Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320-339)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
CBE, MR DESMOND
BOWEN CMG, MR
PETER HOLLAND
AND MS
LINDY CAMERON
OBE
8 MAY 2007
Q320 Mr Jenkin: And that is happening?
Lieutenant General Houghton: That
is happening.
Q321 Chairman: When will the Mastiff
deployment be complete?
Lieutenant General Houghton: I
have not got a firm date, but there has been no change. It is
the late autumn, which is, I think, what I gave last time and,
as far as we are aware, there is no change to that.
Q322 Chairman: So there has been
no delay?
Lieutenant General Houghton: No
delay that I am aware of.
Q323 Mr Borrow: There have been a
number of suggestions made to the Committee, including by General
Richards and President Karzai, that the effectiveness of military
operations would be improved if the length of the tours were increased
or at least as far as the senior officers were concerned, if they
were there for a longer period of time. I wonder how you respond
to the suggestion that senior officers should be there for periods
in excess of six months?
Des Browne: Well, I agree with
them, that there is advantage in relation to certain posts to
have people there for longer than six months. Of course, again
as General Richards told you, that has consequences for the families
of those who may be asked to stay in post for longer. General
Richards himself did nine months in post precisely for the reasons
that he and President Karzai believe would come as a benefit to
operations from extended periods like that about continuity, building
relationships and all the things that are important for the people
at that senior level. Major-General Page, who will take over as
the Commander for Regional Command South, will serve nine months.
Whether we take this further and apply it to other posts of course
will depend on the job involved, but I have no objection in principle,
but the only other point I make is of course that we are operating
in a multi-national environment and the length of tours of commanding
officers, particularly where they are commanding troops from another
country, is a matter for negotiation and discussion with our NATO
partners and others who are deployed in the area, and we have
to take into account the views of other countries as well as the
views, with all due respect, of General Richards and President
Karzai and the other people who get a vote in this particular
discussion. I agree with them and I think there is something to
be said for extending the tours of important people at a particular
stage at this stage in the command.
Q324 Mr Borrow: Do you consider it
was worth exploring the possibility of extending ISAF XI and XII
to periods of in excess of one year?
Des Browne: I am not sure what
would be gained by extending the periods of ISAF. There are ongoing
discussions all the time about the terms of service of senior
officers and, as I say, they are discussed at a fairly senior
level between the Chiefs of the Defence Staff all the time. What
has emerged from that which has affected our officers is that
both General Richards and General Page will be extended to nine
months, or they have been and will be extended to nine months.
Q325 Mr Hancock: In the summer of
last year, ISAF's assessment of the Taliban's capability and tactics
seems to have been somewhat unreliable and we were getting conflicting
information about the reliability of our intelligence. How can
we be sure that the current assessments we are getting are more
accurate?
Des Browne: Intelligence is just
what it says it is; it is information which is gathered. I think
we are in danger of getting into the situation where we put more
of a burden on the people who collect this information and on
the information than they are entitled to bear. Intelligence can
only guide us and we have to make our best assessment on the basis
of the information that we glean from a number of sources. Why
do we think we are better in a position to come to more accurate
conclusions? Well, we have a year of experience in the environment,
we have a year of experience of observing the enemy, of collecting
information from engagement with them, observing their tactics,
learning from logistic lines their lines of communication and
also from building up the sorts of sources that we would normally
use for intelligence purposes in that environment, so we are better
placed from that year's experience to come to conclusions than
we were when we had not been in that environment before and were
relying solely on intelligence that had been gleaned from a comparatively
small number of sources.
Q326 Mr Hancock: When the Committee
were in Afghanistan, they heard conflicting interpretations of
the purpose of the agreement in Musa Qalehh, and General Richards
acknowledged that there were shortcomings in the way that the
agreement was explained to the Afghans. What steps have been taken
to improve the way ISAF gets its message and its role, its specific
role, across to the Afghans at all levels?
Des Browne: As far as the Musa
Qaleh agreement is concerned, it is not just the Afghan people
who, in my view, misunderstand the Musa Qaleh agreement. I read
over the weekend a very interesting report by Amnesty International
on the violence of the Taliban and breaches of human rights by
the Taliban, and no doubt members of the Committee have read that
report. At the heart of that report there is an assertion that
we, the UK Government or our Commanding Officer, negotiated the
Musa Qaleh agreement with the tribal elders of Musa Qaleh. The
fact of the matter is that that is not true. It was gleaned from
media reports of that agreement back here in the United Kingdom
where the footnotes indicate where that came from, as indeed almost
every assertion that is made in the report has a footnote that
depends on the media somewhere or another, but that is not the
case. The fact of the matter is that the Musa Qaleh agreement
was an Afghan agreement. It was an agreement by the Governor of
Helmand with the tribal elders which was endorsed by the President
himself and, in those circumstances, it was an Afghan agreement
that we respected and which we thought had potential for a template
for moving forward if the tribal elders were able to exclude the
Taliban from their area and allow the Governor's writ to run in
the area. We thought that was far better than having to fight
in these communities and we were supportive of it, but it was
an Afghan agreement.
