Memorandum from Dr Michael Williams
Dr Michael Williams is a NATO expert, currently
engaged in strategic concepts and planning evaluation examining
civil-military relations in Afghanistan.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. NATO has made a valuable contribution
towards improving the stability, security and development of Afghanistan.
Despite the progress made, however, the current situation is less
than ideal. Primary areas where the Alliance has failed to deliver
adequately included: (a) failure to agree on a standard mandate
for NATO operations; (b) provision of adequate numbers of fighting
forces and supporting equipment; and (d) a failure to effectively
harness the "comprehensive approach". A lack of international
funding for the mission and a reluctance/inability to address
the external factors affecting the security situation in Afghanistan
have also hampered the mission. These shortcomings are exacerbated
by the fact that the international community is largely absent
from Afghanistan. NATO has been handed the entire responsibility
for a mission that it never accepted. NATO should be only key
actor among many in Afghanistan, not the sole provider of security,
reconstruction and development.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
2. The overriding issue with NATO's involvement
in Afghanistan is that the nature of the mission has never been
agreed upon by all the Allies. The International Security Assistance
Force, operated by NATO, is charged with "assisting"
the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) with the maintenance of security
throughout the country." [1]This
should consequently enable the GOA and the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to operate across the country.
NATO has defined security very broadly, and as such ISAF encompasses
substantial reconstruction and development tasks, in addition
to military campaigns. This has led the public to believe that
NATO is responsible for rebuilding Afghanistan and it has meant
that UNAMA has not played a major role in country. NATO allies
are themselves quite divided over how maintaining security should
be achieved. Certain members feel that the primary object is reconstruction
and development and have sold the mission to their publics as
a "peace-keeping and development" operation. Consequently,
they do not want to engage in combat. Other members, while believing
that reconstruction and development are essential to long-term
security and stability in Afghanistan, believe that kinetic operations,
particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan, are essential
to support development objectives. The lack of consensus on this
point has meant that allies have been (a) reluctant to contribute
fighting troops and equipment and (b) have failed to standardise
a "NATO approach" to the country, instead utilising
different combinations of military power and development in an
entirely uncoordinated manner. There is also a real threat that
NATO is seeking to impose a Western system of government in Afghanistan,
which is not a practical or achievable objective.
MANPOWER AND
EQUIPMENT
3. As of 13 February 2007 there were approximately
35,460 allied soldiers in Afghanistan. The largest contingent
consists of 14,000 US troops. The other large contributors are
Britain (5,200), Germany (3,000), Canada (2,500), the Netherlands
(2,200) and Italy (1,950). The remaining 7,000 troops are provided
by an additional 31 countries with smaller contingents including
1,000 French soldiers, 800 from Turkey and 550 from Spain. The
current number of troops may seem like a large number, but in
reality it is quite low.
Table 1
COMPARISON OF PEAK INTERNATIONAL TROOP DEPLOYMENT
STRENGTH[2]
| Location | Peak Number of
Int'l Troops
| Int'l Troops
per km |
Int'l Troops
per person |
| Kosovo | 40,000 | 1 per 0.3km
| 1 per 50 |
| Bosnia | 60,000 | 1 per 0.85km
| 1 per 66 |
| East Timor | 9,000 | 1 per 1.6km
| 1 per 111 |
| Iraq | 155,000 | 1 per 2.8km
| 1 per 161 |
| Somalia | 40,000 | 1 per 16km
| 1 per 200 |
| Liberia | 11,000 2200 (MEF)
| 1 per 8km | 1 per 265 |
| Sierra Leone | 18,000 | 1 per 4km
| 1 per 300 |
| Haiti | 20,000 | 1 per 1.5km
| 1 per 375 |
| Afghanistan | 20,000 (OEF)
6,000 (ISAF)
|
1 per 25km |
1 per 1,115
|
| | |
|
4. This chart dates from 2004 and thus does not reflect
the most current ISAF troop levels, but even with the additional
troops now in Afghanistan, the ratios are among the worst. There
is one international soldier per 1,123 persons. There is no escaping
the fact that if one applies low levels of economic assistance
and military forces to a reconstruction operation in a post-conflict
society, the results will be low levels of security, slow economics
growth and a lack of public confidence in the ability of the GOA/NATO
to deliver. This last factor may ultimately undermine the ability
to deliver on the first two issues. There are several causes for
the low levels of NATO troops in country. Chief contributors such
as the US and UK are overstretched, but they have in recent months
increased their military manpower in Afghanistan. The more fundamental
problem is that the unresolved issue as to the exact nature of
the mission, coupled with a failure to understand the gravity
of the security situation in Afghanistan, means many larger allies
have not deployed adequate numbers of troops and equipment. Smaller
allies lack sufficient expeditionary resources—but contributions
by the Danes, Macedonians, and Estonians illustrate that they
are committed to the operation. One must keep in mind; however,
than an inability to send more troops does not mean that some
NATO members do not value the mission. Italy for example cannot
send additional troops, as the government is already under pressure
for the current deployment. The Germans also have serious issues
in this area. The recent deployment of six Tornado aircraft for
reconnaissance was met with stiff resistance. Given Germany's
strategic culture this should not be a surprise and the country
has become much more involved in military action since 1991, so
perhaps it is best to accept that this process does take time.
