Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
DEFINITIONS
1. What are the MoD's definitions of Strategic
Lift and Tactical Lift?
In simple terms, strategic lift tasks are from
the UK to an operational theatre; a tactical lift task is one
within an operational theatre.
STRATEGIC LIFT
ASSETS
2. Please provide a list of the different
types of Strategic Lift assets which the MoD has; the number of
each type of asset; and explain whether the assets are owned,
are leased, or are provided under a PFI arrangement (or other
arrangement).
The table below outlines the total number of
MOD assets that can perform strategic lift tasks. At any one time,
a proportion will be unavailable for use due to routine maintenance
or other reasons, such as being involved in a modification programme.
| Platform | Quantity
| Capability | Ownership |
| Roll-on Roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships | 6
| Freight | PFI arrangement |
| Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) | 4
| Freight and passenger | Owned (3 in service, 1 still being fitted-out)
|
| C-17 | 4 | Passenger and freight
| Leased until 2008, then purchased. |
| C-17 | 1 | Passenger and freight
| Owned, from 2008 |
| TriStar C2 | 3 | Passenger
| Owned |
| TriStar KC1 | 4 | Passenger, freight and tanker
| Owned |
| TriStar K1 | 2 | Passenger and tanker
| Owned |
| VC-10 CMk1K[4]
| 10 | Passenger, freight and tanker
| Owned |
| C130K Mk3 | 20 | Passenger and freight
| Owned |
| C130K Mk1 | 4 | Passenger and freight
| Owned |
| C130J Mk4 | 14 | Passenger and freight
| Owned |
| C130J Mk 5 | 10 | Passenger and freight
| Owned |
3. TriStar aircraft are used for the Strategic Lift of
personnel. How old is the current TriStar fleet and what is the
planned out of service date for these aircraft? For the last three
years, please provide availability figures for TriStar aircraft,
showing how these compare with the planned availability rates.
The TriStar aircraft were manufactured between 1979 and 1980.
On current plans the TriStar fleet will reach its out of service
date towards the middle of the next decade.
The table below details the planned availability figures
(in hours) for the TriStar fleet and that which was achieved.
| Financial Year | TriStar Planned (hrs)Achieved (hrs)
|
| 2003-04 | 9,561 | 8,879
|
| 2004-05 | 10,561 | 8,657
|
| 2005-06 | 11,191 | 7,693
|
| 4. What Strategic Lift assets does the MoD plan to have in 2017 and 2027?
| | |
In both 2017 and 2027 the MoD plans to have the following
Strategic Lift assets:
We also plan to have the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft
in service by the turn of this decade and it is possible that
some of these aircraft will be available for strategic lift tasks.
We are currently finalising the commercial arrangements with Air
Tanker Ltd, including the number of aircraft that will form part
of the service they will provide. There are also other assets
which the MoD plans to have (in both 2017 and 2027), such as the
vessels to be procured under the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability
(MARS) programme, which may contribute to our strategic lift capacity.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. What progress has the MoD made in meeting the Strategic
Lift requirements set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
1998?
The MOD has met the strategic lift requirements as set out
in the SDR in 1998. Paragraph 96 from Chapter 5 articulated these
requirements as:
"We have an urgent need to improve our strategic transport,
to allow us to move more powerful forces quickly to an overseas
theatre. In the short term we expect to do this through acquiring
four additional roll-on roll-off container ships and four large
C17 aircraft or their equivalent. In the longer term, we will
also need to consider a replacement for our remaining elderly
transport aircraft. The European Future Large Aircraft is a contender
for this requirement."
The SDR stated a requirement for a four-ship Ro-Ro capability.
This was converted into a PFI for six Ro-Ro ships, which entered
service between 2002 and 2003. In 2000, we contracted with Boeing
to lease 4 C-17 aircraft and announced last year our intention
to procure these aircraft at the end of their lease in 2008. We
are also procuring a fifth C-17, to enter service next year.
The committee will also be aware of our plans to procure
25 A400M aircraft to replace the C130K Hercules currently in-service
with the RAF.
6. Have the Strategic Lift requirements set out in the
SDR been reviewed? Has this led to any change i.e. in the type
/ number of Strategic Lift assets required (if so, please provide
details)?
We regularly review our requirements and planning assumptions
as part of our planning cycle. Hence, we announced in 2006 our
intention to buy a 5th C-17.However the principle set out in the
SDR of maintaining a capable, deployable and balanced force has
remained the basis on which we plan, structure and equip our Armed
Forces.
7. What lessons relating to Strategic Lift have been/are
being learned from operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan?
How are these being applied?
