Appendix 1: Government response
The Ministry of Defence was grateful to the Committee
for undertaking its assessment of the White Paper on the Future
of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Command 6994). We welcome
the report and thank the Committee for its contribution to the
debate.
The Ministry of Defence has already responded to
many of the specific issues raised by the Committee, including
in the Defence Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committee
dated 9 March; in responding to Parliamentary Questions following
publication of the Committee's report on 7 March; and during the
debate in the House of Commons on 14 March. Nonetheless,
we thought it would be useful to provide a comprehensive response
in a single document to all the points raised by the Committee.
We are pleased to note that the Committee recognised
the efforts that the Government as a whole has made to ensure
that this decision making process was as open and well-informed
as possible. We are pleased to note too that the Committee did
not challenge the fundamental decisions set out in the White Paper,
namely to retain a deterrent based on a combination of nuclear-powered
submarines and the Trident D5 ballistic missile, and to start
work now to replace the current Vanguard-class submarines.
We would like to respond to the aspect of the Committee's
report that left open the question of whether the White Paper
in some way entails a lowering of the threshold for nuclear use
by the UK Government. There is absolutely nothing in the White
Paper which implies a lowering of the threshold at which we might
contemplate using our nuclear deterrent. The Government's fundamental
policy has not changed: indeed, the only relevant change is our
decision to cease the use of the term sub-strategic, on the basis
that we fully recognise that any use of nuclear weapons would,
by definition, be strategic in both intent and effect. Throughout
the White Paper, and subsequently, we have made absolutely explicit
that it remains our position that we would only consider the use
of our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence.
We look forward to engaging further with the Committee
in future on these and other issues relevant to the nuclear deterrent,
as this vitally important programme is taken forward.
Detailed comments on the specific conclusions and
recommendations are set out in the attachment to this memorandum.
Detailed Response to Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Our intention is to encourage and inform the
public debate on the future of the nuclear deterrent by exploring
the key issues and questions which should be addressed in that
debate. We do not express a view on the merits of retaining and
renewing the UK's nuclear deterrent. Endorsing or rejecting the
Government's proposals will be for the House of Commons, as a
whole, to decide. (Paragraph 3)
These comments are noted. The House of Commons supported
the Government's decision by a substantial majority.
2. Decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear
deterrent should be taken on the strategic needs of the country,
not on industrial factors. However, whilst industrial considerations
should not affect the substance of decisions, they will necessarily
affect the timing of those decisions. It is not unreasonable for
the Government to take these factors into account. (Paragraph
26)
We agree with this assessment which broadly reflects
the approach that we have adopted. The timing of these decisions
was determined by a realistic assessment of the life of our existing
submarines and the time it might take to develop a replacement.
3. One key difference between the US and UK submarine
deterrent programmes is that the UK seeks to operate a continuous-at-sea
deterrent with just four boats whereas the United States is "generating
two or three hulls from 14". (Paragraph 40)
We agree with this statement. However, another, perhaps
equally important, difference, in the context of making risk judgements
on the UK and US deterrent programmes, is that the US possesses
a number of sea, land and air-based nuclear deterrent systems,
whereas the UK relies on a single sea-based system.
4. The White Paper states that decisions are required
now on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. It
says that the life of the current deterrent platform, the Vanguard-class
ballistic missile submarine, was designed for a service life of
25 years, which could be extended to 30 years with a life extension
programme, albeit not without some risk. It maintains that procurement
of a new submarine will take around 17 years. On this basis decisions
are required in 2007. Some witnesses to our inquiry challenged
the Government's timetable. On life extension, the evidence we
received from critics suggested the Vanguard-class, like the US
Ohio-class Trident submarine, could be maintained in service for
up to 45 years. The Government has told us that to plan for life
extension beyond 30 years would be unwise, given the 25 year design
life of the Vanguard-class, the operational demands placed upon
it in order to maintain continuous deterrent patrols, the experience
of the declining reliability and availability of previous submarines
beyond the 25-year point, and the design and construction differences
between the Vanguard and the Ohio-class submarines. (Paragraph
43)
The Ministry of Defence reached its conclusion on
the scope for extending the life of the Vanguard-class submarines
beyond 30 years on the basis of the best expert advice available
to it. It would be irresponsible to plan on the basis that submarine
lives could safely and cost-effectively be extended beyond this
point, especially as it is the UK's sole nuclear deterrent system.