Q327 Mr Hancock: But the President
himself—
Des Browne: Let me just answer
the second part of your question, Mr Hancock, which is that the
only way in which we can ensure that the people of these communities
know and understand what is going on is by encouraging and improving
communication between their Government both at central and at
provincial level and the people who represent them, the tribal
elders, and, as I have already explained, we were very successful,
it would appear, in doing that in relation to Op Silver and Op
Silicon by using in one case the President and a shura and then
the other the Governor himself sitting down with the tribal elders
and explaining to them what is going on, and that is what we continually
try to do. Over and above that, of course we have, as ISAF, the
opportunity to put out messages on the radio or to put out messages
through local media, and we do that, but the fundamental is if
their own people who lead the communities know and understand
what is going on and explain it to them, then that is the most
successful. This is substantially an environment where word of
mouth dominates this area.
Q328 Mr Hancock: But do you feel
that there is a problem yourself and is the advice that you are
giving that there is a failure to explain properly? The Committee
were told by the President himself and indeed by General McNeill
that they had real reservations about the way this agreement had
been put together. Now, it is an Afghan agreement, but the President
raised with this Committee very strongly held reservations and
said that he doubted whether he would sanction such an agreement
again. Are you personally concerned on the advice you are getting
that the real message of what we are actually doing there is not
getting across at all levels? I do not want to talk about ordinary
Afghans. If you have the situation where the President and the
Afghan farmer have doubts about why we are there, then are we
sure that we are actually telling people why we are there?
Des Browne: Well, just like in
this community or this society, mostly when people are commenting
on things that have happened, then they are not motiveless. Helmand
Province is a very challenging environment, not just physically
in terms of its terrain, its weather patterns and its poverty,
but the Taliban operate in there and these people are capable
of propaganda in a way that would be unthinkable to us. They can
do things which we would never contemplate doing. First of all,
they lie comprehensively, they lie with violence and they intimidate
and they use night letters and other ways of getting their messages
into the community, and it is very difficult for us with the constraints
that we have and the way in which we can approach these issues,
quite proper constraints, to be able to face that sort of intimidation
and propaganda down. It is not surprising in these communities
that people who are having a message delivered to them quite often
with an overt or implied threat are more impressed by that message
than they are by the carefully delivered message which is designed
to try and encourage them to stand up against that. It is also
not surprising to me that sometimes people are selective in their
recollection of exactly how certain circumstances come about if
they are not as successful as they think they may be. What I am
satisfied of is that we are doing the very best in very difficult
circumstances, but our whole objective is to build up the ability
of the Afghan Government to be able to engage with its people
and give them the reassurance that they need because that is what
we are about because building governance is a key element of this
and our ability to be able to do that depends on how good the
messages are that we are given by the Afghan Government as well,
but I am satisfied that we are doing as well as we can, but that
does not mean that we will not improve in doing it. The longer
we are in there, the better we will get at doing it.
Q329 Robert Key: Chairman, some people
have suggested to us Secretary of State that there is a real need
to improve the number and performance of political advisers to
the military. How many political advisers are there in Helmand,
should or could there be more and what is the role of the political
adviser to the military?
Des Browne: I do not know the
answer to the specific question about numbers, I am sorry, though
maybe somebody at this table knows the specific answer, but we
can get that for you. To be honest, Mr Key, in four visits this
year to Afghanistan, nobody has ever raised this issue with me
about the number of political advisers, so that is the reason
why I have had no reason to ask anybody how many there actually
are. I meet people who do that job and I know they are valued
very highly by the people they work with. Their role is to do
exactly, with respect, what it says on the tin and that is to
advise the military about the political environment that they
are operating in, to be au fait with it, its complications, and
to make sure that they know and understand those complications,
but, I have to say, my sense of the military officers that I have
met at that level who have political advisers is that they are
very alert and very aware of the political circumstances that
they operate in in any event and that they tend to complement
each other and advise each other, and I have seen a lot of relationships
between political advisers and senior military officers which
were very supportive of each other.
Q330 Robert Key: Which I think, Secretary
of State, underlines my point that they are clearly very useful.
Des Browne: They are.
Q331 Robert Key: They clearly have
great potential and what I am saying is that, if people are saying
to people like me, "We need more of them", perhaps that
is something that might be considered to help the environment.
Des Browne: It is certainly something
that we will now go and look at. I have to say, nobody has ever
said to me that they need more advice at this level, but, if they
do need more of them, there is no reason why we should not look
to see if we cannot provide more of them to them to support them.
There are over and above of course political advisers that are
FCO civil servants in Helmand who also have the ability and capability
to be able to analyse the politics and there are people who work
for DFID as well who have these skills. I was not aware that there
was a shortage of these skills, but I am certainly prepared to
go and look at it.
Q332 Chairman: Secretary of State,
may I move on to the fulfilling of ISAF's requirements? We have
heard about the CJSOR, the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements,
and we have heard that last year it was not satisfied in that
there was no strategic reserve and that the summit in Riga moved
towards fulfilling some of it but still some of it remains unfulfilled.
