Select Committee on Defence Eleventh Report


4  Strategic air-lift

Current transport and tanker aircraft fleet

33. The MoD provided details of its transport and tanker aircraft fleet in a written answer to a Parliamentary Question in January 2007. The information provided by the MoD is set out in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Details of the MoD's current transport and tanker aircraft fleet
Aircraft type Total fleet planned to be in service in Financial Year 2006-07 Number of aircraft available for tasking (average for November 2006)[45]
C-17 Globemaster4 3
C-130K Hercules25 10
C-130J Hercules25 16
TriStar9 6
VC-1016[46] 9

Source: MoD[47]
Notes: (i) The figures are rounded to the nearest whole number. (ii) The figure for C-130K Hercules aircraft does not reflect the loss of an aircraft in Afghanistan on 24 May 2006 or the retirement of four aircraft during Financial Year 2006-07.

34. All of the TriStar aircraft fleet (some 30 years old) and ten of the VC-10 aircraft fleet (some 40 years old) provide strategic air-lift, such as transporting people and freight. The Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) is planned to replace the air refuelling and air transport capability currently provided by the RAF's fleet of VC-10 and TriStar aircraft. We examine the progress of the FSTA programme in Part 7 of the Report.

AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT

35. Of 75 Hercules, TriStar and VC-10 aircraft, only 41, some 55%, were available in November 2006 for immediate deployment to undertake the required task. We asked at what point there would be an insufficient number of aircraft available to undertake the tasks required. AVM Leeson said that the number of aircraft available to be tasked varied with each of the aircraft fleets "because of the age of the aeroplanes and the various maintenance and fleet overheads that go with those". The point at which the MoD would worry about availability would differ between the different aircraft fleets. He emphasised that there was

constant tension between my capability colleagues who wish to install new and useful facilities to aeroplanes and those of us who have to operate the airbridge in a sustainable and minimised risk fashion where clearly we would like to maximise the number of aeroplanes.[48]

36. AVM Leeson considered that the future A400M transport aircraft and Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft would provide a "seriously modern and capable fleet". However, he acknowledged that there was a great element of "jam tomorrow" and that there was a very difficult period ahead in which the MoD would have "to continue to manage with our older ladies". He told us that he would become very concerned if the aircraft availability level fell below 50% "because to operate at that level is a reasonable yardstick".[49]

37. In evidence to us on 6 March 2007, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, admitted that "air transport, we all know, is a serious concern".[50]

38. We are very concerned that a high proportion of the current transport and tanker aircraft are not available for immediate deployment to undertake the required tasks. While modifications are often the reason for aircraft not being available, maintenance is also a key factor, and reflects the fact that the MoD has an ageing transport and tanker aircraft fleet which is being flown at an unexpectedly high level in very punishing conditions. While new transport and tanker aircraft are in the pipeline, it will be some years before they enter service. We have real doubts as to whether the current transport and tanker fleet can provide the level of availability required between now and when these new aircraft come into service.

FORWARD PLANNING FOR NEW STRATEGIC AIR-LIFT ASSETS

39. Given that the Out of Service Dates for aircraft are known long in advance, it has to be asked why the MoD is operating an ageing transport and tanker aircraft fleet, which requires increasing maintenance to keep the aircraft operational, yet new tanker and transport aircraft are some years away from entering service. A possible explanation was provided by the Royal Aeronautical Society in its written submission to the inquiry:

The gap between "peacetime" and higher tempo operations has often caught governments unprepared. This is true not only of the UK but also elsewhere; even the US which appears fully capable of sustaining global forces has in the past found itself short of critical airlift components. The explanation is a mixture of prudence—the temptation is to avoid procuring costly equipment to meet a worst-case logistic scenario; and institutional—the natural tendency of the armed services to afford priority to combat equipment.[51]

40. We asked Lieutenant General Figgures, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), whether the position that the MoD found itself in reflected a failure of long-term planning. He did not consider it a failure of long-term planning, "because the manifestation of a failure would be that we suffered operational disadvantage". He added that "we have matched the demand to the supply and we have managed the supply".[52] However, he acknowledged that there was concern "about the probability of the impact of the risk increasing".[53] Later in this Report (paragraphs 47-53), we examine the issue of the airbridge. We consider that the damage to morale caused by problems with the airbridge may well amount to the "operational disadvantage" referred to by General Figgures.