The comparison with the US Ohio-class boats is misleading, not
least because their initial design, maintenance and operational
regimes were different from the Vanguard-class.
5. A procurement timetable of 17 years is three
years longer than for the existing Vanguard-class submarine. The
Government says that the additional time is required because of
changes in the capacity of the UK's submarine industrial base
and because initial concept and development work on the Vanguard-class
was already underway when the Government of the day announced
its decision to acquire the Trident system. The Government says
that no such work has yet begun on a Vanguard successor and that
Parliament is being consulted at a much earlier stage than on
previous occasions. (Paragraph 44)
6. The challenge to the Government's estimate
of 17 years is partly based on the suggestion that work has started
on "concept options for platforms", whereas the government
timetable commences with the "detailed concept work".
We take it that these two things are different and accept that
the 14-year period which we commented on in our previous inquiry
commenced from a more advanced stage in the procurement cycle
(years rather than months away) after a period of detailed concept
work had been carried out. (Paragraph 45)
We are pleased that the Committee accepts that the
14-year period for the Vanguard-class referred to in its previous
report is not directly comparable to the 17-year period that the
White Paper makes clear is needed to design, manufacture and deploy
new submarines. Prior to the debate and vote on 14 March, work
had concentrated on a generic comparison between the various platforms
and systems that we might have considered for our future deterrent
requirements. Work will now start on detailed concept and assessment
work specifically and solely on new nuclear powered submarines,
focused in particular on the work needed to inform the decisions
that will be taken at the Main Gate point.
7. Neither the White Paper nor the exchange of
letters between the Prime Minister and the US President in December
2006 explain adequately why decisions on UK participation in the
Trident D5 missile life extension are required by 2007. The Government
should clarify why decisions on the missile are required now.
(Paragraph 50)
The Trident D5 Life Extension programme will be a
joint UK/US project to refurbish the whole stockpile of Trident
D5 missiles by around 2020 and thereby extend the life of that
missile out to the early 2040s. The US has established a clear
project timetable to achieve that. In order to ensure we participate
in the programme in the most cost-effective manner, we need to
align with that timetable and this requires us to commit this
year to the missile life extension programme.
8. The White Paper does not propose any fundamental
change to the UK's nuclear weapons policy. (Paragraph 52)
We agree with this conclusion.
9. The UK's nuclear arsenal is small in comparison
to that of other established nuclear powers. The UK has made very
significant reductions in the scale of its nuclear arsenal since
the end of the Cold War. (Paragraph 56)
We agree with this conclusion and welcome the fact
that the Committee has highlighted our efforts in this area in
this way.
10. We welcome the reduction in warhead numbers
announced in the White Paper and recognise that this follows the
significant reductions previously announced in the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review. We welcome this arms reduction measure, but it
is unclear whether this has significance as a non-proliferation
measure. Since the White Paper proposes no changes to the number
of warheads deployed on UK submarines, it is unclear that this
reduction has any operational significance. (Paragraph 63)
It is unfortunate that some have sought to down-play
the significance of the reduction in warhead numbers set out in
the recent White Paper. By any measure, reducing the number of
operationally available warheads to fewer than 160 is an important
further step, especially when considered in the wider context
of what has been a long-standing and consistent policy to retain
only the minimum nuclear capability that we require to meet our
nuclear deterrence objectives. This represents a further demonstration
of our commitment to making progress on the 13 Practical Steps
towards nuclear disarmament that were agreed at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference.
In terms of the limit on the number of warheads deployed
on our one submarine on patrol, this was reduced by 50% at the
time of the Strategic Defence Review and we believe that the figure
of up to 48 deployed warheads is currently the minimum we require
to achieve our nuclear deterrence objectives.