Maintaining cohesion and fair burden sharing are inevitable challenges
when using an alliance meant for Cold War territorial defence
on an expeditionary mission far from home. Alliance transformation
will take time, but the lack of sufficient manpower and enablers
was a serious problem for ISAF IX under the command of UK General
David Richards.
5. Between May 2006 and February 2007 ISAF faced several
serious military challenges. After Operation Medusa General Richards
was not able to maintain sufficient troop presence to ensure that
areas cleared of Taliban during the operation remained Taliban
free. There were also times during the UK led-ISAF IX that General
Richards was hard-pressed to avoid defeat in what was largely
a conventional battle. Had it not been for the close air-support,
it is very well possible that ISAF may have lost battles to the
Taliban. General Richards would have fared much better had a strategic
reserve been on hand. While manpower is the primary consideration
in effective counter-insurgency operations, adequate equipment
is required. ISAF has also been short of key enablers. Heavy lift
capacity (both fixed wing and rotary), combat support, logistics
have all been lacking throughout the mission. Additional troops,
without enablers, are in many ways an empty donation. While NATO
troops are required, a key factor in long-term success is the
development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP). Neither organisation is fully competent enough to
handle the security situation alone, but the ANA is increasingly
working alongside ISAF forces. This is progress, but they must
not be rushed into extreme combat situations before they are ready.
Such moves may ultimately erode the long-term development of the
ANA. The ANP is significantly less developed than the ANA and
has largely failed to provide adequate policing to increase the
writ of government in Kabul.
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
6. Despite the large percentage of the ISAF mission that
has been consumed with kinetic operations, the approach to providing
long-term security and stability has been defined as one that
encompasses reconstruction and development, as well as military
operations. This is known as the "comprehensive approach".
To be effective this approach must utilise not only the military
and civilian capabilities of governments, but also of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs), such as CARE and Christian Aid, as well
as International Organisations (IO) such as the World Bank. While
theoretically sound the current strategy has been less than optimally
implemented. There exist several schisms in what is supposed to
be a unified Western/International effort.
7. Within NATO there are two levels of difficulty. First,
the defence ministries, development agencies and foreign ministries
of most NATO member states do not adequately communicate with
each other. Reports from Afghanistan indicate that there are good
people-to-people relationships between MoD, DFID and FCO representatives,
but those relationships do not extend upwards back to Whitehall.
In addition to intra-governmental schisms, there is a failure
to coordinate across NATO amongst the various national missions
operating in Afghanistan. The primary tool for provision of security,
reconstruction and development is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). PRTs harness a national government's economic, military,
development and foreign affairs assets to provide comprehensive
security and development assistance in a specific region of Afghanistan.
The PRT, while useful, has two major failings.
8. First, there is no standard product. Every national
PRT has a different mandate. Some focus on security, others development
and reconstruction. Some do both. Others are obsessed with protecting
their own forces and do very little at all. Furthermore, the money
from each PRT comes directly from a national capitol, which means
that the PRT answers to Berlin, Washington, London or Ottawa,
rather than COMISAF and Kabul. Within PRTs the military side reports
through ISAF, but the civilian side does not. This means that
the civilian side is more susceptible to national influence, because
of purse strings, than the military sides run by the ISAF commander.
Some PRTs consult with the Government in Kabul and local populations
about what projects are needed and engage the community. Others
just blindly build schools in a random development grid, which
then go unused. In the worse cases they end up as Taliban bases
that need to be destroyed at a later date. ISAF IX attempted to
rectify some of these deficits establishing a PRT Handbook, standardised
reporting requirements and greater investment in common training
for PRT staff, but more progress is needed. Brussels must establish
a NATO norm for PRT deliverables. At the same time Brussels needs
to provide ISAF with enough devolved power to be effective on
the ground. Different institutions operating in Afghanistan take
decisions at different levels; the most effective generally are
those with a high degree of devolved authority.
