Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380-394)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
CBE, MR DESMOND
BOWEN CMG, MR
PETER HOLLAND
AND MS
LINDY CAMERON
OBE
8 MAY 2007
Q380 Linda Gilroy: Thank you.
Des Browne: It shows how they
are equipped presently and what the plans are. With respect to
General Wardak, and I understand why he does this, everybody he
speaks to he asks for—
Q381 Chairman: He would like some
tanks and we do not necessarily endorse that.
Des Browne: He was a tank commander
himself at one stage, I think, which may explain. I can hand over
this note which I have brought with me, there are a couple of
copies of it, if Members want to pass it around and it will save
a few minutes.
Chairman: Can we move on to the police.
Q382 Mr Havard: You are quite right,
General Wardak did ask us for tanks again. However, one thing
he did, which I thought was very significant, was that not only
was there great merit in the embedded trainers for the Army, he
was arguing that the same sort of process might help in relation
to developing the Police Force. That sounds to me to be about
right. I want to ask about the Police Force, however. There has
not been, if you like, as much progress as we would like to see.
I shared some of your thoughts earlier on about where a criminal
justice system fits with policing because even if you interdict
people and arrest them and cannot process them, it does not help
cement, if you like, the relevance of a Police Force even if you
have policemen on the corner. One of the things that we heard
was as well as the development of the Afghan National Police itself
at all levels, whether at local level or support for forensic
activity, etc, there was the development now of the Afghan Auxiliary
National Police Force. This raised some concern. The Human Rights
Commission, for example, were fearful that this might simply become
a way of supporting a militia-type structure. That ranged right
across to others like the President himself who billed them to
us as community support officers and community policemen. There
is quite clearly a tension here as to whose control they are under
and whether or not they just reinforce regional strongmen, warlords,
whatever, or whether they are part of a national force. I wonder
whether you could comment on the relationship between those two,
the national police and the auxiliary police, and the question,
which is raised all the time, about whether or not the Police
Force in Afghanistan ought to look more like a gendarmerie than
anything else.
Des Browne: Well, where to start?
First of all, the development or the reform of a Police Force
in a post-conflict situation is a very difficult thing to do.
It is invariably more challenging than developing the Armed Forces.
There are a number of reasons for that, not the least of them
in Afghanistan—this is a distinction that I make—is
that the Armed Forces serve the state and there is a structure
for them, but for the police in any community to be successful
and accepted by the community they must serve the law and the
manifestation of the law must have a structure round about it
and where that is missing it is very difficult to grow a Police
Force in a community. The other point, of course, is, unlike the
Army, the police operate in societies where there is endemic poverty,
illiteracy, experience quite often of abuse by Police Forces at
what I would call the point of corruption. They operate at the
point of interface with the community where if they do not resist
the temptation and it becomes endemic then it is really difficult
to get out of any emerging structure. That is a challenge. It
is a challenge that we faced in Iraq, in Sierra Leone and it is
a challenge we now face in Afghanistan. The auxiliary police is
an attempt to rise to that challenge in the communities. One of
the things that we should remind ourselves of is that almost all
of us live in communities where the Police Force has a very strong
identity with our local communities and may indeed have grown
up out of our communities. We only need to remind ourselves of
the way in which communities across England responded to the proposal
that there should be an amalgamation of Police Forces to see how
strongly our communities identify their local Police Forces with
their communities. With respect, it does not seem to me that it
is a criticism of the Police Force that it might identify strongly
with the community. The Afghan Auxiliary Police Force was an attempt
to try and generate Police Forces in communities which serve those
communities out of those communities. Of course, implicit in your
question, Mr Havard, is would they serve warlords in those communities
or individuals rather than the rule of law. In order to try and
prevent that from happening the PAG, which developed this concept,
which the President sits on, and it is community policing in the
sense the policing comes out of communities, made a number of
rules about them and the application of these rules will ensure
that they do not go down the path that people fear. One is that
they are within the structure of the Police Service and they are
accountable to the Ministry of Interior. Secondly, you can only
serve as an auxiliary police officer for a year and then if you
want to continue to be a police officer you have to move into
the Police Force itself. Given that the challenge was in remote
communities to find police officers quickly, people who could
serve that function who the communities would have confidence
in, who would not be seen to have come from the north of the country
or another part of the country and behave or be expected to behave
in the way in which police officers have previously in these communities,
they were worth a go. I have seen them operate. For example, I
have seen them operate in the Kajaki area where they provide a
significant amount of security for our own forces very successfully
as we are doing other work to secure the Kajaki Dam for reconstruction.
