Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 160-179)

SIR PETER SPENCER KCB

10 OCTOBER 2006

  Q160  Robert Key: That is very good news. The Public Accounts Committee suggested that one option might be to break up the helicopters for spares, to cannibalise them. Is there any question of that or will all eight of them remain untouched?

  Sir Peter Spencer: At one stage we thought that might be an option. That was before we had defined what the fix was going to be. We now have good technical definition. We now know what the solution is. The discussion is how much we are going to pay for it and we would expect Boeing to cap our liabilities with a firm fixed price. I am not interested in getting drawn into a project which if it cannot be delivered we end up paying more and more and more money, which is where we were last time. So there is a very important point of balance to be struck here, of course not to delay the needs of the Armed Forces for a day longer than is necessary, but what we cannot do is to sign up to another bad contract. We are not arguing from a position of particular strength with a company which has a very large order book. As I have made it clear to them, as far as I am concerned, it is their reputation which is at stake here.

  Q161  Robert Key: Yes but there are other reputations too. I hope very much that you will manage to lay some ghosts to rest here because, of course, my constituents who work at Boscombe Down have been haunted for many years by what happened with the ZD576 Chinook on the Mull of Kintyre. It was of course the engineers at Boscombe Down who refused to certify that helicopter for flight which subsequently crashed. We will not go into that, but if we can now rebuild the reputation that you have mentioned that will be a very important side effect. The most important thing, however, is to get those Chinooks in service for the benefit of our troops.

  Sir Peter Spencer: Of course.

  Q162  Chairman: The consequence of these Chinooks being out of service is that the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq have a severe shortage of heavy lift. Is there in progress any thought of an interim solution to improve the heavy lift capacity that is available to both of these theatres?

  Sir Peter Spencer: To the best of my knowledge, and I am not as well briefed on this as others in the Ministry of Defence, the focus at the moment is looking at medium lift in the immediate term, but that does not discount anything in terms of acquiring additional items of inventory. The main thrust of the work of course is to manage the operations of the aircraft that we have got and to look at priorities for deployment of those aircraft between the two theatres.

  Q163  Mr Lancaster: Can we clarify what we mean by heavy lift, medium lift and rotary lift? Heavy lift I am thinking of Antonovs and C17s and things like that as opposed to medium lift, Hercules—

  Sir Peter Spencer: I thought we were talking helicopters.

  Mr Lancaster: It is relative.

  Q164  Chairman: So what sort of helicopters?

  Sir Peter Spencer: Heavy lift in my vocabulary is either a Chinook or a great big Sea Stallion or a big Sikorsky; medium lift is Merlin and Puma, those sort of things.

  Q165  Mr Holloway: How are plans progressing or indeed are there any to start using private contractors to do the water runs and mail runs in Afghanistan in order to let the military helicopters do a more military role?

  Sir Peter Spencer: We are looking at a range of options. One of the challenges of those sorts of arrangements is the liability issues in theatre. So until the requirement is clearer from the military customer precisely what he wants us to go and do, all I can do is to look at the proposals that come forward. Anything which is on a lease does give you quite severe challenges in terms of insurance and liabilities.

  Q166  Mr Holloway: But MI-17s cost a lot less, I guess, than Chinooks. On Chinooks how long would it take to magic up another six Chinooks from Boeing or anybody else? What are the options? If the Government decided we want six more Chinooks tomorrow, how long would tomorrow be?

  Sir Peter Spencer: A lot would depend on the extent to which when we engage with Boeing other customers, particularly the United States Army, were prepared to allow an order to be diverted. They are in production at the moment for the Green Fleet of Chinook Foxtrots. You could certainly theoretically go for a very rapid purchase but a lot of it depends on the availability of money, the willingness or the ability of that production line to be diverted and we have not, to my knowledge, approached Boeing with that question. If I am invited to do that then I will do so.

  Q167  Chairman: Do you take the Prime Minister's comments over the weekend as being the answer to the availability of funds?

  Sir Peter Spencer: I work inevitably to the process that it will be for the military to determine the priorities of what equipment they believe they actually need in theatre, the order in which they want it and the extent to which that money would be made available either outside the normal budget in support of operations from the Treasury through the national reserve or the extent to which we would have to look at the rest of the programme.

  Q168  Chairman: But surely if the Prime Minister meant anything he meant that if the need was there the money would be found?

  Sir Peter Spencer: That is going to be something which Ministers will have to determine. It is not for me to act on the basis of what I read in the newspaper what the Prime Minister has said. There does need to be, even allowing for the need for agility of response, somebody who is calling the direction, and that will come from the Secretary of State.

  Q169  Mr Hancock: Have you been approached to look at any method at all of improving the medium lift capability for our troops and have you been instructed to seek out a solution to that problem?

