Select Committee on Defence Eleventh Report


5  C-17 transport aircraft

Background

54. The National Audit Office (NAO) Major Projects Report 2004, provided the following details on the leasing of the four C-17 aircraft:

55. In its memorandum, the MoD provided the following details on the leasing of the C-17 aircraft and the decision to procure an additional C-17 aircraft:

  • In 2000, the MoD contracted with Boeing to lease 4 C-17 aircraft and announced last year our intention to procure these aircraft at the end of their lease in 2008. The MoD is also procuring a fifth C-17, to enter service next year[75]
  • The cost to procure the five C-17 aircraft is commercially sensitive but an indicative cost of a C-17 is around $220 million[76]
  • The fifth C-17 aircraft is currently in production at Boeing to meet an In-Service Date of May 2008[77]

Decision to purchase C-17 aircraft

56. We asked why the MoD had decided to purchase the four C-17 aircraft at the end of the lease. AVM Leeson said that at the time of the SDR the need for "additional outsize airlift" was identified, but there were uncertainties about the "future large aircraft contract which subsequently became the A400M procurement". He said that when the SDR was produced, the UK was "nowhere near the tempo [of operations] that we have been experiencing in the intervening period". Leasing the C-17 aircraft was, therefore, considered the most cost-effective option at the time. However, around 2002, the MoD looked at the likely volumes required to be transported by air-lift and "it became clear that a review was then needed of our overall lift position with the C-17s". He told us that the MoD had taken the decision that it was more cost-effective to own, rather than continue to lease, C-17 aircraft.[78]

57. Mr Tim Rowntree, Director General Air Support, updated us on the purchase of the fifth C-17 aircraft. The aircraft is in production and leaves the production line in February 2008. Upgrade work will then be undertaken to ensure that the aircraft is in the right configuration for the MoD. He considered that the fifth aircraft "is on track and we expect it to be delivered by May next year [2008] as planned".[79]

Performance of C-17 aircraft

58. The Royal Aeronautical Society stated that the C-17 is "rightly regarded as the most versatile strategic and tactical airlifter currently available".[80] AVM Leeson considered that the four C-17 aircraft

have been absolutely first rate aircraft in terms of their capacity, speed, reach, reliability, availability, the arrangements with Boeing and the flexibility to keep them modified to the same standard as their American cousins so we have minimal overheads. They have been a resounding success.[81]

59. In its submission, The Boeing Company stated that the RAF's C-17 aircraft "currently flies at a rate well above its original planned usage".[82] We asked the MoD about the usage of its C-17 aircraft and for how long the aircraft were planned to remain in service. Table 4 provides details on the MoD's actual usage rate of its C-17 aircraft against the planned usage.

Table 4: Planned and actual usage rates for C-17 aircraft
Financial Year Planned usage rate

Hours for the C-17 fleet

Actual usage rate

Hours for the C-17 fleet

2001-023,000 3,377
2002-033,000 5,745
2003-044,000 5,592
2004-055,800 5,727
2005-065,800 6,375

Source: MoD[83]
Note: The increase in planned usage rates in 2003-04 and 2004-05 was because of additional crews.

60. For the financial year 2006-07, the C-17 aircraft fleet had accumulated in the region of 5,720 flying hours by the end of January 2007 and was expected to achieve some 7,000 flying hours by the end the financial year.[84] We were concerned about the high level of usage of the C-17 aircraft and how this might affect the lease, and also whether the increased usage rates put more stress on these aircraft. AVM Leeson told us that the lease was very flexible and allowed the MoD to "increase the hours beyond the baseline entry". He acknowledged that the MoD had, because of the tempo of current operations and the usefulness of the aircraft, "certainly increased quite considerably the number of hours that we get off that fleet".[85]

61. In terms of stress to the aircraft, AVM Leeson did not view this as a problem as when the aircraft were undertaking Strategic Lift tasks they spent a lot of time airborne rather than manoeuvring close to the ground in tactical flying. He said he was "very comfortable that we are not in any way putting ourselves into a difficult period because we are using them much more than originally planned".[86] The MoD expected all four leased C-17 aircraft to remain in service until 2031.[87]

62. The leasing of four C-17 large transport aircraft, which are to be purchased when the lease ends, has greatly increased the MoD's strategic air-lift capability and performed extremely well. We welcome the fact that these four aircraft will be purchased once the lease ends and that the MoD is to purchase a fifth C-17 aircraft. We recommend that the MoD should commission a detailed analysis of the medium and longer term consequences of the high level of use of the C-17 and C-130 Hercules fleets, and should publish the results of that analysis as soon as possible.