11. The White Paper states that the UK is committed
to maintaining a "minimum" nuclear deterrent. The Secretary
of State told us that the Government had conducted a very hard
analysis of the nuclear capabilities required by the UK with a
view to ensuring that they were at a minimum necessary level,
but we are uncertain how the Government determines what constitutes
a "minimum" deterrent. The Government should say how
it calculates the scale of a minimum deterrent. (Paragraph 64)
The White Paper published on 4 December 2006 made
clear that we are committed to retaining only the minimum capability
necessary to deter potential aggressors. The process by which
we make an assessment of our minimum deterrent requirements is
described in paragraph 4-9 of the White Paper. We make an assessment
of the minimum destructive capability that we need to be able
to deliver in order to outweigh the potential benefits a potential
aggressor might believe they would derive from an attack on our
vital interests. This includes an assessment of the decision-making
processes of future potential aggressors and of defensive measures
that a potential adversary might employ in an effort to reduce
the impact of the UK's nuclear capability.
We are not prepared to release precise details of
this assessment process because of the sensitive nature of the
analysis involved and to maintain ambiguity over the circumstances
in which we might consider use of our nuclear deterrent.
12. The White Paper states that the concept of
deterrence has not changed since the end of the Cold War and it
outlines the underlying principles which shape the UK's current
approach to nuclear deterrence. Some witnesses to our inquiry
questioned the continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence while
others argued that it remained as relevant as it ever was during
the Cold War. The Government should do more to explain what the
concept of deterrence means in today's strategic environment.
(Paragraph 74)
Paragraphs 3-6 to 3-12 of the White Paper describe
the range of future risks and challenges that the Government has
considered in taking decisions on the future of the Trident system,
and the possible role we see for the UK's nuclear deterrent in
managing these potential future threats. The Defence Secretary
expanded on the coverage given to this issue in the White Paper
in his speech at Kings College London earlier this year, when
he said:
There are some who …. argue that it is not the
threat but the concept of deterrence which is somehow outdated
and no longer relevant in a post-cold-war world.
I do not accept this. I think it is unfortunate that
the idea of deterrence has become so closely identified with the
cold war. In its simplest terms, deterrence is about dissuading
a potential adversary from carrying out a particular act because
of the consequences of your likely retaliation. This is not an
especially complex or unique concept. Nor does it have anything
inherently to do with nuclear weapons, or superpower blocs. Our
conventional forces are themselves a form of deterrent; they can
and do deter various different kinds of states and non-state actors
even in today's post-cold-war world.
The reality is that it is hard to be sure exactly
what capability will deter any particular threat. The best we
can do is aim to retain a broad spectrum of capabilities to enable
us to respond to a range of potential threats. But there is a
strong argument that nuclear weapons are unique in terms of their
destructive power, and as such, only nuclear weapons can deter
nuclear threats.
13. The Government has stated that the UK will
use its nuclear weapons only in "self defence", in "extreme
circumstances", and in defence of the UK's "vital interests",
but has not defined these terms. It argues that it is important
to maintain ambiguity about the exact circumstances in which the
UK might use its nuclear weapons. Although we understand the need
for ambiguity, the Government should be clearer that this ambiguity
does not lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold. (Paragraph 81)
There is no question of reducing the threshold at
which we might contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent and we
do not believe that there is anything in the White Paper which
suggests that this might be the case. As we have made clear repeatedly,
we would only ever contemplate use in self defence (including
the defence of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme
circumstances. As the Committee recognise elsewhere in its report,
the White Paper does not represent any change to the UK's nuclear
weapons policy.
14. The Government says it no longer uses the
term "sub-strategic" in discussing the UK's nuclear
weapons. However, the White Paper refers to varying the yield
of the UK's nuclear warheads. We call upon the Government to clarify
how a reduced yield differs from a sub-strategic role. The Government
should also state why a sub-strategic role was thought necessary
in 1998 but is no longer necessary now. (Paragraph 87)
15. The Government states that the UK's nuclear
deterrent will continue to be assigned to NATO. NATO nuclear doctrine,
however, explicitly involves a policy of not ruling out first
use of nuclear weapons and a policy of sub-strategic deterrence.