Q383 Chairman: Would there be something
to be said for having a Police Training College in Helmand Province?
Des Browne: I think there would
be something to be said for having Police Training Colleges where
there were people who were prepared to volunteer to join the police.
Indeed, my understanding is that at the surer that President Karzai
attended, he said to the tribal leaders of the south, "If
you want police officers or members of the Army who represent
your community, send your sons to volunteer". If they were
prepared to volunteer then I am sure we could build the training
facilities to be able to accommodate the volunteers.
Q384 Mr Jenkin: Again, can I tell
you, Secretary of State, about what we actually heard on the ground
which was that when the British Army went into Sangin with the
Americans we had to arrest the police because they were looting,
which rather reflected the lack of on the ground training of on
the ground police, yet the Germans are spending large amounts
of money on higher command and staff course training for senior
police officers which is regarded as largely irrelevant to the
ordinary platoon commander on the ground. Is there going to be
a rebalancing of the police training effort towards what is actually
needed now rather than, say, five years hence? I get the impression
that the German effort is largely wasted at the present time.
Des Browne: There is a review
taking place. The Americans are about to invest quite a significant
amount, I think $5.9 billion or thereabouts, in Army and police,
so there is significant resource coming in. I was making the point
about the auxiliary police earlier. There is a problem with the
police. The police do behave corruptly in certain parts of Helmand,
there is no question about that. As you point out, the first thing
you need to do in some of these communities is deal with the police.
We need a structure in place that makes sure that those police
officers who are deployed into these communities are paid, and
paid properly. That is part of the problem, that some of the central
government and provincial government structures that were supposed
to pay them was not working properly and they were not being paid.
In those circumstances they will use at the point of corruption,
as I describe it, their power to be able to get their wages out
of local people.
Q385 Mr Crausby: My understanding
is that as part of this extra money from the ESDP mission and
so on, there is a plan to put embedded trainers in to try and
develop the Police Service at various levels. My only concern
is that there quite clearly is an enthusiasm amongst some of our
people, and I mean the military, the British Army people on the
ground, to try and assist with that and get good people where
they can get them and work with them as best they can and do it.
My only concern is that they may be trying to do things and substitute
for others without the resources to do it. I have a little bit
of a fear that the enthusiasm and goodwill of our people might
be abused a bit by trying to do things that perhaps are not their
full brief and they have not got the resources to do it with.
Des Browne: We have police trainers
on the ground in Helmand Province and we make a contribution to
that and look forward to the deployment of the ESDP initiative
which ought to increase the number of police trainers across Afghanistan
and our ability to do that. Most of the training will need to
be done in local police stations by mentors and people with the
skills once they are deployed and we will no doubt use our resources,
such as military resources that we have in these communities,
to be able to keep an eye on how police officers behave.
Q386 John Smith: I am not sure that
we are going to have enough time to do this question justice at
the end of this session, but in the answers that we have received
this afternoon quite clearly enormous emphasis is placed on the
rule of law, the writ of the central government, presidential
agreements, the role of presidential agreements, the question
of the police, and up until now it has been implied that corruption
does occur but it is varied and it is isolated. This Committee
has received a very worrying submission from a former employee
of the British Embassy in Kabul that corruption remains absolutely
endemic at every level of decision-making, at every level within
the legislature, public appointments, right throughout the Police
Force, and consequently it is undermining the popularity and authority
of the Karzai Government. Do you recognise that description, Secretary
of State? Are we addressing that issue seriously and is there
any more we can do?
