Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-163)
DR SHIRIN
AKINER, DR
GILBERT GREENALL
AND MS
NORINE MACDONALD
QC
27 MARCH 2007
Q160 Mr Holloway: Norine referred
to the Central Asia Development Group which has a huge agricultural
development programme in Helmand with extraordinary local Afghan
infrastructures. I do not know if you know, but that is no longer
being funded so they are sitting around the compound doing nothing.
Is there not a point that there is actually some Afghan infrastructure
for development and there are actually structures in the villages
and you do not actually need the Royal Engineers or the UN who
may or may not come next year. Is that not something that we are
missing out, that the Afghans do have some capacity themselves?
Ms MacDonald: We do not have what
we would call a Western style rule of law, infrastructure and
governance in there and we do not necessarily immediately see
the governance that is there because we are not used to it. For
example, the reason we only survey men is because the social controls
and the social structure make it impossible for us to hire women
and survey women; it is really strong and you cannot break through
that and it governs their behaviour. There are some complicated
relationships around sharing water and the use of community facilities,
but it all does exist. As I said, the village is a highly controlled
structure and we want to experiment and see whether it is possible
to take that force and use that to support the Karzai government
and address these issues. It is a combination of our approach,
the international community's approach, and what already exists.
We need to find some innovative synergies there and experiment
with that.
Q161 Mr Havard: This business about
eradicating poppy, we were told by our side of this, the British
military, that we are not engaging in eradication policies and
what you describe are American contractors, is that correct?
Ms MacDonald: That is correct,
but I do believe your Government is financing them.
Q162 Mr Havard: We will ask about
that separately, but let us just take this point. You say you
want a special trade framework that is making the growing of these
poppies and production facilities in the village to turn them
into codeine and what have you, so you add the value up a point,
which is what I understand is happening with the illicit drugs
now. That is the major change between the last twice I have been,
that the production is actually happening in the village and they
do not just export the raw product. They have twigged onto that,
you want to do that but you talk about a special framework and
you talk about it becoming a taxable activity, but it becomes
part of the legal economy as opposed to the illegal economy. Of
course, you also talk about using the "proven local control
systems" and you talk about the "renowned tradition
of strong local control systems and economic profits remaining
in the villages." I remember having a discussion with some
of General Dostrum's boys about giving up their guns; there are
certainly strong local control systems in various parts of Afghanistan
but I am just wondering whether you are making the process of
growing something that will leak out illegally more efficiently
than it currently is because you do not have the criminal justice
system and other parts of the mechanisms of the state in order
to enforce and practically police what you describe as a jolly
good idea.
Ms MacDonald: And I understand
those concerns. For example, if all of us lived in a village together
and we were all farmers we would know, because we have all been
living there for generations, I would know exactly how many jeribs
you had and how many jeribs he had and I would know exactly how
many kilograms of opium he can produce and you can produce. Our
village licence would calculate on the base of our jerbis the
total amount that we would have to deliver. If he does not deliver
you lose your licence; if you do not diversify, he loses his licence.
We have to test that. As I said, we are not saying it should happen
in Afghanistan, we are just saying we are spending millions of
dollars on a counter-narcotics strategy that is counterproductive—cultivation
was up 60% last year. The Americans did this successfully in Turkey
and India and we should give it a try, so what we are asking for
is to run pilot projects with a balanced, politically diverse
group of observers and see what the answers are to these questions.
I cannot give you any assurance on these points unless we have
been allowed to test them.
Q163 Mr Havard: I know you cannot.
I am well aware of that.
Dr Greenall: The wise course is
to leave those counter-narcotics alone. Whatever you do you will
end up with the law of unintended consequence; it is highly complicated
and it involves the whole of Afghan society. It draws you into
very complicated internal politics and even if you were successful
it would only migrate across the Oxus. I am welcoming the option
to try and do something legitimate because of the point I made
about the rainfall and the unreliability of cereal crops in Afghanistan,
but it must be incentive-driven. If it is incentive-driven and
the market favours it, it will happen.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed
to all three of you. You have been extremely, if I may say so,
courageous, not in going to Helmand but in coming here. Thank
you for your most valuable evidence and we will be able to think
very long and hard about what you have told us. I will now declare
a three-minute break before the next part of the session.
The Committee adjourned for a short time.
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