We call upon the Government to clarify, in time for the debate
and vote in the House of Commons, how the UK's nuclear forces
are integrated into the nuclear defence of NATO and what the implications
of the Alliance's first use and sub-strategic policies are for
the UK's nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 90)
UK and NATO nuclear doctrine are consistent. NATO's
long-standing policy is neither to rule in nor rule out first
use of nuclear weapons, in contrast to the claims of some witnesses
to the Committee's inquiry. The UK's nuclear weapons remain committed
to the defence of NATO as before and we will continue to participate
fully in all aspects of NATO nuclear policy and planning.
Ever since the Trident system came into service,
we have had some flexibility in the scale of any use of our nuclear
deterrent. This flexibility stems from an ability to vary the
number of missiles and warheads which might be used and the ability
to employ a reduced yield from our nuclear warhead. We plan to
retain this flexibility. We would not want any potential aggressor
to judge that they could act with impunity towards the UK because
they felt that we would be unwilling to deploy the maximum destructive
effect possible with the Trident system. Any use of nuclear weapons
by the UK would be in response to extreme circumstances but having
a degree of flexibility in the potential scale of its use makes
our deterrent more credible against the range of nuclear threats
we may face in the future.
What has changed is the way in which we describe
this capability and this is where we currently differ slightly
from NATO terminology. We have previously described it as a sub-strategic
capability. But we have decided to cease using this term for the
simple reason that we believe any use of our deterrent will be
strategic in intent and in effect.
16. The Government acknowledges that there is
no current nuclear threat to the UK but argues that nuclear weapons
are needed as an insurance policy against an uncertain future.
Some of our witnesses pointed to nuclear proliferation and noted
that nuclear aggression could only be deterred by the possibility
of nuclear retaliation. Others—including some who accepted
the need for the deterrent—felt that the Government's analysis
of the threat was vague, flawed and otherwise lacked logic, and
many particularly expressed scepticism about the efficacy of the
deterrent in countering state-sponsored terrorism. (Paragraph
100)
The White Paper sets out clearly the possible future
nuclear risks we might face, against the more general background
of an uncertain future. These are the re-emergence of a major
nuclear threat, the threat of emerging nuclear-armed states and
the risks of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. The White Paper
is careful not to overstate the potential utility of nuclear weapons,
especially in managing the threat from terrorism. Ultimately,
we can never be sure precisely which factor might influence the
decision-making of future potential adversaries, but we are clear
that explicitly ruling out any possible relevance of our nuclear
capability in specific scenarios needlessly weakens our deterrence
posture.
17. The Government states that the retention and
renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent is fully consistent with
its international legal obligations. Some witnesses to our inquiry
challenged the Government's position and suggested that the proposals
in the White Paper may constitute a breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and may be illegal under the UN Charter and international
humanitarian law. The Government rejects this suggestion. None
of the witnesses to our inquiry, however, believed that a decision
to replace the Vanguard-class submarines would, in itself, be
illegal, though some argued that the long-term retention of a
nuclear capability, including the decision to extend the life
of the Trident D5 missile, was inconsistent with the UK's obligations
to pursue negotiations in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament.
(Paragraph 114)
The Government remains clear that the position set
out in the White Paper is fully consistent with all our international
legal obligations and indeed that we continue to have an excellent
record in terms of meetings those obligations, including those
under the NPT.
18. Witnesses to our inquiry accepted that, ultimately,
decisions on the future of the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent
were political and that, in the absence of consensus, legal concerns
were unlikely to be decisive. (Paragraph 115)
We believe that it is essential that the Government
is clear as to the legal position with respect to maintenance
and renewal of our nuclear deterrent. It would not be acceptable
for the Government to take these decisions if there were any doubt
as to the legal position. We are absolutely clear about the position
and have set that position out in detail on many occasions, including
in the recent White Paper and the supporting fact sheets.
