ANNEX: Initial MoD response to the Defence Select
Committee's Report: "The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent: The White Paper"
Conclusion 7. Why are decisions required now on
participation in the Trident D5 life extension programme?
Conclusion 28. What are the total costs of UK
participation in the Trident D5 life extension programme?
Conclusion 32. What are the effects, financial
or otherwise, of the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister
and the US President agreeing UK participation in the Trident
D5 life extension programme before the parliamentary vote?
There has been no formal commitment by the UK to
the Trident life extension programme but it would have been incoherent
to ask Parliament to endorse the decision to procure replacement
submarines unless we had received an assurance from the US that
we could participate in the life extension programme. That was
the intention behind the inclusion of this issue in the exchange
of letters between the Prime Minister and the US President.
Subject to Parliament endorsing our decision, we
intend that this will be a joint programme with the United States.
We need to maintain this joint approach in order to achieve best
value for money. The intention is to refurbish the whole stockpile
of Trident D5 missiles by around 2020. In order to achieve this,
we need to commit this year to the procurement of some long-lead
items for the life extension programme.
We plan that life extended Trident D5 missiles will
be brought into service on the Vanguard-class submarines towards
the end of their lives. Participation in the life extension programme
is important to enable us to maintain the existing deterrent in
service until the end of its planned operational life.
The total costs to the UK of participation in the
Trident D5 life extension programme will be around £250M.
These costs are in addition to the standard annual running costs
for the Trident D5 missile are included in the calculation of
the overall running costs of the deterrent.
As the White paper indicated at paragraph 2-5, we
do not believe that further procurement of Trident D5 missiles
will be necessary through that missile's planned in-service life.
The exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and President
makes clear that one of the options for the future is jointly
to investigate the possibility of a further programme to extend
the life of the Trident D5 missile beyond the early 2040s to match
the life of the new class of submarines that we now plan to procure.
The possible costs, and technical feasibility, of a further life
extension programme are currently unknown.
Conclusion 11. How does the Government determine
what constitutes a minimum deterrent?
Conclusion 10. What is the operational significance
of the reduction in the number of UK nuclear warheads?
The White Paper made clear that we are committed
to retaining only the minimum capability necessary to deter potential
aggressors. The process by which we make an assessment of our
minimum deterrent requirements is described in paragraph 4-9 of
the White Paper. We make an assessment of the minimum destructive
capability that we need to be able to deliver in order to outweigh
the potential benefits a potential aggressor might believe they
would derive from an attack on our vital interests. This includes
an assessment of the decision-making processes of future potential
aggressors and of defensive measures that a potential adversary
might employ in an effort to reduce the impact of the UK's nuclear
capability.
We are not prepared to release precise details of
this assessment process because of the sensitive nature of the
analysis involved and to maintain ambiguity over the circumstances
in which we might consider use of our nuclear deterrent.
We have made clear that we will reduce the number
of operationally available warheads from fewer than 200 to fewer
than 160 in the course of this year. The significance of that
is that we will have reduced our number of operationally available
warheads by 20% and will then dismantle these warheads.
We believe that, by any measure, dismantling around
40 nuclear warheads demonstrates our continuing commitment to
reduce where possible our nuclear deterrent capabilities and to
set an example to other countries who hold nuclear weapons to
do likewise. It represents a further important step towards our
goal of a world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons.
We have also reduced the number of warheads deployed
on our single submarine on deterrent patrol. The Strategic Defence
Review announced a reduction from 96 to 48 warheads and we made
clear in the White Paper that 48 is now the upper limit on warhead
numbers rather than necessarily the actual number deployed.
Conclusion 13. The Government should be clearer
that ambiguity over the potential use of the UK deterrent does
not lead to a lowering of the threshold for nuclear use.
We are absolutely clear that there has not been any
reduction in the threshold at which we might contemplate use of
our nuclear deterrent. As we have made clear repeatedly, we would
only ever contemplate use in self defence (including the defence
of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme circumstances.
