Select Committee on Defence Eleventh Report


6  A400M transport aircraft

Background

69. The NAO Major Projects Report 2006 published in November 2006 provided the following information, as at 31 March 2006, on the A400M programme:

In-Service Date

Current forecast In-Service Date

70. We asked the MoD to provide an update on the current forecast ISD for the A400M programme and the reasons for the ISD slippage. It confirmed that the ISD slippage had not changed since the position reported in the Major Projects Report 2006 and remained at 15 months. The slippage was "due to historic reasons associated with the time required for German approvals and changed customer requirements".[97] Mr Rowntree said that the 15 month slippage had not resulted from poor performance by industry, but was because of budgetary and approvals difficulties following the initial approval of the programme.[98]

REVIEW OF THE A400M PROGRAMME

71. Airbus has experienced problems on its A380 commercial aircraft programme.[99] The Royal Aeronautical Society noted that "there is some concern that further delays might be caused [to the A400M] by Airbus's current problems with its commercial programmes".[100] In its memorandum, Airbus provided the following reassurance:

Following the production difficulties faced by Airbus on the A380 aircraft, EADS [the parent company of Airbus] initiated a review of the A400M programme to assess risks to the final assembly and delivery schedule….The review validated that the A400M programme is currently progressing according to the contractually agreed schedule. However, the programme challenges ahead until first delivery to the French Air Force in October 2009 are assessed as significant and the review clearly identified several critical risk areas: maturity of some systems design, maturity of military mission systems and engine modifications, all of which would have resulted in too much work remaining to be done at the Final Assembly Line, putting first flight and the flight test programme at risk….It was in this context that a potential three-month delay in starting final assembly (until the second quarter of 2007) of the aircraft was announced in January….We are confident that any time lost during A400M assembly will be recovered in the test phase. Therefore important milestones such as aircraft certification and the latest forecast in-service date for the UK can still be met.[101]

72. Mr Rowntree referred to the review undertaken on the A400M programme and said that lessons learned from other programmes were being learned on the A400M programme.[102] He accepted that there could never be absolute certainty that an In-Service Date would not slip and acknowledged that there were a number of risks in the current phase of the programme. He said that the three month slip to the final assembly line was regrettable, but he was fairly optimistic that there was "nothing major wrong with this programme".[103]

73. Mr Richard Thompson of Airbus Military Sociedad Limitada, believed that the company was on track to deliver the first seven aircraft on time which would enable the MoD "to declare the in-service date by the due date".[104] Mr Fabrice Brégier, Chief Operating Officer, Airbus, told us that the company had devoted more resources to the A400M programme, an additional 1,500 people, as Airbus wanted to keep the programme on track as it was considered a key programme.[105]

74. We note that the In-Service Date slippage on the A400M programme remains at 15 months, as reported in the Major Projects Report 2006, and that Airbus has devoted more resources to the programme to keep it on track.

IMPACT OF IN-SERVICE DATE SLIPPAGE

75. The original Out of Service Date for the C-130K had been 2010, but had been delayed by two years because of the delay on the A400M programme. The MoD confirmed that the cost of extending the lives of 14 C-130K Hercules aircraft remains unchanged from that reported in the Major Projects Report 2006.[106] We asked whether, if there were any further delays to the A400M programme, it would be possible to extend further the life of these aircraft. AVM Leeson considered that "more work can be done on the C-130K. The issue becomes whether or not it is a cost effective thing to do".[107] He told that for the C-130K aircraft the MoD has "a small dip in the number of airframes available prior to the current A400M programme. Should the A400M slip any further that will most probably get slightly worse".[108]

76. We asked how many C-130K aircraft were being retired in the current financial year, 2007-08. Air Commodore Gunby told us that the MoD had announced the retirement of four aircraft when they required "very major servicing", but these were "without theatre entry standard of equipment" and were not of use to the MoD in current operations.[109] Three C-130 aircraft had been lost in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. AVM Leeson said that the MoD had the "capacity to be able to backfill the lost frames with UK fleet aeroplanes which are to theatre entry standard".[110] However, he recognised that

whilst one can do various neat tricks to extend capability and capacity, at the end of the day sometimes one needs the aeroplane where one needs it and therefore numbers, rather than activity or volume, count.[111]

77. The delay to the A400M programme has required the lives of ageing C-130K aircraft to be extended. If there are any further delays on the A400M programme, the scope for further extending the lives of C-130K aircraft may be limited, and expensive, leaving a potential capability gap. We recommend that the MoD undertakes a full analysis of the options for bridging a potential capability gap if the A400 programme experiences any further delays.