19. The White Paper states that the Government
is committed to nuclear non-proliferation and to the ultimate
goal of nuclear disarmament. It cites a variety of ways in which
the Government has sought to achieve these objectives. Some witnesses
to our inquiry, however, have argued that the White Paper gives
insufficient attention to the implications of the Government's
decisions for non-proliferation efforts. Some argued that the
Government's proposals may actually encourage nuclear proliferation
and undermine the authority of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others
have argued that whether the UK opts for or against retaining
its nuclear deterrent, the decision will have a negligible impact
on global proliferation. (Paragraph 126)
20. The reductions in warhead numbers announced
by the White Paper are significant disarmament measures, but,
in themselves, they do not amount to a non-proliferation strategy.
There is a need for a much stronger narrative on the forward commitment
of the Government to achieve nuclear non-proliferation. The Government
should not assume that current activities such as those mentioned
in respect of the Norwegian 7 Country Initiative have a wide currency.
The Government should explain how it will use its position at
the Security Council, as the only nuclear weapon state with a
single platform and 1% of the global arsenal, to give new momentum
to what are widely perceived as stalled non-proliferation treaty
discussions. Without a stronger narrative, the UK's decision to
retain and renew its nuclear deterrent might be seized upon by
would-be proliferators to justify their own efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons, though it remains the case that any non-nuclear
state which is a signatory to the NPT is in clear breach of its
undertakings if it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons. (Paragraph
127)
We do not agree that the White Paper gives insufficient
attention to non-proliferation issues. The White Paper and the
supporting fact sheets cover in some detail the UK's disarmament
achievements, describe the role we play in multilateral disarmament
negotiations and set out the measures we are taking to counter
proliferation. On non-proliferation in particular, Fact Sheet
2 sets out elements of the UK's strategy aimed at tightening export
controls, combating supply chains and preventing old or unused
materials from falling into the wrong hands. This lists 11 discrete
activities aimed at real, operational improvement to the non-proliferation
regime.
We will work hard to foster positive engagement in
the NPT Review process, and to strengthen all aspects of the Treaty
by 2010. This will involve work on the peaceful use of nuclear
energy as well as on non-proliferation and disarmament.
We do not accept the arguments of some commentators
that the decisions set out in the White Paper might encourage
nuclear proliferation. On the contrary, we see no evidence or
indeed any likelihood that a unilateral decision by the UK to
renounce its nuclear deterrent would have any effect on the ambitions
of those states currently seeking nuclear weapons. We are convinced
that multilateral negotiations remain the best route to nuclear
disarmament.
21. None of the witnesses to our inquiry was surprised
the Government had decided to opt for a renewal of the submarine-based
deterrent. Few of them considered the SSBN option was the wrong
one. But, of course, a great many of them argued that the Government
was wrong to renew the nuclear deterrent at all, and a few thought
the Government's justification for its choice was inadequate.
(Paragraph 131)
This conclusion is noted. We agree that, having taken
the decision to retain a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent,
the case for retaining a submarine-based system is clear-cut.
22. While many of our witnesses disagreed with
the Government's decision to renew the nuclear deterrent, few
challenged its choice of a submarine-based ballistic missile over
other deterrent options. However, some have found the analysis
of the options in the White Paper not to have explored fully the
option of a nuclear-powered submarine carrying cruise missiles,
noted as being the best alternative option. The Government should
set out in more detail what were the comparative advantages of
cost, range, operation and invulnerability associated with cruise
and D5 missiles which led them to conclude in favour of the D5
missile. We believe the Government should offer further details
of its assessment of deterrent options. (Paragraph 138)
This point was covered in detail in the information
sent to the Committee on 31 January, in which we said:
As for the option of cruise missiles launched from
submarines, we are clear that, in both cost and capability terms,
retaining the Trident D5 missile is by far the best approach.
A comparison between cruise and ballistic missiles is set out
in detail in Box 5-1 of the White Paper.
An option based on submarine-launched cruise missiles
would, like the option we have decided on, require the procurement
of new nuclear-powered submarines to fulfil the deterrent role,
as the existing conventional role submarine flotilla, and the
Astute class which will replace them, are required to undertake
other key defence tasks. Indeed, given that a much larger number
of cruise missiles, compared to Trident D5 missiles, would be
required to meet our minimum deterrence requirements, moving to
a deterrent based on submarine-launched cruise missiles could
well lead to a requirement for additional submarine hulls.
