. FAILURE TO
CONSOLIDATE MILITARY
VICTORY
2.1 The decision to invade Afghanistan and
defeat the Taliban in 2002 was necessary and undoubtedly correct.
The Taliban allowed the AQ training camps which were a direct
threat to the United Kingdom.
2.2 Within hours of Kabul being taken the
euphoria that greeted the Coalition was heartfelt and genuine.
However, the failure to demonstrate the benefits of peace in the
100 days that followed and use this goodwill to consolidate the
military success, left a vacuum which has been exploited by the
Taliban.
2.3 There was no post conflict recovery
plan in December 2001. Even then interest on Iraq was distracting
attention from Afghanistan. The military defeat of the Taliban
appeared so easy that new objectives of nation building and counter
narcotics took centre stage. Rural Afghanistan was neglected and
the Taliban were able to recover.
3. WHAT ARE
THE UK'S
OBJECTIVES?
3.1 It might be useful to examine exactly
what the UK's objectives are in Afghanistan, whether we are approaching
these problems in the right way and how British government policy
is affecting Central Asia beyond the borders of Afghanistan?
3.2 The initial objective was to remove
a direct threat to the United Kingdom (AQ training camps). The
establishment of democracy, the strengthening of a centralised
modern nation state as a barrier to international terrorism and
an attempt to stem the supply of heroin from Afghanistan have
been added since 2001.
3.3 Do these have a reasonable probability
of success regardless of the outcome of the military campaign
in Helmand?
3.4 Defeat the Taliban and their Support to
AQ
3.4.1 Every report indicates that British
Military operations have been successful and that the Taliban
has been severely weakened. However, this is not a problem that
has a simple military solution. The population of Helmand and
Afghanistan have to see the benefits of international intervention.
Unless this happens the Taliban will regain support.
3.4.2 The security situation has made it
difficult for civil assistance projects to demonstrate the benefits
of peace. The distraction caused by the Gulf War meant that the
goodwill after the 2001 defeat was not sufficiently used to improve
the welfare of the rural population. It is difficult to recover
from this position now.
3.5 Counter narcotics
3.5.1 Afghanistan has had a rapid population
growth over the last 20 years. The population is now over 26 million
and there has been a food deficit of 350,000 metric tonnes for
some years. Cereal crops are unreliable and cultivation of poppies
is advantageous on the grounds that they will grow on poor soil
and survive unreliable rainfall. For a large proportion of this
rural population there is no immediate alternative.
3.5.2 The "narco" economy permeates
every sinew of economic life in Afghanistan and foreign backed
attempts to irradiate it are unlikely to succeed. Even if successful
in Afghanistan the narcotic trade would migrate elsewhere in Central
Asia. It is easy to see transference of allegiance from Taliban
to "narco" warrior to freedom fighter, all united against
the interfering foreigner. Our domestic drug problem requires
a domestic solution.
3.5.3 A counter narcotics policy is not
only unlikely to succeed but will undermine the central objective
to defeat the Taliban. It will inevitably lead to the UK getting
tangled in internal Afghan politics. There is no doubt that this
will generate conflict.
3.6 Strengthening Central Government
3.6.1 It has been clear that failed states
harbour international terrorists. Injudicious military interventions
also create international terrorists. It has been argued that
a solution to this problem is to create a strong centralised central
state in Afghanistan.
3.6.2 The idea of Afghanistan as a nation
state is a relatively modern and western idea. It has traditionally
been a buffer zone between other countries and loyalties determined
by tribal rather than national considerations. Because of tribal
allegiances, a strong central government is unlikely to be popular
anywhere outside Kabul. Neighbouring countries may be equally
unenthusiastic. Afghanistan should have functioning government
departments but insensitive attempts by foreigners to strengthen
the central government against the provinces are likely to increase
instability and violence.