Defensive Aids Systems

78. The A400M will be able to undertake Tactical air-lift within the operational theatre, which the C-130 aircraft currently does.[112] The NAO Major Projects Report 2006 refers to a reduction in the number of A400M aircraft "to be equipped with Defensive Aids Sub-System (DASS) from 25 to 9". The cost saving from this measure is estimated to be £238 million.[113] We asked if the A400M would have defensive aids, given that it would be operating in potentially hostile environments. Mr Rowntree said that the aircraft would be protected[114] and would have a "very capable defensive aid suite".[115] However, he added that there was not an "absolute defensive aid solution" and, that even if "you could embody defensive aids on the production line, that certainly would not protect us through life" given that threats evolve over time.[116] The MoD subsequently told us that "Fuel Tank Inertion systems", which perform a similar function to Explosive Suppressant Foam, are to be fitted to the A400M aircraft.[117]

79. The MoD has assured us that A400M aircraft will be fitted with a Defensive Aid System and a Fuel Tank Inertion system for protection. We assume these systems will be fitted to all A400M aircraft and call on the MoD to confirm, in its response to our report, that this will be the case. It would be a false economy not to fit these systems to all A400M aircraft during manufacture, only then to retro-fit the systems later at great expense.

Attrition batch

80. The MoD has lost three C-130 aircraft during current operations and some commentators have asked whether, if operations are going to be the norm rather than the exception, the MoD should acquire additional A400M aircraft as an "attrition batch".[118] We asked General Figgures if he was satisfied that 25 A400M aircraft would be enough, given the aircraft losses seen during current operations. He told us that he was not satisfied and that was why he was reviewing the work looking at the overall air-lift position. He agreed with us that "we have to identify what our potential attrition is—how we would make that good".[119]

81. The MoD is acquiring 25 A400M aircraft to replace its C-130K Hercules aircraft fleet. Several C-130 Hercules aircraft have been lost during current operations and the MoD is undertaking work to identify likely future attrition rates. We recommend that the MoD consider acquiring additional A400M aircraft to ensure that the pool of 25 available aircraft is maintained.

Future Rapid Effect System

Weight challenges

82. We examined the progress on the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme, which is to provide the Army with a family of medium-weight armoured vehicles, in our Report The Army's requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme[120], published on 21 February 2007. In our Report we examined the weight challenge facing FRES vehicles, as the requirement for additional armour in response to the latest generation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) inevitably added weight. The additional weight has made it impractical to transport FRES by C-130J Hercules aricraft, but it is still intended that it should be transported by the A400M. Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of Defence Procurement, told us during our FRES inquiry that any further delays to the A400M project would delay the deployment of FRES.[121] In our FRES Report we noted:

the tension between the requirements that the FRES Utility vehicles provide sufficient protection and that they will be quickly deployable. The requirement that the FRES Utility vehicle should be transportable by the C-130J Hercules proved over-ambitious. It remains to be seen whether transportability by A400M is achievable.[122]

83. The Government Response to our Report, published on 11 May 2007, said that:

The decision to remove the requirement for C-130 Hercules deployability reflects the anticipated change in the balance of the air transport fleet in favour of A400M. It also reflects the increased protection levels required for FRES which cannot be accommodated within the C-130 load limit. Transportability by A400M is recognised as a risk to the programme but is being carefully managed.[123]

84. The memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical Society stated that the A400M will be able to carry FRES "as currently defined (a 37 tonnes payload)", but points out that "vehicular weight, airborne or ground based, tends to creep upwards during design, as well as once in service—20% growth is not unusual. Clearly it would be sensible to ensure that the FRES specification is consistent with A400M performance".[124]

