Memorandum from Marshall Aerospace
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Marshall Aerospace is pleased to submit written
evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee Inquiry on
Strategic Lift. This submission records the early success of the
joint MoD/Marshall Aerospace Hercules Integrated Operational Support
(HIOS) programme in providing Royal Air Force C130s for operational
tasking and notes that valuable lessons learnt from HIOS are being
applied to the forthcoming Tristar Integrated Operational Support
(TRIOS) programme. Marshall Aerospace highlights that sustainment
of the Tristar fleet will be challenging for the MoD and Industry
as the Royal Air Force becomes the only mainstream operator of
the Lockheed 1011 aircraft. It recommends that further consideration
be given to options to purchase or lease additional Tristar aircraft
which could alleviate the intense pressure on the "airbridge".
For the future support of the new A400M aircraft, Marshall Aerospace
notes that the MoD is pursuing strategies which appear to run
contrary to the DIS in terms of maintaining the operational independence
and sovereignty of UK airlift assets. A change of strategy is
required if the A400M is to be subject to urgent operational requirements
and the MoD requires industry's immediate response in a similar
manner to the RAF C130 fleet.
1. Marshall Aerospace was identified in
the Defence Industrial Strategy as the Domain Leader for strategic
airlift due to its knowledge and experience of supporting both
military and civil transport aircraft for more than forty years.
This evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee's Inquiry
draws on this substantial experience and concludes by offering
an alternative view on the emerging A400M support arrangements.
The Marshall Aerospace evidence has four main themes:
Effectiveness of Industrial Partnering.
Early retirement of C130K aircraft.
Effectiveness of the current strategic
"airbridge".
UK Support Strategy for A400M.
EFFECTIVENESS OF
INDUSTRIAL PARTNERING
2. The Defence Industrial Strategy sought
to embed the culture of partnering between the MoD and Industry
where clear benefits could be demonstrated, in particular improved
equipment availability for the Armed Forces and value for money
for the UK taxpayer. One such partnering programme is underway
for the RAF's Hercules C130 fleet where, 10 months after contract
award, the joint MoD/Industry team is working through its initial
set up period of Hercules Integrated Operational Support (HIOS)
programme.
3. Since June 2006, HIOS has provided an
outstanding level of support and levels of available aircraft
have exceeded the contracted levels of 75% for the Hercules C130K
and approached 80% on Hercules C130J. This HIOS support has been
achieved against a backdrop of operational upgrades, direct support
to operational theatres, and over-flying of the Hercules C130J
against original targets. From a wider perspective, HIOS has developed
new ways of working:
Providing accessible Industry support
directly to front line squadrons.
Combining MoD and Industry technical
specialists to reduce investigation timescales.
Streamlining aircraft maintenance
programmes.
Providing single management of the
engine and wider supply chain.
Whilst such effectiveness is planned to be applied
to the Tristar fleet, it would appear that A400M will not benefit
in a similar manner (see paragraph 7). Furthermore, the Committee
may wish to be satisfied that arrangements for C-17 and FSTA provide
incentives for all parties to deliver faster, cheaper and better
support.
4. Overall, the HIOS programme is already
showing promising signs of delivering a stable and cost-effective
solution to RAF Hercules support. The lessons learnt from this
partnering are already being fed into the next aircraft programme
for Tristar Integrated Operational Support (TRIOS). Expected to
start in January 2008, the TRIOS programme should provide the
MoD with a sustainable support solution for the RAF's 9 Tristar
aircraft and thus enable them to reach their Out of Service date,
notwithstanding the many technical and logistics challenges which
lie ahead. The Tristar aircraft (L1011) has been phased out by
all major civil airlines and hence there is an increasing risk
of Tristar spares shortages over the next few years. To mitigate
this risk, the MoD and Marshall Aerospace are working together,
as per the DIS, to prepare a robust and credible TRIOS solution.
Costs are expected to rise above current funding levels as industry
will have to maintain a unique spares inventory for the RAF aircraft
but effective partnering should help to minimise this additional
cost and ensure that the Tristar remains an available and sustainable
aircraft for at least the next 5 years.