Des Browne: Corruption is a significant
issue, I do not doubt that. We have to be realistic. This is a
largely subsistence economy and over the years corruption has
become endemic, it has become almost cultural in certain parts,
and in order to get things done people use the resource that they
have. If you add to that the fact that it is largely a drugs economy
and there are quite substantial amounts of money floating around
in the hands of a very small number of people then it is not surprising
that there was corruption. I think it will take time to develop
the sort of values that we are all more familiar with and against
which we judge whether or not progress is being made. Sometimes
we set ourselves measures of success which are unrealistic given
the nature of the challenge and then we are bound to fail against
these measures that we set. Stability will ease this challenge
for us. We will work towards the goal that we have set ourselves
of eradicating corruption from this society, but I say again we
must keep realistic expectations while we are going along. What
can we expect of the Karzai Government at this stage to prevent
people taking the opportunist corrupt path which will be there
for them as money moves around? First of all, and I will come
to Ms Cameron after, we have to ensure that the money we are investing
through DFID is not being used for corrupt purposes. We have very
strict rules in place and audit methods for ensuring that the
money that we are investing in this country is being used for
the purposes that we are investing it. I will let Ms Cameron deal
with that. The second is that we can expect from the government
the creation of structures that ensure that corruption is identified
and eradicated. Those structures are emerging. The international
community continues to keep a lot of pressure on the President
and the government. For example, the President has established
both an Anti-Corruption Committee and a Commission, as I understand
it. The committee is chaired by the Chief of Justice, he has established
an Appointments Advisory Panel to make sure that all senior appointments
below ministers that are not within the mandate of the existing
Civil Service Appointments Board are carried out properly so that
people do not use patronage and corruption. The Afghan Prosecutor
General, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Supreme Court
have proven, in our assessment, that they are determined in their
fight against corruption despite the enormity of the task. A number
of government officials in Kabul have been suspended, various
provinces and provincial governors are under investigation and
there are a number of investigations under way. I do not think
that these steps will bring an immediate end to corruption but
they are visible signs of intent, and that is the crucial and
important part given where we are starting from in this country
that they are making progress in this regard, and they are. I
suspect, frankly, and it does not surprise me, that anybody looking
at that against what we would expect would say, "This place
is corrupt. If you want to get things done then you grease people's
palms". Whether or not that is a measure of success or strategic
failure, in my view, is challengeable.
Chairman: Secretary of State, can we
finally discuss the regional context in which Afghanistan plays
out its part.
Q387 Willie Rennie: We have discussed
this issue a number of times, both in the Chamber and in this
Committee. President Musharraf has been given considerable credit
for the efforts that he has made on the Afghanistan front, but
it seems to be a widely held view in Afghanistan that elements
of the Pakistan Army and Intelligence Service are funding and
training insurgents. What is your view on that?
Des Browne: I have not got any
evidence that the problem that emerges from Pakistan, and there
is unquestionably support from the Taliban coming from Pakistan,
is state sponsored. I do not have evidence that suggests that
is the case. What I do know is the Pakistan Security Forces have
sustained considerable losses, disproportionately greater losses
than certainly we or others have, in trying to deal with the issues
that lie on their side of the border. I believe that President
Musharraf is committed to taking on this problem and in recent
months they have stepped up their actions against the Taliban
to a level that we have not previously seen. We ought to encourage
them to continue to do that. There is no doubt that historically
there were relations between elements of the Pakistan structure,
government structure, and the Taliban and it is highly improbable
that those have gone away, those are likely still to be the case.