Lessons and evidence are gathered at the tactical, operational
and strategic levels. The information provided is verified and
supplemented by independent research, theatre visits and interviews
including observing of the planning, preparation and initial deployment
phase of an operation.
A number of lessons identified have been confirmed from operations
in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Operation Resolute (Bosnia-Herzegovina
1995/96) confirmed that UK military strategic lift was limited,
resulting in the requirement to approach the commercial market
to hire civil sea and air lift. Also, US usage of C-17s to deliver
outsize cargo loads at austere forward delivery points was noted.
This helped inform the MoD's requirements for the Ro-Ro ships
and C-17s identified in the SDR.
Lessons pertinent to the build-up to Operation Telic, in
Iraq, in 2003 cover a broad spectrum of strategic lift. They include
tactical lessons, such as ensuring chartered sea-lift vessels
have suitable containers for the stowage of personnel weapons
and ammunition to larger baggage allowances for personnel on chartered
aircraft. They also include wider lessons such as the ongoing
recognition of the utility of chartered aircraft to support airlift,
in freeing up RAF aircraft to undertake more dangerous operations.
An additional lesson identified relates to the performance
of the enduring airbridge between the UK and both theatres of
current operation (in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the experience
for those using the airbridge. Personnel involved with the airbridge
process at the various hubs have had new training, including enhanced
passenger handling skills. Additionally, movement personnel are
collecting customer feedback from those using the airbridge to
identify and, if necessary, implement future improvements required.
Other recent improvements to the airbridge include: direct TriStar
flights to Kandahar, which help reduce the overall journey time
to Afghanistan; procurement of additional security screening equipment
at RAF Brize Norton and the Joint Air Mounting Centre at South
Cearney; the refurbishment of facilities in the RAF Brize Norton
Air Terminal (such as a large cafe«); an increase in air
movements contractor support staff at RAF Brize Norton; and closer
integration of RAF and Army movements personnel at airheads.
SEA LIFT
8. Are the six Ro-Ro ferries sufficient to meet the MoD's
current requirement for Sea Lift? Where additional Sea Lift is
required, does the MoD have access to sufficient Sea Lift from
the commercial market? What arrangements are in place regarding
access to Sea Lift from the commercial market? What is the MoD's
assessment of the effectiveness of these arrangements?
The Strategic Ro-Ro requirement emanates from the SDR and
was endorsed in the Defence White Paper entitled "Delivering
Security in a Changing World" in July 2004.
Four Ro-Ro ships are permanently contracted to the MoD with
a further two at notice for MoD tasking. These 6 ships are supplied
and manned by Foreland Shipping and their readiness profiles are
matched to meet MOD requirements. We judge that this is sufficient
to meet our current needs.
Short-term peaks of tasking, or major deployments, may require
additional shipping over and above the capacity provided by the
Ro-Ros. The first option to provide this would be through the
use of allied shipping provided via the Sealift Coordination Centre,
which allows allies to make use of spare capacity from other nations,
on a repayment basis. The cost of this shipping is less than that
for chartered commercial shipping and the capabilities of the
vessels and their condition is well known.
When additional sealift is required from the commercial market,
a Statement of Requirement is prepared which sets out the quantity
and type of equipment, the timescale and loading/discharge ports.
This is submitted to the market, through a panel of brokers. Ships
offered in response are evaluated in terms of their technical
ability to achieve the task, safety management and cost.
Since the introduction of the 4 x Strategic Ro-Ros, charter
requests for additional shipping are around 15 per year. Most
of these tasks are for routine re-supply to overseas garrisons,
most notably the South Atlantic Islands, and support to exercises.
The UK has a robust safety management system in place to ensure
the quality of the vessels chartered and has excellent working
relationships with the brokers who acquire the ships. These arrangements
work extremely well and are able to meet Defence's requirements.
AIR LIFT
9. The MoD is procuring the four C-17 aircraft which are
currently being leased, and an additional C-17 aircraft. How much
are the five C-17 aircraft expected to cost the MoD to procure?
How old are the five aircraft being procured and how long are
they expected to remain in-service? Are the four C-17s currently
being leased operating above the planned rates and, if so, by
how much?
The cost to procure the five C-17 aircraft is commercially
sensitive but an indicative cost of a C-17 is around $220 million.
As at end February 2007, the four leased C-17 aircraft are
just under 6 years old (the oldest is 5 years 9 months old). The
fifth C-17 aircraft is currently in production at Boeing to meet
an In Service Date of May 2008. All four leased aircraft are planned
to remain in-service until 2031. The table below details the planned
and achieved availability figures for the C-17 fleet.
| Financial Year | C-17 Planned (hrs)Achieved (hrs)
|
| 2001-02 | 3,000 | 3,377
|
| 2002-03 | 3,000 | 5,745
|
| 2003-04 | 4,000 (1) | 5,592
|
| 2004-05 | 5,800 (1) | 5,727
|
| 2005-06 | 5800 | 6375
|
| 1. Increase in planned hours due to additional crews.
| | |
In 2006-07 the fleet has accumulated in the region of 5720
flying hours as at the end of January 2007 and is forecasting
circa 7,000 flying hours at the end of the financial year.