EARLY RETIREMENT
OF C130K AIRCRAFT
5. Building on the success of HIOS, Marshall
Aerospace is currently working with the MoD to develop a true
through-life C130 capability, ensuring that capability gaps are
identified and managed in a timely and appropriately funded manner.
In this respect, we are seriously concerned that C130Ks are being
retired from active service ahead of the A400M's entry into service,
leading to an airlift shortfall. In as much as FSTA has been delayed,
this too will place further pressure on the existing airlift fleet.
We recognise the financial burden in maintaining ageing aircraft
but the premature retirement of C130Ks is a high risk to MoD's
overall airlift capability given the uncertainty of the delivery
schedule for A400M. Interim solutions, such as wing changes and
avionics upgrades could be funded to extend the life of these
aircraft. Such an approach would bridge the capability gap while
generating resalable aircraft to a high standard for the MoD.
EFFECTIVENESS OF
CURRENT STRATEGIC
AIRBRIDGE
6. It is recognised that the RAF's existing
fleet of 9 Tristar ageing aircraft are challenging to manage and
hence the TRIOS programme, described earlier, is underway to guarantee
their availability in the strategic transport role. One major
difficulty for the RAF is to generate sufficient Tristar aircraft
to provide the required troop carrying capacity. As recently reported
in Hansard, the unserviceability of a passenger Tristar aircraft
causes a significant, adverse reaction on morale from the troops
who are due to fly back to their families in the UK.
7. Marshall Aerospace has offered (informally)
additional aircraft, in the form of ex-civilian Tristar aircraft,
to supplement the existing RAF fleet of nine aircraft. Many suitable
second hand aircraft are available from reputable sources and
Marshall Aerospace is prepared to work with the MoD on either
a purchase or lease arrangement. Some additional MoD expenditure
would be required to bring the aircraft onto the military register
and, if required, to fit defensive aids equipment. However, additional
Tristar aircraft would add immediate benefits for the MoD:
Increased certainty in maintaining
the "airbridge".
An extra source of essential spares
to sustain the long-term fleet.
A support arrangement from Industry
to add experienced manpower into RAF Brize Norton.
A reduction in charter airlift expenditure
by the Defence Transport & Movements Agency.
Overall, delays in FSTA and A400M, at a time
of very high operational tempo, has placed additional strain on
the existing fleets, particularly C130, VC10 and Tristar, all
of which have suffered "creeping" delays to out-of-service
dates. The effect is to blight difficult decisions on upgrades
to structures and systems, in order to meet the high demands of
the Nation.
UK SUPPORT STRATEGY
FOR A400M
8. The arrival of the A400M will provide
a significant boost to the MoD's airlift capacity but there are
significant questions regarding the MoD's approach to the support
of this new platform. The DIS states (on page 17) that "we
must maintain the appropriate degree of sovereignty... to ensure
operational independence... and the ability to respond to Urgent
Operational Requirements (UORs)". We see no evidence that
the MoD is taking due account of the sovereignty issue for A400M,
as specified in the DIS. Indeed, we understand that the UK MoD
is investigating a pan-European support solution by joining with
other A400M operators, which presumably would lead to a European
industrial competition. This approach runs contrary to the experience
and success of the RAF's C130 fleet which has, in part, been attributed
to the ability of the UK MoD to control the configuration of the
aircraft and task industry to modify its fleet with equipment
to perform roles bespoke to UK operations, including Special Forces.
Over its lifetime, the RAF C130K fleet has received over 700 major
modifications and the new C130J has already received almost 100
modifications. Therefore, without a robust national support solution
for the A400M which specifically addresses the sovereignty issue,
the MoD will restrict its ability to adapt and modify the A400M
aircraft and thus ensure operational independence. It is also
important to recognise that both A400M and C130 are not airliner
derivatives, unlike FSTA, and demand similar upgrade "autonomy"
afforded to fast jets, like Harrier and Tornado, where operational
independence is the norm.
9. In summary, we are surprised that the
UK MoD has elected to ignore the virtues of UK partnering for
the A400M programme. Moreover, we believe that the MoD and UK
Industry should work together to embed an indigenous technical
capability to support and modify the RAF's A400M aircraft, and
thus provide the rapid industrial response to UORs, as witnessed
today on many other military platforms. (Marshall Aerospace is
able to provide much greater detail on this matter if required
by the Committee).
12 April 2007
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