85. AVM Leeson acknowledged that there had been a trend for armoured vehicles to become heavier to provide improved protection. He said that, given the security situation currently faced by UK Service personnel, it was a "considerable worry that with each threat change there is an inexorable rise in the weight of armour or protection that our various vehicles are carrying". As a consequence "it will constantly stress the ability to lift these vehicles around". AVM Leeson considered that, so far, the design of the A400M was "living up to the FRES demands". However, he recognised that, if the threat situation changed further, this issue would have to be looked at very carefully.[125]

86. We asked whether the A400M aircraft could cope with the increasing weight of FRES. Mr Rowntree said that the floor strength of the A400M had been recently strengthened. He said that the A400M was at a more advanced stage of development compared with FRES. FRES was "working to around a 25 tonne total size" which would enable A400M to transport it about 2,000 miles which "would be a very useful lift capability". However, if the weight crept up to 32 tonnes, this would reduce the distance that an A400M could transport FRES.[126]

87. Mr Rowntree emphasised that the FRES and A400M teams were in very close dialogue and the FRES team knew where "the bounds are" for the A400M.[127] The MoD did not know to what extent the A400M could be upgraded through life. However, if FRES weight increased through life it would "create problems".[128] Mr Thompson said that the floor reinforcements and the ramp reinforcement for the A400M was a "UK-unique configuration".[129] He added that it was more difficult to retrofit aircraft than incorporate a change while it was being built. He thought that with the A400M "we have probably reached the end of the easy modifications".[130]

88. We asked about the implications if the weight of FRES went above 32 tonnes. General Figgures told us that as threats changed, the protection for FRES would have to be adjusted, and would have to be tuned to a particular threat. This could mean that there would be different mixtures of armour for different threats which could be taken on and off the vehicle. He considered that if FRES went above 32 tonnes, the MoD would be "able to fly the base vehicle with a base level of protection and then we would increase that protection once we got into theatre".[131] We asked whether this would mean that more aircraft would be required to transport the same number of FRES vehicles. General Figgures said that would be the case if the MoD deployed all its FRES vehicles by air:

but the proposition would be that we would fly FRES, if necessary, for say a small scale focused intervention where speed of reaction was important, and we would have sufficient air fleet to be able to air land the appropriate sub-unit and framework of the battlegroup that was going to be deployed.

He added that for a small scale focused deployment "we require that rapidity. For a more deliberate intervention….the Strategic Lift could well be provided by sea".[132]

89. It has recently been reported in the media that the MoD had asked Airbus whether a FRES vehicle weighing 36 tonnes could be transported on A400M aircraft and that, while the company considered this achievable, it was not within the current price and schedule terms of the UK's A400M contract.[133]

90. It is intended that the MoD's Future Rapid Effect System (FRES), a family of medium-weight armoured vehicles, are to be transportable to operational theatres by A400M aircraft. However, the increased weight of FRES could lead to it becoming too heavy to be transported by A400M or could substantially reduce the distance that the vehicles could be transported. The weight of FRES must be carefully monitored and managed, both during development and when in-service, to avoid a situation where the UK Armed Forces will have a new generation of armoured fighting vehicles which cannot be deployed rapidly overseas.

Support and maintenance

91. In its memorandum Marshall Aerospace stated that the A400M would provide a significant boost to the MoD's air-lift capacity, but raised concerns about the MoD's approach to supporting the aircraft as it could see "no evidence that the MoD is taking due account of the sovereignty issues for A400M, as specified in the DIS [Defence Industrial Strategy]".[134] We asked the MoD about the arrangements for supporting and maintaining the A400 aircraft when it enters service. The development and production contract with Airbus includes some support provision, but was not "a full support solution of a modern kind".[135] Mr Rowntree said that further work was being undertaken to consider what the support solution might look like which included looking at "possible collaborative and UK national options".[136]

92. We sought confirmation that the support arrangement would provide the UK with sovereign national capability. Mr Rowntree said that the design authority for the aircraft was not "at the moment UK-based" and this required the MoD to make sure that there were arrangements with an "onshore expert provider….and we are working, along with a number of suppliers, to make sure that we make those right decisions to keep the capability we need".[137] He considered that there were certain elements of the support arrangement that "sensibly should be pan-European".[138] The MoD is undertaking work to identify a support and maintenance arrangement for the A400M aircraft when it enters service. The MoD needs to ensure that the arrangement identified provides the UK with operational sovereignty.

