Appendix 2: Interim Government response
Letter from the Secretary of State for Defence
to the Chairman of the Committee
I was very grateful that your Committee was able
to publish its report on the recent White Paper on the Future
of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent in good time before the debate and
vote on 14 March. This will be of great benefit to MPs as they
consider the issues in the coming week. With your agreement, I
am also making this letter public prior to the debate by means
of a Written Ministerial Statement.[1]
We will of course respond fully to the report in the usual way
in due course but I aim to address here the majority of issues
raised in the Committee's report and to clarify some minor points.
First, the table of future decision-making at para
184 broadly accords with our assessment, although we would not
be so definitive on the year in which the contract to build the
first new SSBN would be placed. Also, and as set out in the exchange
of letters between the US President and the Prime Minister, we
would not at this stage wish to rule out that the Trident D5 missile
might be further extended, beyond the early 2040s. Finally, Table
4 states that France maintains 3 deterrent systems, whereas in
fact they only retain 2: submarine launched ballistic missiles
and air-launched cruise missiles.
I would also wish to register three detailed points:
i. It would be helpful to clarify Table 8 on
costs and funding. The entries under "Decommissioning costs"
are included elsewhere within the estimates: they are not in addition
to the other figures.
ii. There is an inaccuracy in Table 1 which is
repeated in the second bullet of paragraph 9. We have said that
the one submarine normally on deterrent patrol carries up to 48
warheads. We have also said that the number of missiles on that
submarine is up to 16. But the 1998 Strategic Defence Review did
not limit the number of warheads to be carried per missile to
3 and neither is that constraint imposed now.
iii. Paragraphs 89 and 90 imply that NATO has
a policy of first use of nuclear weapons. This is not true. As
for the UK, NATO's policy is to maintain ambiguity by not ruling
in or ruling out the first use of nuclear weapons.
More detailed responses to your conclusions and recommendations
are set out in the attached Annex.
DES BROWNE
1 See HC Deb, 12 March 2007, col 1WS Back
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