9. Second, PRTs have largely failed to harness the NGOs
that operate in Afghanistan. This does not mean that NGOs should
be subordinate to ISAF, but there must be better coordination
between NGOs and ISAF civilian and military forces. NGOs worry
that PRTs unnecessarily duplicate the NGO mission and that the
reconstruction element of the PRT confuses Afghans as to the difference
between PRTs and NGOs. This is important, for whereas the military
relies on armoured vehicles and guns for security, NGOs rely on
the full consent of the people. If the population becomes hostile
NGOs are very soft targets. NGOs also feel that the military places
too much emphasis on quick-fix projects to win "hearts and
minds" and not enough time and effort is spent on long-term
development projects. Most NGOs have consequently decided to have
nothing to do with PRTs. This is not good for NATO or Afghanistan.
The NGOs criticisms are valid ones that have yet to be adequately
addressed or rectified.
10. To rectify some of these civil-military issues it
would make sense to split Afghanistan into three types of zones:
High-Conflict, Low-Conflict, Minimal-Conflict. In High Conflict
Zones (HCZ) such as Lashkar Gah and Kandahar the military would
be the major presence, engaged in mainly kinetic ops, with quick
relief reconstruction to support the campaign. Low-Conflict Zones
(LCZ) in Bamyan, Ghazni and Gardez would be engaged by PRTs that
would have a balance between military and development components.
PRTs could handle insecure situations, but would not be engaged
in heavy combat operations. Finally, Minimal-Conflict Zones (MCZ)
in areas such as Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Herat would be engaged
by NGOs with only minimal military patrols and no-PRT presence.
This would avoid NATO supplanting NGOs and it would allow for
better allocation of NATO forces hopefully enabling delivery of
security, development and better governance from Kabul.
INTERNATIONAL FUNDING
11. It is useful to compare Kosovo to Afghanistan to
see how little funding that country has received. In the first
four years after major fighting concluded in Kosovo the province
received $1.8 billion in international aid for a population just
under 2 million. In the four years since the ousting of the Taliban
from power in 2001 Afghanistan was pledged $15 billion but only
received some $4.7 billion. The population of Afghanistan is 29
million. Therefore, whereas the people of Kosovo received some
$900 per head, Kabul has received $162 per head. Kosovo, located
in Europe with a legacy of development in an industrialised country,
was not nearly as decrepit as Afghanistan. Two hundred years as
a buffer state between the Russian Empire and the British Empire,
followed by occupation and conflict under Soviet control from
1979 to 1988, then a civil war, followed by Taliban rule and finally
the US-led invasion in 2003 has left Afghanistan in ruins. The
level of international funding has never been enough and more
recent contributions (ie US, Canada) while helpful, still do not
adequately match the development challenges in Afghanistan.
NEIGHBOURING STATES
12. The bulk of this report has focused on the internal
facets of Afghanistan's security and reconstruction, but it is
worth noting that the ISAF mission will not be a success without
the assistance of Afghanistan's neighbours. No matter the number
of western troops deployed, the amount of money donated or the
development projects completed—there will be no security
in Afghanistan without the support of neighbouring states. It
is next to impossible to suppress well-established insurgencies
that enjoy "external support and neighbouring sanctuary."
At the moment ISAF is engaged in securing the Afghan frontier,
but it is not proactively addressing the threat from the other
side of the border in Pakistan. The UK and its NATO allies must
address the issue of Pakistan head on.
CONCLUSION
13. NATO is not failing in Afghanistan, but it is a long-way
from a successful end-point. The Alliance has assumed a massive
task, which will require adaptability, patience and a long-term
commitment. NATO can succeed in Afghanistan if ISAF is provided
with the resources and time required for such a daunting undertaking.
It should not be surprise that western militaries have been slow
to adapt to the reality of conflict in Afghanistan. Conflict is
no longer linear—aid, military operations and diplomacy
all need to occur simultaneously in places like Afghanistan. This
type of conflict is still very new to the West. It will take time
to adapt. It is crucial, however, the NATO gets the equation correct
in determining the proper-mix of civilian vs. military activities.
This is not to excuse the fact that NATO failed in part to extend
effective governance away from the Kabul and major cities, into
the countryside, particularly in the South. This is not surprising
in some ways given the nature of the situation in Southern Afghanistan,
but it means that as renewed violence threatens, local populations
are still waiting from promises to be delivered and have little
incentive to risk their lives. They may not turn against NATO,
but they will not go out of their way to support the Alliance
either. To rectify this situation the Alliance must recommit itself
to the mission. It must ensure that adequate troop numbers and
key enablers in place. The Alliance must address the gaps in the
comprehensive approach, standardise PRTs and more effectively
coordinate with other international actors. Without such changes
there is little hope for sustained success in Afghanistan.
29 March 2007
1
UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003), and
1623 (2005). Back
2
M Bhatia, K Lanigan and P Wilkinson "Minimal Investments,
Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan"
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004. Back
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