Because of the costs and capability disadvantages
of cruise missiles set out in the White Paper, we have not undertaken
a detailed analysis of what the requirement for submarine hulls
would be.
It is also the case that moving to a submarine-based
cruise missile solution would necessitate the procurement of new
nuclear-capable cruise missiles and also the development of a
new nuclear warhead suitable for use with a cruise missile, both
at considerable cost and technical risk. Thus, such an option
would have significant disadvantages in both cost and capability
terms compared with the option we have chosen.
23. We welcome the Government's assurance that
funding for the nuclear deterrent will not come at the expense
of the conventional capabilities required by the UK's Armed Forces.
However, the Government has not said how it would guarantee this,
when expenditure on the deterrent is included in the defence budget.
We call on the Government to specify in more detail how it will
fulfil this assurance. It is important that additional funding
is provided not only for the initial procurement costs, but also
with any additional costs of maintaining the system in-service.
(Paragraph 148)
The Government made clear in the White Paper that
the investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come
at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces
need. Detailed decisions on the level of our investments in nuclear
and conventional capability will be taken in the Comprehensive
Spending Review, the results of which will be announced later
in the year. The in-service costs of the current nuclear deterrent
system already form part of the Defence budget. Once the new fleet
of deterrent submarines comes into service, and during the transition
from the current system, we expect that the in-service costs of
the UK's nuclear deterrent, including costs at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment, will be similar to those of today.
24. It is important that Parliament be aware of
the full costs of retaining and renewing the UK's nuclear deterrent
before it is asked to agree to the Government's proposals. These
costs include not only the acquisition costs for a new fleet of
SSBNs, but also the costs of life extension, the costs of the
missile and warhead programmes, the projected infrastructure costs,
and the personnel costs of operating and maintaining the deterrent.
The Government says that the overall procurement and infrastructure
costs are £15-20 billion and that the annual running costs
will be £1.5 billion at 2006-07 prices. (Paragraph 153)
The White Paper set out in some detail our initial
estimates of the potential costs involved and we have augmented
this further in subsequent oral and written evidence. The Committee
have rightly identified most of the areas where costs involved
in sustaining our independent deterrent capability will be borne
but, in addition, we have also included the estimated costs of
the Atomic Weapons Establishment and the estimated disposal costs
of submarines, missiles and related infrastructure. All the costs
will need to be refined as work on the concept and assessment
phases is taken forward with industry. More accurate cost estimates
will be available by the time we come to place a contract for
the detailed design of the submarines around 2012 to 2014. However,
the information that we have so far been able to release is relatively
comprehensive given that we are at a very early stage of the procurement
process.
25. The MoD proposes to embark on a life extension
programme for the current Vanguard-class SSBNs, but has not offered
a clear estimate of the costs involved in that programme. The
MoD should make it clear when it will be in a position to give
more accurate estimates and what work needs to be done to achieve
this. (Paragraph 154)
In evidence to the Committee on 6 February, we estimated
that the total costs for the 4-boat fleet of the planned life
extension programme would be in the hundreds of millions of pounds.
We will provide more detailed information to the Committee on
the work required and the associated costs as it becomes available.
26. The House of Commons should be aware that,
even if it were to vote against retaining the deterrent, certain
costs would be involved. These would include costs, such as onshore
infrastructure, industrial costs, and regional assistance to the
areas affected by industrial closures. The costs of investing
in regions affected by any decision not to go ahead with renewal
of the present deterrent should be estimated and included together
with other costs so that those who argue there is an opportunity
cost to other public expenditure can see what the full costs of
such a negative decision are. (Paragraph 155)
This conclusion has been noted. No further work in
this area is planned now that Parliament has voted to support
the decisions set out in the White Paper.
27. The MoD states that it is not possible to
provide precise estimates of the costs of decommissioning the
Vanguard-class submarine. However, it says that £827 million
is included in the MoD annual accounts for the decommissioning
of nuclear powered submarines. Whether or not the UK decides to
replace the Vanguard-class submarine with a new SSBN, the costs
of decommissioning the Vanguard-class will still be incurred.