3.6.3 Even if the United Kingdom thinks
that strengthening the central government is important, the proportion
of GDP devoted to it is unrealistic, it is probably no more than
half that of other extremely poor countries. The problem is not
only funding. Many government departments in Kabul do not have
the capacity to improve central government services even if they
wished to. Capacity building will take at least a generation not
the four years originally envisaged.
3.7 Establishing Democracy
3.7.1 Clearly anecdotal evidence, but discussions
with Afghans revealed a dislike for democracy imposed by foreigners
and preference for traditional political arrangements. The Afghans
are fiercely independent and there was a strong message here about
foreigners meddling in their affairs
4. DESTABILISATION
OF PAKISTAN
4.1 There is a danger that international
military operations in Afghanistan are already destabilising Pakistan.
An unstable Pakistan is a much bigger threat than Afghanistan.
5. UK FUNDING
5.1 The press reports £1billion being
budgeted for the war but only £180 million for civil projects
in Afghanistan. The exact figures and the period are not important
but the disparity is.
6. THE WAY
FORWARD
6.1 The military campaign has had nothing
but praise. Lt General David Richards and Brigadier Ed Butler
have taken the military initiative and severely weakened the Taliban.
The campaign plan is dependent on the lives of Afghans improving,
a task that is DFID's responsibility. What will now be important
is to make sure that other UK objectives do not undermine the
military success. A clear, simple objective (the defeat of the
Taliban) geographical focus in Helmand Province, realistic funding
and timeframe are required. It is not clear this is going to happen.
7. INFORMATION
CAMPAIGN
7.1 The British public need to understand
exactly why we are involved in Afghanistan if they are to be supportive
and accept the considerable cost over the next few years.
7.2 The Afghans need to see British activities
in their country as helpful and supportive. They should not find
UK policy threatening or interfering.
8. OPIUM POPPY
CULTIVATION
8.1 To destroy the only source of income
that people have can only generate conflict, especially when done
by interfering foreigners. This policy needs to be abandoned by
the UK, the Coalition and NATO partners. As security improves,
irrigation systems are repaired and there is access to markets,
other forms of livelihood can replace opium.
9. CIVIL MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
9.1 There has been too much concern about
the deployment of civilians in conflict zones. If Britain is serious
about expeditionary campaigns key civilians must be deployed if
necessary. They have not deployed in sufficient numbers and this
has delayed projects demonstrating the benefits of peace and improving
the welfare of the civilian population.
9.2 The same amount of effort should be directed
at improving the lives of the civilian population as in the war
against the Taliban.
10. FUNDING
10.1 The UK funding so far for civil projects
has been disproportionate to the cost of the military campaign
both centrally in Kabul and provincially, yet the overall plan
was to help the Afghans not wage war against them. Delay over
spending the $5 billion of international funding pledged will
have serious consequences.
11. TIMESCALE
11.1 Afghanistan's troubles over the last
30 years will take a generation to cure. Four year plans at nation
building are not helpful. If the UK is serious about Afghanistan
we need to realistic about the funding and length of commitment
required.
12. CONCLUSION
12.1 There has been a loss of strategic
focus.
12.2 The needs in Afghanistan are beyond
the scope of one nation yet Britain is taking a disproportionate
share of the international effort. Currently Britain's contribution
is split between multiple objectives some of which are working
against the successful outcome of others.
12.3 It would be wiser to direct all the
effort, both military and civil in Helmand Province, with one
single objective, the defeat of the Taliban.
12.4 Britain's military effort must continue
to be associated with improvements to the welfare of the civilian
population otherwise it will be seen as an army of occupation.
12.5 This effort, both military and civil,
requires adequate resources and a realistic timeframe.
12.6 Kabul is much less stable than it appears.
The rapid economic growth in Kabul is no more than "narco"
consumerism not real economic growth. The capacity of government
departments remains poor. The Afghans are fiercely independent
and resent foreign interference. Present UK policy remains high
risk.
27 March 2007
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