Conclusion 12. The Government should do more to
explain what the concept of deterrence means in today's strategic
environment.
The Defence Secretary covered this ground in more
detail than in the White Paper in his speech at Kings College
London earlier this year. He said:
There are some who …. argue that it is not the
threat but the concept of deterrence which is somehow outdated
and no longer relevant in a post-cold-war world.
I do not accept this. I think it is unfortunate that
the idea of deterrence has become so closely identified with the
cold war. In its simplest terms, deterrence is about dissuading
a potential adversary from carrying out a particular act because
of the consequences of your likely retaliation. This is not an
especially complex or unique concept. Nor does it have anything
inherently to do with nuclear weapons, or superpower blocs. Our
conventional forces are themselves a form of deterrent; they can
and do deter various different kinds of states and non-state actors
even in today's post-cold-war world.
The reality is that it is hard to be sure exactly
what capability will deter any particular threat. The best we
can do is aim to retain a broad spectrum of capabilities to enable
us to respond to a range of potential threats. But there is a
strong argument that nuclear weapons are unique in terms of their
destructive power, and as such, only nuclear weapons can deter
nuclear threats.
Paragraphs 3-6 to 3-12 of the White Paper describe
the range of future risks and challenges the Government has considered
in taking decisions on the future of the Trident system, and the
possible role we see for the UK's nuclear deterrent in managing
these potential future threats.
Conclusion 14. How does a reduced yield differ
from a sub-strategic role? Why was a sub-strategic role thought
necessary in 1998 but is no longer required?
Conclusion 15. How does this square with NATO
nuclear doctrine?
UK nuclear doctrine matches that of NATO. The UK's
nuclear weapons remain committed to the defence of NATO as before
and we will continue to participate fully in all aspects of NATO
nuclear policy and planning.
Ever since the Trident system came into service,
we have had some flexibility in the scale of any use of our nuclear
deterrent. This flexibility stems from an ability to vary the
number of missiles and warheads which might be used and the ability
to employ a reduced yield from our nuclear warhead. We plan to
retain this flexibility. We would not want any potential aggressor
to judge that they could act with impunity towards the UK because
they felt that we would be unwilling to deploy the maximum destructive
effect possible with the Trident system. Any legitimate use of
nuclear weapons would be in response to extreme circumstances
but, having a degree of flexibility in the potential scale of
its use makes our deterrent more credible against the range of
nuclear threats we may face in the future.
What has changed is the way in which we describe
this capability and this is where we currently differ slightly
from NATO terminology. We have previously described it as a sub-strategic
capability. But we have decided to cease using this term for the
simple reason that we believe any use of our deterrent will be
strategic in intent and in effect.
Conclusion 20. The Government should set out a
stronger narrative on the forward commitment of the Government
to achieve nuclear non-proliferation.
The Defence Secretary also set out the position in
detail during his evidence session with the Committee on 6 February:
Q386 Robert Key: Secretary of State, the United Kingdom
is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the White Paper
says that we are fully compliant with all our NPT obligations,
and the White Paper goes on, "Nevertheless, we will continue
to press for multilateral negotiations towards mutual balance
and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons". What is the
Government currently doing to press for those multilateral negotiations?
Des Browne: Mr Key, we not only say that; we actually
set out in some detail in a fact sheet and an annex to the White
Paper itself how we address our international legal obligations
and particularly the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, so there
is no need for me to read that. In summary, and we have set out
in the White Paper what we have done over the last ten years in
dismantling our maritime tactical nuclear capability and the RAF's
WE177 bomb, reduced the maximum number of operational warheads,
and our ambition is to reduce that further, and ceased production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We have in my view, and
I think this has been recognised even in evidence before this
Committee, a good record in living up to our international obligations
in this regard. For the future, we continue to support and we
have made progress in 13 practical steps towards the implementation
of Article VI agreed in 2000; we have ratified the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; we have increased our transparency by
publishing historical accounting records of our defence fissile
material holdings; we have pursued a widely welcomed programme
to develop expertise in methods and technologies that could be
used to verify nuclear disarmament; we have produced a series
of working papers culminating in a presentation to the 2005 NPT
Review Conference and, looking to the future, our priority remains
to press for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of
the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; we welcome the draft text
which the United States tabled last year; we are also concerned
whether to accept the very broad mandate proposed and agree to
open negotiations towards a treaty without delay, and we are also
actively engaged in the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism
but we will be playing a key and active role in shaping and contributing
to the forward-looking programme of this important new development.