This must be taken into account when considering the costs of
retaining and renewing the nuclear deterrent. Equally, procurement
of a new SSBN will, in time, mean that the MoD will incur ongoing
decommissioning costs associated with the deterrent. (Paragraph
160)
The MoD recognises that there are decommissioning
costs associated with the Vanguard class submarines and that there
will be costs in the future associated with the new deterrent
submarines. The estimate of in-service support costs for the UK's
nuclear deterrent, set out at paragraph 5-14 of the White Paper,
includes those costs, both nuclear and non-nuclear, that have
been identified for the current deterrent system and includes
an allowance for the decommissioning of the future system. The
Department's current estimate of the costs of nuclear decommissioning
are included in the MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 (HC
1394). These liabilities include costs associated with the existing
nuclear deterrent and will in future include the cost of nuclear
liabilities associated with the future system, in line with normal
practice.
28. The Government says that the cost of UK participation
in US plans to extend the life of the Trident D5 missile will
be around £250 million. We call upon the Government to state
whether any further expenditure will be needed to acquire the
life-extended missiles over and above the initial buy-in costs
to the life extension programme. (Paragraph 162)
We have consistently made clear that the total costs
to the UK of participation in the Trident D5 life extension programme
will be around £250M at 2006/07 prices and exchange rates.
These costs are in addition to the standard annual running costs
for the Trident D5 missile, which are included in the calculation
of the overall running costs of the deterrent.
29. The Government states that greater industrial
collaboration and affordability are essential components in any
new submarine programme and that it needs to address its own shortage
of skills in managing a programme of the scale of a Vanguard successor.
The MoD must ensure it has the skills necessary to deliver any
future submarine programme to time and on budget. In the event
of Parliament voting in support of the renewal of Trident, industry
and the MoD must work together to drive down and control costs
in order to deliver an affordable submarine programme. (Paragraph
169)
We have little to add on skills and industrial capacity
beyond the evidence given to the Committee by Lord Drayson in
November 2006 and in our response to the Committee's second report
on the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. We agree on the need for Government
and industry to continue to work closely together on this programme
to drive down and control costs to deliver an affordable submarine
programme.
30. It is probable that a new generation of SSBNs
could be designed to deliver a higher level of reliability and
availability, and it is possible that this could allow continuous
at sea deterrence to be ensured with only three boats. But it
is also possible that the cost-savings would be small, and outweighed
by the increased risk. The Government should clarify when a decision
will need to be made on the number of boats in the new SSBN fleet,
and what is the likely level of savings from doing without a fourth
boat. (Paragraph 175)
The cost savings that might result from a decision
to procure only 3 boats are currently unquantified, although,
as was made clear in the White Paper, we believe that they would
not be in proportion to the reduction in the number of submarines,
because, for example, of the large fixed overhead costs associated
with the deterrent programme. A significant body of work needs
to be undertaken to examine whether sufficient changes can be
made to enable us to maintain continuous deterrent patrolling
with a fleet of three submarines. This will be a complex piece
of work. We will need to consider carefully the balance between
initial procurement costs, through-life maintenance expenditure
and the need to meet demanding operational requirements, as well
as managing the potential for other unforeseen risks. Decisions
on the number of submarines to be procured will be taken once
this work has reached a sufficient level of maturity, although
we would not wish to speculate further at this stage on precisely
when that is likely to be. We have, however, made clear that we
will not take irresponsible risks with the maintenance of our
deterrent posture.
31. The Government states that it is not yet possible
to judge the potential costs of procuring a successor to the Trident
D5 missile. Given that the Government intends to spend some £11-14
billion on new ballistic missile submarines, it is essential that
any successor missile is fully compatible with the UK's future
SSBN. (Paragraph 179)
The Government fully recognises this issue, which
is why the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and
the President, signed on 7 December 2006, explicitly covered this
point. In his letter, the US President gave a clear undertaking
that any successor to the D5 system should be compatible with,
or be capable of being made compatible with, the launch system
for the D5 missile. More generally, the US also undertook to ensure
that the UK has the option to sustain an effective nuclear delivery
system for at least the life of our new class of ballistic-missile
carrying submarines.