We need to recognise what Pakistan is seeking to do. At the end
of the day it is relations between the Pakistan and Afghan Governments
that will resolve these problems. There is no other resolution
to them than that these two governments talk to each other. Certainly
I am encouraged by the fact that both presidents have spoken to
each other recently. On my most recent visit to Afghanistan, which
was only weeks ago, I heard President Karzai speak much more warmly
and positively about what Pakistan have been doing in this regard
than I have ever heard him speak before. I am encouraged by that
but it is an enormous challenge.
Q388 Willie Rennie: Do you think
he is doing enough to try to root out these rogue elements within
the Intelligence Service? What more support could be provided
to him to help him do that?
Des Browne: Across the board a
number of countries provide a significant amount of support and
encouragement to him, but we all recognise that he has to balance
our calls for action, which are repeated, against the risk that
operations of a certain nature in these very troubled areas of
his border communities will inflame tribal groups and drive them
into further extremism. He has to make these judgments for himself.
We can encourage him, and do encourage him, and there is significant
emerging evidence that he is responding in a very positive way.
Will these problems be resolved by military force? They will not
be. They will be resolved across that disputed border by these
two countries coming to an accommodation and an agreement about
how they will deal with a common problem. I am much more interested
in them talking to each other and developing a common solution
to the problems than I am in encouraging people to deploy military
force. I will be guided by others but I think there are approximately
four million refugee Afghans living in refugee camps in the territories
across the border in Pakistan. The scale of these problems is
phenomenal. How much military force would you need to deploy?
Some of these communities you could not deploy military force
into at all without the danger of carnage.
Q389 Willie Rennie: It is the rogue
elements within the Intelligence Service and the Army that I am
focused on here. I accept what you say, but within the Intelligence
Service and the Army do you think he is doing enough to try and
root out those rogue elements?
Des Browne: I am just not in a
position to measure that, I am afraid. I know the effect that
is having but that is not the only activity that is going on at
that border that is generating problems for us or generating Taliban
fighters into southern Afghanistan.
Q390 Mr Jenkin: Secretary of State,
there are estimated to be 3,000 madrasas in Pakistan funded by
various Gulf States very liberally churning out degrees of religious
extremism, some of whom finish up over here, some of whom finish
up fighting our Armed Forces in Afghanistan.
Des Browne: Absolutely.
Q391 Mr Jenkin: Is Her Majesty's
Government treating this problem, albeit in as positive a way
with regard to President Musharraf, as a top level strategic problem?
Are we determined that this should change and should we not encourage
General Musharraf to back the Commission which he himself established
to bring the tribal areas, particularly in Waziristan, under the
constitution of Pakistan instead of this vestige of imperial government
that still remains in that part of Pakistan which basically leaves
the tribal elders to govern themselves? The tribal elders have
given their view that they would like to be incorporated under
the constitution of Pakistan as part of regular Pakistan, should
we not be encouraging and aiding Pakistan to achieve this objective?
What support are we giving President Musharraf, perhaps financial
or in terms of reform support, in order to be able to do this?
Des Browne: Can I just say to
you, Mr Jenkin, I am not in a position to give you chapter and
verse on this, but my recollection of our recent engagement with
the Pakistan Government is that we have been doing all of those
things that you identify, including significant aid for education
purposes. As you point out, we have a common interest with the
Afghan Government and, indeed, the Pakistan Government in addressing
the radicalisation that these madrassas are creating in that area.
It is a strategic issue for us because it is a strategic issue
in relation to the security of the streets of this city, never
mind Afghanistan. We are investing there and encouraging President
Musharraf, who indeed has taken action, as you will have seen
from your visit, in these areas in relation to some of these madrassers.
You will have seen the demonstrations that are taking place in
the streets of his own capital city about his challenge to the
way in which his own people are educated. We are working on the
other side also, on the Afghan side, with the Education Minister
in Afghanistan directing and encouraging investment to ensure
that Afghans are not crossing the border into these madrassers
to get their education but are able to be educated in Afghanistan
in a broader way. All of these things we are seeking to address.