41. General Figgures considered that the question of whether the MoD gave too much priority to combat equipment and not sufficient priority to support equipment was a fair one. But he believed that the MoD's planning process took account of this and the MoD looked at "the interaction between the effectors and the enablers".[54]

Commercial air-lift

42. The MoD uses military aircraft to transport Service personnel into operational theatres, such as Afghanistan. AVM Leeson explained that for military aircraft:

we can then put the defensive aid protection systems on board the aeroplane because the safe transport of Armed Forces personnel….is the absolute priority.

Military transport aircraft are also used to transport weapons and munitions.[55]

43. For other purposes, the MoD also makes use of commercial air-lift. AVM Leeson said that the MoD "use quite a considerable amount of charter lift both in the passenger and freight sense to supplement what we own as military aircraft".[56] For routine air transport activity, for example the support of BATUS [British Army Training Unit Suffield, Canada], the MoD has a long-term contract with DHL who "move the item by whichever carrier they utilised". For the support of the operational theatres, the MoD used brokers and enabling contracts with them.[57] The price of these contracts was negotiated in advance. Brigadier Mason explained that the cost depended on seasonal activity, as it was more difficult to get passenger aircraft during the spring and summer, the main holiday season. He considered that the enabling contracts were "extremely valuable and we could not operate without them".[58]

44. As there were times when it was difficult to obtain the commercial air-lift required, we asked whether the MoD had got the balance right between the air-lift assets it had and the air-lift it required from the commercial market. AVM Leeson said that over the past 18 months there had been an increasing number of Service personnel deployed and the "sustainment package and everything else that goes with it" had progressively moved upwards. The MoD kept this issue under constant watch so that it could make decisions on what it needed to do. He recognised that the MoD had a "large reliance" on the commercial sector to provide freight and personnel air-lift.[59] In 2006-07, the MoD spent £82 million on air-lift charter.[60]

45. On the issue of whether the MoD had the right balance between the military transport aircraft it owns and the transport aircraft it charters from the commercial market, AVM Leeson told us that he was "becoming increasingly nervous as to whether, looking at the marketplace and the risk to aeroplanes, we got the balance quite right". The MoD is undertaking a review to examine the volumes that it predicts will be moved over the next 12 months.[61] This review will assess the risks faced in the future and the "cost-effectiveness of the operation and whether or not one has the balance right".[62]

46. The MoD makes extensive use of commercial air-lift for transporting freight and personnel to supplement its own air-lift assets, and is reviewing whether the current balance between the air-lift capacity provided by its own air-lift assets and the air-lift capacity it requires from the marketplace is right. The MoD should complete its review as quickly as possible and ensure that the recommendations are implemented fully.

Airbridge

47. During our visits to Afghanistan, Iraq and Cyprus in 2006, we spoke to Service personnel about the airbridge which transports Service personnel to and from the UK and operational theatres. We heard concerns about the reliability of the airbridge and witnessed at first hand some of the frustrations experienced by Service personnel whose return home had been delayed owing to failures of aircraft.

48. In our inquiry into the MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 we examined support to operations and the issue of the airbridge.[63] We questioned Mr Bill Jeffrey, the MoD's Permanent Under Secretary of State (PUS), about the airbridge from Afghanistan and Iraq to the UK. He recognised that the airbridge had experienced significant shortcomings and said that the MoD was considering how airbridge reliability could be improved. In our Report we expressed our concern that the unreliability of the airbridge had implications for morale and for operational effectiveness. We looked to the MoD to "provide the case to the Treasury for a significant increase in investment in the transport fleet".[64]