  Sir Peter Spencer: Have I been or will I be?

  Q170  Mr Hancock: Have you been?

  Sir Peter Spencer: The work is going on at the moment through the future rotorcraft capability team leader who is looking at the whole range of options. It is a pretty rapidly moving field at the moment, so there are a range of things which are being looked at from diverting from other sources to accelerating the programmes that we have already got.

  Q171  Mr Hancock: What sort of time-frames have you been instructed to work under for that?

  Sir Peter Spencer: I have not personally been given a time-frame to work under but the answers are being fed back to Ministers in real time in terms of what those options are and Ministers are engaged in it.

  Q172  Chairman: Sir Peter, I am a bit disappointed by what you are saying here because the Prime Minister said over the weekend that the troops can have anything they need, and the implication of your reply is that you are shoving it back into the negotiations between the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence, which have always been rather fraught. What does the Prime Minister's promise that the troops could have anything they need actually mean in practice?

  Sir Peter Spencer: I am not hiding behind the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury. I am just respecting the position I am in in terms of being accountable for the expenditure of public funds.

  Q173  Chairman: But did your heart leap when your heard what the Prime Minister said?

  Sir Peter Spencer: Yes of course, but somebody has to be the team leader and the team leader is the Secretary of State. That is not me opting out. If everybody rushes off in different directions and runs up their own particular wheeze, it does take quite a long time to sort it all out. I am absolutely clear that the Secretary of State is looking at the options which are available and are being costed and presented to him, and I am absolutely clear that he will implement those as fast as he is able to. How he gets that funded is something which he necessarily must agree with the Treasury. There is no basis on which the Ministry of Defence would go out without the Treasury having endorsed the expenditure of money; that is the way the process works.

  Q174  Chairman: So we can be confident, can we, that the Secretary of State would put into effect and give reality to the Prime Minister's words over the weekend?

  Sir Peter Spencer: I think you would have to ask the Secretary of State that himself.

  Q175  Chairman: Can we move on to HMS Astute. Recently the Committee visited BAE Systems in Barrow and Devonport Management Limited because we were looking at the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent and we saw HMS Astute, we saw HMS Ambush, and Astute was very nearly finished. Are you satisfied that the problems with the programme are now dealt with?

  Sir Peter Spencer: No, I am not.

  Q176  Chairman: What are the problems outstanding?

  Sir Peter Spencer: Well, to give credit where it is due, I think the leadership at Barrow has been outstanding under Murray Easton in terms—

  Q177  Chairman: I think we would agree with that.

  Sir Peter Spencer:— of the focus of his shipyard on the schedule and I think in terms of the progress in making the schedule is extremely encouraging. Our planning date is 2009 and he is determined to beat it and show us he can do it in 2008 and all of that I hugely applaud. The concerns I have got are that we have at the moment unlimited financial liability for boats two and three because we have not managed yet to agree the prices of boats two and three and we know that there have been problems in terms of rework in terms of the fragility of the supply chain, all of which continue to put up the financial pressures and I am extremely keen to bring this to a conclusion ideally before the end of this financial year because it is high time we did so. Now, we are making progress on that front because we now have got a much more detailed set of prices which are being offered up for negotiation. We have done a lot of independent assessment of that with the Pricing and Forecasting Group and we are now into the stage of negotiations which is very difficult to predict in terms of duration because there is a lot of money at stake. We then have to think about the rest of the programme and the ability to continue to build these submarines where we know the supply chain has taken a lot of damage because of the disruption to the early part of the build. Therefore, there is a lot of effort being put into drawing together across industry the right grouping of companies to look at boat four and the subsequent boats in that class to make sure that we get right the underlying drumbeat of the industry, that we nurture and make healthy again the supply chain and that we do not lose out on the key skills which are needed to do this very demanding work because it is probably the most complicated thing that anybody ever makes, a nuclear submarine.

  Q178  Mr Crausby: So does the lack of agreement on prices for boats two and three affect the second batch of submarines? It seems to me that it would be odd not to agree the prices on boats two and three, but agree a contract for further submarines.

  Sir Peter Spencer: Our approach is, as you would expect, that we necessarily must agree prices for two and three before we consider placing a contract for boat four, although in the nature of things we have not been absolutely literal about that because if we had not done anything regarding boat four, we would have already forgone the opportunity to have a boat four, so we have invested carefully in those long-lead items which are necessary to sustain the industry.

  Q179  Mr Crausby: So you see the next batch as just simply being boat four? The question is: how many would be in the next batch? Would you do this one at a time for boat four and boat five?

  Sir Peter Spencer: The decision has not yet been made and it is being worked through in the context of the Defence Industrial Strategy as to precisely how and when we will contract for them.


 
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