Conclusions and recommendations
1. Strategic
sea-lift enables large volumes of defence equipment and stores
to be transported to operational theatres in the most cost-effective
way, but early political and military decision-making is needed
if sea-lift is to be possible. We recommend that the MoD identify
how the speed of its decision-making could be improved further
in order to maximise the use of sea-lift. (Paragraph 15)
2. Strategic air-lift
is an expensive option for transporting equipment and stores when
compared with strategic sea-lift, but is the fastest option for
transporting equipment and stores needed urgently in theatre.
When using strategic air-lift, the MoD must ensure that the lift
capacity of aircraft is fully utilised, giving priority to the
equipment and stores urgently needed in theatre. However, where
spare capacity is available, it makes sense to transport other
items which are not needed as urgently, rather than "fly
fresh air". (Paragraph 17)
3. We note that the
transportation of equipment through third countries to support
current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has generally not caused
any problems. (Paragraph 19)
4. We are pleased
to learn that the Ro-Ro container ships have performed very effectively
in both supporting current operations and undertaking other tasks,
and note that the MoD considers that the six ships are sufficient
to meet its current needs. (Paragraph 22)
5. We note that in
addition to the six Ro-Ro container ships, the MoD's four Landing
Ship Dock (Auxiliary) vessels can also be used in a strategic
sea-lift role, although they have only been used once to date
in such a role. (Paragraph 25)
6. The MoD has good
arrangements to access commercial shipping and has, to date, secured
the commercial shipping it required to supplement its own sea-lift
capability. However, the commercial shipping market is reducing.
We recommend that the MoD undertake a detailed analysis of the
commercial shipping market with the aim of assessing whether it
will be able to secure access to commercial shipping in the quantities
and timeframes necessary to meet its future needs. (Paragraph
32)
7. We are very concerned
that a high proportion of the current transport and tanker aircraft
are not available for immediate deployment to undertake the required
tasks. While modifications are often the reason for aircraft not
being available, maintenance is also a key factor, and reflects
the fact that the MoD has an ageing transport and tanker aircraft
fleet which is being flown at an unexpectedly high level in very
punishing conditions. While new transport and tanker aircraft
are in the pipeline, it will be some years before they enter service.
We have real doubts as to whether the current transport and tanker
fleet can provide the level of availability required between now
and when these new aircraft come into service. (Paragraph 38)
8. The MoD makes extensive
use of commercial air-lift for transporting freight and personnel
to supplement its own air-lift assets, and is reviewing whether
the current balance between the air-lift capacity provided by
its own air-lift assets and the air-lift capacity it requires
from the marketplace is right. The MoD should complete its review
as quickly as possible and ensure that the recommendations are
implemented fully. (Paragraph 46)
9. We welcome the
action that has been taken to improve the reliability of the airbridge
and to improve the experience of service personnel being transported
to and from the UK and operational theatres. The MoD should not
underestimate the impact on the morale of Service personnel of
delays returning to the UK, particularly if the delays cut into
a short period of leave. The MoD must monitor closely issues relating
to the airbridge and ensure that the improvements in hand are
fully implemented. (Paragraph 53)
10. The
leasing of four C-17 large transport aircraft, which are to be
purchased when the lease ends, has greatly increased the MoD's
strategic air-lift capability and performed extremely well. We
welcome the fact that these four aircraft will be purchased once
the lease ends and that the MoD is to purchase a fifth C-17 aircraft.
We recommend that the MoD should commission a detailed analysis
of the medium and longer term consequences of the high level of
use of the C-17 and C-130 Hercules fleets, and should publish
the results of that analysis as soon as possible.