Lessons from the programme

93. Collaborative defence equipment programmes, for example Eurofighter Typhoon, have in the past often experienced both cost overruns and delays. We asked how the lessons from such programmes had been learned on the A400M programme. Mr Rowntree said that in launching the A400M programme, efforts were made to ensure that some of the inflexibilities and difficulties experienced on the Eurofighter Typhoon programme were not brought into the A400M programme. He said that:

On Eurofighter we had some inflexible arrangements, such as fixed work shares between nations, and quite a bureaucratic process. With A400M we are following what we call a commercial approach, which is a fixed price contract with Airbus with key delivery milestones, and once the contract is placed, the nations really do not manage it by committee any more. It is the same as a commercial Airbus product would be managed. It is then up to the company to manage the programme and, in fact, we do not have a fixed work-share arrangement.[139]

94. In its submission, the Royal Aeronautical Society said that the acquisition of the A400M had not been one of Europe's successes and "must hold some kind of all-comers record for protracted development". However, it acknowledged that an important breakthrough came when responsibility for developing the aircraft was assumed by the Airbus consortium, as Airbus had brought commercial discipline to the programme.[140]

95. Mr Francisco Fernández Sáinz, Managing Director, Airbus Military Sociedad Limitada, had been involved in the Eurofighter Typhoon programme and considered that the arrangements for the A400M programme were much better because "you have one company, you have one agency, no interference from the nations". However, he considered that the nine years to develop the specification and to refine the A400M aircraft had been too long. He thought that more money should be spent on the development phase of programmes like the A400M.[141] Mr Thompson considered that:

If there is a lesson to be learned, I think it is that a single-phase, fixed-price, fixed deadline contract with very little opportunity….for the customer to change his mind, because of the shortness of the delivery period, is a positive lesson to be learned".[142]

96. The A400M programme is a European collaborative programme, but has been structured in a way to avoid some of the problems experienced on past collaborative programmes, such as Eurofighter. We recommend that the MoD evaluate those aspects of the A400M programme which have gone well, and those aspects which have gone less well, such as the very long development phase, and ensure that the lessons are applied to future collaborative programmes.


96   National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 2006, Project Summary Sheets, HC 23-II, Session 2006-07, pp 1-7  Back

97   Ev 47 Back

98   Q 124 Back

99   Q 220 Back

100   Ev 34 Back

101   Ev 38 Back

102   Q 125 Back

103   Q 127 Back

104   Q 224 Back

105   Qq 220-221 Back

106   Ev 47 Back

107   Q 59 Back

108   Q 62 Back

109   Qq 63-66 Back

110   Qq 67-69 Back

111   Q 69 Back

112   Q 157 Back

113   National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 2006, Project Summary Sheets, HC 23-II, Session 2006-07, p 3 Back

114   Q 160 Back

115   Q 164 Back

116   Q 161 Back

117   Ev 49 Back

118   Defence Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 3, p 19, March 2007 Back

119   Q 137 Back

120   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2006-07, The Army's requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme, HC 159 Back

121   Ibid., Q 37 Back

122   Ibid., para 42 Back

123   Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2006-07, The Army's requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2006-07, HC 511, para 8 Back

124   Ev 35 Back

125   Q 108 Back

126   Q 151 Back

127   Ibid. Back

128   Q 152 Back

129   Q 253 Back

130   Q 256 Back

131   Q 153 Back

132   Qq 154-155 Back

133   Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 May 2007, UK MoD concedes FRES frustrations Back

134   Ev 42 Back

135   Q 165 Back

136   Ibid. Back

137   Q 166 and Q 168 Back

138   Q 170 Back

139   Q 130 Back

140   Ev 34 Back

141   Q 241 Back

142   Ibid. Back


 
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