Are you disappointed by NATO's apparent inability to meet the
requirements of the CJSOR?
Des Browne: Can I just say, Chairman,
that it would be better in my view if the requirements of the
CJSOR had been met but, as you point out, this is fundamentally
a question for NATO. Consistently we have, as the United Kingdom,
put our money where our mouth is and we have supported this mission
well, as have a number of other nations, and I continue to press
others to identify and deploy resources that will move towards
the fulfilment of the CJSOR. I learned today, and I did not know
this but I share this with the Committee, that nobody in our department
has any knowledge of any NATO CJSOR for any operation ever being
fully fulfilled. I am going to have it checked to make sure that
it is exactly right, but I am told that it is quite common for
NATO CJSORs not to be fully fulfilled.[5]
Q333 Chairman: What does that say about
NATO?
Des Browne: The only thing I can
say it says about NATO is that the NATO countries have never been
able to fulfil the statement of requirements. I am not in a position
to go into the motivation of the individual countries in relation
to all of the operations but as far as this CJSOR is concerned
this ISAF Commander has significantly more resource available
to him than General Richards had, but essentially he asked for
seven additional battle groups and—
Q334 Chairman: I thought it was eight.
Des Browne: I think it was seven.[6]
Q335 Chairman: And he has got six.
Des Browne: He has been given
five.[7]
I think the two that are missing are the border one and the Nimruz
battle group.
Q336 Chairman: But that is quite an important
battalion, is it not, to go onto the border of Pakistan?
Des Browne: Well, yes, although
we did discuss this the last time I gave evidence to this Committee
and it does not necessarily mean that the Commander of ISAF will
not be able to deploy resources into that area. If that is a priority
for him then he could, of course, deploy resources into that area.
Q337 Chairman: At the expense of
something else?
Des Browne: I make two points.
One, the theatre reserve has been deployed as instructed to northern
Helmand, as we have already discussed in this evidence session,
and, secondly, the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, the ASNF, has
been deployed into the border area and was there for a period
up until about the end of March shortly before I went to Afghanistan
myself, and was very effective in working in a manoeuvre fashion
in that area and detecting the communication and supply chains
of the Taliban, so it does not mean that the work is not getting
done and I believe there are plans at some time in the future
to deploy them there again in a tactical way. It just means that
the Commander does not have a force that specifically fulfils
that requirement of the CJSOR.
Q338 Chairman: But in the end it
costs NATO, does it not, not to fulfil the CJSOR because they
are under-equipped and under-manned to do the job that NATO themselves
have assessed needs to be done?
Des Browne: They certainly are
the latter, under-manned against what NATO assessed needed to
be done. The question as to whether or not there is a cost depends
on what actually happens. That is the discussion we had the last
time. I am not in a position to anticipate exactly what the challenges
will be and what General McNeill will require. I know that retrospectively
General Richards was able to go into some detail as to what he
would have been able to do additionally had he had that reserve,
how he would have been able to deploy that reserve in the aftermath
of Medusa, for example, but I do not think I can anticipate what
General McNeill may or may not do. I just make the point to the
Committee, as I did before, that it does not mean there is no
manoeuvre capability for that important area. If the General decides
that needs to be done then it can be done, and indeed it has been
done by the deployment of the Afghan Special Narcotics Force.
Q339 Willie Rennie: I am quite surprised
at the relaxed approach that we seem to be taking to the constant
under-manning or under-committing of the NATO countries. Is there
a kind of overbidding by commanders in the knowledge that these
requirements will never be met, so that at the end of the day
they always get what they want? Is there a little game being played
here?
Des Browne: No, it is not my sense
of the way the process goes forward. The process is an iterative
process and there are discussions that take place about it before
the CJSOR is finally settled. I do not have any sense that there
is overbidding. I just share that fact with the Committee today
because in preparation for this meeting I was advised quite casually
by somebody who had more extensive knowledge in terms of time
in the department than I have. I am going to go back and check
that it is accurate. I am not suggesting it is not true. The source
that told me suggested it was true but I have not had a chance
to verify it. I am not casual at all about this. I spend a lot
of my time engaged with defence ministers from other governments
encouraging them to provide additional resources to the collective
NATO commitment, and indeed we ourselves have taken some steps
to fulfil the demands of the CJSOR. We have also, recognising
the challenge that lies there in the border area where we supported
the deployment of the Special Narcotics Force into that area for
that very purpose, taken some operational steps to tackle the
problems posed by the border areas, such as the provision of additional
ISTAR as part of our next roulement in order to get some visibility
of what is going on in that area.
5 NATO operation and mission CJSORS have never been
entirely fulfilled, although the level of successful force generation
varies between missions and within missions over time. Back
6
There are seven battle groups. Back
7
Five new battle groups were provided (3 US, 1 UK, 1 Polish) but
only 3 of these were against CJSOR battle group requirements. Back
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