(Paragraph 62)
11. MoD
officials are producing advice to ministers setting out options
for addressing possible risks relating to the MoD's future air-lift
requirements. Given the performance of its C-17 large transport
aircraft, the MoD must give consideration to the acquisition of
additional C-17 aircraft. Such a decision needs to be taken quickly
given that the C-17 production line may be closing in the near
future. (Paragraph 67)
12. We
note that the In-Service Date slippage on the A400M programme
remains at 15 months, as reported in the Major Projects Report
2006, and that Airbus has devoted more resources to the programme
to keep it on track. (Paragraph 74)
13. The
delay to the A400M programme has required the lives of ageing
C-130K aircraft to be extended. If there are any further delays
on the A400M programme, the scope for further extending the lives
of C-130K aircraft may be limited, and expensive, leaving a potential
capability gap. We recommend that the MoD undertakes a full analysis
of the options for bridging a potential capability gap if the
A400 programme experiences any further delays.
(Paragraph 77)
14. The
MoD has assured us that A400M aircraft will be fitted with a Defensive
Aid System and a Fuel Tank Inertion system for protection. We
assume these systems will be fitted to all A400M aircraft and
call on the MoD to confirm, in its response to our report, that
this will be the case. It would be a false economy not to fit
these systems to all A400M aircraft during manufacture, only then
to retro-fit the systems later at great expense.
(Paragraph 79)
15. The
MoD is acquiring 25 A400M aircraft to replace its C-130K Hercules
aircraft fleet. Several C-130 Hercules aircraft have been lost
during current operations and the MoD is undertaking work to identify
likely future attrition rates. We recommend that the MoD consider
acquiring additional A400M aircraft to ensure that the pool of
25 available aircraft is maintained.
(Paragraph 81)
16. It
is intended that the MoD's Future Rapid Effect System (FRES),
a family of medium-weight armoured vehicles, are to be transportable
to operational theatres by A400M aircraft. However, the increased
weight of FRES could lead to it becoming too heavy to be transported
by A400M or could substantially reduce the distance that the vehicles
could be transported. The weight of FRES must be carefully monitored
and managed, both during development and when in-service, to avoid
a situation where the UK Armed Forces will have a new generation
of armoured fighting vehicles which cannot be deployed rapidly
overseas. (Paragraph 90)
17. The
MoD is undertaking work to identify a support and maintenance
arrangement for the A400M aircraft when it enters service. The
MoD needs to ensure that the arrangement identified provides the
UK with operational sovereignty. (Paragraph
92)
18. The
A400M programme is a European collaborative programme, but has
been structured in a way to avoid some of the problems experienced
on past collaborative programmes, such as Eurofighter. We recommend
that the MoD evaluate those aspects of the A400M programme which
have gone well, and those aspects which have gone less well, such
as the very long development phase, and ensure that the lessons
are applied to future collaborative programmes.
(Paragraph 96)
19. The
MoD's current tanker aircraft fleet consists of elderly TriStar
and VC-10 aircraft which are becoming increasingly expensive to
keep in service. We note that MoD considers that these aircraft
can be maintained in service until the Future Strategic Tanker
Aircraft (FSTA) is available, although it acknowledges that there
would come a point where the cost of maintaining the aircraft
would become prohibitive. (Paragraph 105)
20. We
note that the MoD considers that a Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) deal for the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) programme
offers better value for money than acquiring the aircraft under
a conventional procurement approach.
(Paragraph 111)
21. The
FSTA programme was nominated as a potential PFI project in 1997,
but some ten years later a deal has yet to be finalised. We expect
the MoD to identify the reasons why this project has taken so
long, and the lessons for future projects where the MoD is considering
a PFI approach. (Paragraph 112)
22. We
welcome the news that MoD has decided to proceed towards financial
and contractual close of the FSTA PFI deal. However, challenges
still remain on the project as the funding has still to be raised.
It is important that the MoD works closely with the contractor,
AirTanker Ltd, so that the PFI deal can be finalised quickly.
We consider it vital that the FSTA aircraft enter service as soon
as possible, given the need for improved air transport for Service
personnel. (Paragraph 115)
23. We
note that other countries also have a requirement for new tanker
aircraft. The MoD should consider whether there is scope for another
country to become a partner on the FSTA given the financial and
inter-operability benefits that this might offer.
(Paragraph 116)
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