10. What is the current in-service date for the A-400M
aircraft (the Major Projects Report 2006 reports that the programme
was forecast to be 15 months later than the approved in-service
date)? What is the out of service date for the Hercules C130K
aircraft which the A-400M aircraft is replacing? What is the current
forecast cost of the life extension to the Hercules C130K aircraft?
The in-service date (defined as the 7th aircraft delivered
to the UK) for the A400M aircraft is 2011 (50% confidence). The
ISD variation, as reported in the Major Projects Report (MPR)
2006, is due to historic reasons associated with the time required
for German approvals and changed customer requirements. The out-of-service
date (OSD) for the C130K Hercules is 2012. The original OSD for
the C130K was 2010 but has been delayed by two years in order
to be coherent with the entry of A400M. The cost associated with
this measure is unchanged, as recorded in MPR 2006, at £26
million.
11. What arrangements are in place regarding access to
Air Lift from the commercial market? What is the MoD's assessment
of the effectiveness of these arrangements?
The MoD makes regular use of the commercial aviation markets,
both for longer-term core contracts, such as movement to and from
Germany, and for operational and exercise tasking. The majority
of ad hoc business is done through established brokers as experience
has shown that this provides greater robustness. In addition,
MoD has enabling agreements in place for a number of key airlift
freight capabilities, including outsized lift. This process, in
which pricing and capability have already been commercially competed,
gives rapid access to available commercial lift by effectively
"fast-tracking" the individual approach to the market.
It does not, however, guarantee availability. The complexity and
diversity of passenger airlift precludes the use of enabling agreements
for those tasks.
MoD is subject to the normal vagaries of the commercial market,
hence there are no guarantees of availability of commercial aircraft
under these arrangements. However, experience has thus far showed
that the process in place is effective and able to meet demand.
As with sealift, the MoD also moves individual consignments of
freight using scheduled commercial airline services.
COSTS
12. How much does Strategic Lift cost the MoD each year?
Please distinguish between direct and indirect costs. What proportion
of the total Strategic Lift cost relates to chartering from the
civil market?
We estimate that strategic lift tasks cost the MoD over £750
million per year, key elements of which are (using 2006-07 figures):
— Airlift charter—£82 million;
— Sealift charter (including Ro-Ros)—£64
million;
— Strategic lift infrastructure on Ops TELIC and
HERRICK—£11 million (this figure includes cost of personnel,
infrastructure and air cargo handling equipment);
— Annual operating costs of RAF Brize Norton—£200
million;
— Cost of using C-17, TriStar and VC10 aircraft
in 2006-07 is in the region of £430 million;
— LSD(A) support costs—£2.4 million.
This does not include the cost of the C130 fleet as the majority
of C130 tasks are likely to be tactical rather than strategic
lift. The above costs also exclude the support costs for sub-system
IPT's which support the Strategic Lift platforms (eg providing
Defensive Aids Systems), or basing costs for the LSD(A), which
are shared with other maritime platforms.
It has not been possible to distinguish between direct and
indirect costs, given how the overall "Strategic Lift"
cost figure, above, was constructed.
KEY PLAYERS
13. Please provide a diagram setting out where the various
players fit into the Strategic Lift process, eg which part of
the MoD: identifies the assets/stores/personnel to be transported;
tasks the provider of Strategic Lift; and provides the Strategic
Lift.
The diagram below indicates the key players and their interaction
within the operational "Strategic Lift" process. The
diagram contains a number of abbreviations, which are:
— Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Logistic Operations
(ACDS Log Ops).
— STC (Strike Command), renamed Air Command with
effect from 1 April 2007.
— PJHQ (Permanent Joint Headquarters).
— DE&S (Defence Equipment & Support).
— DSCOM (Directorate Supply Chain Operations and
Movements).
— FLC (Front Line Command).
The wider strategic lift delivery process includes the planners
in the Equipment Capability Customer (ECC) organisation, who advise
on the future size and shape of MOD's strategic lift capability,
and the DE&S who, through the relevant Integrated Project
Teams, deliver the equipment to the front line.
19 April 2007
4
The RAF also has 4 VC-10 K3 aircraft and 2 VC-10 K4 aircraft which
have a very limited passenger carrying capability, as they are
predominantly air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Back
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