Second memorandum from Dr Michael Williams
1. Mr Stewart put forward an interesting
proposal—to pull out of operations in Southern Afghanistan
and to focus on the development of the North. He failed, however,
to connect it to the larger picture and I think failed to consider
the possible strategic implications of his suggestion.
I would therefore like to raise a number of points and questions
that you should consider.
2. What does pulling back mean for the larger
mission? If you cede control of Southern Afghanistan will the
forces there be happy with just this plot of land? There is a
strong possibility that they may then press further into the North
and endanger all the progress to date made in this region. If
the idea of pulling back is linked to not expending additional
military resources, the reality is that the Taliban will most
likely just push up on the border established by NATO between
the North and South. As such, military conflict will still be
an issue. Only this time, it will occur closer to areas that are
currently stable and on their way towards development. Rarely
is giving up ground the sound military strategy. One should also
keep in mind that the security situation in Afghanistan is not
created by an Afghan insurgency. This is very much an internal/external
conflict. The majority of the population is complacent—they
just want to be on the right side of the conflict when it ends.
The insurgency in the South does not enjoy broad support across
the country.
3. Geopolitically, the external dimension
of this problem must be considered. What does an ungoverned southern
Afghanistan mean for the region? Is it in the interest of Pakistan
to have such a region abutting Waziristan? Considering that this
insurgency is mainly driven by Pashtuns (NB: the insurgency involves
many Pashtuns, but not every Pashtun is an insurgent!) leaving
two such ungoverned spaces together may result in the creation
of a new state. It is very possible that two such regions could
unite and form a Pashtunistan. Does the Government of Pakistan
want such a state on its border? What effects would this have
on the stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan? How does an ungoverned
space such as this help reduce the threat of terrorism to the
UK domestic population? A peaceful Northern Afghanistan that is
not a terror threat to the UK, neighboured by an ungoverned and
extremist South would seem to be a rather neutral outcome and
does not offer a much different situation that pre-9/11 Afghanistan.
There will still be a terrorist safe-haven and a point from which
both Afghanistan and Pakistan can be destabilised.
4. Pulling out of Southern Afghanistan may
be an option, but it should not be suggested trivially. The one
situation where this strategy should be employed is where it would
prevent a total NATO pull out of Afghanistan. If conceding
the South means keeping a NATO presence in Kabul, the North and
West then it would be a worthwhile sacrifice, but this should
not be the first option. It is not an easy way out. There
are no easy outs in the situation. We have seen time and time
again how ungoverned spaces come to affect Western security. I
do not think an ungoverned space makes much strategic sense either
for UK security, the future of Afghanistan or regional security.
29 March 2007
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