Possible additional purchases

63. Given the good performance of the C-17 aircraft and the continuing high tempo of operations, and the fact that it will be some years before the A400M aircraft comes into service, we asked if the MoD had enough C-17 aircraft and whether consideration should be given to purchasing additional C-17 aircraft. AVM Leeson said that the MoD was reviewing whether the balance between the air-lift capacity provided by the MoD's air-lift assets and the air-lift capacity it required from the marketplace was right.[88] He acknowledged that the MoD had "configured a programme for a situation that is now being exceeded" and that "causes a number of stresses and stretches in the programme".[89] We pressed AVM Leeson further on whether the MoD needed another C-17 aircraft. He said that it was not a simple "yes or no answer", but acknowledged that "there is a need for analysis of the risks faced in future and the cost-effectiveness of the operations and whether or not one has the right balance".[90]

64. In its submission, The Boeing Company said that the United States Department of Defense had not requested funding for additional C-17s in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget. Boeing and its suppliers had been spending their own resources since late 2006 "to protect the option for production of additional C-17s". Based on the 34 month lead time necessary to build a C-17, and in the absence of any US Government commitment to procure additional C-17s in the future, Boeing directed its suppliers on 2 March 2007 "to stop work on aircraft beyond current customer commitments….the production line heads towards complete shutdown in mid-calendar Year 2009".[91] This position was also highlighted by the Royal Aeronautical Society who noted in its submission that the production of C-17 aircraft was at risk of termination because of a lack of orders.[92]

65. AVM Leeson told us that Boeing's closure date for the C-17 production line had been delayed very slightly after a recent re-order by Congress, so that there was "no longer the need to have a decision tomorrow morning, as it were". He added that:

Clearly, there is a complex dynamic between the A400M balance, the C-130J balance, the commercial balance and the C-17 which is why we must get that answer right.[93]

66. We asked General Figgures whether there were any plans to purchase any further C-17 aircraft in addition to the five already being purchased. He said that:

I am looking at all options as part of this constant review of how we deal with the risk of the strategic airbridge, so I am in the process of producing advice for ministers. In due course they will decide and all this will become apparent. That does not say we are going to buy x, y or z.[94]

67. MoD officials are producing advice to ministers setting out options for addressing possible risks relating to the MoD's future air-lift requirements. Given the performance of its C-17 large transport aircraft, the MoD must give consideration to the acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft. Such a decision needs to be taken quickly given that the C-17 production line may be closing in the near future.

68. On 20 June 2007, NATO Allies agreed to set up a new NATO agency to acquire and manage C-17 strategic transport aircraft on behalf of a group of 15 NATO nations (the UK is not one of the 15) and two Partnership for Peace countries. NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoope Scheffer, welcomed the decision and said that:

The Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative will help address NATO's, and Europe's, critical shortfall in strategic airlift. This capability will support our current operations, including in Afghanistan, and will be a pillar of the Alliance's long-term transformation".

The SAC plans to acquire 3-4 C-17 aircraft, the first is expected to be delivered in mid-2008. The SAC aircraft are to be configured in a similar way as the C-17 aircraft flown by the US Air Force, Canadian Air Force and the RAF. [95]


74   National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 2004, Project Summary Sheets, HC 1159-II, Session 2003-04, pp 37-39 Back

75   Ev 45 Back

76   Ev 47 Back

77   Ibid. Back

78   Q 40 Back

79   Q 207 Back

80   Ev 34 Back

81   Q 37 Back

82   Ev 44 Back

83   Ev 47 Back

84   Ibid. Back

85   Q 38 Back

86   Ibid. Back

87   Ev 47 Back

88   Q 48 Back

89   Q 49 Back

90   Q 50 Back

91   Ev 44 Back

92   Ev 34 Back

93   Q 52 Back

94   Q 208 Back

95   NATO Press Release "Allies Agree on Strategic Airlift Capability initiative", 20 June 2007 Back


 
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