That is all to be read in the context of what we have already
put into the public domain with the White Paper and in the accompanying
fact sheet.
The key point to note is that any route to a world
free from nuclear weapons must be a gradual and carefully managed
process, taken forward incrementally and verifiably, ensuring
we maintain balance, stability and security as we move forward.
Implicit in this is the fact that this is a multilateral process
and so we must also bring along our allies, friends and other
interlocutors throughout the process. We see the negotiation of
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as the next logical phase for
multilateral nuclear disarmament. This would be a positive step
forward and is one we are pursuing energetically.
On 22 February, FCO Minister of State Dr Kim Howells
gave a speech at the Conference on Disarmament reiterating the
UK's commitment to the principles and practice of multinational
nuclear disarmament and encouraging the multilateral community
to rise to the challenges of nuclear disarmament. A copy of the
speech is available on the FCO website.
Conclusion 22. The Government should set out in
more detail what were the comparative advantages of cost, range,
operation and invulnerability associated with cruise and D5 missiles.
This point was covered in detail in the information
sent to the Committee on 31 January, in which we said:
As for the option of cruise missiles launched from
submarines, we are clear that, in both cost and capability terms,
retaining the Trident D5 missile is by far the best approach.
A comparison between cruise and ballistic missiles is set out
in detail in Box 5-1 of the White Paper.
An option based on submarine-launched cruise missiles
would, like the option we have decided on, require the procurement
of new nuclear-powered submarines to fulfil the deterrent role,
as the existing conventional role submarine flotilla, and the
Astute class which will replace them, are required to undertake
other key defence tasks. Indeed, given that a much larger number
of cruise missiles, compared to Trident D5 missiles, would be
required to meet our minimum deterrence requirements, moving to
a deterrent based on submarine-launched cruise missiles could
well lead to a requirement for additional submarine hulls.
Because of the costs and capability disadvantages
of cruise missiles set out in the White Paper, we have not undertaken
a detailed analysis of what the requirement for submarine hulls
would be.
It is also the case that moving to a submarine-based
cruise missile solution would necessitate the procurement of new
nuclear-capable cruise missiles and also the development of a
new nuclear warhead suitable for use with a cruise missile, both
at considerable cost and technical risk. Thus, such an option
would have significant disadvantages in both cost and capability
terms compared with the option we have chosen.
Conclusion 25. The Government should make it clear
when it will be in a position to give more accurate cost estimates
and what work needs to be done to extend the life of the Vanguard
class by 5 years.
In evidence to the Committee on 6 February, we estimated
that the total costs for the 4-boat fleet of the planned life
extension programme would be in the hundreds of millions of pounds.
We will provide more detailed information to the Committee on
the work required and the associated costs as it becomes available.
Conclusion 33. Why could the UK not re-manufacture
warheads to the existing design?
As the White Paper makes clear, decisions on whether
to refurbish or replace the existing warhead are likely to be
necessary in the next Parliament. The refurbishment option would
require the re-manufacture of a number of warheads to the existing
design, employing a combination of new and recycled components.
There will be a range of factors that determine whether or not
we decide to produce a warhead to a new design, including cost
and our ability to certify the warhead stockpile in terms of safety
and reliability. We will provide more information to the Committee
as it becomes available.
9 March 2007
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