If it is necessary and helpful I would ask colleagues from the
Foreign Office and perhaps also DFID to give a note to the Committee
in relation to this issue.[8]
Q392 Mr Jenkin: That would be very
helpful.
Des Browne: I am not in a position
to give the detail but I recognise steps being taken in all of
the areas that you identify.
Q393 Mr Havard: Can I ask you about
the other border on the west, which is the border with Iran. We
visited India on our way to Afghanistan. Having visited Pakistan
last time we thought we would get the other point of view. The
Indian point of view is slightly different but interesting in
terms of their own strategic development into the future. They
have quite a significant aid programme, as do the Iranians in
the west of Afghanistan, who have been there for some time. Therefore,
military engagement on the border on the west in Herat with US
forces, we discussed those issues about whether or not the confusion
that could come in some minds, if you like, about the US involvement
on a border with Iran might not be very helpful but, on the other
hand, given that there is a positive engagement, and it seemed
to be a positive engagement, by the Iranians in Afghanistan, by
the US Commander, that was quite clear, that might be a very helpful
thing in terms of developing a different regional relationship
and the business about having a regional conference which might
involve all of these different parties because there are countries
such as India and Iran playing a positive role within Afghanistan
at the moment which is perhaps not fully understood.
Des Browne: I agree with you and
the Committee, and I am sure you came to the conclusion that Iran,
India and Pakistan all have strategic interests in a strong, stable
Afghanistan. Regionally an Afghanistan which is not a failed state
and has a reduced drugs economy, which I suppose is the best we
will get, is in the strategic interests of all of those countries.
They all in their own way make a contribution to achieving that
but it is much more complex than just saying that because Pakistan,
for example, is very wary of India's intentions and has been for
some significant period of time and is suspicious of India's engagement
with Afghanistan. Iran, on the other hand, do make a very positive
contribution, particularly on the border in relation to drugs.
They make significant investment inside Afghanistan as well and
in keeping that border sealed against drug dealers have themselves
lost a significant number of their own security forces in protecting
that border. They are supportive of Afghanistan. On the other
hand, comparatively openly, and certainly demonstrably, they have
sought confrontation by proxy with us and the United States and
other NATO members elsewhere in the region and there is some indication
that they are doing the same in Afghanistan. This is a complex
environment. Should these countries come together in some form
of co-operative regional conference, yes, they should, and that
is exactly what they do. There is an organisation called the Regional
Economic Co-operation Conference which last met in India in November
of last year, the year before in Kabul and next year proposes
to meet in Pakistan. It is co-chaired by Afghanistan. They provide
a real opportunity to move the economic and trade agenda forward,
which is where the common interests lie. For example, I am told
that India has pledged $650 million to Afghanistan over five years
and signed an MoU on rural development, but you know yourself
that Iran has made investment and Pakistan has made significant
investment as well as the contribution that we have already discussed
at the border. These countries need to come together themselves.
Q394 Mr Crausby: Do you think that
NATO involvement in Afghanistan, supported by others outside NATO,
such as Canada and particularly Australia, and the view that these
countries have towards the East as well as to the West, must be
hugely beneficial in trying to move that political agenda on which
would obviously help Afghanistan as well in terms of its structural
development?
Des Browne: I do not think there
is any doubt that the international community, particularly those
who are involved in Afghanistan and those who have resources there,
whether they be troops or other resources that they deploy, would
encourage this sort of regional co-operation and, indeed, as far
as I understand it, do everything to encourage this regional co-operation.
I am not aware of any of those countries involved, be they NATO
or other countries, who are not encouraging this. Frankly, as
far as I can see there is a well-worn path to President Musharraf's
office by almost all of the countries who are involved in Afghanistan
encouraging this sort of co-operation.
Chairman: Secretary of State, and to
all of the witnesses, I would like to say thank you very much
indeed for a very constructive and helpful evidence session. A
long session but it is an extremely important subject and we are
most grateful to you. Thank you.
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