32. We note the exchange of letters between the
Prime Minister and the US President, dated 7 December 2006—printed
in Annex 2 to this report—to effect collaboration in the
life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile delivery system.
Given this exchange of letters took place three days after the
publication of the White Paper and before debate in Parliament
about the replacement of submarine platforms to carry such missiles
beyond the life of the current Vanguard-class submarines, we look
to the Government to explain the effects, financial and otherwise,
of this exchange of letters agreeing the extension of this part
of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent system. (Paragraph 180)
There has been no formal commitment by the UK to
the Trident D5 life extension programme but it would have been
incoherent to ask Parliament to endorse the decision to procure
replacement submarines unless we had received an assurance from
the US that we could participate in the life extension programme.
That was the intention behind the inclusion of this issue in the
exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the US President.
It is also the case that we plan that life extended
Trident D5 missiles will be brought into service on the Vanguard-class
submarines towards the end of their lives. Participation in the
life extension programme is therefore important to enable us to
maintain the existing deterrent until the end of the planned operational
life of the Vanguard-class.
33. The Government says that decisions on a new
warhead will be required in the next Parliament. We call upon
the Government to state whether the cooperation it envisages with
the United States will include participation in the US Reliable
Replacement Warhead Programme and why the UK could not re-manufacture
warheads to the existing design. (Paragraph 182)
Any programme to design and build a replacement nuclear
warhead will be a UK national project. We will, however, continue
to work closely with the US in this area, and, as part of this,
explore the scope for collaboration between our future warhead
programmes as our respective future plans develop.
As the White Paper makes clear, decisions on whether
to refurbish or replace the existing warhead are likely to be
necessary in the next Parliament, and work will be undertaken
between now and then to review the optimum life of the existing
warhead stockpile and analyse the range of replacement options
that might be available. We also made clear that this work will
include activities to be undertaken with the US.
The refurbishment option would require the re-manufacture
of a number of warheads to the existing design, employing a combination
of new and recycled components. There will be a range of factors
that determine whether or not we decide to produce a warhead to
a new design, including cost and our ability to certify the warhead
stockpile in terms of safety and reliability. We will provide
more information to the Committee as it becomes available.
34. It would be helpful if the Government could
confirm whether the timetable we suggest is accurate or in what
respects it is wrong. (Paragraph 184)
The table of future decision-making at paragraph
184 broadly accords with our assessment, although we would not
be so definitive on the year in which the contract to build the
first new deterrent submarines will be placed. Also, and as set
out in the exchange of letters between the US President and the
Prime Minister, we would not at this stage wish to rule out that
the life of the Trident D5 missile might be further extended,
beyond the early 2040s.
35. If the White Paper's proposals to retain and
renew the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent are endorsed, it is
essential that the Government keep Parliament informed of the
progress of the submarine, missile and warhead programmes. We
expect Parliament to be consulted at each significant stage of
the programmes before major procurement decisions are made. (Paragraph
185)
In light of the further work which we will be undertaking,
there will necessarily be decisions to be made in future, and
the Government has made clear that it will be for future Governments
and Parliaments to determine the right form of Parliamentary scrutiny
and discussion of future decisions. In the meantime, the Government
will continue actively to support scrutiny of the programme as
it moves forward by the Defence Select Committee and the National
Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee.
36. The Government deserves to be commended for
exposing its proposal to renew the strategic nuclear deterrent
to public debate and decision in Parliament, which previous Governments
have not done. We look to the Government to inform the House of
Commons of any errors of fact or interpretation in this report,
before the debate in March. And we hope that the Government, and
the MoD in particular, will learn for the future that greater
transparency is to its own, as well as to the public, advantage.
(Paragraph 186)
This recommendation has been noted. We are pleased
that the Committee recognised the efforts that have been made
to ensure that this decision-making process has been as open and
well-informed as possible.
17 May 2007
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