49. The Government Response to that Report, published on 9 March 2007, set out how the MoD was seeking to address the shortcomings of the airbridge. These included: an end-to end review of the airbridge; improvements to RAF Main Air Transport Bases, such as Brize Norton; improvements to the runway at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; and the possible forward basing of TriStar aircraft.[65] The Government Response stated that airbridge reliability was affected by the availability of suitably protected TriStar aircraft able to fly directly into operational theatres.[66] AVM Leeson told us that more TriStar aircraft had now been equipped with defensive aids and the MoD was "now in a much better position to provide the service".[67] He was keeping a watch on passenger satisfaction statistics and considered that "we are now getting the sorts of numbers where I am beginning to feel more comfortable". The improvement in the service was because the MoD could "now provide a spare aeroplane that is properly equipped".[68]

50. Air Commodore Gunby, Air Officer Air Transport and Air-to-Air Refuelling, Headquarters 2 Group, RAF, told us that a very significant improvement was transporting personnel direct to Kandahar in Afghanistan, whereas before they had had to go to Kabul and then be transported in a Hercules aircraft.[69] He also provided examples of more modest improvements to improve the level of service. These included: a refurbished and expanded café at the Brize Norton terminal; a customer helpline; and the installation of air-conditioning in the lounges at RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus.[70]

51. We asked what the MoD was doing to ensure that the charter aircraft used to transport personnel provided sufficient space.[71] We were concerned that aircraft normally used for short-haul holiday travel were being used on long flights to transport service personnel. Brigadier Mason said that the MoD was now chartering Boeing 747 aircraft for transporting personnel to the South Atlantic. The MoD did not ask the airlines to adjust the seating on the aircraft because "frankly, none of them would want to have a contract with us if we so asked". However, AVM Leeson agreed that having "rough-and-tough, big, solid chaps sitting in seats built for the average tourist" was an issue and said that he did not pressure the Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements organisation to achieve 100% load occupancies. He said that when the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft came into service it would provide improved seating.[72]

52. We asked General Figgures, in the context of his comment that the manifestation of a failure of long-term planning would be that we had suffered operational disadvantage, whether the difficulties experienced with the airbridge led to operational disadvantage. He said that the operational outcome had not been affected adversely, but accepted that it had an impact on the morale of service personnel.[73]

53. We welcome the action that has been taken to improve the reliability of the airbridge and to improve the experience of service personnel being transported to and from the UK and operational theatres. The MoD should not underestimate the impact on the morale of Service personnel of delays returning to the UK, particularly if the delays cut into a short period of leave. The MoD must monitor closely issues relating to the airbridge and ensure that the improvements in hand are fully implemented.


45   Aircraft that are available for immediate deployment and capable of undertaking the required task on a given day. Aircraft are not available for tasking if they are undergoing scheduled maintenance, modification programmes or any other unforeseen rectification work that can arise on a day to day basis. The figures do not reflect the fact that an aircraft not available for tasking may be returned to the front line at very short notice to meet the operational need. Back

46   Of the 16 VC-10 aircraft, six (4 VC-10 K3 aircraft and 2 VC-10 K4 aircraft) have a very limited passenger carrying capability, as they are predominantly air-to-air refuelling aircraft (Ev 45). Back

47   HC Deb, 9 January 2007, Col 525W Back

48   Qq 74-75 Back

49   Q 76 Back

50   Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 6 March 2007, HC (2006-07) 381-I, Q 7 Back

51   Ev 34 Back

52   Q 112 Back

53   Q 113 Back

54   Q 120 Back

55   Q 19 Back

56   Q 18 Back

57   Q 19 Back

58   Q 20 Back

59   Q 48 Back

60   Ev 47 Back

61   Q 48 Back

62   Q 50 Back

63   Defence Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06, HC 57, paras 25-27 Back

64   Ibid., para 27 Back

65   Defence Committee, Seventh Special Report of Session 2006-07, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2006-07, HC 376, para 6 Back

66   Ibid. Back

67   Q 103 Back

68   Ibid. Back

69   Ibid. Back

70   Q 104  Back

71   Qq 106-107 Back

72   Q 107 Back

73   Qq 114-115 Back


 
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